How to Defeat ISIL by Bing West, National Review
… So what should we do? The chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Martin Dempsey, has suggested that we “initially contain, eventually disrupt, and finally defeat [the Islamists] over time.” Notice that the general used the word “defeat.”
What is necessary to put flesh on Dempsey’s objectives? First, both parties in Congress must agree that this Islamist army is a mortal threat to America’s core values and must be destroyed. General James Clapper, the director of national intelligence, has testified that ISIL, or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, poses a potential threat to the homeland. The phrase “potential threat” is fraught with ambiguity. Until catastrophe occurs, many will argue that ISIL is a murderous religious cult confined within regional geographic boundaries. That was how Mr. Clinton viewed Osama bin Laden before 9/11. If the commander-in-chief does not perceive a mortal threat and if the press grossly underreports the persecution of Christians and other minorities, then the public will see no reason for our military to become heavily involved…
Comments
Edited and added to:
Let's look at the situation from the standpoint the United States' overriding political objective and consider a (possible) historical analogy.
The overriding political objective of the United States has been -- and still is - the transformation of "different" states and societies more along modern western lines.
During the Cold War, and in the face of the challenge presented by (1) a peer rival with (2) a compelling global transformational goal of its own, we chose the defensive strategy of "containment" as the means by which to achieve our objective. Herein believing that, over time, the problems presented by the communist system would eventually cause these folks to come around more to our way of thinking and our way of living. Sure enough, this seemed to work out (at least temporarily).
Having, in this manner, (1) defeated our peer rival and (2) achieved a "better peace," now the United States moved to adopt and implement a more offensive strategy -- known as "engagement and enlargement" -- for favorably transforming those lesser and remaining states and societies that still had not made the move toward adopting our way of life, our way of governance and our values, attitudes and beliefs.
It is against this backdrop (protection of great power rivals now diminished; the United States moves aggressively to transform the lesser and remaining states and societies as it desires) that Islamist movements such as AQ and ISIL/S are formed.
(Herein, the United States shows that it is prepared to work with governments that quickly and enthusiastically adopt a pro-western "reform" agenda -- or to work to overthrow those governments [Egypt, Libya, Syria, etc.] that do not show sufficient transformational zeal.)
Thus, the Islamist come to understand (much as did the American Southerners by the mid-19th Century) that they must stand up and defend themselves against the looming loss of their preferred way of life, their preferred way of governance and their unique values, attitudes and beliefs. Otherwise, they must expect to see their foundational ideas and concepts, much as did the populations of the "Old South," become "gone with the wind."
Given this (possible) similar situation and (possible) historical analogy, might we see Bing West's suggestions (re: the need for a more fully-involved, aggressive, ruthless and decisive approach?) in a new light?
The United States, as it did in the American Civil War, has formally thrown down the gauntlet. The Islamists, much as did the American Southerners, have formally picked the gauntlet up and, thus, the battle -- of our making and our choosing -- then as now -- has been joined.
Thus, do we follow through -- as we did in the American Civil War -- with the full force of America's might; to achieve the state and societal transformations that we require?
Or do we adopt, now in the face of greater resistance than we expected, some other method -- as we did in the Cold War -- for achieving our global transformational objectives?
(Herein, the global economy -- and the developed and developing world -- being in a position to "wait" while this latter method finally achieves our goals? In the American Civil War, the United States felt that it could not "wait" and, thus, had to act decisively.)
A new take on why the Christians were overrun by the IS---does not place a good light on the myth of Kurdish fighting abilities.
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/08/17/how-the-u-s-favored-ku…
Carl, you can google ADRP 2-0, Intelligence, and go to page 4-5 and see the difficult definition for Measurement and Signature Intelligence. I don't know anything about the classified means of accomplishing it and don't want to. I just hope it works if a rogue group ever gets hold of a loose nuke. We also want bad guys to believe it works really, really well as a deterrent...
Move Forward:
Your use of the phrase "sensing it from above" jumped out at me. It seemed kind of blithe, like a movie. Sensing anything from above if the weather is bad is quite difficult and sensing anything from above if the guy down below knows you are looking can be close to impossible. To build on what RC said, which mule in the herd that just dispersed all carrying identical appearing loads was it? Or your plane that could figure it out can't fly for a few days because of snow storms and wing breaking turbulence. Where did that mule go? To cite a historical example, the Red Chinese managed to move hundreds of thousands of men into Korea in 1950 without us being quite aware of it. And then we had absolute control of the sky and could fly anywhere we wanted whenever we wanted at most any altitude we wanted.
It just isn't that easy.
MF wrote:
‘I suspect a 50,000 lb max gross weight Chinook with only 3/5ths of that weight can HOGE at those altitudes to fast rope. Even UH-60s landed a quick reaction force at OP Fritsche above COP Keating at 2100 meters. HOGE also only applies if you actually must hover out of ground effect (HOGE) which is why running fire has become the norm there and fixed wing fly above valleys or continue to follow them to climb out if strafing.’
You are absolutely correct and the fruitcake know it in spades. What they are betting on is they have seen you at 2100 meters and can simply double up to 4200 meters and see what you've got. From my understanding McChrystal folded and what that tells the enemy is there is a place where they can go that their enemy dares not. That is very useful to know if you are trying to hide something/someone.
