U.S. Sends More Troops to Iraq by Steve Almasy, Barbara Starr and Chelsea J. Carter, CNN
The United States has increased its military presence in Iraq, ordering 300 more troops to the violence-ravaged nation, the Pentagon announced Monday.
ISIS militants have "continued to pose a legitimate threat to Baghdad and its environs," a U.S. official told CNN. "We have seen them reinforce themselves around Baghdad enough to convince us more troops was the prudent thing to do."
The new troops, 200 of whom arrived Sunday and Monday, will provide security for the U.S. Embassy, the Baghdad airport and other facilities in Iraq, Pentagon spokesman Rear Adm. John Kirby said.
The deployment includes "a detachment of helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles, which will bolster airfield and travel route security," Kirby said in a written statement.
The airport is in western Baghdad about 12 miles (20 kilometers) by helicopter from the embassy in the capital's fortified Green Zone.
The 300 troops are in addition to 300 U.S. advisers who will help train Iraq's security forces. They will bring the total of American forces in Iraq to about 800 troops...
Comments
Bwilliams,
Indeed a great article and refreshing counter-balance to my bias. Thanks. I have been missing a lot of the fun of the Council blog post. Apparently, I do not have privileges to access that chat-boom and so I am indirectly posting here two quick questions to the Iraq string about the caliphate, etc. led largely by Outlaw-09, Dayuhan and Curmudgeon.
1. ¿Why can't the Shi´ites accept the concept of the Sunna and vice versa? Surely, after so many centuries, there are Sunnis who also have links back to the Prophet or his inner circle. ¿Would that not reconcile a doctrinal difference that is a 'red masgouf'?
2. ¿Is this whole extreme Islam against the infidels idea really an intellectual proxy for the much-feared (pre-Islam 1970s) rich vs poor conflict with people like bin-Laden being educated middle class malcontents in the vanguard? This is a question of where all this ends and what are the real ends.
bwilliams, not to slight your post, that article was interesting. One thought that crossed my mind, as I read through it (and forwarded it to my personal network via F.B.), was the feeling that the writer had made an implicit assumption that a partition would not be so bad, if it occurred peaceably over time.
That may be difficult to sustain because the Sunnis might be left out dry in a desert with no resources, a fate they may not accept quite so easily, with too much time and too few riches (unless there were mineral deposits discovered or an arrangement brokered to make Sunnistan the world's hub of solar power).
The article also reminded me of the concern raised by a close friend who helped negotiate the 2008 agreement. He had said, much to my disbelief at the time (because I deemed the P.M. too much a fuzzy wuzzy), that al-Maliki wanted to be a dictator. Perhaps, as the article implies, al-Maliki has leaned heavily on Iran, more to consolidate his power than because of a sectarian agenda. So, encore une fois, thanks!
I thought this was a decent read. The point on Maliki is key. The other major Shiite parties are both more hostile to the former regime and more sympathetic to Iran.
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/07/why-iraq-is-more-stable-…
Why Iraq Is More Stable Than You Think
By DOUGLAS A. OLLIVANT
Consider the following statement -- from Ambassador Kirkpatrick re: Nicaragua and Somoza cir. 1979 -- and see if you see any parallels to the arguments being made re: Iraq and Maliki today:
"When he says that 'the Somoza regime lost the confidence of the people,' the President (Carter in this case) implies that the regime had previously rested on the confidence of 'the people,' but that the situation had now changed. In fact, the Somoza regime had never rested on popular will, but instead on manipulation, force, and habit, and was not being ousted by it. It was instead succumbing to arms and soldiers. However, the assumption that the armed conflict of Sandinistas and Somozistas was the military equivalent of a national referendum enabled the President to imagine that it could be, and should be, settled by the people of Nicaragua. For this pious sentiment even to seem true, the President would have had to be unaware that insurgents were receiving a great many arms from other non-Nicaraguans; and that the U.S. had played a significant role in disarming the Somoza regime."
Likewise today -- and as relates to Iraq and Maliki -- should we understand:
a. That the Maliki regime has not lost the confidence of the Iraqi people; this, because the Maliki regime never rested on popular will but, instead, on the manipulations and force of the government of the United States et al.
b. That now that American-plus military might has been withdrawn, the Maliki regime is succumbing -- again not to popular will -- but, instead, largely to the manipulations, arms and soldiers arriving from other countries.
c. This suggesting that what we are seeing in Iraq today (much as was the case with Nicaragua cir. 1979) is (1) not "the equivalent of a national referendum" and (2) not "something that should be settled by the people of Iraq" but, instead, is
d. A contest of wills between (1) those who seek to transform the political, economic and social structures of various states and societies (to wit: the former USSR then; the United States today) and (2) those who seek to preclude/deny such transformations.
In the case of Nicaragua then, it was the United States that (finally) decided to play the spoiler role re: the expansionist agenda of the former USSR.
In the case of Iraq (and, indeed, Afghanistan, Syria, Libya, Egypt, etc.), today it would seem that it is the Islamists (with tacit approval and assistance by such nations as China, Russia and Iran?) who have determined that they will deny the United States its expansionist objectives.
Given this more-accurate characterization of these conflicts (a contest between [1] the expansionist United States and [2] those that would deny such expansions), now let us ask the question:
Should the United States send more troops to Iraq?
Ned--there was a recent article floating around in the net quoting Casey who stated it had been in fact the Shia who bombed the mosque with AQI taking the credit.
I have not for the life of me be able to find that article anywhere outside of the one article quoting him as having said the statement---it was unusual as Casey has remained largely quiet on Iraq after he left. but he would have been in a position that certainly would have access to HUMINT/SIGINT confirming his alleged bombing comments.
Thank you, Outlaw-09.
The exiled V.P. seems to be saying what Kilcullen ought to be saying, that these Sunnis in Iraq are largely 'accidental guerillas'. If Iraq can move quickly toward a Constitutional Convention, drafted largely by the sheiks (as the land-owners), then marked up by Parliament with the conference report subject to referendum and set up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to hold Bayan Jabr, al Maliki et al. accountable to Shi´ites and Sunnis (and Kurds) alike, there is still some hope that the Iraqi Sunnis will flush out I.S. as a newly imported crime-wave to be eradicated by community policing, much as the Sons of Iraq did in 2008. But that would only proceed with something like:
1. Maliki out;
2. the Shi´ites politicos who started the revenge-war of ten years ago exiled, in jail or, at least, under house arrest;
3. the sheiks in with Constitution crafted to Iraqi culture set to evolve over time much as British Constitutionalism did in the nineteenth century; as well as,
4. the Kurds seeking and getting a nested autonomy with the Kurdish area of Turkey and, eventually, the enclaves of Syria and Iran.
