National Defense Panel Releases Assessment of 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review
Report Addresses U.S. National Security, Sequestration, Force Structure
Published: July 31, 2014
For Immediate Release: July 31, 2014
(Washington) – The National Defense Panel delivered its review of the Department of Defense 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) to Congress today. The Congressionally mandated report, “Ensuring a Strong Defense for the Future,” was written at the request of the Department of Defense. The executive director of the project was Colonel (Ret.). Paul Hughes, a senior advisor at the United States Institute of Peace and was written in partnership with LMI, a non-profit government consulting firm. COL. Hughes also led the 2010 review of the QDR.
The consensus conclusion of the report is that there is a growing gap between the strategic objectives the U.S. military is expected to achieve and the resources required to do so. In their cover letter to Congress, NDP co-chairs Dr. William Perry and General John P. Abizaid wrote, “We must act now to address our challenges if the nation is to continue benefiting from its national security posture.”
“USIP is an honest, non-partisan convener of sometimes difficult conversations related to America’s security,” said Kristin Lord, acting president of USIP. “The NDP is the most recent in a long list of practical discussions involving senior leaders hosted, and led, by the Institute.” USIP has also facilitated the work of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, the Task Force on the United Nations, the Iraq Study Group, the Afghanistan Senior Working Group, the Genocide Prevention Task Force, and others.
The NDP is comprised of 10 members appointed by the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. Dr. Perry and General Abizaid were appointed to co-chair the 2014 Panel by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel. The report examined how the QDR presented U.S. interests and objectives; the strategic and operational environment; U.S. strategy, budget and reforms; and the readiness, capabilities and force structure of the armed services.
Comments
"Americans have benefited greatly from the international order that the United States helped create and sustain following World War II. As we note above, this order is not self-sustaining; it requires U.S. involvement, engagement, and active leadership, including a defense posture that underpins its continued vitality."
Consider this thought:
The United States (acting essentially alone) is no longer in a position to provide either (1) the active leadership required or (2) the defense posture needed to underpin the international order that the US helped create and sustain following World War II.
This being the case:
a. What other actor, or group of actors, will be required (whether they wish to or not) to step forward to provide such leadership and defense posture as is necessary to sustain the present international order?
b. Lacking this stepping-up-to-the-plate of other interested and/or capable parties, what other form of international order (if any) will take the place of the current iteration?
The current international order, I suggest, cannot be sustained -- as in the past -- by the United States acting significantly alone.
Thus, options "a" and "b" above should be what the QDR -- and the National Defense Panel -- should be addressing.
This being, in this instance, "the" (or at least "a") eventuality that the United States -- and its military -- must actually plan and prepare for.
I know every wants to focus on their sequestration analysis but I have to wave the BS flag here from page 26 of the report:
QUOTE: During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan U.S.
forces forward based in and deployed to the Asia-Pacific, although reduced in capacity by the
Middle East conflicts, kept up an ambitious schedule of engagement, exercises, and security
cooperation with allies and partners, while Special Forces soldiers continued partnering with
local forces in counter-terrorism operations.END QUOTE
SOF did/does a lot more than partner with local forces in counterterrorism operations. This panel continues to perpetuate the myth that all SOF does is focus on counterterrorism. Unfortunately and with all due respect to the distinguished panel members and consultants (Appendix 6 page 69) few to none have any significant experience in special warfare activities conducted by SOF (LTG (RET) Kearney notwithstanding).
However, they do recognize that the ability to counter unconventional and political warfare must be a priority (interesting that it is listed first - but this can be extended beyond the former Soviet Union to other hostile state and non-state actors to include Iran, China, ISIL/IS, and even AQ). From page 19:
QUOTE Specific challenges that should guide U.S. planning include:
1. Russia’s increasing use of rapidly mobile and well-equipped special operations forces
with coordinated political warfare and cyberspace capabilities to create new “facts on
the ground,” particularly in areas of the former Soviet Union; END QUOTE