MF wrote:
Smugglers are unlikely to go over so many tall Badakhshan ranges with mules wouldn't a group of nuke-carrying mules stand out?’
Once a 100 kg package reaches a road in this part of the world (only a days march from your high altitude safe-haven) it is lost forever. The thousands of tons drugs pouring out of AF/PAK region to all points of the globe is testimony to that fact. In other words it’s there one day and a day later it’s gone – until it finds you anywhere on the globe.
MF wrote:
‘Although I suspect terrorists would simply drive a nuke down to the Pakistan coast and put it on a boat. It is pretty disconcerting to read news reports about Pakistan nukes being moved around in unmarked large vans without much of an escort.’
Absolutely. I suspect they already have them in shipping containers and let it be known to all and sundry that when the first foreigner’s boot lands on any Pak nuclear facility the goods will be shipped. In fact the smart money would suggest the packages are there already and are just awaiting a final delivery date and address.
However there are many Navies/Police Forces that can interdict this form of delivery if they choose to do so. It’s the delivery system that we don’t recognize and/or can’t deal with that I find disturbing.
MF wrote:
‘If it even exists, it would not be small by any means and there is no indication anywhere of a W54-style smallish artillery round or Davey Crocket style capabilities.’
I seriously doubt that 1950’s design is beyond the Pak military establishment. I had always assumed the difficulty in producing large amounts of fissionable material would favor the smaller designs of artillery rather than ‘Fat Boy’ et al.
Size back in the 1940’s was a direct result of the lack of sufficiently precise machine tools and electronic timers. Today there is widespread access to both of these elements that are literally light years ahead of what was available in 1945
Important conversation and I appreciate the exchange.
RC
RC, I hear you and don't want to attempt to dispute too much because I know and agree with some of what you are saying about the danger of terrorists getting WMD.
However, in your first paragraph, I'm not sure we should accept the premise of the closest CP being 100+ kms away in Bagram. COP Keating had FOB Bostick about 20 kms away if I recall. Wanat's closest CP was Camp Blessing just 8 kms to the south. Ganjgal had a CP very close at FOB Joyce...they just were not helping much due to ROE fears. The U.S. and presumably Israel also have airborne C2 means as well as aerial and satellite data links and relay of comms and full motion video.
Jake Tapper's book, The Outpost, about the battle of COP Keating, mentions a Predator crash during the battle into a very tall mountain on page 571. I also integrated declassified mIRC logs from CENTCOM about that and other things in that battle into training which was useful and amusing. However, the U.S. has been flying helicopters, UAS/RPA, and all kinds of fast movers over those Nuristan mountains for a decade.
I suspect a 50,000 lb max gross weight Chinook with only 3/5ths of that weight can HOGE at those altitudes to fast rope. Even UH-60s landed a quick reaction force at OP Fritsche above COP Keating at 2100 meters. HOGE also only applies if you actually must hover out of ground effect (HOGE) which is why running fire has become the norm there and fixed wing fly above valleys or continue to follow them to climb out if strafing.
Your figures about tactical artillery nukes sent me to Wikipedia to research Pakistani nukes and in particular an Arms Control Wonk blog article and its comments about a potential Nasr missile tactical nuke. If it even exists, it would not be small by any means and there is no indication anywhere of a W54-style smallish artillery round or Davey Crocket style capabilities.
The Arms Control Wonk comments section seemed to doubt Pakistani nuclear capabilities in a small package. The Wikipedia part with references seemed to indicate that Pakistan was offered U.S. PAL encryption code systems and turned them down but probably developed their own version to avoid feared dead switches hidden in the U.S. versions. That would complicate terrorists using any nuke they obtained.
Wikipedia also indicates that Pakistan may have 80-120 nukes primarily oriented on air-delivered bombs and larger ballistic and cruise missiles. That mule will be mighty tired. If the cliffs are as steep as you say, even mules may have difficulty. Yes I know about mules and camels but then we get back to the MASINT and mule heat signatures because a mule going toward the northwestern "stans" would be out of place vs. staying in the valleys...the easier route yes? If smugglers are unlikely to go over so many tall Badakhshan ranges with mules wouldn't a group of nuke-carrying mules stand out?
I'm not disputing your facts but geez I hope you are wrong, and doubt you would reveal classified data if you knew it about Pakistan nuke weights and capabilities given your suspected prior agency history. However, I stand steadfastly beside you in grave fear that something similar to your notional scenario might be feasible and ISIS, Hamas, Iran/Hezbollah, or AaZ's organization might pull it off.
Although I suspect terrorists would simply drive a nuke down to the Pakistan coast and put it on a boat. It is pretty disconcerting to read news reports about Pakistan nukes being moved around in unmarked large vans without much of an escort. Hopefully that is not correct and hopefully they have strong encryption code devices so that unless someone turns and helps terrorists, the nukes can't be used. I imagine Outlaw knows a lot about this but probably can't discuss it.
MF,
The point I was attempting to make was being wired into a Land-Warrior type Network that supposedly maintains a live C4I feed from an individual section leader as readily as a Battery Cmdr or a BCT O6 on the neighborhood beachfront is one thing. I would suggest it is another thing entirely when you are standing a hundred klicks from anywhere at 3000 meters ASL and you taking HMG fires from above and all sides and you are being shaded by a ridge-line a further 2000 meters straight up.
