Breedlove: Allies Must Prepare for Russia ‘Hybrid War’ by John Vandiver, Stars and Stripes
NATO must help allies in the east bolster first-line defenses to counter any aggression from Russia, whose unconventional tactics in Ukraine could pose special challenges if deployed on alliance turf, Gen. Philip Breedlove, NATO’s top military commander, said Thursday.
Before the incursion of what Western officials say are regular Russian troops into Ukraine, Moscow stirred unrest in other ways during the early stages of the crisis, Breedlove said during an Atlantic Council event that coincided with the start of NATO’s two-day summit in Wales.
Russia’s utilization of troops without national uniforms — the so-called “little green men” — and perhaps “the most amazing information warfare blitzkrieg we have ever seen in the history of information warfare” were part of the first Russian push in Ukraine, Breedlove said…
Comments
<blockquote>"Indeed, with the end of the Cold War and new security concerns arising, the legitimacy and practice of external actors promoting democratic change in third world countries has steadily grown, as more and more states turn democracy promotion into one of their key foreign policy goals. A veritable democratic promotion industry has come into being ... "</blockquote>
I skimmed through most of your linked paper and found a number of things interesting. Thanks for the link as it supports my point. Perhaps the paper's quote that encompasses it all to me is in the conclusion:
<blockquote>Finally, we find it important to note that, as we have outlined in an earlier chapter, both actors (U.S. and EU) are more or less actively and consciously-exploiting models similar to their own history and constitutions and the idea of "Being like Us" is the quintessence of most western democracy promotion efforts.</blockquote>
To me that says that our own and EU democracy promotion efforts are much more talk and lead-by-example than action as budgeted amounts for such promotion will illustrate. She makes a point of mentioning top down efforts from the European Union which involve talk because little action is available to them. They spent only $174 million Euros on such promotion in 2005 and just $2.5 billion between 1991 and 2004. The U.S. between 1990 and 2003 spent more money from the bottom up with about $2.438 billion on Civil Society support of NGOs, $1.458 billion on Governance support of political parties, Parliament and local/community government, $1.219 billion on Rule of Law, and .687 billion on Elections. In other words the 13 year total is about what the Pentagon spent on the entire U.S. Army Gray Eagle "Predator-like" UAS program let alone the rest of the annual half-trillion Pentagon budget.
Overall the study says that U.S. funding on democracy increased from around $800 million at the beginning of the 19th century to $1.4 billion <strong>worldwide</strong> in 2005.
So when we compare and contrast monies spent promoting democracy since the end of the Cold War to Pentagon and other activities worldwide that involved greater kinetics and nation-building, there is no comparison. Israel and Egypt each get more U.S. aid <strong>each year</strong> than the Ukraine got over more than a decade for "democracy promotion."
Beyond that, as Henry Kissinger put it, "America is always exploiting or projecting a story about itself, even when it is not consciously trying to do so." The paper's author also quotes Kissinger saying "there is no surer way to turn millions of America's admirers into American opponents than to force an unfamiliar system on them."
She also quotes President Clinton back in 1992 who claimed that democracies are more likely to respect civil liberties, property rights, and rule of law within their own borders. He also mentioned that they are less likely to go to war with one another, sponsor terror, or threaten WMD use. Think about those views in the context of Putin's democratic Russia and <strong>his</strong> definition of his own borders.
Move Forward said:
"The problem is your recurring basic premise of the U.S. actively exporting Western ideals/democracy is flawed from the get go."
As to this (astonishing) contention, I found this interesting reading:
http://www.ie-ei.eu/IE-EI/Ressources/file/memoires/2008/BRUNNER.pdf
Here is an excerpt:
"Indeed, with the end of the Cold War and new security concerns arising, the legitimacy and practice of external actors promoting democratic change in third world countries has steadily grown, as more and more states turn democracy promotion into one of their key foreign policy goals. A veritable democratic promotion industry has come into being ... "
Move Forward also said:
"Imperialists of both camps are not attempting to expand Russian or Islamic identity."
I did not suggest, I believe, that imperialists in both camps were attempting to expand Russian or Islamic identity. What I did suggest was that:
a. The leaders in the Russian, the Islamic and the other opposing camps
b. Were using their own unique and individual "identities"
c. As the primary/principal means by which they might
d. Stand against the onslaught of alien/profane values, attitudes and beliefs -- and alien/profane ways of life -- which were
e. Being actively, and at times aggressively, pressed upon them by the West.
