Don’t Hold Colombia Up as a COIN Model to Emulate

Significantly enhanced and expanded upon:

I like to start my arguments from the standpoint of the (1) often not addressed by others but (2) most important aspect of these discussions, which is: the United States' overarching and overriding foreign policy objective, to wit: the transformation of "different" states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines; this, so as to cause these "different" states and societies to become more capable of both benefiting from, and providing for, the global economy.

One can see this common overall focus and goal (if not common overall success) in our actions in Colombia and the Philippines, and in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Egypt, Libya, etc.

Thus, it is in this specific regard (common overall foreign policy objective of transforming outlying states and societies more along modern western lines) that such states as Colombia and the Philippines are held up as examples of some degree of "progress" and success.

Likewise, it is in acknowledgement of this common goal and starting point (state and societal transformation) and progress made along these lines (Colombia and the Philippines) that individuals, such as Admiral Stavridis I believe, promote the usefulness of certain general methodologies used in Colombia and the Philippines.

Thus, to understand Admiral Stavridis' suggestions re: common methodology, one must, I believe, understand and acknowledge:

a. Where he and the United States are coming from.

b. Where he and the United States intend to (or wish to) go.

c. And how he, and the United States, hope to get there.

Here again I think we must understand that Admiral Stavridis, and the United States (as opposed to others), are thinking and acting:

a. Not so much in tactical terms (quell the insurgency; establish or re-establish order and "stability") but, rather,

b. More in strategic terms (use the opportunity presented by the conflict to transform the subject states and societies more along modern western lines).

If only "stability" (rather than "transformation") was our overarching foreign policy objective, then one would expect that the United States would embrace ideas such as those presented by COL Jones.

Given, however, that these such ideas are not readily embraced, this should tell us that "stability" -- achieved along whatever political, economic and social lines is necessary -- is (1) not our objective nor (2) something that we will allow.

Rather both our rhetoric, and our actions, should indicate to us all (much as it does to our enemies) that we are determined, at this point and time in history, to, once again, knowingly sacrifice "stability" so as to achieve the political, economic and social changes that we desire in "different" states and societies.

Thus we find ourselves, in my way of thinking, in much the same place as we did during America's Civil War when, then as now, we determined to sacrifice "stability" so as to achieve what is/was perceived to be our more-pressing and more-important objective: the transformation of "different" states and societies more as we desire.

This overriding/overarching strategic objective being the matter that "drives" Admiral Stavridis, and the United States, to consider and suggest "common" (rather than "individual or tailored") approaches to dealing with, not "insurgencies" (wrong focus), but, rather, states and societies which are not organized, ordered and oriented as the United States requires.

To conclude:

The author of this article in "Cicero Magazine" wishes us to focus on the harm done to/the price paid by the civilian population re: the transformation of Colombia.

This, I believe, underscores my argument above, to wit: that the temporary loss of "stability" -- as in the case of both America's and Colombia's civil wars -- is the well-understood price that we believe often must be paid to achieve, then as now, our strategic state and societal transformation goals.

As we all know, there are many models for many things that occur in life and nature. I am more comfortable saying that "there are no absolutes," but of course, that is an absolute statement in of itself.

We should probably all just keep an open mind. One obstacle to keeping an open mind on topics such as insurgency and counterinsurgency is that the military codifies its understanding of this naturally occurring political disturbance and the associated family of governmental responses with doctrine and definitions. While we need to place such marks on the ground to derive common language and actions - they work equally to trap us into perspectives that may be much more about the history, culture, bias and experience of the authors, organizations and nations they represent, than they are about a true, pure, fundamental understanding of the problem itself.

While the US experience in Colombia and the Philippines are often rolled out as good examples of what "right" looks like in regards to COIN - one does well to remember that both of those countries are decades, if not centuries, away from resolving the conditions of insurgency that reside deep within the fabric of each.

Perhaps the best one can say accurately is that in each the US did little harm, and actually provided a little good as well. Both are equally important. As in places like Iraq and Afghanistan we did tremendous amounts of both good and harm, and in the end the effects of the harm tend to win out.

So what was unique about Colombia and the Philippines? Several things, I will list a few that I believe to be particularly important, but it is an incomplete list at best. (And certainly are much more tenets to consider in planning operations to help some partner or ally prevent or resolve an insurgency, than they are a "model" that will simply generate a successful answer for any set of facts if only the right data is fed into the hopper).

1. Recognize the limits of military power in resolving insurgency.
The military can help mitigate the high end of violence; it can help create time and space for civil authorities to understand and resolve what is resolvable; and can disrupt or suppress for some period of time the actions of an insurgent group. But history does not show us much hope that a military can "defeat" or resolve insurgency itself.

2. Apply the flagpole test.
If the flag at the top of the highest pole is not that of your own nation, then you are not conducting COIN, you are simply helping some other conduct COIN. Calling this activity FID helps remind us that we are not in charge and to stay in a proper role with our actions. When we begin an operation by blowing out the existing system of governance and have to start from scratch, but have no intent of making that place the 51st state, we create a very large hole for ourselves that is nearly impossible to claw out of.