IMO what is good for the IDF has very little meaning anywhere else in the world. Many folks in the IDF would argue it doesn't make any strategic sense for the State of Israel but that’s another argument.
You mentioned the altitude of villages where women and kids live. The fruitcake fighting position will be another 1000 meters higher and some. The pass out of Parun is around 4400 m ASL. The pass into Badhdakshan is a ball-breaking 5000 m ASL. From there it is half a days march to the road which leads to the Stans of Central Asia.
The problem with rotary-wing aircraft at these altitudes is when you take fire, hit cloud, turbulence, hot air, load too many bleeding-out litter cases or get a bead on a target and you decide to abort your approach. When you turn (lose airspeed) in the tight space of these valleys and try to go back your HOGE envelope buries you.
A donkey can carry 40 kgs, a horse 80 kgs, a mule 150 kgs and a camel 400 kgs. Most of the Pak nukes are shells or missile warheads not bombs. Starting at the 155mm nuclear shell it weighs 58 kgs and up to the 1 kiloton 8 inch howitzer round which comes in at 110 kgs.
Pack animals have been carrying these weights from the sub-continent over these exact passes and across central Asia into Europe and the Holy Land for thousands of years.
Regards,
RC
<blockquote>The actual Gaza Red Zone is 3 km deep. The entire TO is 10 km deep. The entire TO is at sea level and all points within the TO are LOS. The entire area is under 24/7 live ISR feed. Many of the assault force catch the same public transit network to the LOD that they catch to go to work.</blockquote>I flew over Gaza to the coast from the vicinity of the Rafah crossing during the first Intifada. Also we flew 5 miles off the Gaza coast en route to Tel Aviv for MEDEVAC practice. We drove along the Gaza border multiple times in buses and vans going to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. As you point out, now there are remote control gun towers with sensors along the Gaza border and I read that one of their female IDF operators spotted bad guys emerging from one tunnel who subsequently were dispatched by a bomb.
<blockquote>The enemy are an international pariah and has its back to the sea and must transport all hardware along tunnels that are barely shoulder wide.
I’m sure all that Networking is an absolute marvel. Good job as I’m pretty certain come Christmas every tunnel/rocket/fighter will and have been replaced...and some.</blockquote>
I read that Egypt's new President has clamped down on the tunnels leading from the Sinai to Gaza. Nevertheless, agree their construction will continue as will Israeli technology to detect and destroy them. If Israel lifted its blockade, Iran would ship all kinds of more advanced large missiles to Gaza. You can't stop the grass from growing but you can mow it as required. If Israel lifted the blockade, gave up on tunnels and threw up their hands, weeds would overcome Iron Dome and the IDF and Israeli population would suffer even greater future casualties.
Israel will not alter the hearts or minds of Hamas and Gaza Palestinians and fortunately for Israel, Gaza is small and they don't have to deploy heavy armor and its logistics or employ massive aerial refueling to strike Gaza and south Lebanon. Same problem, same unalterable attitudes, different brands of grass to be mowed when they launch rocket/missile attacks at Israel. Crime never ends. Muslim extremist hatred of Israel never ends and even Gaza children are indoctrinated from their earliest years.
<blockquote>In the meantime get the good commander and the Nahal Infantry Battalion to Bagram and tell them AaZ has a stolen Pak nuke 120 km away in a tunnel complex above the Parun River at around 4100 meters ASL. He’s making plans to get it out thru Badakhshan across the Oxus and down thru Iran and handing it over to Hamas.
There are 5000 meter mountains between Bagram and the Red Zone (say again?...5000 meters ASL & 120 klicks). The nearest LZ on the Parun is at 3500 ASL so only a Kaman can get in and only if the temperature is below 20 degrees C. There are several thousand fruitcake waiting and they have hundreds of dug in DsKh 12.7mm up to 5000 meters ASL to grease the ride in and out.</blockquote>
Believe you are exaggerating the altitudes of Parun in your notional scenario because Wikipedia says it has 6 villages with the lowest at 2500 meters and the highest at 2850m. The surrounding mountains are higher obviously. Even at COP Keating on the Landay Sin River near Parun River, Apaches, remotely piloted aircraft, and fighters/bombers provided support in the face of 5 dshKs dispersed along high terrain surrounding the COP. However, I believe you are restricting the Israeli options available that hypothetically would include lots of U.S. assistance:
* Dropping one or more 5,000 pound bombs on tunnel entrances to seal the bomb inside
* Waiting until they attempt to move it, sensing it from above, and bombing it or firing a missile into the valley route below. You aren't implying they will carry this large bomb over multiple ridgelines are you?
* Letting the movers die of radiation poisoning or cold weather before they get too far over those ridgelines and then recovering the weapon intact
* Israel monitoring the movement until they get close enough to engage with their own air force or commandos
* Using a MH-47 or CH-47 to fast rope SOF to the upper ridgeline (not close!) of the tunnel site and monitor their advance to prevent ambushes. That altitude would be no problem for a lightly loaded Chinook. I read the book about a failed attack that involved dropping ODAs into the valley and expecting them to climb up to ridge Taliban sites in Shok Valley. We also saw what happened to the SEALs in Operation Red Wing. Even SF/SOF are not invisible to the Taliban. Isn't it better in a case like yours to go in overt with all manner of force?