This being consistent, I believe, with my "threats to identity/defense by identity" thesis provided in my comment above.
Gotta hand it to you Bill C. You consistently attempt to organize your thoughts in an orderly, logical manner. The problem is your recurring basic premise of the U.S. actively exporting Western ideals/democracy is flawed from the get go. However, here is a great observation you made that ties into my own recurring theme of creating new borders if we go to war to align borders with “identity:”
<blockquote>The conflicts within which the United States finds itself involved today -- in the Russian borderlands, in the Middle East, and elsewhere -- can best be understood within the context of "threats to identity/defense by identity."</blockquote>
This observation is astute in terms of the identity part. The problem is your generalization of identity and inaccurate characterization that it is defensive in nature. For instance, very few Ukrainians are of Russian “identity.” The same is true for many other NATO lands where only small portions of the countries would identify their culture and background as Russian. If Russia made a good nature attempt to change borders diplomatically or expand federalism in small affected areas of NATO and other nations with Russian peoples that would be a good thing. Instead, we see aggressive imperialist movement and UW attempts that fool nobody except the Russian population.
The same lack of a generalized Muslim culture is true in the Middle East. Look at Sunnis of various beliefs from Egypt, Turkey that partially is quite secular, the GCC and Jordan, Shia from Iran (and Persian too) and Iraq, Kurds, Syrian Alawites, Palestinians, and Bedouin. Embedded in these majority Muslim areas also are Christians, Jews, and Yazidis and so on. Many of these Islamic identities have no beef with us whatsoever (except maybe our support of Israel) and are allies or friends in other instances. For instance, Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, and Egypt have substantial populations with no axe to grind regarding the U.S. and the same applies in Gulf States. Indian and Indonesian Muslims also are friends. It is the radicalization of Islamic identity within some borders that becomes problematic.
The truly errant premise that follows your initially quoted sentence above is this:
<blockquote>The United States has moved aggressively, post-the Cold War, to "open up" other states and societies -- to our way of life, to our way of governance and to our foundational values, attitudes and beliefs.
This has caused populations and leaders of certain nations and civilizations, thus threatened by the West, to adopt a defensive posture, illustrated, for example, by this quote:</blockquote>
This utterly ignores the natural trend for many to mimic aspects of the West due to the media, our economic success, and Western cultural appeal to their general populations. General Zinni notes in his current SWJ interview that post WWII Marshall and Japan assistance plans were highly successful. However, that assistance was within cultures of singular identity in borders restricted by island shores (Japan) or the redrawing of borders (decades of East/West Germany and Berlin) that included fences. Why are attempts to mimic that WWII assistance while training host nation forces and establishing effective government and stability not equally a good idea…if accompanied by redrawing borders, fences, and creating new governments of like identity?
We never moved aggressively in the 90s to “open up” Iraq, Somalia, Central America, the Philippines, or the Balkans and force our way of life and governance upon them. The intent of Desert Storm was to kick Hussein out of Kuwait. The intent in the Balkans was to prevent genocide and establish stability for people of like identities. Missions accomplished but larger missions left unfinished. We “thought” the Shia would eliminate Hussein on their own just as President Obama thought that without U.S. help the Sunnis could overthrow Assad. Mission not accomplished.
It took OIF to finish the job after the no-fly zone failed to stop Hussein or his atrocities to the Shiites and Kurds and oil was not flowing. It took our failure to redraw borders to screw up post-OIF stability operations followed by our failure to stick around with U.S. troops to finish the job. We thought Hussein had WMD. We were wrong as General Zinni points out in his SWJ interview. But Iraq and Syria <strong>did</strong> have WMD at one time and Pakistan has nukes that could fall into the wrong hands. Our motivation was and is not conversion of Iraqi Muslims to Christianity or Western ways. It was an attempt to rid Iraq and Syria of a dictator with a proven record of WMD use and attacks on Israel. Similarly, we fear radical extremist could get WMD and use them or other terror methods in the West.
As for the “defensive posture” of ISIS and Russia, perhaps you should reevaluate who actually has demonstrated “moving aggressively” and look up the definition of “offensive.” Then consider President Obamas statement the other night that partially vindicates and also disputes your notion of “identity.”
