Syrians to be Trained to Defend Territory, Not Take Ground from Jihadists, Officials Say

As to COL Maxwell's question below ("So why bother?"), could the following be the answer:

"A defensive opposition force also could allow President Bashar al-Assad’s government to regain territory it has lost to the Islamic State, which has been pummeled — but remains far from defeated — by hundreds of U.S. and coalition airstrikes over the past month."

(12th paragraph down in the Washington Post article.)

Thus, and specifically by our actions here, have we not officially reversed course and determined that we WILL -- at least for the time being -- ally ourselves with Assad?

Herein, it being Assad, it would seem, who will -- in his own state and re: ISIS -- do the real fighting and do the real retaking of ground?

Thus, might we say that our political objective, of transforming Syria more along modern western political, economic and social lines, this has been placed -- at least temporarily -- on hold, and until such times as ISIS might be adequately dealt with?

Likewise does this move (to put Assad back in the driver's seat) also portend the larger trend that I have suggested, to wit: that we will no longer seek to achieve our political objective (states and societies transformed more along modern western lines) via the divided, fickle, disorderly, unreliable and generally incapable populations.

Now, instead (and as in days past), we will seek to achieve this objective, via the often odious and oppressive, but otherwise highly organized and effective, regimes?

This new/old way of achieving our political objective (via the regimes) now being re-adopted due to the admitted failure of our post-Cold War concepts ("universal values," etc.,) as a means to motivate the population to achieve the state and societal transformations that we require?

Mr. Maxwell's last paragraph is appropriate. The train and equip programs lead to corruption, nepotism, and a too big to fail mission. The equipment stagnates the supported force and their commanders focus on acquisition and preservation rather than the fight. We should not go down that road, nor should we consider previous large scale train and equip efforts a success, they are a racket; Smedley style.

We should not have to bargain with our hosting partners to get them to take action. If they are not actively resisting without our assistance we should conduct a unilateral or a narrow coalition action to destroy the adversary, or we should abstain from the conflict altogether.

The United States cannot withdraw now, without a partial success. This fact actually puts the United States at the mercy of the supported element. Unsavory leaders like President Karzai emerge from this environment. A similar leader may emerge in the moderate Syrian opposition.

I remember folks calling ISIS moderate rebels about 6 months ago. Let's avoid these situations. Two thumbs down for train and equip and for large, inconsequential coalitions.

This article is a confession on the inadequacy of our approach. It also points to our tendency to create imaginary stovepiped problems where we can choose to address one problem and ignore another. Much like going after narcoterrorists while attempting to ignore the FARC, because we were only interested in stopping the flow of cocaine. The resistance can't ignore Assad just because we want them to focus on ISIS. We also can't ignore the fact that if we are not training them to win, then we are setting them up to lose. ISIS and the regime will have the option to mass and crush a village defense force at will. We may just be simply putting targets on their backs. Another dim witted operation that in some ways reminds me of the Bay of Pigs.

Then why bother? I guess we can only train them in our image and if we cannot provide them all the support we give our own forces they will never be as capable as ISIS who do not have the luxury of having all the same support we have. What are we thinking?

QUOTE:
The Syrian opposition force to be recruited by the U.S. military and its coalition partners will be trained to defend territory, rather than to seize it back from the Islamic State, according to senior U.S. and allied officials, some of whom are concerned that the approach is flawed.

“We have a big disconnect within our strategy. We need a credible, moderate Syrian force, but we have not been willing to commit what it takes to build that force,” said a senior U.S. official involved in Syria and Iraq operations who, like others cited in this report, spoke on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to discuss the training program.

Military commanders are reluctant to push Syrian fighters into full-scale battles with well-armed militants if they cannot summon close air support and medical evacuations, mindful of how fledgling forces in Iraq and Afghanistan crumbled without that assistance during the early years of the wars in those nations. But U.S. military aircraft cannot provide that aid without American or allied troops in close proximity to provide accurate targeting information on secure radio channels. END QUOTE

If we cannot provide training to forces that is commensurate with their abilities and in accordance with their customs, traditions, and capabilities and can only train them in our image then we have no business training them at all.