* HALO troops to the upper ridgeline (maybe or maybe not close or some mix thereof with an overwatch force infiltrating into place augmented from above onto the objective) with the same overwhelming force applied.
At one point I had 1:50,000 and 1:250,000 maps of the areas around Wanat and COP Keating which are reasonably close to Parun. I've mentioned before unclassified simulation exercises we conducted on actual simulated terrain of that area. Our helicopters, fighters, and unmanned aircraft have operated at similar altitudes for over a decade. An MV-22 tilt rotor would have greater difficulty and Future Vertical Lift requirements go up to 6,000' and 95 degrees to ensure future troops can function at higher altitudes.
You couldn't do Afghanistan in an old Vietnam era Hueys and original Chinooks. I flew nothing more than UH-1H at far lower (but not always low) Sinai altitudes to include resupplying pinnacle OPs with sling loads. Technology does not stand still thankfully and reality on the ground (or air) for both good and bad guys is a constantly moving target. It is our asymmetric advantage...not duking it out hand-to-hand or spear-to-spear in a misguided notion of chivalry and honor.
MF wrote:
‘The following article in DefenseNews.com disagrees with your assessment.’
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140816/DEFREG04/308160016/
The actual Gaza Red Zone is 3 km deep. The entire TO is 10 km deep. The entire TO is at sea level and all points within the TO are LOS. The entire area is under 24/7 live ISR feed. Many of the assault force catch the same public transit network to the LOD that they catch to go to work.
The enemy are an international pariah and has its back to the sea and must transport all hardware along tunnels that are barely shoulder wide.
I’m sure all that Networking is an absolute marvel. Good job as I’m pretty certain come Christmas every tunnel/rocket/fighter will and have been replaced … and some.
In the meantime get the good commander and the Nahal Infantry Battalion to Bagram and tell them AaZ has a stolen Pak nuke 120 km away in a tunnel complex above the Parun River at around 4100 meters ASL. He’s making plans to get it out thru Badakhshan across the Oxus and down thru Iran and handing it over to Hamas.
There are 5000 meter mountains between Bagram and the Red Zone (say again?...5000 meters ASL & 120 klicks). The nearest LZ on the Parun is at 3500 ASL so only a Kaman can get in and only if the temperature is below 20 degrees C. There are several thousand fruitcake waiting and they have hundreds of dug in DsKh 12.7mm up to 5000 meters ASL to grease the ride in and out.
Crank up your Gaza proven Network and suck on that and see what happens.
RC
<blockquote>We have a fundamental problem at the core of our approach to war that our much smaller and poorer opponents are not encumbered by. IMO we have been seduced by the false god of digitization. It strikes me there is a real possibility that there is something primeval about mortal combat that is not swayed by the micro-chip.
The perfect example is the IDFs action in Gaza. The IDF is probably the most digitally obsessed military in the world. The images of laser guided bombs blowing up endless wretched Palestinian slums were forgotten whilst the debris clouds were still rising. However the faces of terrified infants having shrapnel pulled out of gaping wounds whilst cowering in their local UN school reverberated around the globe. The fate of these tiny children will create strategic problems for Israel; both political and military for a generation.</blockquote>
The following article in DefenseNews.com disagrees with your assessment.
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140816/DEFREG04/308160016/
In the first Operation Cast Lead, I believe only about 8,000 artillery rounds were fired and many if you recall were white phosphorous that got the Israelis in trouble. This time 34,000 155mm rounds were fired with half being smoke instead of willie pete and many others being anti-personnel fragmentation and illumination. The smoke screened ground IDF movement and anti-personnel limited collateral damage to structures. When you see major damage to structures no doubt it was a big bomb and something nefarious was occurring from that location.
The "danger close" limits to safeguard friendly forces from fratricide are illuminating between different bombs, artillery rounds, and Hellfire missiles. Without going into the differences, let's just say that a UAS/RPA Hellfire is far less likely to kill or injure adjacent civilians. Israel has done all it could to limit civilian casualties and property damage. However, when Hamas <strong>purposely</strong> places rocket factories, C2 and logistics facilities, and tunnel entrances in civilian areas, schools, hospitals, and mosques and tells civilians not to leave, collateral damage will result. Leaflets, phone calls, and "taps on the door" can warn the population but collateral damage still will result if folks don't leave those areas.
Israel also does not attempt to conduct COIN it would appear. They segregate Palestinians in areas where they can live in peace if they so choose. Hamas does not so choose and Israelis know that no amount of information operations, kissing babies, and political appeasement will change that. The Israelis originate ground, air, and sea military action from safe areas into not so safe areas. Perhaps Kurdish areas and the sea would be safe areas for coalition operations against ISIS. We don't have to conduct COIN or expose U.S. forces unnecessarily to have them be effective fighting from safer areas. However, we need an entire combined arms "police" general purpose force and not just a few SF/SOF "SWAT teams" to be the most effective in accomplishing wide area security.