“ISIS is neither Islamic nor a state”
ISIS is an extremist aberration of Muslim beliefs. The same aberration might be said for Russian separatists who are neither oriented in a “defensive posture,” nor are they the majority even in east Ukraine, nor are they a state. They are thugs backed not so subtly by a former KGB thug. Instead of the half-year old article you cite earlier, I invite your perusal of a current article published 10 September that better describes the nature of both ISIS and the Russian separatists. The gist of the article is that irrational collective rage/anger and hatred is the common theme of both parties who actually are “moving aggressively.” Unfortunately, our “defensive posture” or more accurately our “sanction or ignore posture” better describes the U.S. posture up until recently.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/09/10/license_to_kill
From the above linked Foreign Policy “License to Kill” article:
<blockquote>It's also important to realize that the politics of collective anger is ultimately self-destructive. I don't think that the Islamic State is destined to survive for the long term; its nihilistic fury already has many other countries closing ranks against it. Meanwhile, there are also signs that Russia's fit of national pique is sending its economy into a tailspin -- and much of the destruction is actually self-imposed. Ideologies based on violence, hatred, and exclusion don't make a good basis for stability. But that's little source of consolation. The question is how much damage they can do before they burn themselves out.</blockquote>
Also, when I went to your March FP linked article, imagine my surprise to see this as the opening sentence and second paragraph.
<blockquote>A specter is haunting Europe, the specter of Russian imperialism.
When Vladimir Putin first came to power in 1999, he talked ideologically but acted rationally. He listened to a range of opinions, from liberal economist Alexei Kudrin to political fixer Vladislav Surkov -- people willing to tell him hard truths and question groupthink.</blockquote>
Imperialists of both camps are not attempting to expand Russian or Islamic identity. They are imposing their will and beliefs onto others. Your March article goes on to describe a Putin who has changed to become more of an ideologue than the pragmatist he started out as in 1999. But is he actually more of an ideologue now, or is he posturing for his own people to justify his imperialism?
I would suggest given former KGBer Putin’s frustration with the demise of Soviet influence and his lack of success in turning the Russian economy around, Putin is publically proclaiming an ideological game while pragmatically taking advantage of a closing window of opportunity.
What is that window of opportunity? I would suggest (without any proof other than his typically KGB mentality) that the following are the true factors Putin is considering:
• The Russian economy is tanking and a Western scapegoat is needed
• The West is too focused on ISIS and the Pacific Pivot to react strongly to Ukraine.
• Budget and election political considerations preclude the West from spending what is necessary right now and taxing accordingly
• As in the case of addressing Syria and ISIS, Putin knows the West is war weary and President Obama and his European counterparts will not place the troops on the ground actually required to address ISIS/Syria or deter Russia from new NATO bases and prepositioning.
• Gazprom faces a continued threat to its monopoly as Western sources of oil and clean energy increase
• Russians are moving <strong>on their own</strong> toward Western ideals and practices and a distraction is required to paint the West as bad and Russian values as good
• President Obama still has over 2 years left in his term offering Putin an opportunity to make gains now against a weak leader.
• The U.S. is far ahead in development of stealth and unmanned aircraft able to overcome Russian air defenses and crush their airpower. If Putin doesn’t act now, the West would be better equipped in the near future to launch an effective air war in defense of NATO countries despite Russian radar air defenses and 4th generation fighters. India has noted problems with the Pak FA T-50 so it seems unlikely given the F-22, B-2, F-35, and LRS-B and our remotely piloted aircraft capabilities that the Russians will ever catch us in terms of airpower launched from land or at sea.
The conflicts within which the United States finds itself involved today -- in the Russian borderlands, in the Middle East, and elsewhere -- can best be understood within the context of "threats to identity/defense by identity."
The United States has moved aggressively, post-the Cold War, to "open up" other states and societies -- to our way of life, to our way of governance and to our foundational values, attitudes and beliefs.
This has caused populations and leaders of certain nations and civilizations, thus threatened by the West, to adopt a defensive posture, illustrated, for example, by this quote:
"The pragmatic political fixer of the 2000s (Putin) now genuinely believes that Russian culture is both exceptional and threatened and that he is the man to save it. He does not see himself as aggressively expanding an empire so much as defending a civilization against the "chaotic darkness" that will ensue if he allows Russia to be politically encircled abroad and culturally colonized by Western values at home."