Nested autonomy would permit free passage between various Kurdish areas while national borders are maintained. That would permit national interests to be preserved and Kurdish identity to be respected. Essentially, the Kurds would have two passports and be dual citizens. The devil would be in the details. But that is what courage and vision are for--staying power. But, for God's sake, no more James Madison wannabe-newbies from law school in the foreign service doing things "the way they are done"...
What is missing here is what was missing in 2010: the willingness to confront difficult issues and even more difficult personalities head-on.
Lastly, I am reading many references to the bombing of the Golden Mosque in 2006 by A.Q.I. When I returned in late 2007, many old hands told me that Jabr had ordered the bombing to be executed by Shi´ite police officers to loot the gold inside the mosque (and to create the pretext for the genocide narrowly averted by the Surge and the Awakening). The people who told me tended to impress me as being chock-fool of bravado and bromide (another, less savory 'B' word ties these two together well). Any resonance out there with that rumor?
Robert Jones would say ---the current problem in Iraq is the lack of the rule of law and good governance.
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/07/08/iraq-s-vice-president-…
Taken from the above link:
“I can assure you a widespread spectrum of groups participated in what happened in Mosul. The media is focusing on ISIS,” he said. “They are influential and empowered on the ground and they are participating in this armed revolution. But we shouldn’t be blamed for that.”
The Maliki government reneged on its promises to build an inclusive government with the Sunnis as soon as the American troops left Iraq, Hashimi said, and went after Sunni moderate leaders even though those leaders had led the Sunni awakening in 2008 that resulted in extremist groups leaving Iraq in the first place.
“We managed to clean up our territories, especially Anbar, and we put an end for a time to he extremists. But Nouri al-Maliki, instead of involving the Sunni moderates, he attacked them, starting with me,” said Hashimi. “There are two sides, the extremists and moderates. If you target the moderates, you intentionally create a vacuum that could be filled by the extremists and that’s exactly what happened.”
As former U.S. official in Iraq Ali Khedery wrote in The Washington Post, the U.S. policy during the crucial years following the 2008 Sunni awakening was to place faith in Maliki to build an inclusive system rather than use American influence to support other political actors.
WaPo link:
http://m.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-we-stuck-with-maliki--and-lost…
Hashimi said that the Obama administration was repeating that mistake again by sending U.S. advisers and equipment to shore up the Iraqi military and considering U.S. military force against Sunnis inside Iraq. He urged the U.S. to stay out of the conflict.
“It’s a really annoying development. The U.S. is in the process of committing itself into another set of grave mistakes. Definitely we consider all this military support to Nouri al-Maliki an alliance with Iran against the Arab Sunnis,” he said. “Try to avoid any use of military means, try to be fair, try to diffuse the bomb by asking Nouri al-Maliki to immediately to establish a caretaker government. Try to be neutral at least.”
And don’t expect another Anbar awakening this time around, Hashimi warned. The Sunni tribes still remember what happened last time and they are not going to make the same mistake of expelling the extremists and thereby leaving themselves vulnerable to Shiite forces.
“Nobody from the Arab Sunnis are ready to repeat the same experience of 2008, no way. But if we establish a real state in Baghdad, extremism will be over, I assure you.”
“The U.S. ethically is still in charge of our security, our stability and preventing interference from foreign countries, whether neighboring countries or far away countries, it is still the responsibility of the U.S.,” he said. “Transparency, human rights, no corruption, justice, no interference. All of these values have been talked about nicely but nobody has pressed the government on which have been achieved and which have failed. That is the role of the United States.”
More from Ambassador Kirkpatrick:
“No idea holds greater sway in the mind of educated Americans than the belief that it is possible to democratize governments, anytime and anywhere, under any circumstances.” “Decades, if not centuries, are normally required for people to acquire the necessary disciplines and habits. In Britain, the road [to democratic government] took seven centuries to traverse.” “The speed with which armies collapse, bureaucracies abdicate, and social structures dissolve once the autocrat is removed frequently surprises American policymakers.”
Indeed.
Kirkpatrick, in her famous 1979 "Dictatorships and Double Standards" article, provided in my comment above, seems to have associated the "loss" of China, Cuba, Vietnam, Angola, Iran, and Nicaragua with these such American difficulties.
If she were alive today, would she -- based on our latest mistakes along these lines -- now add, for example, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Libya, and Egypt to this list?
Ned, Outlaw, et al:
I read this again recently.
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/dictatorships-double-standard…
"In each of these countries, the American effort to impose liberalization and democratization on a government confronted with violent internal opposition not only failed, but actually assisted the coming to power of new regimes in which ordinary people enjoy fewer freedoms and less personal security than under the previous autocracy–regimes, moreover, hostile to American interests and policies."
"Yet despite all the variations, the Carter administration brought to the crises in Iran and Nicaragua several common assumptions each of which played a major role in hastening the victory of even more repressive dictatorships than had been in place before. These were, first, the belief that there existed at the moment of crisis a democratic alternative to the incumbent government: second, the belief that the continuation of the status quo was not possible; ..."
Consider this against the Wolfowitz comment I provided below:
"Our friends in Israel tell us that the Palestinian intifada is exacting an insupportable economic and human burden. Our friends in Saudi Arabia tell us that they are sitting on a fundamentalist powder keg. The status quo is not an option. Imaginative new approaches are needed. The unelected governments comprising the Arab League must be persuaded to reform, to embrace democratic pluralism, by force if necessary."
Ambassador Kirkpatrick --the realist -- provides us with a proper understanding.
But the idealists (in both parties) do, on occasion, prevail against such logic, examples and rationale.
Wherein we, and the populations involved, seem to pay a heavy price indeed.
1. When Biden said it, there wasn't any alternative. 2. Doesn't the fact that Biden would "bet [his] vice presidency Maliki will extend the SOFA" indicate that the Administration wasn't hell bent on getting out?
Again, I would love to know what the coalition that elects Allawi comes from. How does he get the numbers to become PM? Maliki could have been replaced, but it was by someone that would have been worse for the US. Adil Abdul-Mahdi clearly had the best shot of becoming PM after the 2010 election.
Ned---Tom Ricks carried this as Biden's comments concerning the author of the article I linked to.
Wonder if Biden would say the same thing again.
The Washington Post has just put online a blockbuster article on how Maliki rose to power in Iraq. It is one of the best things I have ever read on the role played by the U.S. in Iraq.
The article is partly a mea culpa by Ali Khedery, who was the longest serving American official in Iraq until he resigned in 2010, disgusted with Maliki, and indeed with his own role in helping Maliki become prime minister. But by September of that year, he had decided he was wrong about Maliki. He pleaded with Vice President Biden to dump Maliki. He says Biden declined, saying that there was no alternative to Maliki. Biden added, "I'll bet you my vice presidency Maliki will extend the SOFA."
Ned---
While we watch the activities of the IS in Iraq do not forget their activities in Syria--this is interesting oil article as it ties into a NYT article on the IS Syrian/Iraqi strategic strategy.
