Small Wars Journal

Even if We Defeat the Islamic State, We’ll Still Lose the Bigger War

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Sun, 10/05/2014 - 12:49am

Even if We Defeat the Islamic State, We’ll Still Lose the Bigger War by Andrew J. Bacevich, Washington Post

As America’s efforts to “degrade and ultimately destroy” Islamic State militants extend into Syria, Iraq War III has seamlessly morphed into Greater Middle East Battlefield XIV. That is, Syria has become at least the 14th country in the Islamic world that U.S. forces have invaded or occupied or bombed, and in which American soldiers have killed or been killed. And that’s just since 1980.

Let’s tick them off: Iran (1980, 1987-1988), Libya (1981, 1986, 1989, 2011), Lebanon (1983), Kuwait (1991), Iraq (1991-2011, 2014-), Somalia (1992-1993, 2007-), Bosnia (1995), Saudi Arabia (1991, 1996), Afghanistan (1998, 2001-), Sudan (1998), Kosovo (1999), Yemen (2000, 2002-), Pakistan (2004-) and now Syria. Whew.

With our 14th front barely opened, the Pentagon foresees a campaign likely to last for years. Yet even at this early date, this much already seems clear: Even if we win, we lose. Defeating the Islamic State would only commit the United States more deeply to a decades-old enterprise that has proved costly and counterproductive…

Read on.

Comments

RANGER82

Mon, 10/06/2014 - 11:00am

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Will a few years of police work cure the crime problem in major cities ? Will the world eventually become a sane place ? If the answers are no, what do we do? Hide ? Hope for the best ? Try to influence the situation ? Is our power a burden or an opportunity ?

"Part of the problem is that American policymakers have repeatedly given in to the temptation to unleash a bit of near-term chaos, betting that longer-term order will emerge on the other end." ... "In the Greater Middle East, it has meant dismantling a country with the aim of erecting something more preferable ... "

And here what we must learn and acknowledge is that the primary force/factor that "drove" (1) these such temptations, (2) those such unleashings (of chaos) and (3) these such dismantling of countries was our belief in the overwhelming appeal of our way of life, our way of governance and our underlying values, attitudes and beliefs.

And here we (much like the Soviets before us?) proved to be delusional.

Thus, as we learned recently (and as the Soviets learned before us?), reliance on one's generally foreign and profane way of life, way of governance and corresponding values, attitudes and beliefs -- to achieve a "new order" and a more preferable state -- this (1) does not always make good sense and (2) can be grave and horrible error.

Thus, it appears that -- as relates to the so-called Greater Middle East -- it will take something other than (a) imprudent/irrational reliance on (b) foreign/profane ideas and examples to (c) win the "bigger war."

What this "something other" might be (and, accordingly, whether it is worth it); this, I believe, should be a/the focus of our future discussions.