Observations on the Long War by Conrad Crane, War on the Rocks
For more than a decade, I have been recording reflections about the course of the so-called “Long War” launched after the tragic events of 9/11. These are based on many unique experiences: being the recorder for the 2002 Army After Action Review on Operations Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle, developing prewar Army plans to reconstruct Iraq, serving as lead author for the 2006 version of Army/Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24 on counterinsurgency, visiting Iraq in 2007 for General David Petraeus, working on projects analyzing wartime assessment and war termination for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Army Training and Doctrine Command, and innumerable conversations with insightful civilian and military veterans returned from the field. This commentary has also been shaped by many international travels and my own reading of history. I hope to provoke more critical thought about where the American military has been and where it should be going…
Comments
Forget Kashmir and Pakistan and India. Instead, focus on processes, for instance:
Nationalism taken hostage by Islamism and this too aided and abetted by outsiders (in the case of IS, the US and Saudi and Turkey and others have helped to do this).
This is the insurgency that provides so much rich insight into the way in which the international community takes local conflicts and globalizes them. Well, others can be studied in this way, but the connections to the current ideologies of Islamism and the TECHNIQUES used to expand ideologies is particularly useful in this area of study.
I still think the main problem is just plain old ignorance. For some reason, our system as a whole "believes" many stupid things and is spectacularly ignorant. The perils of having ideologues and activists as the main movers and shakers within the foreign policy "deep state" of DC, the deep state that cannot be easily moved by Presidents. And, horrifyingly, when they do try, they seem to rely on outsiders that are equally deluded.
Ignorance of the world is the main problem, more important than any theory of war. That, and scheming by schemers for money, power, what have you.
David Kilcullen wrote a very nice paper ( at least, I think it was David Kilcullen) surveying studies of insurgency in Western journals? I can't remember it exactly, but that was the general thrust of the paper. In the paper, some insurgencies were overrepresented, while others barely studied at all.
In the light of Afghanistan and IS/ISIS/ISIL, I find it interesting that certain insurgencies remain a less popular area of study.
For instance:
<blockquote>During the 1980s, the ISI completed a vast training and support infrastructure for the Afghan resistance that was also used for the training and support of other regional groups. There was a corresponding ideological development in Indian Kashmir. Since 1984, virtually suddenly, the prevailing popular sentiments in Indian Kashmir was that "Islam is in Danger," and that sentiment, rather than nationalism, began mobilizing the youth.
The timing of the change was not spontaneous. Hashim Qureshi, the founder of the nationalist JKLF [Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front] recently recalled how "in 1984 ISI Generals and Brigadiers approached me with the offer: 'get us young people for training from the Valley so that they could fight India on return.'" When he refused, Qureshi explained, his struggle was taken over by the ISI who installed Amanullah Khan. "It is tragic that so-called nationalist Amanullah Khan and some of his supporters started the present struggle in Kashmir in league with the ISI. A man with common intelligence can understand that any movement started in a Muslim majority area with the help of Pakistani military intelligence will eventually mean religious struggle." Qureshi stressed that by 1993 "Amanullah proved that he was an agent of the ISI" having sacrificed the nationalist liberation struggle in Kashmir on the altar of Islamist politics. Qureshi himself had to flee Pakistan and seek political asylum in Western Europe.</blockquote>
http://fas.org/news/pakistan/1995/950000-pak-kashmir.htm
Islam is in Danger is certainly a theme we have seen with the so-called global war on terror, and one theme in which we continually provide fodder for our enemies. We basically hand them, on a plate, everything they need to continue to expand.
Forget taking the side of Indians, Afghans, Pakistani, various Kashmiri groups, or their diasporas. Instead, think about the processes:
1. Local conflicts based competing agendas of religion, money, local power politics, ethnolinguistic identities, etc.
2. The regional national competitions between states.
3. The international competition between states and their non-stop use of proxies, one one day, another the next.
4. Western capitals as safe havens for exiles, immigrants, various Western political factions with interests in foreign policy.
5. Contractors and arms selling.
6. Propaganda in different guises, to rally fighters to the cause, to influence voting Western publics (by both insurgent and counterinsurgent), news coverage with its desire to sell and influence and be near the powerful, etc.