Currently the IS through the declaration of the Caliphate has created effectively a new Sunni State complete with oil reserves and revenue streams so the argument that the Sunni's in Iraq can not sustain themselves is actually false from the IS perspective---they are in fact right now in this time and space a viable state.
Then if you take the statement by al Hamdun that the Sunni's are ready to declared themselves independent of Baghdad if Malaki does not increase the number of Kurds and Sunni's in the government and allow a Sunni federated region.
http://www.arabnews.com/news/596796
Ned---you hit two items that are very correct;
1. look at the Iraqi Constitution ---it was written by the US not Iraqi's---if one really looks at that period even Sistani was complaining about it but stayed quiet because he wanted the 2005 elections to occur--we should have had the Iraqi's write it--right now they have become actual experts on how to use a US designed constitution to delay, to void/avoid and or how to become a dictator all in the name of legality based on the "constitution"---kind of like what we are seeing in the US Congress currently---does make one wonder.
2.---will give an excellent example of how wrong we were about WMD and how I know it was the "core" reason and how we knew there was none to begin with even before we went in-so it was no surprise when it was not there.
We picked up on a tip an AQI cell leader of a violent cell inside Baqubah---I was one of the first civilian interrogators that taught raid teams how to take and recover evidence for analysis in 2005 for intel purposes (the rest of the Army how no earthly idea about evidence).
One of the pictures of the individual had him getting a high civilian military award straight from the hands of Saddam---it turned out that he was the "father" of the Iraqi liquid missile fuel program---remember the UN picked up about 65 liquid fueled missiles that had way to long a range and destroyed them?--he was the reason.
Now if he had been in Berlin in the Cold War days they would have flown him to the States along with a US passport---response in Iraq ABSOLUTELY no interest by the national level IC---that told me they already knew thus no further interest---so if they were that informed about the missile technology then they "knew nothing else"?
Still hear no politician/President from that 2003 period---state to the US population when our OCO costs will be repaid by Iraqi oil which was all over the headlines then.
Bill,
You and I differ on one, very fundamental point. Whereas you see cultural socialization as more determinate than human nature on what works among people and societies, I believe there are certain universal desires or aspirations. Call them political archetypes.
What Iraq needs to do if she is to have a chance of surviving is hold a new Constitutional convention for a social contract befitting of Iraqis and not one hammered out by arrogant Americans educated one year too many and under-schooled one culture too little.
That is to say: President Bush was -- is -- right. Liberty does live in the breast of most every man. Where your ideas of intrinsically different schemata and values, socialized since birth, holds its currency is how that fundament manifests in a practical polity.
In 2005, when the Constitution was being drafted, it was taking shape as an American brokered -- ¿broken? -- compact as equally out-of-touch as AMB Bremer's temporary predecessor. One evening I made a case with the brainiac bubble-heads that there be a House of Lords.
In this upper house would sit the sheiks of the sixty largest tribes in Iraq, with six seats to rotate among the smaller tribes. This chamber would harness two large cultural forces inside Iraq: tribes (Sunni, Kurdish, Shi´te or mixed).
The House of Lords would also tap Iraqi affinity for her British past. Like it or not, British colonial oversight left an enduring, and a largely endearing, imprimatur on Iraq. That means officers trained at Sandhurst, accounting systems derived colonial standards, etc.
Combined with that upper house would be a strong executive with a one term limit (much like the French Fifth Republic with its Gaullist bent). The best and the brightest laughed me out of the room. My ideas may well have failed also, no doubt, but they took the Iraqi psyche seriously.
Now is the time for Iraq to be Iraq, on her own terms. Partition is not a solution since Sunnis will literally be left out in the desert. If your view is correct, Bill, what do you suggest as a U.S. action now? ¿Nothing? Wouldn't that make us accessories after one fiction and before another fracture?
Here is where I agree with you, Bill. Something much bigger may be in play, here. That is the possibility of the "future north-south conflict" between rich and poor nations, oft cited in the 1970s prior to the rise of extreme Islam.
That latter phenomenon may not have been superseded but coöpted by global jihad against the West. Democracy or, better put, liberty will come to the Middle Eastern countries tyrannized by tottering, corrupted dictatorships. But in a form suited the history and culture. It will take twenty years to get there.
Wolfowitz:
"The Middle East is a region of great strategic interest to the U.S. The security of Israel is a core commitment of the U.S. and access to Middle East energy resources is a vital strategic interest. Yet the region is highly unstable and successive attempts at intervention by past American administrations have come to nothing. Our friends in Israel tell us that the Palestinian intifada is exacting an insupportable economic and human burden. Our friends in Saudi Arabia tell us that they are sitting on a fundamentalist powder keg. The status quo is not an option. Imaginative new approaches are needed. The unelected governments comprising the Arab League must be persuaded to reform, to embrace democratic pluralism, by force if necessary. The second step will be a reinvigoration of the peace process."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rationale_for_the_Iraq_War (see the section on "Neoconservative Rationale")
It appears that "democracy," "forced" if necessary, and other western "reforms" were seen as the solution to all the Middle East's problems. (And, indeed, the solution to the world's problems.)
Religion? Just one of the problems that democracy, and other western reforms, were expected to handle -- with ease.
Where this "rationale" falls apart -- within their understanding I would suggest -- is just what "forced democracy" actually meant.
Herein, it did not just mean "regime change" -- but also massive follow-through -- requiring occupation and assistance on a scale and time-frame similar to or greater than that of the US involvement in Japan and Germany following WWII.
And that was more than anyone (especially the NEOCONs), post-the end of history, had thought would be needed?
Outlaw-09,
As always, very well documented and argued. I would like to submit my answers to your first four points:
"1.The argument to get the US into Iraq was basically one massive lie as we the US "wanted" to beat up on anything that was "Islamic" due to 9/11"
NED: certainly a scratch-n-sniff motive underlying all my arguments at the time; I freaked out a soon to be ex-girlfriend by saying, "This stop Kabul, next stop Baghdad" just a month or two after 9-11. Truthfully, I had never heard of the Alliance for a New American Century or neocons; just my hot celtic blood and thick celtic cranium. This is why I say I may burn in Hell for supporting the invasion.
"2. President Bush was adamant about WMD just as he and the VP were adamant we were going to be repaid our costs via oil because we 'liberated' Iraq from Saddam"
NED: bad intelligence supporting a reasonable concern. In 1991, Americans arriving in Baghdad were surprised to find that Iraq had been 3-5 years away from developing nuclear weapons. By 2003, it had been five years since international inspectors had been in Iraq. The concern over chemical weapons was legitimate after Hussein's 1988 attack in Kurdistan. Scott Ritter wrote a convincing refutation in 2002 or 2003 of this contention. Personally, I split the difference: if Saddam had these weapons he had the proven disposition to use them. Must be HONEST here: I did wonder at the time 'What if it turns out that Hussein was bluffing, not to rile us but to deter Iran...'