3. Respect the sovereignty of the host.
Regardless of how inept, unsophisticated, inexperienced, or whatever rationale we are apt to apply to justify why our sovereignty should trump that of the host for some period of time, we must resist that urge. In Colombia and the Philippines we did this, in most other places where we are struggling we have not.

4. Appreciate that legitimacy is in the eye of the beholder, not the fiat of some foreign governing body.
Who we recognize as the "legitimate government" is interesting, but it is who the various population groups recognize as having a right to govern them that is essential. Typically the population groups supporting the insurgent have either lost faith in the system of governance over them, or they have never recognized its legitimacy but have been forced to endure it. To overly fixate on legal legitimacy leads us to see those who disagree as "the enemy." By being more open minded we are less likely to set out to force or bribe non-aligned populations into accepting the government wanted by us, and more likely to work in a more neutral manner to help increase the percentage of the population who recognize the legitimacy of governance in general. This will typically demand that governance makes reasonable concessions (think US Civil rights acts, or the very similar Bangsamoro concessions made by the government of the Philippines as examples).

5. Recognize that actions perceived as appropriate are equally important as actions being deemed as legal.
We are a nation of laws, and tend to draw too much comfort in rationalizing highly inappropriate activities simply because the lawyers assure us they are legal.

6. The intended strategic effects of all actions should be to positively influence the perceptions of a wide range of audiences.
We overly fixate on the objective, immediate, local, first-order effects of our actions - and then believe that the sum of well executed operations will somehow add up to produce our desired strategic effect. If the insurgency we attempt to counter is a resistance insurgency this is possibly true - but if it is an internal revolutionary insurgency, then strategic success is if our actions serve to help shape perceptions in a positive way among the population the insurgent group(s) draw upon.

7. Military commanders will always want more authorities, but we tend to do better the less authority we have.
Authorities for foreign military action invariably chip away at perceptions of the legitimacy and sovereignty of the host. We will ask for greater authority in the belief that greater tactical leeway will generate greater strategic effect. Too often the counter-productive strategic effects on perceptions of the host nation governance far outweigh any good generated at the tactical level.

I will stop there, but the discussion should continue. It is also wise to remember that US SOF had decades of experience in both Colombia and the Philippines, and had accrued a level of understanding, influence and relationships that we lack in many places where we have struggled and continue to struggle in recent years. It is much easier to design and implement appropriate activities, when one first understands what appropriate looks like.

DOL,

Bob

I wish to chime in on the idea that phenomena observed and decisions taken in one country’s or region’s experience with irregular warfare can be useful as lessons, maybe not as models. Of course we should study others’ experiences. Colombia’s national armed forces have been tasked to confront large, well-funded armed opponents for over a half century. In other words, we speak of institutions involved in irregular warfare for a period that spans the US experience in Vietnam, its recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and all the time in-between, within a national territory that is almost as large as the later two combined. That history cannot be summarized easily. In a search for best or worst insurgent or counter-insurgent practices, it might do a disservice, given the ample universe of human and physical geographies involved in that war, to simplify possible lessons onto an abbreviated on-off moral ledger. In consideration of taking the ‘Colombian cure’ as it might be aggregated into some suite of governmental military or internal security decisions, I agree it is appropriate to consider the moral content and intent of decisions, as well as the unintended moral consequences of the otherwise well-meant. Still, if we are going to put moral weight on our consideration of the Colombian case, we will be best served by historical thoroughness. I offer as overall guidance for assigning proper moral weight to the various decisions taken and not taken by the Colombians (recognizing that I am presuming authority to make any such suggestion) that we should go nowhere near allowing moral equivalency (of the FARC and the government) to enter into our thinking. Such equivalency would be no more reasonable than to suggest that Hamas and the Israeli government are moral equivalents. The FARC is culpable for immense ecological damage, the sewing of hundreds of thousands of landmines (and their repulsive consequences) and thousands of kidnappings, assaults and murders. Their stated purpose has always been to take power by force. Perhaps they should be lauded because they are not ‘into’ public beheadings? The FARC leadership has spanned almost a dozen democratically elected presidencies. Surely all of those Colombian presidents and all of the senior military officers working for those presidents made moral errors. Meanwhile, the FARC’s leaders willfully committed heinous violent felonies by the tens of thousands. Only through a dizzying, contemptuous, cynical use of argumentational logic could we place the behavior of Colombia’s formal military leaders (with the exception of two or three rogue personalities) on the same moral plane as any member of the entire leadership of the FARC.

There are no models. We should not be searching for one because there is no one size that fits all. That said we should perhaps look to those who developed strategy for Colombia and examine their strategic calculations and learn from them. We should not emulate Colombia but we should consider emulating the strategic thinking done by those who developed the strategy (both Colombians and Americans).