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/04/21/putin_s_empire_of_the_…
It is in this exact same light (defending one's civilization) that we might see the actions, thinking and motivations of certain actors in the Middle East and in other areas of the world. (Thus, they do not see themselves as aggressors and imperialists per se, but, rather, as defenders of their unique -- and in their minds exceptional -- identities, ways of life and civilizations.)
Here, in a nutshell I would suggest, is where we are at today.
So as "we" use our identity in an "offensive" mode, "they" have come to use their national and cultural identities to defend against our such actions.
Questions regarding how to deal with such defenders (prepare for hybrid war; use Article 5?) -- who use cultural conservatism/cultural defense as their primary weapon -- to be addressed within the "threats to identity/defense by identity" context offered by me above?
Bill M:
Okay, I'll concede a sematic point. Our 'elites', the genii inside the beltway do know the Russians are behind it. So I should restate, all it takes to paralyze the genii inside the beltway, our 'leaders', into confused, hand wringing inaction is for Vlad and the boys to say "It isn't us." and "How dare you?!"
Either way there is zero disincentive for Vlad not to continue his march to having "the Great" appended to his name.
<blockquote>Herein, we might come to understand that the West/NATO's efforts at expansion/democracy promotion -- in the Russian borderlands, in the Middle East, and elsewhere -- are not benign or welcomed activities.
But, rather, matters which cause (1) many horrible difficulties for (2) many different peoples.
</blockquote>
The problem seems to be that "most" mayors of the very large city (the U.S.) and "most" mayors of a smaller influential independent town (Israel) have grown very close over the years due to large diasporas and related heritage. A group of other larger economically-banded cities (Europe) also have agreements with the very large U.S. city and each other in economic agreements to form a bond and in Europe's case an economic union with a somewhat common currency and separate "police" forces under common NATO command and control.
Both the large city and the union of smaller cities, face a gang problem...gangs of bullies who really hate the small influential independent town. These gang members live in small numbers throughout the Western world and in very large numbers near the small influential independent town. Up until now they have been powerless to seize and wreak havoc in the small city of Israel because Israel has built strong fences and armed its citizens with many guns if gangs of bullies show up at their doorsteps.
Of course there are bad bully gangs in Eurasia as well. The Serbia bully with assistance from the Russian bully practiced genocide on some Muslim non-bullies in the Balkans. The U.S. and West European combined police forces joined forces to put a stop to that...a benign and welcomed activity...but the oppressed Muslim bullies later proved that no good deed goes unpunished. Earlier the Soviet bad bully gangs had muscled their way into Afghanistan...neither a benign nor a welcomed activity. The U.S. helped. Again no good deed goes unpunished. In 1990, one of the bad Muslim bullies seized another's land in Kuwait. The U.S. and NATO intervened in a benign and welcomed activity.
Again no good deeds went unpunished on 9/11 after we rid Afghans of the Taliban and al Qaeda, after ending Hussein's rule, and later due to ISIL because two mayors of the largest town failed to split the town of Iraq up into separate Sunni, Shiite, and Kurd suburbs with separate security forces, resources, and governments. That's OK, the Kurds pretty much did it on their own forming a new suburb. If our current mayor would work with Assad to split up Syria, and let the U.S., Saudis, Turks, and Kurds assume control of traditionally Sunni and Kurd areas, the ISIL problem eventually would disappear.
You can color it any way you so choose Bill C. We've heard your insistence that the U.S. tries to force feed its will onto others all the time in some sort of expansion of western ideals. We gave up on countering that most nations seek to be more like the West <strong>all on their own accord</strong>. We have repeatedly shown a willingness to help Islamic nations and peoples. But because we continue to support the small influential town called Israel that had every bit as much historical ownership of their lands as Palestinians, we continue to get bashed by Islamic extremists. We won't stop backing Israel. Extremists won't stop bashing the West. So there you go...its a wicked problem that has little to do with our often benign and welcomed activities.
