Peace and War: The Space Between by Nadia Schadlow, War on the Rocks
President Obama’s commitment to reducing America’s reliance on the military instrument of power is well-known. It has been a constant theme of his presidency – from his first presidential campaign through his major speech on foreign policy at West Point earlier this year. It is therefore paradoxical that the administration’s foreign policy outlook and operational style have made use of the military instrument almost unavoidable. By failing to understand that the space between war and peace is not an empty one – but a landscape churning with political, economic, and security competitions that require constant attention – American foreign policy risks being reduced to a reactive and tactical emphasis on the military instrument by default…
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Madhu above asks: "How does a military ... think about peace."
Given that, in the United States, the military acts at the pleasure of our civilian leaders, then I believe that we must start by asking: "How do our national leaders think about peace -- and -- what do our national leaders think our military should be thinking about in times of peace?"
Today (much as in the past) the answer to this question would seem to be that our national leaders want our military to think about peace as a time in which it must be prepared to engage in "small wars" -- in support of national efforts -- to transform and "open up" other states and societies such that they might better accommodate our civilization's ideas and better accommodate our civilization's political, economic and social interests.
Thus, from C. E. Caldwell:
"The great nation which seeks expansion in remote quarters of the globe (in times "peace?") must accept the consequences. Small wars dog the footsteps of the pioneers of civilization in regions afar off." (Items in parenthesis are mine.)
Or, as Andrew Bacevich might say:
"Crusades (to expand one's civilization and one's way of life) mean work for soldiers." (Emphasis added.)
Thus it is in this manner, I believe, that our national leaders want our military personnel to think about "times of peace," to wit: as a period in which it (the military) must be prepared act -- in unison with our other "instruments of power" -- to engage in "small wars" to expand our civilization via the "opening up" of other states and societies to our ideas, to our values, attitudes and beliefs and (thereby) to our political, economic and social interests.
To describe peace you have to describe what war is, and presumably the absence of war would be a condition we could call peace. The waters have been muddied though, or maybe they always were, since we don't have an acceptable definition for war. During the Cold War we described all efforts short of war to impose our will (or the USSR imposing their will on us) as political warfare. Can we conduct political warfare (sponsor insurgencies, subversion, sabotage, etc.) and still be at peace? Can an adversary declare war on us, but since we refuse to declare war on them, could it be they're at war and we're in an uneasy peace as Bob defined it? Is this debate even worth having? Does it matter? Why doesn't Congress declare war anymore? The space in between war and peace has always been gray, how we manage it is critical to our national security, and maybe defining it would be unhelpful because definitions by definition are restrictive in what is included and what isn't. Complexity, dangerous, uncertainty, emergence, and 20 other buzz phrases that reflect our world indicate to me we need to be flexible and agile in how we respond to opportunity and challenges, but that requires keeping our overall aim on our long term ends which a prosperous and secure country, and the protecting/creating the international system that supports that end.
One parting thought, is peace a bi-lateral condition? We're at peace with Canada, Australia, etc. and not so at peace with others? If peace then only defines the relationship between two countries, and not an overall general condition with all actors, both state and non-state, does it have utility as a concept in our national security strategy?
This is a good conversation.
If there is such a thing as war, why can't there be such a thing as peace? This is another civilian-military culture clash, isn't it, especially for those involved in the more "shadow wars" aspect of military activity. From that perspective, it probably is "all war all the time," but I think Robert makes a good point. How does a military, especially one taught to be active during the Cold War and GWOT, think about peace? So too for civilian agencies bulked up during the process?
Mankind has long struggled with the concept of nothingness, and "zero" is the object we wedge into that void. http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/what-is-the-origin-of-zer/
Kind of like the algebraic use of "x" in an equation that fills the gaps unaddressed by our current understanding of the facts until the critical fact can ultimately be derived.
For the past 12 years (much longer really) the US has applied assumed values for the variables unsupported by facts in our response to 9/11, and have come over time to believe those assumptions to have turned into facts - even when the reality of events around us suggest the opposite is more likely true.
Our government as a whole has misunderstood the problems we face and over-employed the military in hot pursuit of the symptoms of those problems in a naïve belief that somehow that could make the problems themselves disappear. Instead those problems have grown stronger, more distributed and more resilient to these symptomatic efforts - as have the symptoms themselves.
We have called peace "war" to generate the authorities and rationale necessary to pursue this line of illogic, and it has not worked. Sure, "we have not been attacked," but as Napoleon sagely once commented "never interrupt your opponent when he is making a mistake."
Of all of our governmental organizations the one perhaps the most uncomfortable with nothingness is the military. For a military with nothing to do is a military in need of serious down-sizing so that it does not rob too mightily from everything else a government must do.
We have over-engaged, and it has not worked. Now, as we prepare to move forward, we have somehow captured the strategic lesson that our future success will come from over-engagement as well. I find that a difficult proposition to support with clear eyes and unbiased mind.
Certainly there is work for aspect of our military to do in peace to help prevent, deter and mitigate any future war. But this is peace all the same, not some phase 0 preamble to a coming conflict. Such prophesies tend to fulfill themselves when pursued aggressively enough. Why tempt the fates?