Long term strategy? If you are unlikely to win hearts and minds, at some point you decide that continuous "policing" internationally is just as essential as continuous policing stateside. Crime will never end. International conflict will never end. Ignoring the latter only will lead to ability to plan, coordinate, and finance terror abroad and regional wars that will drag the U.S. and coalition into larger wars.
<blockquote>I don’t buy the argument that if all the major ethnic groups of any region are partitioned and correlated that more peace will prevail. India has 36 different states and unions. Many of the inhabitants of these states are as different in culture and physical appearance as China is to the US. But I see very little civil war.
Some folks may argue that the creation of Pakistan 60 years ago acted as a pressure valve for Muslim agitation on the sub-continent but more Muslims remained in India after partition and continue to live peacefully within India as they have for over a thousand years.</blockquote>
Google "dispersion of Muslims in India" and select the entry for "Crafting State-Nations: India and Other Multinational Democracies." Hopefully the following link takes you directly to page 61, Table 2.4
http://books.google.com/books?id=kGUuOdeCiXQC&pg=PA61&lpg=PA61&dq=dispe…
The link describes that Muslims in India are highly dispersed and are not a majority in any state of India except Jammu and Kashmir...where the problems are. In addition, Bangladesh and Pakistan were created from India where clear Muslim majorities existed.
However, the major factor that distinguishes India is Table 2.4 that shows that 35% of Muslims self-identify as "Only Indian." Another 11% self-identify as more Indian than State in identity. This trend is similar with Hindus, Sikhs, and Christians in India. In other words, unlike multi-ethnic Afghanistan and many parts of Pakistan dominated by Baluchs and Pashtuns, Indians view themselves as a country first.
In Afghanistan, most Pashtuns live in the east and south. Most Hazaras live in the central Hindu Kush provinces. Most Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmen live near their respective "stans" in the north and northwest Afghanistan. Most Baluchs live in the south near Pakistan and Iranian Baluchs.
In other words, it would not be difficult to break up Afghanistan into two major states with an admitted risk of further calls for sub-division. Land swaps could move minority populations to areas where they better align with the majority. The same applies in Iraq where Kurds live in the north and northeast of both Iraq and Syria. Same applies to Shiites who live primarily in the south and big cities like Baghdad.
Admittedly, cities would prove the most difficult to split up. However, cities like Cold War Berlin prove that if necessary cities can also be split to segregate identities and limit infighting.
The overwhelming cultural, ethnic, and religious "sameness" of both Columbia and the Philippine Islands is one primary differential with insurgencies there vs. the Middle East. The problem areas are driven largely by Philippines areas where Muslims are a larger part of the population and the rural areas of Columbia where drugs may be grown.
I don’t buy the argument that if all the major ethnic groups of any region are partitioned and correlated that more peace will prevail. India has 36 different states and unions. Many of the inhabitants of these states are as different in culture and physical appearance as China is to the US. But I see very little civil war.
Some folks may argue that the creation of Pakistan 60 years ago acted as a pressure valve for Muslim agitation on the sub-continent but more Muslims remained in India after partition and continue to live peacefully within India as they have for over a thousand years.
In many parts of the UK if you walk into a pub on a Saturday or Sunday afternoon before or after a local football match with an accent that is not local you will get beaten up by the local drinkers.
All over the world if you even glance at the sister of someone from a different tribe/neighborhood /race/religion / football team you will instigate a brawl or even murder - but in the vast majority of these regions open conflict or mass killings are unheard of.
IMHO the question we should ask is not ‘How to defeat IS?’ or the next Broadway Joe who is bound to come along. The question we need to address is why is it we are so easily defeated. Many people often remark how tactically powerful we are. The argument is if we plant our flag in the middle of the enemy camp with their dead at our feet and nobody shoots at us for a day or so we are masters of tactical combat. The fact that on the first night after our departure the position is retaken by an even more hostile enemy does not factor in our hell-yeah reckoning of what war is about.
One could argue every bullet, bomb, shell, vaccine, hamlet, paved road, KIA, WIA, MIA we delivered in Vietnam contributed to our eventual defeat. We failed to recognize (unlike our opponents) the immediate aftermath of every one of these actions was a tactical prelude not a tactical accomplishment.
Likewise Fallujah. All of the above that was inserted into Fallujah’s battle ecosystem in 2004 contributed to the tactical reality we now find in Fallujah and across many other areas of Iraq
We have a fundamental problem at the core of our approach to war that our much smaller and poorer opponents are not encumbered by. IMO we have been seduced by the false god of digitization. It strikes me there is a real possibility that there is something primeval about mortal combat that is not swayed by the micro-chip.
The perfect example is the IDFs action in Gaza. The IDF is probably the most digitally obsessed military in the world. The images of laser guided bombs blowing up endless wretched Palestinian slums were forgotten whilst the debris clouds were still rising. However the faces of terrified infants having shrapnel pulled out of gaping wounds whilst cowering in their local UN school reverberated around the globe. The fate of these tiny children will create strategic problems for Israel; both political and military for a generation.
I had a similar experience of the overwhelming effect of human perceptions in mortal combat whilst processing Soviet POWs captured by the Mujaheddin. These men were essentially begging for their lives or at the very least being spared the retribution of the Afghan females lurking in the shadows of bombed villages.