Seems to me that many of the horrible difficulties for many different people are related to our unwillingness to split up like people into like nations. Heck California wants to split itself 6 ways. Some in Scotland want their own nation. We saw a split up of the former Yugoslavia into smaller nations that has restored relative peace. NATO has kept the peace in Europe despite Russian attempts to go the opposite way in history and re-seize prior owned territories and force others to live under Russian oppression. NATO won't make any attempt to expand or promote democracy under its member states. They happily jumped on that bandwagon long ago.
My analogy would be imagine a neighborhood with homes of widely varied value and size where one bad landlord (Germany) loses poker bets to both another equally bad landlord (USSR) and a friendly landlord (U.S. and West Europe) who both subsequently split all the German landlord's properties. One of the USSR's properties called Ukraine makes a deal to turn over all their big guns (nukes) to the USSR landlord in exchange for being left alone on their own property.
The Soviet bad landlord who now call's himself Russia then runs into hard times and must sell all its smaller properties at a price that the renters consider a good deal...and they buy them. The original bad German landlord's daughter (Merkel) many times removed who had some experience living under the Soviet bad landlord decided that she and a bunch of others wanted to expand their neighborhood watch and join forces with the good west landlord (NATO). If the Soviet bad landlord ever again decided to show up at former renter's door with a gun, lots of adjacent homeowners would show up with their own guns.
But the bad landlord's son many times removed proves that the apple doesn't fall far from the tree and he welches on earlier agreements with the homeowner Ukraine who already had paid in full. He claims that some of Ukraine's property belongs to him and tries to build a new fence claiming that property. Ukraine and Georgia had not joined the neighborhood watch so they were kind of out of luck. However, the rest of the neighborhood watch determines they must expand their gun collection and be more vigilant about future welching on legally owned properties.
Bill C:
I figure it this way, if something happens in Ukraine, or any other country that isn't Russia, and Vlad doesn't like it, tough luck. Sometimes your neighbors do things that you don't like and the law abiding just nod their heads and regret that they live in the neighborhood. Crooks, like Vlad, try to get their neighbors to do what they want them to do, not what their neighbors want to do. This is called being a bully. You stop bullies by punching them in the mouth. This is called promoting good civic relations and keeping the neighborhood peaceful. So when something happens in Ukraine that is not viewed by Vlad and the boys as welcome and benign, tough luck for them. Unless they are crooks, which they are. Then they try to push other people around. Now is the time for the neighbors to promote good civic relations and keep the neighborhood peaceful.
Or everybody can concede that Vlad can shove people around as he pleases, which would be a bad thing since Vlad has not shown any evidence of beneficence. He wants to be Vlad the Great, not Vlad the Good (and you should consider that he is a Russian and a KGB guy when figuring what he thinks he needs to do to be called the Great.)
The "feckless effete" at Foreign Affairs would -- in no way -- seem to be trying to justify the actions of mass murders.
Rather what this writer would seem to be trying to do is:
a. Properly identify who it was that "went over to a neighbors house and started a big fight in which shots were fired." This, so as to:
b. Properly assign responsibility/blame for the killings and other difficulties which occur because of this such action.
Herein, we might come to understand that the West/NATO's efforts at expansion/democracy promotion -- in the Russian borderlands, in the Middle East, and elsewhere -- are not benign or welcomed activities.
But, rather, matters which cause (1) many horrible difficulties for (2) many different peoples.
Bill C:
I arrested a guy once for going over to a neighbors house and starting a big fight in which shots were fired. Fortunately nobody was hurt. While we were processing him he kept saying "You would've done the same thing.", a variation of the 'can you blame me?' argument crooks always use to explain away their actions. Another variant of that argument is used by their relatives and supporters, the 'can you blame him?" argument.
When the guy asked us that we mostly ignored him but on occasion somebody would respond with "No, we would not have done that. Because we aren't crooks you dumb jerk!" So this is my response to the "can you blame him?" arguments made by feckless effetes at Foreign Affairs as they try to justify the actions of mass murderers, "He's a crook and a killer you dumb jerks!"
It would appear that it is West/NATO who is doing the aggression/expansion and Russia that is doing the defending/containing:
QUOTE
According to the prevailing wisdom in the West, the Ukraine crisis can be blamed almost entirely on Russian aggression. Russian President Vladimir Putin, the argument goes, annexed Crimea out of a long-standing desire to resuscitate the Soviet empire, and he may eventually go after the rest of Ukraine, as well as other countries in eastern Europe. In this view, the ouster of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014 merely provided a pretext for Putin’s decision to order Russian forces to seize part of Ukraine.