7. International business, licit and illicit.
So on.
Perhaps it is uncomfortable to study in this way given the implications for what we have been doing over the years in the Middle East, with the Kurds, or in Jordan with the CIA and FSA, etc.
That sort of scholarship likely would indict most everything that we do and have done, yet, I can't believe that is the only reason that over the decades this area has been neglected. It seems to represent, until recently, some sort of blankness or blindness in the Western political consciousness as it cannot be fit easily into either progressive or conservative ideologies and politics, and doesn't serve well an expansion of certain domestic power blocs, be they military or civilian. Both the right and left-and some non-interventionists--have an interest in these insurgencies only based on their own political interests, and, so the wider understanding and scholarship seems to happen quietly and carefully, outside the hot-headed and ADD world of policy.
The floor is open for you to articulate what you believe to be a more-correct characterization of the "Long War" and for you to provide -- within such a characterization -- an explanation of the primary dynamics, trends, etc., that you see therein. Herein, for example, you being able to explain the current use -- by opposing sides -- of their unique "identity" as primary weapons?
Might it be helpful -- or indeed essential -- to articulate, in some manner, what it is that we call the "Long War?
Here is my take:
It is the place-in-time in which:
a. The West -- using its unique cultural identity as a primary weapon -- has actively sought to transform outlying states and societies more along modern western lines. It is, likewise, the similar/same place-in-time in which
b. Outlying states and societies (such as Russia and certain states and societies in the Middle East and elsewhere) have sought to (1) use their own cultural identities as (2) a primary weapon to (3) defend against and oppose such unwanted aggression/transformation.
All questions, statements and suggestions -- by both the author of this article and by those providing responding comments thereto -- to be considered, evaluated and addressed within this specific context/theme, or one which is more accurate/valid?
Thus, for example, the applicability and usefulness -- or lack thereof -- of air power, SOFs and FID needing to be considered within the confines/borders of this -- or some other -- "Long War" characterization?
Conrad Crane wrote,
‘America’s airpower is its greatest asymmetric advantage in major combat operations. The U.S. Air Force has doggedly pursued the ideal of precision bombing since the 1930’s and has achieved truly remarkable levels of accuracy. But when military museums of former enemies develop displays portraying American war fighting, the dominant theme is one of massed airpower (Hanoi even has a separate “Museum to the Victory Over the B-52”). Obviously there are certain propaganda angles that can be exploited from that perspective, but discussions with Chinese, Vietnamese, and Iraqi veterans reveal the persistent power of such images. One of the key motivators that drove so much of the Iraqi Army to go home.’
I found this paragraph amazing. IMHO the author contradicts himself three times.
He labels ‘American airpower’ as a ‘greatest advantage’ and then draws attention to the Vietnamese defeat over our most ‘powerful’ delivery system - the B-52. To drive home the point they even built a museum in celebration!
He then draws attention to enemy perception of airpower as a determining feature in Korea (Chinese veterans?) VN (VC/PAVN veterans) and Iraqis. The first was/is a draw, the second an abject defeat and the third is still going - badly.
The author suggests airpower played a ‘key’ role in the defeat of the Iraqi Army. Forgive me but I missed the imagery of ISIL airstrikes punctuating the Iraqi Army’s most recent defeat. Likewise I doubt the Israeli’s are celebrating any victory after their recent ‘shock and awe’ adventure on the Gaza.
IMO the spectacular image of rising clouds of dust and debris has a lopsided effect on folks who obsess over imagery and technology. Perversely the effect of ‘shock and awe’ is particularly acute amongst folks who haven’t been shelled or bombed by anything bigger than a 107mm rocket or an 82mm mortar. However there have been plenty of US soldiers and marines who have been on the receiving end of the consequences of those who have embraced the ‘How I Learn to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb’ approach.
My grandfather was a Belleau Wood when the French and American artillery reduced the German position inside Belleau Wood to the iconic shattered matchwood forest depicted in the historical imagery of the battlefield. They were ordered to attack and after 15 minutes you couldn’t see the ground for a hundred yards owing to dead doughboys. My grandfather told me the best you could do for your dead buddies was not to stand on their faces as you walked over them. It was a new lesson for the US but our allies had had this lesson in spades for the previous 4 years.
