#Operating: Beginning a Discussion on the Army Operating Concept

<blockquote>The AOC touches frequently on one of those structural items; set the theater capabilities. In order to deploy, employ, and sustain units – even inside the U.S. – maneuver and maneuver support units must have the infrastructure to operate. This includes “essential capabilities including logistics, communications, intelligence, long-range fires, and air and missile defense.”</blockquote>

The year is 2025 and Vladimir Putin is still running Russia alternating between stints as President and Prime Minister. Western-developed sources of oil and natural gas have dropped prices to low levels. The resultant Russian economy continues to tank in reaction to both low energy prices and sanctions resulting when all of Ukraine finally fell to the Russians along with all of Georgia and several other “stans.” Now Russian forces appear to be massing armor along Baltic states and approaching the west Ukraine border with NATO countries west and north of Ukraine.

The President had prepositioned heavy armor in NATO countries to deter such aggression however other NATO countries had continued to underspend on defense and Putin doubted their resolve and ability to defend other NATO nations. The Army deployed a different armor company and pair of infantry companies to both exercise and service the prepositioned armor in Eastern Europe every 9 months rotating from country to country where stores were located. 173rd Airborne BCT in Italy also had limited armor as part of a NATO quick reaction force and a Stryker regiment in Germany rounded out U.S. NATO forward elements.

Prepositioning in each affected NATO country were 200’ x 200’ tent roof shelters with embedded heating and metalized elements to present a constant temperature and radar signature from above and melt winter snow. Alongside the shelter’s external concrete walls were parked M1A2 tanks and IFVs to augment ballistic protection. Within each shelter a pair of 65’ x 50’ Kevlar wheeled shelters were hidden giving enemy top attack missiles just a 1 in 6 chance of hitting one of the two “shell-game” Kevlar shelters housing a pair of Apaches.

Those odds further were reduced to less than 1 in 12 due to Patriot and THAAD air defenses. Prepositioned Strykers, MRAPs, and JLTVs also were parked alongside the Kevlar shelters under the tents to provide more protection. At the first sign of potential conflict, the four AH-64Es had been moved from the shelters into the countryside and were replaced by inbound pairs of Marine F-35Bs able to take off and land on local roads or taxiways even if runways were cratered. ATACMS and GMLRS-capable MLRS launchers also were parked under the tents surrounded by other armored vehicles and dispersed at signs of Russian aggression.

In effect, the armor of a single armored BCT and its three combined arms battalions and a reduced nine line companies with 52 M1A2 tanks in 3 companies (17 per company) and 84 IFVs in 6 companies (14 per company) was dispersed across nine NATO country locations in 9 shelters along with 36 Apaches, a ground reconnaissance squadron, multiple MLRS launchers, logistics vehicles, engineer vehicles, JLTVs, ground and air ambulances, mission command vehicles, and integrated air defenses and airpower to reduce the effectiveness of any A2/AD strategy requiring many hundreds of missiles or air-dropped bombs to attack with minimal guarantee of preemptive threat success.

The co-location in appropriate related locations of a division headquarters and logistics for the armored BCT, inbound 173 Airborne BCT, and Stryker regiments coupled with host nation defenses in the same vicinity would further increase the targeting challenge given numerous ground targets, more dispersed air defense and airpower protection, and multiple locations where arriving C-17s, C-5s, and C-130s and railroads can bring additional U.S. and NATO forces.

Of course the same strategy would work with armor, air defenses, Army Aviation, and equipment for division HQ and logistics prepositioning in the Middle East in Kuwait, as well as in Asia in the Philippines, Japan, Australia, and possibly Vietnam and Singapore. Because we were clever enough to split up IFV weight between two major components of 33,000 lbs in the rear and 42,000 lbs for the prime mover, our heavy IFV armor was now air transportable to a limited degree by C-130 to include airdrop. However the overwhelming majority of Army ground troops for these IFVs and other systems were stationed in the U.S. and would join their equipment and rotate in low numbers periodically as a regionally-aligned force with no forward-based families and dependent infrastructure to increase costs and overhead.

We even had created a tank version mounted on the 42,000 lb IFV armored prime mover with a main gun for the 82nd, 101st, and 173rd Airborne BCTs. A scout version carried unmanned ground vehicles and small UAS in the place of the 33,000 lb rear infantry compartment. But of course the Abrams had continued as our mainstay and even though we had increased numbers of combined arms battalions in the armored BCTs, the number of BCT tanks had actually declined (52 instead of 58 due to one armor company per battalion with 17 tanks) to reduce fuel and deployment requirements and allow prepositioning of Abrams tanks in multiple locations.