But this account is wrong: the United States and its European allies share most of the responsibility for the crisis. The taproot of the trouble is NATO enlargement, the central element of a larger strategy to move Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit and integrate it into the West. At the same time, the EU’s expansion eastward and the West’s backing of the pro-democracy movement in Ukraine -- beginning with the Orange Revolution in 2004 -- were critical elements, too. Since the mid-1990s, Russian leaders have adamantly opposed NATO enlargement, and in recent years, they have made it clear that they would not stand by while their strategically important neighbor turned into a Western bastion. For Putin, the illegal overthrow of Ukraine’s democratically elected and pro-Russian president -- which he rightly labeled a “coup” -- was the final straw. He responded by taking Crimea, a peninsula he feared would host a NATO naval base, and working to destabilize Ukraine until it abandoned its efforts to join the West.
END QUOTE
A discussion of what "the elites" understand/don't understand is found in the very next paragraph:
QUOTE
Putin’s pushback should have come as no surprise. After all, the West had been moving into Russia’s backyard and threatening its core strategic interests, a point Putin made emphatically and repeatedly. Elites in the United States and Europe have been blindsided by events only because they subscribe to a flawed view of international politics. They tend to believe that the logic of realism holds little relevance in the twenty-first century and that Europe can be kept whole and free on the basis of such liberal principles as the rule of law, economic interdependence, and democracy.
END QUOTE
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141769/john-j-mearsheimer/why-th…
Same general problem (the elites in the U.S. and Europe believe that the age of realism has ended and that the age of liberalism now rules) in the Middle East and elsewhere?
I think both of you are focused on the wrong issue, the elites and John Cue public know what is going on. You can call it political warfare, unconventional warfare, or hybrid warfare, but at the end of the day everyone knows Russia is behind it. That really isn't the issue, the only thing that matters is whether it threatens our, or our collective NATO interests, and if it does what are we going to do about it? Time to move beyond the argument the elites' don't get it. They got it from day one.
In lieu of having a real strategy the West responded with some limited sanctions, which will most likely prove to be ineffective (they usually are). In reality we're not seeing anything that is really new, and it isn't something we can't deal with if we choose to do so. Unfortunately there seems to be some fissures within NATO based on national interests (shocking I know), which complicates a collective response.
The real issue is NATO, and in our case U.S., policy that states how we will respond to this aggression is still missing in action. Once a policy is stated we can develop a strategy to counter or defeat what is threatening our interests. The policy is critical, for example, do we risk a major war with Russia over a non-NATO country? I suspect the answer is no, but the answer becomes more complex when it comes to another NATO country, and that is something that needs to be answered prior to it happening. It appears Putin doesn't want to risk major war either, which is why he is using this hybrid approach that stays below the redline. He even developed dominance in parts of the human domain in Ukraine which gave him a thin veneer of legitimacy with some actors, and confounded any easy options to liberate occupied areas (like we did in Kuwait during the first Gulf War). Obviously there are only a few places where he can implement this strategy, so it scopes what areas we need to focus on.
I would think that one course of action would be to implement a robust FID program in threatened NATO countries (and beyond if that is the policy) aimed at defeating Russian subversives/saboteurs. This obviously will be focused on intelligence and law enforcement to excise the cancer before it metastasizes. Military training may also be necessary to deter bored Russian soldiers from conducting combat operations there while they're on leave :-). We have the tools to fight this, the only thing missing is a policy and strategy, and despite our frustration it takes time to develop those, especially in a multinational environment. It is in no one's interest to have a major war, but missteps could easily lead to one, so being rash could be very unwise.
It is past time to move beyond the false argument that the elites and public don't know what is going on. They clearly do. The question is how do we respond, back to containment?
I don't quite understand what all the complicated talk is about. Regular Russian forces, paid by the Russian government and subject to Russian (Vlad the would be Great) government authority are shooting Ukrainians dead, lots of them, in an attempt to conquer Ukraine or part of it. The extent of their subtrifuge (sic) is to say (in Russian with a Russian accent) "I'm not Russian" when asked, take the patches off their uniforms and hire mercenaries. That's it. What the heck is so complicated or novel about that? If all it takes to pixillate the West is to deny who you are and not mark the uniform we got problems. Big problems. And it appears that is all it takes to completely mystify our "elites".