There was a litany of excuses of conscription, ‘following orders’ , KGB combat commissars, a desire to convert to Islam etc. etc. However it was when the question of why a communists should be believed that a genuine exchange/reaction came about. It was if a judge in a US court had asked the condemned why he should spare someone who believes in Santa Claus. The prisoners always had completely mystified expressions on their faces. Most generally laughed at what I assumed was their perception of my naivety.
I discussed this with some of my colleagues and it is something they all noted. Most of the prisoners were born in the 1960s or early 1970s. From what we could glean it appeared this generation had grown up in households where the ‘New Soviet Man’ and the ‘Worker’s Paradise’ had been reduced to a very bad joke.
It was sobering to think the parents of these men were the generation who were slaughtered in their millions in the giant German encirclements of the summer of 1941. The survivors staggered back for 2000 km and stood with their backs to the Volga and declared ‘not one more step back’ and beat the Germans all the way to Berlin at a cost of more than 10 million men.
Needless to say their children’s contempt for the Soviet ideal came as quite a shock.
The fact all orders for Soviet troops in Afghanistan were coaxed in ‘Internationalist Duty’, ‘Workers Proletariat’, ‘Anti-Imperialism’, ‘Defend Mother Russia’ etc. compounded the overwhelming sentiment that the mighty Red Army was executing a hollow lie and many of her soldiers knew it. Furthermore they had known it for a very long time and no amount of military force could overcome the perception for those who wore her uniform that the Soviet Union was dead.
Strangely enough I found myself sticking up for the Red Army but this was greeted with even deeper furrowed brows and wry grins.
Obviously I believe there is good intention in our efforts to create an Islamic democratic state in Afghanistan and as such I believe the root cause of our lack of effectiveness is completely different to that experienced by the Red Army in Afghanistan.
However the Mujaheddin was a much more powerful force compared to the Taliban and enjoyed universal support across the entire country. Therefore in the balance of our greater expenditure of treasure ( if not blood) and the comparable feebleness of our present day opponents I would argue our current military has a bigger problem than the now extinct Red Army.
RC
Under governance, power, and trust it is important to recognize that the dominant form of power is military power. Sykes-Picot was enabled due to superior military power, and in the past uprisings were crushed due to the state's superior security forces. My point in stating the obvious is military power (terrorist or conventional) appears to be more instrumental in determining what form of governance and where the lines of control will be drawn than popular movements (I still don't see one in Iraq).
We have our high ideas that were first identified in our founding documents that we should endeavor to live by to the extent possible, but I think it would be a mistake to confuse the rise of ISIS is a freedom seeking people that desire to form a governance that is the best interests of those who will fall under its influence. It doesn't appear to be anything less than a tyrannical form of governance, and even that is too kind.
Furthermore, it isn't a stretch to state ISIS is a threat to the economic and security interests of our allies, partners, and the U.S., and we reserve the right to self-defense.
As for states and their borders, I suspect many in the region will disagree with you, and instead believe their borders are critical to their security and economy. Certainly understand your point about borders softening despite the best efforts of states to maintain them, but I suspect states won't relinquish control without a fight. Whether we help, oppose, or remain neutral will most likely be determined on a case by case basis as it relates to our perceived interests.
I understand your point about repairing our influence, but that can be argued. Repair our influence with who? If we side with the people against the state, then all state governments will begin to see us a threat to their stability, which will reduce our influence. I don't think is as black and white as you make it out to be.
If I were to sum this situation in just three words, they would be Governance, Power and Trust.
People long out of power, or under systems of governance built around these religion-based identities with no trust between those in power and those out of power, are acting out to either become the ones in power or to carve out dirt where they can form new systems of power and governance in which they can trust.
The states exist in name only, and there is nothing magical or essential about modern borders drawn by French and British politicians 100 years ago for their own selfish purposes. Certainly nothing worth the ocean of American blood, treasure and provocation they would take to enforce and sustain.
Mindless defense of the status quo, or shaping and sustaining governments we think best for us over the protests of their own people was never good, and is now unnecessary as well. We need a new game plan based on a clearer perspective about who we are, and how to best be that America in the world that actually exists today.
This will preserve our interests and repair our influence.
I certainly don't think we can defeat the so called radical Islam movement, but we probably do need to manage it with military and paramilitary action to reduce the threat to our homeland and our interests globally.
I'm not on the ground in Iraq, but accept there is great frustration with the government in Baghdad, especially among the Sunnis, yet I remain skeptical this is truly a populist movement. I didn't see to many populist movements in Iraq during my time there, but saw several factions (within each ethnic group) using coercion to gain advantageous and power. Time will tell, but I doubt IS has popular support.
While we may not have the ability to defeat the larger Islamist movement, since it is based on idea, I don't think that prevents us, if we choose to do so, from defeating the current IS with military action. The million dollar question is what comes after the IS is defeated?
Iraq and Syria still exist as States, even though they lost control of some regions within their states. It is certainly possible to reestablish control if they have access to sufficient military resources to do so. Not arguing this feasible, desirable, or anything other than it is possible. You could argue that France wasn't a state under German occupation, but the State was re-established in quick order after the Germans were defeated. Is it really dangerous to think of them as states if we also recognize the other players (non-state, quasi-state) also?