"3. Once we got there we had virtually no idea then what to do and we the US sent in civilians who further caused damage for the lack of understanding of the ME and yes religion"
NED: At the time, I felt that if we 'what-if' this policy to death, we'll never do it. Notice the implicit decision to invade in that reasoning. Turns out we invaded a straw-bogeyman based on half a PhD thesis for which Paul Wolfowitz received a whole doctorate.
"4.I would argue that someone in the WH gave DoD the implicit orders to start a drawdown in 2006"
NED: I agree in retrospect, though I did not get it at the time. In mid-2005, at MNSTCI HQ, we were informed that all sustainment costs were to transfer to Iraqi security forces in three months. That never came close to occurring thanks in part to stupid civilians more intent on preserving their prerogatives and showboating themselves across the Embassy. The desire to transfer such responsibilities by FYE 2005 (i.e., 9/30) does support the inference you have made.
On the religion point: of course there were enlightened people inside the USG, like you, who foresaw this complication. They likely reported it, at times passionately, up their respective chains. I would guess these wise counsels hit a brick-wall among minions one or two levels below the gang-of-four (i.e., Vice President Cheney; Secretary Rumsfeld; as well as, Messrs Feith and Wolfowitz) due to the age-old bureaucratic subterfuge of 'managing up'. For my part, I was oblivious or nearly so of these subtleties at the time, unfortunately.
I confine these answers to me to avoid implicitly pointing a finger at others and to lay out the perspective, flawed and incomplete, of a John Q. Public. As always, I salute your service to my country; I also often wonder what is so bad about saying, "We blew it..."
http://nedmcdletters.blogspot.com/2012/07/old-letter-from-march-2003.ht…
Ned---this is where I disagree for the following reasons;
1.The argument to get the US into Iraq was basically one massive lie as we the US "wanted" to beat up on anything that was "Islamic" due to 9/11
2. President Bush was adamant about WMD just as he and the VP were adamant we were going to be repaid our costs via oil because we "liberated " Iraq from Saddam
3. Once we got there we had virtually no idea then what to do and we the US sent in civilians who further caused damage for the lack of understanding of the ME and yes religion
4.I would argue that someone in the WH gave DoD the implicit orders to start a drawdown in 2006--why because Gen. Casey started the planning of a drawdown by repositioning of 11 BCTs---meaning he gave them ever larger AORs and calculated that for every reorg of an AOR it would get him 1 BN so therefore 11 BNs could come out thus a de facto drawdown of approximately 4 BCTs which would have been a large drawdown for that period and Bush could have claimed credit politically.
Here is the issue---the AQI and the Sunni insurgency monitored all US movements 24X7 and noticed as well the "thinning of the troops" coupled with an expanded AOR and Zarqawi not being dumb knew the implications.
I firmly still believe the ethnic cleansing he started was designed to keep US targets on the ground for years of protracted ground fighting which it in fact did do.
I was in those Staff reorg meetings at the BCT level and that is where Casey was headed---then the ethnic cleansing started but not in the surge period ---actually in mid to late 2005 it started ---and not by Zarqawi but by the Shia ahead of the 2005 elections. The bombing of the Samarra mosque was after a series of Shia ethnic attacks on Sunni's in Diyala province.
Zarqawi saw what was developing and he rode it and he got far more US targets on the ground---look at the spike in US wounded and killed for that period and then look at the period 2003-2005.
So I am not convinced there was a "victory" in 2008 on our part---all we did in the surge period was to separate two religious killing machines which we call ethnic cleansing by placing concrete barriers and check points ie via the Irish solution.
To have gone into the ME with boots on the ground and not reflected on the religious side should have caused a President to be fired---the two things that have always driven the ME is in fact religion and hegemony regional conflict and we "overlooked " this?
Outlaw-09,
Many things about the invasion were not foreseen or deliberately overlooked in 2003; such oversights are fairly common in the run-up to a war. Not foreseeing the religious conflict -- perhaps most dire in its longer-term implications -- was less an oversight or a failure to foresee something as it was a blind-spot in Western thinking. This type of religious conflict that we see today had taken place in Europe some three four hundred years earlier, before the glorious, American and industrial revolutions. We did not foresee these conflicts because the world-view of the West (i.e., viewing international affairs as the exclusive province of nation-states) precluded their detection (and integration into pre-war planning).
Nevertheless, I credit President Bush for a surge that won the war in Iraq in 2008 and prevented a sectarian genocide there. Sadly, through a failure to exert influence in 2010 (though the necessity of such influence was not necessarily an easy issue to foresee) and a pattern of 'ostrichism' with respect to Poland in 2009, Syria in 2012 and Ukraine today, the fruits of that hard-earned U.S. victory have been allowed to spoil by the current Administration.
Ned---the interesting thing about the Caliphate being called out by Baghdadi is that in the Koran and comments made by Mohammed to his earlier followers just about anyone can call himself the Caliph ---am surprised that the KSA did not know this so in fact Baghdadi even beat the Wahhabi's to the punch especially since the KSA views themselves as the defenders of the two cities and leaders of the Sunni faith.
Baghdadi is taking this seriously---he held Friday Prayers as the new Caliph in the Great Dome in Mosul---he fully understands how one uses symbols in the Islamic world. The video even made the Iraqi News which is a government voice piece.
http://www.iraqinews.com/features/urgent-video-isis-releases-abu-bakr-a…
Part of this problem is that Mohammed did not anticipate having to name someone to follow him since he had no son as an heir and the details on how to select a follow on leader are kind of vague to say the least.
And historically if one looks at Islam three of the first four leaders were killed in office.
So what we are seeing in Iraq is just a further play out of Islamic history. Just as we are seeing the Shia/Sunni divide play out on top of a regional hegemony fight.
And the former President, his advisors and the DoD in 2003 did not understand this nor foresee this?
This is the single question that has to be answered in light of the last 11 years---why was this not foresee?
Ned---Iranian pilot killed in Iraq---maybe he got hit by one of "unarmed" drones being used by our "none boots on the ground" advisors.
http://news.yahoo.com/iranian-pilot-killed-fighting-iraq-state-media-10…
Bwilliams---an extremely detailed article on how we got involved with Malaki by the US government official pushing the US towards Malaki in 2006.
Now this same US official though in 2010 was trying to get the US government to distance itself from Malaki which is exactly what I have been trying to get you to understand---the evidence was there that with him the ship would go under---but not a word out of this WH---it was the ticket home thing that drove this WH not events playing out now that were put into play by the previous President.
This article is really worth the read and then going back and looking at the public open source media reporting during that period.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-we-stuck-with-maliki--and-lo…?
Why is it so hard to answer rather simple questions? Of course culture will matter in forming a government. It always does. However, structure also matters. Again, who would be Allawi's coalition partners? How does American OPEN support aid in gaining the numbers needed?