Our Strategic Naval and Air assets have a critical role to play. Yet we mortgage the future on the F35. Foreign armies are only welcome when greater threats loom large. Thus the role for a large army presence in Western Europe during the Cold War stand off. There is little to justify much of a foreign army presence today. Sure Russia reasonably presses back at our own pressing of NATO into it first, but there is little threat of a major Russian offensive. It simply isn't in there interests. Frankly, overly expanding NATO is not in our interest either. At a certain level we should thank Russia for reminding us of that fact prior to our creating an irreconcilable situation.
Building Partner Capacity has become our battle cry for phase 0 engagements, as if we were some reincarnation of the British Empire, raising foreign forces to carry the brunt of our future wars. But where has capacity building borne the promised fruit? In Iraq? Afghanistan? Both are abject failures given the time, cost and promise applied. But where we have focused more on developing our own understanding of some place and the people who live there; where we have nurtured true and enduring relationships between individuals and institutions - these are the places where we have had influence to shape at low cost and low provocation events favorable for our national interests, and those of the partner or allied nation as well.
I'm just saying we can do better. In fact, we must do better, and waging peace as war and encumbering it with phase 0 "logic" is not the likely path to better.
Edited and expanded upon:
Let me address this idea that (1) a tactical mindset (2) dominates national security decision-making by (3) prioritizing military means over political ends, thereby, (4) confusing "activity" (such as bombings of enemy positions) with progress.
First in this analysis, I believe, we must articulate "political ends," which might, for variety's sake, be described as our nation's enduring goal of "modernizing" (along modern western lines) the non/less-modern states and societies; first those within our own country and then those throughout the world.
Next, let us look to history to confirm these suspicions; wherein, it appears that our military forces were, indeed, used as a/the primary means/method by which the United States set about transforming outlying states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines (some of these transformations, of course, still being in the rather early and tentative stages).
Historical examples here might be:
a. In the 19th Century, the significant use of our military forces -- for state and societal transformation purposes -- in the American West and in the American South.
b. In the 20th Century, the significant use of our military forces -- for state and societal transformation purposes:
1. In Germany and Japan (during and following World War II). And
2. Re: the Soviet Union and China (during, and increasingly now after, the Cold War).
In each of these historical instances, might we say that the use of our military force was -- generally speaking and re: state and societal transformation -- directly connected to operational plans for subsequent political consolidation?
Yet, somehow today, we are unable to see our military forces being used in this same enduring (and historically accurate?) light.
This, giving rise to suggestions that, due to our unenthusiastic and inadequate application of our military forces, we have, somehow, (1) abandoned the space between war and peace and (2) compromised our enduring and historical national security objective (outlined by me above).
We might, I suggest, wish to look at this another way; this being:
a. We (obviously) have not changed our overriding political objective -- of transforming "different" states and societies more along modern western lines. (In this regard, see Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Libya, etc.)
b. Nor have we "abandoned the space between war and peace."
c. Rather what we have done -- of late -- is attempt to achieve our enduring and historical foreign policy objective (state and societal transformation) via different ways and different means, to wit:
1. With "diplomacy" and "development" in the lead. And
2. With "defense" now only bringing up the rear. (As opposed to the reverse way that we did these things until recently.)
By using these such "instruments of power" in this different order and in this different manner, does this mean that we have (1) abandoned the space between war and peace and (2) abandoned our historical political objective?
I think, in both of these instances, the answer to these questions is a resounding "NO."
To sum up:
What we are witnessing today would only appear to be:
a. The application of the well-announced re-ordering of the use of our "instruments of power" (diplomacy and development then defense -- instead of -- defense in the lead). And
b. The results, thus far, of this attempt at using these ways and means in this different order/manner.
Thus, "limited bombing of enemy positions" to be seen, not so much from the "tactical unconnected to strategy" perspective, or re: the "abandoning the space between war and peace" charge but, rather, from the perspective of our new "defense in the rear" foreign policy strategic approach?
Bill,
Phase 0 isn't a real phase just as zero isn't a real number, it is a term we use to describe steady-state operations, something prior to phase 1, 2, etc., while also a place we endeavor to prevent the necessity of subsequent phases while simultaneously preparing to execute contingencies. I have no idea what Bob is talking about when he refers to a clumsy planning process for Phase 0, since we don't have a planning process for phase 0, steady-state, or whatever we eventually end up calling this place. It is a free play zone for the services and staffs to pursue whatever they like despite claims to the contrary of a unified approach. I think there is a movement to treat it as something important, as important as war and operationalize as such. Some call it activities to win the peace, a bit simplistic, but a start. To be effective at winning the peace and disrupting threats to our interests requires a higher level of interagency and jointness between the services than we currently enjoy in this place or phase.