As for a balanced response, any military targeting in the so called IS will not be balanced. It will of necessity be very biased as it should be; however, what concerns me is the potential long term strategic impact to our interests will be if we work solely through the Kurds. The Kurds are friends of the U.S., but they're also enemies of many different groups in Northern Iraq (not just the ISIS/IS). I hope we're thinking through the second order effects over time of overtly partnering with them. Personally, like most of us who worked with the Kurds like them, and we believe they have a better vision for Iraq than other ethnic groups (as long as your Kurdish), but I recall well the havoc and anger they created when they displaced non-Kurds from their homes (their homes for decades) by claiming the Arabs, Turks, etc. were living on Kurdish land. If we're ready to accept a Kurdistan then full steam ahead. If not, we may want to reconsider.
Bill---you have hit an interesting point---which is seldom discussed in the ME--the core issue is that in reality the Christians as a whole are in many minorities and sub minorities regardless where they reside in the ME.
Much of this goes back to the Romans and then the Crusades and the rise of Islam, the Ottoman empire and then back to Islam along the way having colonial powers giving tone and the direction.
Robert is right---it will take generations for what the Arab Spring called into play to quiet down and that means as well how non Islamic minorities will be treated by the Sunni and the Shia---notice the IS also attacks the Sufi as well as Christians as well as secular Sunni's--understand the Takfiri view of Islam and the world around them then one will understand what comes next.
Right now all is in play including Jordan, and Turkey--both who have as well Christian minorities.
The principle issue is the Sunni-Shia rift, but don't dismiss the impact on Christians and Christians on the conflict. Not unlike the Muslim Ummah, Christians also have a global community/identity group that transcends nationality (politics are not always local). If it is perceived that Christians are being targeted, and they are, in Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Nigeria, etc. that Christian community will pressure their governments to intervene. Locally and tactically wiping out a small ethic group may seem relatively insignificant, but strategically it could be a Tsunami that changes the nature of the conflict in ways that can't be predicted.
See MF---one can throw all the modern weapons in the world at the IS but in the end they are fighting with basic infantry weapons and equipment captured from their "enemies" and yet they are rolling over all in their way regardless of what laser guided bombs, Hellfires, and barrel bombs are dropped or how much artillery is fired at them.
So what is the explanation for this ability? Sometimes in an asymmetric fight simple is the best way forward. Notice the trend to remain with the light trucks---and not the captured 114s--which have now been seen carrying the fight to the Assad army.
And is it all about the Sunni/Shia divide that has not been solved for 1400 years---maybe we are in fact seeing their "reformation" in progress.
But it is being carried out by the two regional powers both of whom represent their religious factions.
Robert is correct the area of Lebanon, Syria and Iraq are in the process of having their borders and the populations in those "old" borders redrawn following basically religious, ethnicity and cultural lines. And it effects Turkey, Iran, Jordan, and finally yes even Israel.
As this redraw is ongoing --it will also affect the relationships of the Chinese, US, and Russia as well as the EU.
Is that not what Putin is demanding he has the ability to do when he states he is protecting Russian civilians regardless of where they reside?
Again we need to sit this one out or be drawn back into a war we will never get out of for at least 15 years.
<blockquote>Many seem to want to make this a Christian vs Islam "thing" it goes far deeper and as long as the regional hegemony issues between the views of the Shia side expressed initially by Khomeini and now Khamenei and the views of the Sunni as expressed and defended by the KSA are not addressed by those players there is really nothing the West can do.</blockquote>
Except it goes far beyond a Sunni vs. Shia fight. The radicals of both Islamic variations also wish to rule or already run theocracies be it Iran in one case or its counterpart proclaimed Islamic State. There is no equivalent to sharia law elsewhere outside the Islamic world. In addition, no other current primarily secular state or religion persecutes others just because they are not Muslims.
When so many of the IS fighters are of foreign origin, many from Europe, the West is not left with the option of doing nothing. Your link here basically states that we can't figure out ISIS/ISIL and its leadership. It may be true that few saw that ISIS would rise to such prominence. However, we see no current shortage of State Department, and military and civil agency intelligence predictions that it means trouble outside the confines of Iraq/Syria.
We conveniently ignore that boots on the ground in Germany and Korea led to decades of peace there with no Cold War evolution into WWIII. We forget Jimmy Carter's rare triumph in preventing additional repeats of the two major Arab-Israeli wars by getting multinational boots on the ground in the Sinai as a buffer. Those prior wars of '67 and '73 resulted in far more casualties than recent Israel conflicts and had there been future ones, it may have led to WWIII. Likewise, had we done nothing in the Balkans and greater genocide of Muslims had occurred, it could have further inflamed radical jihadists. That timeframe also under a Democratic administration saw Operations Northern and Southern Watch, the no-fly zones over Iraq.
So why can't there be an equivalent coalition action originating from Kurdish territory, Turkey, and aircraft carriers that targets ISIS/ISIL/IS over the long term just as Northern and Southern Watch did? Put UAS/RPA, fighters, and Army attack aviation in Kurd territory along with some GMLRS in a repeat of Task Force Hawk that failed due to mud and inexperience. In an Army with over a decade of combat experience, those same failures are unlikely. Tell me Outlaw that your cat's meow will survive an encounter with an AH-64E, JDAM, and UAS/RPA Hellfires.