Lets not forget the third largest list was the National Iraqi Alliance, which was the list that of Maliki's Islamic Dawa Party. During this election Maliki formed another list, The State of Law Coalition, but they would later reunite in the National Allience. They had 70 votes. When put together, they had 159 votes, which is enough to form a government.
Bw---here I go again yes there were numbers but numbers are only numbers in the Arab power games.
Check Google--there is an old Arab math concept that states two plus two actually equals five---check it out---goes to the heart of Arab negotiations. Actually in a conversation with a young Emir of Ansar al Sunnah---he pointed this theory out to me.
But if an "certain" unspoken participant sits on the sidelines and their hands and says nothing then in fact four plus four becomes ten. Then the Arab assumption run wild---and believe me Iraqi's love rumors.
By not saying and or uttering a single disdaining statement to what was ongoing during that time we the US effectively in an "unspoken" sign language stated "we want Malaki".
The question is why?---my answer--- we meaning the WH wanted out of Iraq at all costs---both from a personal view point of this President as well as from his political statements and political posturing.
One can twist the numbers of who won and or who lost---Arabs negotiate always and sometimes especially in Iraq when one party the US has 60K troops on the ground then one does in fact have a "voice" in the game.
Problem was we the US but more so the President had no "game plan" ie an exit strategy other than to just get out---which is not a really good strategy as we can now see.
So why is it so hard for the US to stand up and assume responsibility for the failure in 2010 to form an inclusive government.
Bw---was not that inclusive government the reason we were sold in order to go into Iraq in the first place after the WMD argument?
Why is it so hard for the US and it's military and civilian leadership to state ---hey we blew it? Once one fully understands the foul up only then can a foreign policy move forward without being a clumsy rebuild with every new world event because that is what our current foreign policy looks like to the world.
Like a 18 year old plumber making the 75th repair to the same set of pipes do you not think?
Simple questions. After the 2010 election, the Iraqi National Movement had 91 seats, State of Law Coalition had 89 seats, the National Iraqi Alliance had 70 seats, Kurdistan Alliance had 43 seats, smaller parties had the rest. 163 seats are needed for a majority.
1. How does the Iraqi National Movement achieve a stable coalition to form a government? In other words, how do they keep and hold 163 votes.
2. How does open American support help them in this process?
Bwilliams--here is where we differ and maybe it comes from being around the UW/IW world to long.
1. the concept of turning power back in 2005 to the Iraqi's was ill constructed and basically flawed causing some of these problems until today-again a question of who was making the US decisions ---those few who knew nothing in the Green Zone or those few back in the WH who never had a strategy must less and exit strategy
2. you are correct it was two votes ahead---but here is the difference---the Sunni tribes went all in and turned out a large vote as they were going to give it a honest attempt after blockading in 2005---and Allawi was secular Shia on top of it---had the US even uttered a word or visibly gotten involved then the coalition would have perked up and been motivated to make a move---and here is the BUT---nothing came out of the WH--Malaki saw the US hesitation and assumed correctly we would not care since we wanted in the end to leave---check all the media reporting from that timeframe--the election was the key event on the planned road to leave
Sometimes action regardless of how big or little sets the tone for follow on events---we set no tone because IMO we wanted out in 2010 and what many still do not fully understand is that Casey wanted out in 2006 and there was planning going on in 2006 to do a drawdown.
By the way never talked about in SWJ or in the US media.
Here was the problem---Zarqawai watched the US like a hawk and saw the repositioning that was taking place in preparation of that withdrawn and cranked up the force not only locking us in but getting more "targets" sent to Iraq.
Iraq is, has been,and always will be a place of perceptions actually the entire ME is one big perception game and it did not matter who was winning or losing---it was the perception that counted.
In 2010 we could have "set" the perception on the ground, but this WH chose otherwise because it wanted out.
By the way international relations is actually one big game of perceptions ie check the Russians and Chinese strategies and one sees it clearly being played currently in the China Sea area and in the Ukraine.
Right now Iraq is de facto split and will remain that way for good--this NYT article confirms it---just read the Kurdish demands-Malaki will never give in to them as his perception of that would be a serious loss to the Shia again his perception--Kirkuk was the key for them and who helped them get it--- the Sunni's.
Also check the NYT article from yesterday on the IS Two Rivers Campaign from Syria to Iraq--from say a military planning perspective---a genius of a ground strategy that is working brilliantly up to now if you ask me.
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/04/world/middleeast/kurdish-officials-do…?
Again it is all about perceptions nothing more nothing less. And we the US do not play perceptions well as that is not in our political DNA.
He didn't "win" the election. The Iraqi National Movement won two more seats in the election then Maliki's party. Either party still had to form a coalition. In forming a government, Maliki was better positioned to serve as PM under a coalition from the start. His major benefit was that he was willing to give into demands of other parties to create a government. Which is pretty logical, given that Allawi actually did want a unified government. Maliki quickly gave into Kurdish demands, for example. It is important to note that the Iraqi National Movement did become part of the government, but it quickly started to break apart. The collection of parties under the Iraqi National Movement was always unstable. It is doubtful they would have held together even if Allawi became PM. Again, this is actually a story about them and not us.
That said, what about US policy? You state that the WH did not support Allawi. Open support by the White House would have doomed him form the start. His connections to the US were already a political liability to him. In fact, any open support for anyone in the Iraqi election would hurt that party. What option are you suggesting the US should have taken in 2010?
Bwilliams--I am not the only one pointing out WH issues right now.
Michael Doran, a former senior director at the National Security Council and a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, told Business Insider that the Obama administration needs to stifle both Iran and ISIS's regional strategies if it wants a comprehensive solution to the problems wracking Syria and Iran. In his view, the U.S. needs to avoid taking a side in the region's larger Sunni-Shiite split — now encapsulated in the fight between Shiite Iran and its Iraqi clients, and Sunni extremists like ISIS — and work to curtail all of the region's bad actors.
"If you want to build up a non-jihadi Sunni force that is capable of commanding loyalty from people on the ground then you have to fight Assad and push against Iran, and you push back against ISIS and Iran at the same time," he said. "If you're just fighting ISIS then you're building an Iranian security system in the region."
U.S. policy could have this effect even if it isn't the Obama administration's intent to strengthen Iran's hand. Even simply coordinating intelligence with a sectarianized and Iranian-infiltrated Iraqi military could play to Tehran's advantage.
"The Iraqis are a thin membrane between the U.S. and the Qods Force," says Doran, referring to the foreign arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. "Any intelligence that we give to the Iraqis is probably going to be on the desk of Qassem Suleimani in less than a day."
With this increased commitment of U.S. military assets to Iraq, the U.S. isn't just forcing itself to coordinate logistics with the Iranian-Syrian-Russian alliance in the Middle East. It's also bringing American policy alarmingly close to that of some of the region's more destructive forces — whether Obama intends for this or not.
This last sentence is a telling sentence in the lack of a WH strategy which has been missing in the ME since 2001.