In a similar vein the Marines going ashore at Tarawa, Saipan, Palau, Iwo Jima and Okinawa wouldn’t have given a dime for all the ordnance that supposedly ‘should have made the island sink’. As the Japanese soon learned they could survive the heaviest of bombardments. They adapted a defense in depth and did not oppose the immediate landing. In order to deter an Allied invasion of Japan the Japanese High Command realized the defenders could not only survive heavy bombardment but US casualties would get worse after each ‘island hop’. At Iwo the US casualties even surpassed the Japanese who had only infantry weapons and a few mountain artillery pieces.
The man acknowledged as the savior of the UN effort in Korea General Matthew Bunker Ridgway was dismissive of the effects of airpower in Korea. Furthermore upon retirement he warned the White House against involvement in Vietnam based on the folly of a much-heralded RMA in airpower.
An old mentor of mine who was a LRRP in VN recounted a day when his patrol got too close to an unexpected Arc Light airstrike. He literally ‘hovered’ face-down about 6 inches above the ground as the detonation waves from several hundred bombs from the B-52s came up thru the ground and levitated him. He and the rest of his patrol are still alive and well.
In AF I occupied a position that was on the receiving end of over a hundred airstrikes by Soviet aircraft in the space of a week. There was not one casualty amongst a treeless fixed dug-in position that covered about a square mile. Certainly we bounced and the sides of the slit trench collapsed but there was no permanent damage.
On another occasion an extremely large bomb/warhead hit the side of a cave we were sheltering in. The entrance of the cave was a good 30 meters from our position deep inside the cave. The exposed side of the cave was an enormous boulder the size of a house. Somewhat alarmingly the smell of cordite penetrated my nostrils instantly after the bomb detonated on the outside but only a few meters from where I was standing inside the cave. What had transpired was the blast from the huge bomb had lifted a boulder weighing hundreds of tons and the distinct smell of burnt nitro borne by the detonation wave had jetted under it before the boulder resumed its origin place. After the screaming and dust had subsided we were completely unscathed.
The awfully long-winded point I’m trying to make is we should not be so quick to assess the spectacular imagery of tons of dirt, bricks and dust being ejected hundreds of meters into the air as an indicator of lethal/decisive power.
Though there is little recent first-hand US experience we have access to tens of thousands of historical AARs that indicate a determined infantryman soon learns that the very earth upon which he stands can neutralize even the biggest shell or bomb.
RC
Here are my comments that I also posted at WOTR.
Some very important observations by Conrad Crane, the man behind FM 3-24 whose name you rarely hear associated with it.
I strongly agree with his conclusion about being “COINfused” – not to be confused but to have a fusion between the COINtras and COINdinistas.
But I have to take some exception to his comments about SOF and FID. I concur on the critical importance of FID and the FID approach but I disagree with his characterization that SOF has been drawn to much to the dark side (though the role reversal of SOF and conventional forces he describes in Iraq is accurate and interesting to consider – but that should be understood to be a function of those who designed, executed, and led the campaign plan). I think the Army and the US Army Special Operations Command have well articulated the Yin and Yang of SOF with Special Warfare and Surgical Strike and the vast majority of SOF and in particular US Army Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations forces are conducting Special Warfare with particular emphasis on FID. I think that what causes confusion is that there is a dominant narrative both in the press and in the military that revolves around the high payoff immediate effects of surgical strike and there is a major command and control headquarters that is conducting those operations. Special Warfare does not currently have that type of headquarters to integrate Special Warfare on a global scale. USSOCOM does not do that though the separate Theater Special Operations Commands at the Geographic Combatant Commands do command and control Special Warfare and FID operations. But they will never achieve the notoriety of the forces conducting surgical strike and therefore there is a perceived imbalance. His comment about headquarters and playing the super bowl is especially applicable to the conduct of Special Warfare and FID. The only super bowl capable headquarters we have is the surgical strike headquarters. I do also agree with his comments about Air Force FID and with the need for the Coast Guard to conduct FID.
But all his observation are very much worth pondering, discussing, debating and using as we move forward.