Why is it necessary and not just a regional civil war? Civil Wars typically lack $2 billion in stolen and black market funds to fund terror and WMD attacks outside the region. Civil Wars lack aspirations to kill Westerners and Israelis, not to mention other Muslims from other nations. Placing limited combat forces back into Iraq is a "strategy of using force the day before to prevent escalation to more lost blood and treasure the day after." Prior Democratic administrations have not ignored world problems, thinking they would go away on their own. Why does this one bury its head in the sand?
This is exactly why I say one has to understand Islam but not attack Islam---it is about the players and how they think, act and engage their populations. Engage the players not their religion.
Many seem to want to make this a Christian vs Isalm "thing" it goes far deeper and as long as the regional hegemony issues between the views of the Shia side expressed initially by Khomeini and now Khamenei and the views of the Sunni as expressed and defended by the KSA are not addressed by those players there is really nothing the West can do.
I took hits here when I would often mention the "Green Crescent" concept as envisioned by Khomeini--but it was real and is now at the heart of this Sunni/Shia clash and we the West need to stay of out of this cat fight---protect unarmed and terrorized civilians when possible--provide as much humanitarian support as is earthly possible but stay of the fight until the dust settles. Assistance also means trying to get the various players to at least talk to each other but not the US supporting one side or the other.
So we the US bomb the IS--they simply change battlefield tactics and keep expanding, he rush arms and aid into the Kurds and at some point they will declare independence and cause a huge amount of pain with say Iran and the Turks.
We still by the way really know nothing about al Baghdadi, what drives him, how did he make his up the food chain, and how he envisions the new Caliphate which has gained support from other AQ North African groups.
Sometimes as brutal as it seems--the local populations have to hash this out not the West.
In all this hectic about the IS---one never hears small voices saying "what about the day after"?
Do we the US and for that matter in general the West have a "strategy for the day after" when the dust finally settles?
No not really.
I had asked here in a comment---what was it the intel community missed when al Baghdadi was first in Abu G and then four years in Bucca---this link below shows someone is still trying to answer that after nine years.
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/08/14/isis-still-baffles-us-…
What is going on in Syria and Iraq was not created by ISIS. To attempt to "defeat" ISIS would only suppress the popular movements and grievance they draw their strength from at best, and probably only modify the leadership in some small way.
What is going on in Syria and Iraq is not a military problem and therefore has no military solution. Sure, there is room for military action. Military forces can act to mitigate the high end of violence that affects the people of the region as old, obsolete and inappropriate systems of governance are leveled to make way for better systems to someday emerge (a process that can take generations, btw); military forces can temporarily suppress or disrupt the symptoms of the underlying problem; and lastly, military forces can help to create time and space for those civil leaders who actually own the problems of governance that are energizing this mess. But "defeat"? Not likely.
In truth, the states of Syria and Iraq no longer exist. This is now a region of factions built around core identities supported by ideologically aligned militias. What once was the Iraqi government and military is now just another such faction and militia. Likewise Syria. These are "zombie states". Much like what happens to a person in that current popular genre of fiction once bitten, these states have turned, and no longer are what they once were. They may look like states and we may still think of them as states, but make no mistake, to do so is dangerously misguided.
We supported a similar zombie state in Lebanon in 1983. In truth, we were perceived as Christian Americans coming to the support of the Christian Maronite faction and militia; and were therefore attacked by the Muslim factions.
If the West acts at all in the region once occupied by the states of Syria and Iraq (Zombieland?) we should do so in a manner that is equally balanced across all of the major factions. Not to defeat what cannot be defeated, or to restore what is not restorable; but do shape the region in line with the three missions I outline above, with the purpose of posturing ourselves for influence with all of the parties with whatever emerges going forward.
Mr. West's advocacy lacks realism in key details:
- Iraq isn't going to relinquish its sovereignty in exchange for U.S. military intervention. It's something that has to be negotiated.
- Iraq's Shia leadership isn't going to accede to a U.S. zero sum position that entirely shuts out the Iranians.
- The Iranians are politically capable of lining up with the United States, as seen in its accepting the American supported pick for the new Iraqi prime minister. In my opinion, West's position would repeat the gross mistake made in 2002 where the United States pocketed Iranian assistance with intelligence and influence over the United Front during OEF, only to forthwith resume a hostile attitude.
- The American public is against sending a ground force back to Iraq. Really, West should be advocating CAS and attack missions, embedding JTACs, and dispatching SF teams.
- I also think the more reliable ground force partner in the Syrian theater of operations against IS is the SyAA and NDF. However, that requires admitting our American policy toward Syria contributed to the rise of IS, which might enabke a corresponding oreign policy realignment towards the Syrian government.
I read Bing's article twice and wondered whether these two passages negated his whole argument: 'Muslim ground forces to push the Islamists out of Iraq and Syria' and 'Muslim leaders have failed their people'.
Which Muslim armies are ready for such a campaign today or tomorrow? Not one I would contend, nor in an alliance of the willing. Then he assumes the very same failed leaders will act. There are few leaders in the local, Arabic-speaking Muslim world who answer to their people.