Bwilliams---will flip the argument around -once it was realized that the SOFA could not get signed and nor would it be signed which every tea leaf reader in the ME was actually saying in their media which I never understood why the US media never heard it --but the WH did and that played into a elegant "get out of Dodge card" for this WH.
The core argument is that while we had what in 2010 about 60K still on the ground in and around Baghdad and the moderate secular Alawi had won the 2010 election we "allowed" then Malaki to maneuver his way into the PM's position without a single word originating out of this WH which had Alawi taken the post Iraq would have had an "inclusive" government.
This President does not have the heart for combat and or anything related to it including economic sanctions declared as red lines on the Ukraine which have all been crossed in the last six days nor red lines say in Syria---which if occurred would have gotten some attention by those we wanted to get their attention.
Here is also another problem with this WH---the first announcement of troops going back in was to be 300 and that was all it was to be---then another 300 were announced and on top of those still in Iraq we are currently at 1000 and counting---and that is what "not boots on the ground"?
This WaPo article from today is setting the stage to return US combat troops to Iraq--so who the "outside help to be"--the Iranians or better the Russians or maybe the Chinese since 10,000 Chinese workers are in Baghdad.
Iraqi security forces are probably incapable of retaking large swaths of territory seized by Sunni insurgents in recent weeks without outside help, the Pentagon’s top leaders said Thursday as they sketched a bleak assessment of turmoil in the country.
Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and Army Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said at a news conference that U.S. commanders are still considering what potential military courses of action they will recommend to the White House and that it remains unclear whether U.S. troops will take a more active role in the conflict. But they said any further U.S. involvement would hinge on Iraq’s ability to overcome deep-seated political and sectarian fissures and form a national-unity government.
Dempsey said the Iraqi army had “stiffened” its resistance to a fast-moving insurgency led by the Sunni fighters of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, which has renamed itself Islamic State and declared a caliphate on captured territory. He said government forces were “capable of defending Baghdad” but added that they would be challenged to go on the offensive without external support.
Dempsey said the U.S. government was contemplating the possibility of airstrikes, as well as providing help beyond what is being provided by about 750 U.S. military advisers and other troops that have deployed to Iraq in recent weeks “What will we be willing to contribute to that cause?” he said. “That’s not a question that we’re prepared to answer just yet.”
The answer, he added, would depend on political developments in Iraq. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a Shiite Muslim, has alienated Sunnis, Kurds and other groups, and it is unclear whether he can muster the votes in parliament to win a third term. If Iraq is unable to form a new government that can draw support from all factions, “then the future’s pretty bleak,” Dempsey said.
Hagel and Dempsey sidestepped questions about whether the Obama administration might send more troops to Iraq, what they will do and how long they might stay there.
The defense secretary said, “President Obama has been very clear that American combat troops are not going to be fighting in Iraq again.” But when asked how that could be the case if Obama orders airstrikes in Iraq — which probably would be guided by U.S. forces on the ground — Hagel said he was referring only to the U.S. advisers and assessment teams now in the country and acknowledged that their mission could change.
“We have one mission today, and that’s assessments,” Hagel said. “I don’t know what the assessments are going to come back and say or what they would recommend.”
On June 18, during testimony before Congress, Hagel and Dempsey downplayed the possibility of a U.S. bombing campaign in Iraq to weaken the terrorist organization. They questioned the strategic objectives of airstrikes and said Sunni insurgents had blended into the local population, raising the likelihood of civilian casualties.
On Thursday, Dempsey said intensified surveillance flights and the deployment of U.S. advisers and liaison officers had improved the Pentagon’s grasp of the battlefield. But he added that it was still difficult to sort out hard-core Islamic State fighters from disaffected Sunnis opposed to Maliki’s rule.
“We have a much better intelligence picture than we did two weeks ago, and it continues to get better,” Dempsey said. “The complexity, though, is the intermingling of [Sunni] groups. . . . And that’s going to be a tough
The President was on the record and told congress to aspect between 35,000 to 50,000. http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/02/26/obama.troops/ This is something the White House was fine with and that would have been the number if the SOFA had been signed.
Despite all the revisionist history going on at Fox News and other places, the primary reason it didn't get signed is not us. It would be those other actors the Iraqis. We were not going to keep forces there and agree that they fall under Iraqi jurisdiction of the Iraqi justice department. That is the only way the SOFA had a chance of getting signed.
I think it is fair to say you have a slight amount of political bias. I ask you, looking at this objectively, do you really think any President would have gotten that signed? Or is the cause that the Government in Iraq did not want to sign it?
The outline provided below, I believe, helps explain President Obama's actions:
Simply put, our objective was/is to transform outlying states and societies more along modern western lines.
With the victory of the Cold War at our back -- and the belief that now everyone -- everywhere -- wanted to be like us, we determined that the best way to achieve our objective was to:
a. Liberate populations (who we believed desired our way of life)
b. From their oppressive regimes (who were denying the populations this right).
Thus, Iraq, Afghanistan, Egypt, Libya, Syria, etc.
Then, reality hits us square in the face.
It turns out that these populations, liberated from their oppressive regimes, did not universally desire our way of life and our way of governance. They wanted what they wanted -- and this might be a thousand different things -- many of which were not in our best interest.
Thus, the United States was forced to revert back to its old way of thinking, to wit:
a. That the governors/governments of these nations, regardless of how odious and oppressive they may be, are still the best way to (1) keep the lid on and (2) over time, achieve our state and societal transformation objectives.
b. This because these governors/governments have proven that they can (by whatever means) (1) hold their countries together and that they can, with proper motivation, (2) transform their states and societies more as we desire.
c. Herein:
1. Saving the United States/the West, a tremendous amount of various treasure (time, blood, money, political capital, disputes/discord here at home). And
2. Allowing that the borders of present countries do not have to be -- unendingly -- redrawn.
This understanding, I suggest, helps one understand why we are reluctant to do anything (shall we say stupid?) re: Putin, Assad, the new guys in Egypt and other strong, powerful leaders.
We desperately need these guys. They are, essentially, the only game in town. The alternative, as we have learned, being total and unending chaos.
Ned---this articled highlights what I call a total lack of any ME understanding by any WH or President since 2001.
Just how does one explain to the entire ME or at least the Sunni side of the ME that since we have been negatively pounding on Assad for killing over 130K of his Sunni population, driving another 2M Sunni's into refugee camps, dropping barrel bombs on children, using starvation as a civilian weapon system, and then gassing his own population we are now going to do WHAT?
The WH set a red line in the sand on gas and then ran from the red line, we "complained" about barrel bombs and all the killing then when moderate to maybe not so moderate Sunni Islamic fighters were deeply engaged in trying to kick out Assad along comes ISIS and AQ and we back away from supporting the more moderate Islamic groups.
NOW what?---we want to side with Assad in order to fight IS---come on this really does indicate just how unreflective the current WH is and seems to not understand the impact of that decision---meaning we might as well write off for the next 50 or so years having any form of reasonable foreign relations with the Sunni world of the ME.