Bob can call it an uncomfortable peace, I can call it a low intensity form of war. Words have meaning, so I agree with Bob that the difference in describing the environment can frame our view in ways that are not helpful. In my view, I see governments and non-government actors using various forms of coercive action to include low to not so low levels of violence to pursue their ends, so from a military view I think we need to accept this as a form of warfare short of war, or a lower former of war. I would challenge Bob to define war, since it does have legal implications and our Congress hasn't declared war since when? Our strategy doesn't have to address all the political injustices in the world (often identified as the underlying causes for conflict, although this is overly simplistic), it just needs to be aware of them, and protect our interests and our people in a way that hopefully doesn't make the situation worse like invading Iraq.
I think Bob is probably right about over engaging, and that our focus on capacity building is misguided. Everyone does assessments for the purpose of seeing if we're making towards our ends. An honest assessment (seldom see one) would clearly point out our capacity building efforts for the most part have and continue to fail, which would prompt a rational man to change behavior. We're not dealing with rational men, we're dealing with dogmatic institutions with deeply engrained bureaucracies that do what they do regardless of the result. This begs a question, if capacity building doesn't work, then what are the implications to our strategy? What replaces it as a line of effort, or how do we do it more effectively?
"Peace" being the period in which we attempt to achieve our political objective (such as outlying state and societal transformations) via ways and means other than war?
For example: More via diplomacy and development, rather than more via defense?
The fundamental problem with this concept, as would seem to relate to our current reality, is that the "enemy" seems to understand that he -- and we -- are still at war.
Herein we, after formally throwing down the gauntlet, have now attempted to leave the battle field.
While our enemy -- who formally picked up the gauntlet that we threw down -- has shown that he has no intention of doing the same.
Thus, from this perspective (the enemy has a vote), "Phase Zero Operations" to be considered as irrational, irrelevant, erroneous and/or OBE (overcome by events)? To wit: Something to be considered -- not for here and now -- but for another place and another time?
Thus, the difference between "our" perceptions (we are at peace) and "their" understanding (we are at war) helping to explain the perceived abandonment of the space between war and peace -- and the perceived disconnect between tactics, strategy, etc.?
Peace is always messy, and often involves low-level coercive and violent operations in various places where one perceives interests to reside. But this is levels of peace, not levels of war.
Most things are shades of peace, not shades of war. One of the smartest things the military could do is retire the clumsy and inartful "Phase 0" planning construct and seek to better understand our role in peace.
Fessing up, peace is an abstract utopia we strive for, it is not a condition of reality in the spectrum of conflict. The reality is we are always at some level of war. Not the western traditional concept of state on state war where traditionalists can apply mass against an adversary's army to supposedly reach a decisive result, but rather the application of violence and other forms of coercion to impose our will. It is subordinate to the state's policy for states, and the political leaders of non-state actors, so yes it is a form of war. The buzz phrase is shadow wars, often conducted out of sight in the shadows, but with Twitter, and every person with a Smartphone the report it seems everyone has a flashlight that can and does expose what is happening in the shadows. Soviets called these activities "active measures," we generally called them covert operations. None of it is new in concept, but in practice there seems to be some significant shifts.
From the linked article:
<blockquote>In Syria, at least as far back as 2006, when Bashar al-Assad called King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia a “half man,” Samantha Ravich, former Deputy National Security Advisor to Vice President Cheney, observed that Riyadh had sought to work with the United States and others to consider regime change in Syria. The door was open to combine U.S. expertise with Saudi resources to empower anti-Assad opposition groups, thus undercutting not only the Syrian regime itself but also Iran’s regional power – by undercutting its proxy in Damascus.</blockquote>
So, assisting a violent regime change is something <em>between</em> Peace and War?
If anyone tried to assist in regime change against the American government, would that be an act of war?
So....proxy warfare is something we Americans do during peacetime, and SF Phase Zero is simply <em>shaping the environment.</em>.
Just 'fess up. It's all war, all the time....
*By the way, I'm sure that little scenario would have worked. Just like regime change in Iraq kept all those jihadis out.
This is probably the most important and succinct critique of American national security decision-making:
QUOTE: The tactical mindset that dominates national security decision-making prioritizes military means over political ends and confuses activity (such as the bombing of enemy positions) with progress. Because the use of military force is not connected to operational plans for subsequent political consolidation, the United States vacates the space between war and peace. And because they cannot match American military power directly, it is in this space — battlegrounds of perception, coercion, mass atrocity — that America’s enemies and adversaries prefer to operate. END QUOTE
Thinking tactically is not limited to the military. We need to be able to achieve balance and coherency among ends, ways, and means. That is the art of "doing strategy." This provides a good description why we need to think strategically vice tactically in national security decision making.
QUOTE Finally, this tactical mindset provides an explanation for the apparent failure to appreciate how to leverage military force for strategic ends. This view leads to an under-appreciation of its broader deterrent value and the role that military forces can play in shaping security environments and consolidating tactical gains to ensure progress toward policy goals. Military forces – strong land forces especially – provide reassurance and tangible presence of American commitment. One of the key insights of the recently released National Defense Panel report was to make the important point that powerful U.S. military capabilities can shape events and provide options that may, by their mere existence, deter others from taking actions that require a U.S. military response. They help to establish the conditions to allow U.S. diplomats and policymakers to engage in that space between peace and war. END QUOTE