To inherently and fully understand the new Russian military doctrine of New Generation Warfare which is really a UW strategy in support to political warfare.
We must learn and have available via translations some of the insights being stated by Russian General Officers concerning this new doctrine and the impact it has had in the Ukraine.
This following link is a translation of a top Russian Generals' views towards and about that new doctrine--a really worthwhile read as it spot on in his assumptions.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-coalson/valery-gerasimov-putin-ukr…
The first two paragraphs of the translation are as the younger generation states "a hammer" and the national command authority better fully understand it and have long term strategy to counter "The New Generation Warfare" as it is now part and parcel of Russian doctrine which has been now fully field tested in the Ukraine.
Taken from the article:
Here is my translation of key portions of General Gerasimov's article, which appeared on "Military-Industrial Kurier" on February 27, 2013
In the 21st century we have seen a tendency toward blurring the lines between the states of war and peace. Wars are no longer declared and, having begun, proceed according to an unfamiliar template.
The experience of military conflicts -- including those connected with the so-called colored revolutions in north Africa and the Middle East -- confirm that a perfectly thriving state can, in a matter of months and even days, be transformed into an arena of fierce armed conflict, become a victim of foreign intervention, and sink into a web of chaos, humanitarian catastrophe, and civil war.
The entities that make up NATO and the West are states, so as states these nations can be deterred.
The states that make up NATO and the West have an agenda, which is best understood under the heading of "expansion."
Russia, it would seem, has a counter-agenda, which is best understood under the heading of "containment."
Thus, from the Russian perspective, the goal is to make the West/NATO understand that their efforts to achieve expansion -- into Russia's borderlands and beyond -- will result in a much higher price than the states that make up NATO/the West are willing to pay.
Viewed within this context (NATO/the West bent on expansion; Russia bent on containment), prevention of great power or other significant war (so as to keep the present international ecosystem healthy) might look something like the "neutral zone" suggested by John Mearsheimer in his recent Foreign Policy article:?
QUOTE:
"There is a solution to the crisis in Ukraine, however -- although it would require the West to think about the country in a fundamentally new way. The United States and its allies should abandon their plan to westernize Ukraine and instead aim to make it a neutral buffer between NATO and Russia, akin to Austria’s position during the Cold War. Western leaders should acknowledge that Ukraine matters so much to Putin that they cannot support an anti-Russian regime there. This would not mean that a future Ukrainian government would have to be pro-Russian or anti-NATO. On the contrary, the goal should be a sovereign Ukraine that falls in neither the Russian nor the Western camp."
"To achieve this end, the United States and its allies should publicly rule out NATO’s expansion into both Georgia and Ukraine. The West should also help fashion an economic rescue plan for Ukraine funded jointly by the EU, the International Monetary Fund, Russia, and the United States -- a proposal that Moscow should welcome, given its interest in having a prosperous and stable Ukraine on its western flank. And the West should considerably limit its social-engineering efforts inside Ukraine. It is time to put an end to Western support for another Orange Revolution. Nevertheless, U.S. and European leaders should encourage Ukraine to respect minority rights, especially the language rights of its Russian speakers."
END QUOTE
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141769/john-j-mearsheimer/why-th…
This same general problem (the West bent on expansion; other entities bent containment) helping to explain why various actors in the Middle East and elsewhere -- acting together or separately -- are using terrorism and other treatments to try to convince the West that the cost of unwanted expansion attempts will be much more than the states that make up the West are willing to pay?
Russia is a state, so as a state Russia can be deterred. We need to first focus on updating our deterrence of Russia as a state from doing things we do not believe serve our interests well.
We also need to update how we think about prevention of conflict, which is a very different thing than deterrence.
Deterrence is cost/benefit manipulation in the mind of some decision maker. It is making them believe that the cost of some action or actions does not merit the potential gain. Russia reasonably sees tremendous gain for their own interests in regaining greater control over their western flank, so the costs must be tremendous as well.