I will be more than happy to come to Washington and explain this to anyone who wants to listen.
The major core issue with the current WH decision making group is absolutely no one has "spent time on the ground in boots next to an infantryman" trying to resolve what the WH and US politicians created.
The second core problem is that action regardless of what is it is not a substitute for a overarching strategy which addresses the reality on the ground as determined by the populations involved on the ground.
Sometimes being an American overseas and trying to explain to residents of a foreign country what we are doing is difficult if not impossible to explain---because if it makes no sense to me then how does makes expect it to make sense to them?
In our blindness chasing jihadi's since 9/11 we basically have had no strategic forward thinking foreign policy----by anyone in any WH since 2001.
This article depicts just that.
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/07/03/iraq-crisis-pushes-u-s…
Ned---11 years later we all know that there were four serious mistakes made by the US WHs and US Presidents;
1. we were lied to in order to get into Iraq by a US president but no one seems to want to call it what it was
2. the stupid US civilian decision makers who disbanded the Iraqi Army and ordered the de-baathification laws literally forcing thousands of Sunni's into the insurgency
3. the same civilians made a totally wrong decision to allow elections in 2005 with no strategy for the "what after effects" of that key election
4. the civilian decisions by the WH to not influence the 2010 elections which would have provided the "inclusive" government and Alawi was in fact supported by a large number of Sunni's who really tried to take part in their governance process
We sent civilians into Iraq in 2003 who had absolutely no understanding of Iraq and or the ME and we wonder why we are where we are?
So in effect we the US are directly responsible for what we are now seeing in Iraq--it is not the IS (ISIS/AQI), it is not the Sunni armed coalition, it is not the Iranian response and or the Russian response.
It is simply us the US that is responsible so why not own it--is that not the AA first step process?
Outlaw-09,
Great to see your commentary here. I am so happy that someone recognizes the big mistake was in "looking the other way" in 2010. Whose interests were served by this sin of omission? A President determined to get out of Iraq at all costs and to avoid confrontation at everyone's expense? Fault also lies with the military planners who were dreaming big about 35-50,000 troops post-2011 yet unwilling to test that groupthink by exerting pressure on the security ministries and on al-Malarky when he subverted the electoral process and used 18 extra months to consolidate, incompletely as it turns out, his shi´ite dictatorship. Ironically, the winner of the 2010 election whom al-Malady undercut was himself a shi´ite, Ayad Allawi, but secular and moderate. I discussed these thoughts in letters 100 and 102 of my essays home to friends an familiares. I would be interested in your thoughts. http://nedmcdletters.blogspot.com/2014/06/addendum-to-letter-100-police…
From the 'Washington Post', the link to which was kindly posted by Outlaw-09 earlier today:
"With the Obama administration vowing to end Bush’s 'dumb war, and the continued distraction of the global economic crisis, Maliki seized an opportunity. He began a systematic campaign to destroy the Iraqi state and replace it with his private office and his political party. He sacked professional generals and replaced them with those personally loyal to him. He coerced Iraq’s chief justice to bar some of his rivals from participating in the elections in March 2010. After the results were announced and Maliki lost to a moderate, pro-Western coalition encompassing all of Iraq’s major ethno-sectarian groups, the judge issued a ruling that awarded Maliki the first chance to form a government, ushering in more tensions and violence."
No. I am suggesting that the Iraqi National Movement won 91 seats and the Maliki's party won 89. If my math is correct, that would be well short of the 163 needed to form a government. I do not doubt both men tried to position themselves to become PM. However, Maliki's ideology was actually an advantage in becoming PM because he was willing to cut deals. For example, he agreed to the to all but one of the Kurdish demands. In the end, he became PM because he got the support from the various Iraqi blocs, including the Iraqi National Movement. Yes, he used the courts. But that is not the primary reason why he became PM.
In sum, I am saying, lets not rewrite history to support our points. If we would have openly or behind closed doors threatened to become involved in the process that would have alienated Iraqis, the American people, and some of our closest allies. Moreover, we would have properly gotten the opposite effect. Even if we somehow achieved the effect of Allawi becoming PM, his coalition was such a hodgepodge that it is doubtful it would have lasted. Again, lets not forget, it: 1. Became part of the government. 2. Started to break up in 2011.
The point is that al-Maelstrom rammed a court decision through a sympathetic judge to undercut Allawi's fairly won victory in 2010. I am not suggesting that we should have dictated the formation of a government but that we should have exerted what influence having 50-75,000 troops in-country afforded us to preserve the albeit flawed machinery that was in place. Are you seriously suggesting that al-Maliki was the better man in 2010 than Allawi?
¡Oy-vey!
He won two more seats. Its a parliament. That's not "winning" You have to form a coalition. Moreover, it was a coalition that the Iraqi National Movement joined, before it started to break apart.
You basically think the US should try to openly force the formation of a government. That would have rocked our relationship with even our closest allies and I imagine Iraq would have been in a similar situation today. I don't see how you think the Iraqi National Movement could form a strong coalition. It is way short of a majority and had some major internal divisions. It is important to note it starts to break apart in 2011.
Bwilliams,
To use that favorite acronym of you all...
BLUF: my bias apparently obscured the fact that you and I agree.
THE TOME: My bias is apparent. I voted for Senator McCain in 2008 and dearly wish he had won. Nevertheless, as I have repeated often to anybody not sufficiently fed up with me, a President McCain would have fared no better in a S.O.F.A. The mistake was not "no troops left behind".
Unless we were willing to re-impose the status of conquered territory upon Iraq -- ad ignite a bloodbath worse in casualties to people and interests than that occurring now but aimed mainly at younger brothers and sisters in uniform -- the outcome was pre-determined. Had it not been immunity for troops, the Prime Sinister would have found another deal breaker and ridden that one to the same conclusion.
The mistake was not threatening to pull all support, by an accelerated draw down with a possible demolition of all equipment for al-Maliki when he subverted the 2010 election results. That may have prompted better behavior and empowered Ayad Allawi to assume the office he had rightfully won, albeit by plurality. Instead, we provided the aegis for this sectarian dictator wannabe to consolidate his hoped-for tyranny.
http://nedmcdletters.blogspot.com/2014/06/letter-to-friends-and-familiar...
That was a civilian call President Obama was unwilling to make. Please excuse my not being clearer. The worst-case is not that al Malaki failed nor would it have been his success. The worst case was that he did not quite succeed. President Obama is right in refusing to bail out al Maliki; the President's deliberative pace is appropriate right now.
Ned McDonnell shared a link.