Prevention is not, IMO, the denial of conflict. In fact, I think prevention in many times encourages or allows small conflicts to occur. Think of prevention in the context of how we prevent other naturally occurring things. Prevention of cancer. Prevention of wildfire. It is about understanding what makes for a healthy ecosystem and then treating that ecosystem over time in a manner that is most likely to keep it healthy. Efforts to simply stop something perceived as bad, such as fire in a forest ecosystem, or conflict in a governance ecosystem (think Clausewitz's social trinity model of Government-Army-People as a simple description of such an ecosystem) is more likely than not to make the ecosystem unhealthy, or to destroy the natural balance.
Are the ecosystems of the former Soviet states along Russia's western border healthy? Probably not. To simply seek to "stabilize" them in that unhealthy condition is likely to contribute to conditions that make conditions even less healthy. Once that happens one sets conditions for a major disaster. Fear of the small problem and overly working to stop something of minor bad from happening in ecosystem management too often leads to a cataclysmic destructive event.
This does not mean that we let Russia do as they please. Russia must be deterred. This also means that we must not work to simply freeze the current border states in some sort of political-social amber. These states must be allowed to evolve to a naturally sustainable balance. It is highly doubtful we in the US know what that is. But we can help create conditions for that balancing to occur.
This is equally true in the region where the states of Syria and Iraq used to reside. ISIS is now a government of a state (whether we choose to recognize that or not). As such, they can be deterred. We need to deter state action and at the same time conduct a form of conflict prevention that recognizes that small conflict is often necessary to prevent larger ones.
I don't think the issue is political warfare, that is relatively simple for most states, and it is being waged in different forms around the world to include the U.S.'s support for some of the Arab spring movements, which was nothing short of subversion if we look at through the lens of political warfare. The real issue for NATO is when does political warfare cross the line and trigger a NATO response? What type of response? If Russia conducts similar activities in actual NATO countries, when is it considered an attack?
Bill C.:
Considering Vlad and the boys are invading, as in driving tanks into, another country and shooting, as in dead, lots of Ukrainians; and considering further that no NATO countries are invading, as in driving tanks into, nor shooting, as in dead, Russia nor Russians; I think calling NATO expansionist and describing Vlad's efforts as containment is standing the definitions of those words on their heads.
Regarding political warfare, is it at all helpful to articulate the "national objective" of each side?
If so, then might:
a. The national objective of the West/NATO today, in a single word, be best described as "expansion?" And
b. The national objective of Russia, in a single word, be best understood within the context of the word "containment?"
Thus, Russia employing political and unconventional warfare in an effort to "contain" the West/NATO.
And the West/NATO needing to gear up to employ counter political warfare -- and counter unconventional warfare measures -- so as to:
a. Overcome Russia's containment efforts and
b. Achieve the expansion that it (the West/NATO) desires?
SACEUR knows that we need to be able to counter political and unconventional warfare. The Latvians and Poles have described Russia's new generation warfare (Latvia) and Russian information warfare (Poland) the best in their reports this past spring
QUOTE: NATO members, especially the Baltic states that border Russia, must take into account such tactics as allies prepare for future threats, he said. That means steps should be taken to help build the capacity of other arms of government, such as interior ministries and police forces, to counter unconventional attacks, including propaganda campaigns, cyberassaults or homegrown separatist militias.
“What we see in Russia now, in this hybrid approach to war, is to use all the tools they have ... to stir up problems they can then begin to exploit through their military tool,” said Breedlove, NATO’s supreme allied commander.
By building up pre-crisis capabilities to deal with such tactics, nations will be better able to assign responsibility to an aggressor nation, which is key to triggering NATO involvement in a crisis, Breedlove said.
“When you cannot attribute (to an aggressor), this causes problems,” Breedlove said. “But the moment we attribute these actions to an aggressor nation, now this is Article 5. So we need to build the nations’ ability to fight through that first onslaught, attribute to an aggressor nation, and then NATO Article 5 kicks in.” END QUOTE
I hate to beat a dead horse but we should pay attention to our own George Kennan who described this in 1948:
•Political warfare is the logical application of Clausewitz's doctrine in time of peace. In broadest definition, political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation's command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures (as ERP--the Marshall Plan), and "white" propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of "friendly" foreign elements, "black" psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states.
http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history/johnson/65ciafounding3.htm