Yesterday • Edited
I listened to the new White House spokesman the other day dance around the deadline for Russian de-escalation in Ukraine lest severe sanctions be imposed. (I believe that 'drop-dead' date was June 30th.) Truthfully, sanctions are wrong and a cop-out; they hurt ordinary people and not the élites. We saw that in the Balkans and, terribly, in Iraq. Additionally sanctions rarely deter those leaders who are already committed to a policy. In the case of Russia, the Putinista is in for a pretty penny and in to pound Ukraine. But once a visible due-date of consequence is laid down, even by a superpower in decline, that promise needs to be kept (especially if it is short of war).
http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/one-dead-six-injured-as-fierce-…
Sadly, that Admin. spokesman (¿Josh Ernest?) invoked the same rhetorical end-run as President Obama did about Syria. In this case, casuistry comes across as cowardice. The Putineer and his stand-in gangsters in Ukraine accepted the invitation, reading these remarks as further appeasement by a failing leadership that hopes problems will go away.
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/02/world/europe/ukraine.html?_r=0
Those gansters are the new vanguard of Putin's proletariat; i.e., we are seeing part-1 of the Anschluß of eastern Ukraine.
Ned McDonnell
Unfortunately, the Admin. thinks it knows at what moment to flinch. In its case, that moment seems to be every moment.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mh599VtMB1c
The Admin. is laying some of the responsibility on Europe, as are others. This assessment is unfair. No European power would last long in a conflict with Russia and what the U.S. advocates is directly contrary to immediate economic interests. That is where leadership becomes important. The president might fail in a bid to frame a concerted N.A.T.O. response to this continuing and simmering aggression. While not pleasant, it would be far more palatable than inviting further aggression by inaction and artfully avoiding explicit commitments explicitly made.
All President Obama had to do was, upon the request of the Ukraine government, to declare a no-fly zone over eastern Ukraine; quarantine Crimea; and dispatch 500-600 troops to both halves of Ukraine. Three hundred California national guard in western Ukraine for 'routine' exercises and three hundred Special Forces trainers for police training in eastern Ukraine. The prompt presence would likely have been enough to put a serious cease-fire into place to establish a framework to address and resolve genuine problems. Now the options are fewer and may prove to be far more costly down the road.
Michelle
I have a feeling that the Ukraine is the last thing everyone is thinking about. The distracting squirrel (Iraq) has changed the focus!
21 hours ago • Like
Ned McDonnell
Michelle: you are absolutely right. Putin was waiting for a distraction to amp up his Anschluß. The retreat from another line drawn in the sand confirmed the timing.
20 hours ago • Like
Outlaw-09,
So beautifully articulated are your three comments. They are worth the time to read. I will read the article soon enough, I assure you. Needless to say, while my knowledge is not as deep as yours, I agree with what you say with two smaller exceptions. First, I do not think we were lied to on W.M.D. prior to the invasion of Iraq. The intel turned out to be inaccurate, perhaps shoddy. Second, I still hold out hope that, with a firm negotiating posture by the U.S. (wait 'til next life), Iran and Israel can work with Jordan to provide stability in the Middle East. The key for me is to empower moderates on all sides of these divides. They are the silent and retreating majority.
Thanks, as always,
Ned.
P.S. Immediately below is my little tantrum on F.B. yesterday. Now I am in this discussion as an interested, frankly irrelevant, observer. The sticking point for is, if what is going on is evident to average joes not particularly well-informed (e.g., me), then...¿What in the hell does the White House do all day?
Ned---here is the core problem of current US foreign policy--ABSOLUTELY no one in the current world "believes" a single word coming out of this White House and this President.
There was a recent Berlin newspaper article from a newspaper that I have been reading since 1970 and which has been pro US all these years.
SUDDENLY their major pundit stated on the front page basically the words "save us from Obama and the US"---where is he going, coming and or not going or coming---whatever he is doing is not in the interests of Germany and Europe.
Right now there was a "in the sand line" drawn by first the US and then "followed up" by the EU Council of EU leaders that stated a "four point threat" if ALL and ALL was the core demand points were not implemented.
NONE of those points have been implemented by Putin within the time frame stated by both the US and the EU---actually the T64 count was first 4 and is now seen at the 12 level which is the standard Russia count for a Russian Tank BN---and by the way the T64s are coming from the same batch that the Russians were to have destroyed under OCSE disarmament agreements they themselves have signed but not carried out much as they have in their violation of the INF and which we have not called them on.
Now if neither the US and or the EU fail to carry out the serious threat of targeted sectorial sanctions due to the serious Russian failures both will be seen as "paper tigers" to the entire world---which by the way the Ukrainians have been pointing out the last several days.
So again as the Germans are saying publicly and privately "save us from this US president".
Actually what is a amazing ---they are actually stating that Bush was not so bad in comparison at least he stated his intent and then did it whether they liked it or not.
If any think this above is not the case then simply look at the following list and ask the question WHY not?
1. total failure in the Syria---yes the gas is out but at what cost to the US "line in the sand"?---and no solution to the removal of Assad as constantly stated by the US
2. total failure in the Israeli/Palestinian issue--actually worse now than before when nothing was being done
3. total failure of the Iraq stated "no boots on the ground" is exactly what the English means "no boots on the ground"---SOF are "boots on the ground" troops regardless of the title given them
4.absolutely no effect on Russia by US leadership in the Ukrainian issue
5. no effective foreign policy/strategy stated by the US in response to the new Russian doctrine of "New Generation of Warfare" and the Chinese new strategy of "Three Phases of Warfare"
And let us not get even into Iraq and the current WH response to Malaki's direct challenge at becoming Saddam.
This list could actually go on and on.
If one does not agree with this comment then look at the latest poll numbers and ask the question WHY so low---granted the American internal politics is totally dysfunctional, but leadership is leadership even in dysfunctional times.
Please excuse the first reply jumping ahead of your well thought out commentary, Outlaw-09. I had intended -- and had thought I had designated -- that response to be a reply.
P.S. Interesting news on Ukraine within days of the Obama Administration retreating from a another 'line in the sand', this time with respect to the Ukraine. Iraq created the distraction and President Obama's apparent weakness invited the action by Russia in articulating a pretext to use force imminently to annex eastern Ukraine.
So 300 advisors are not boots on the ground---now another 300 boots on the ground are for security and then what are the next 300 boots on the ground to be called?
Boots on the ground regardless of the title given them will still have a US military person wearing them.
So is this the new WH policy even after the West Point Foreign Policy speech?---and we are now back into Iraq when the realists of the world state Iraq is not in the interests of the US nor was it ever in the interests of the US regardless of the spun intel.
With the increased troop count, the drones, and the Hellfires--has it gotten the Iraqi's an "inclusive government"?
We the US "looked the other way in 2010" when they was a golden opportunity to create an "inclusive government"---the question has to be asked why did we look the other way and in whose interest was it to look the other way?
When will the US realize this is about Sykes-Picot and that Putin has shown the way forward with his new doctrine of redrawing borders.
The Genie is out of the bottle and we let that Genie out in 2003 and in the end all the new boots on the ground and Hellfires will not change that fact.