COIN Is a Proven Failure

One can be a reductionist and get to "simplistic" positions. An example of this is the frequently stated position that "war is war."

The opposite approach is to play the complexity card and say "every insurgency is different" and then create convoluted definitions such as "insurgency is a complex form of violent irregular warfare."

Or, one can seek to attain a "simple" understanding, one that takes into account all of the varied complexities of a problem, but that seeks to understand the fundamental aspects that are largely common to all. After all, every snowflake is different as well, yet every snowflake requires the same ingredients, conditions and process to form. So equally, at a fundamental level, every snowflake is the same.

Insurgency can be violent or non-violent, as that is a tactical choice and does not affect the fundamental nature of the problem either way.

Insurgency can be warfare if born of a resistance, or it can be a form of civil emergency if born of a revolution.

So the military definition runs into some serious problems, leading us to end up fighting our doctrine and definitions rather than actually working to resolve the problem before us.

But every insurgency is internal or it is not insurgency. (granted, foreign fighters and supporters are typically brought in, but that only changes the character, not the nature of the matter).

Every insurgency is political in primary purpose. If it is for profit exploiting some lucrative illicit market it is a very different problem as it requires a very different solution; even if that for profit activity grows so large as to disrupt and challenge governance as well.

Every insurgency is rooted in some domestic population. If it is just a disgruntled segment of government acting to overthrow the regime it is a Coup, which again requires a very different solution than a movement rooted in some segment of the population.

Lastly, it is illegal. If legal it wouldn't be a problem at all. Much that is legal in the US is insurgency in countries where effective legal opportunities to influence government do not exist.

So, fundamentally insurgency must have these four components, and if it does not, it is something else requiring a solution other than COIN to resolve.

Now, how these things manifest in any particular case will vary widely. After all, every insurgency is different. We must understand the difference to design and implement effective approaches - but we must understand the fundamental commonalities so that we know what it is that actually needs to be resolved.

But if I missed something let me know, as I want this concept to be as accurate and valuable as possible.

So your claim is that "the only real difference between revolutionary insurgency and democracy is legality", based upon four data points? Sorry, I can't make that leap, I think you've critically oversimplified the argument.

Bill M.: Per your second paragraph, I would present several counterpoints. I agree that the approach in Afghanistan and Iraq has failed, but I would reiterate that I think the evidence suggests that they <I>why</I> of this failure points to two shortfalls: overly ambitious timelines for the "transformation" of the societies in question, and a failure to follow any actual doctrine. Your suppression vs. defeat observation is valid, but points back to the point I've made repeatedly: American leaders, both civil and military, lack the strategic understanding to capitalize on those tactical and operational successes - what you deem "suppression", and what others might call "the security necessary to facilitate medium- and long-term development" - and consolidate them into strategic success.

I understand your hypothesis that I subscribe to the Liberal theory of international relations, but you are incorrect, I am an avowed Realist. My observations reflect the view that it may be in the best interest of America and its allies to enact regime change and compel a change of national governmental system in some cases - for example, in Afghanistan and Iraq. I also disbelieve that democracy or self determination are endemic to Western civilization, and that's a belief that's supported by evidence: pre-Columbian American Indian tribes practiced various forms of democracy, as did the Omani Imamate prior to 1959, and so on and so forth. In other cases, such as the Gulf Emirates, I happen to think that their monarchies are, on balance (and acknowledging that it may be a slight balance), both fit to their people's purposes and complementary to Western interests. As I've stated elsewhere (and there's a lot of bruck spread about here, so I don't blame you if you've missed it), I think our timelines were far too ambitious, particularly in Afghanistan, and we should have followed the long play model that's still playing out nearly fifty years later in Oman. What you're describing is Democratic Peace Theory, and although I found it attractive in my early twenties, subsequent observation has disabused me of such notions.

I think we're in agreement that part of the problem is that U.S. policy and/or conduct doesn't reflect U.S. COIN doctrine, which is itself inconsistent with the corpus of accepted COIN doctrine espoused by the likes of Trinquier, Galula, Thompson, Callwell, and such. This statement...

<BLOCKQUOTE>I think an argument that our development efforts have been as disconnected from our political objectives as our military efforts.</BLOCKQUOTE>

... is accurate, and reflects my earlier observation that there is no concept of grand strategy to tie the disparate threads together into a semi-coherent picture. I also agree with your appraisal that MNF-I/ISAF has done little better than the French, which reiterates my view that American COIN doctrinal developers have been studying and emulating the wrong campaigns.

Regarding your observations about money, I'm not so convinced that money can't be used to a good effect - it worked in Dhofar, and I would argue that it worked as part of the surge in Iraq, by giving the agitators and malcontents a reason to cease and desist and, in so doing, providing the security necessary to begin the "hold" and "build" phases of the clear-hold-build sequence. That said, I think your observations about Karzai and Maliki are accurate: at the upper operational/lower strategic level, less cash and more accountability would have gone a long way. You're right on target that billion dollar development projects in insecure areas served little purpose. One particular example I'm fond of using is that of <A HREF="http://www.michaelyon-online.com/gobar-gas.htm‎">gobar gas</A>, which (as Michael Yon rightly notes in that article) could be revolutionizing Afghanistan right now. I've spoken to Nepalis about gobar gas, how simple and foolproof the systems are, and how relatively cheap. As with the provision of cheap radios to the Dhofaris in the 1970's, making the Afghans pay a fractional portion of a single system's cost would give them buy-in that ISAF hasn't been getting from the billions of dollars of, for lack of a better term, handouts. Instead, the international community has spent billions upon billions of dollars to little effect, with exceptionally poor accountability; Iraq was only marginally better in this regard. So, I thik we're largely in agreement on this issue as well.

I can't make that final leap with you with respect to the proposition that modern war has changed. When I look at modern war, even the post-Cold War conflicts, I see some return to old conditions, but I also see a lot of continuity. I see nothing to which Clausewitz's magnum opus doesn't apply, with an additional nod to Thucydides. Rather, I think the issue at hand, and I'm a broken record on this point, is that most Western civilian and military leaders don't actually understand <I>war</I>; instead, they're learning <I>warfare</I>, which is to say, tactics and operations/campaigning. Aside from a staggering alteration of the curriculum and completion standards for all training received by commissioned officers from commencement of their pre-commissioning training all the way through their war and staff college stints, I'm not sure how to remedy this. However, this issue obviously impacts more than just the prosecution of potential COIN operations, so it's worth exploring.

To your first counterargument, the fact, not opinion, is that significant application of force has worked throughout history in suppressing insurgencies. Historically suppression has been more so than our "hearts and minds" approach. This disappoints me also, because it runs against my desire to do HAM in hopes it will work. I am not advocating using that level of force due to the associated moral issues that rightfully guide "our" behavior, but simply pointing out that we ignore or cherry pick from history. I tend to agree with Bob's comments that in those cases the insurgencies are suppressed, not defeated. That reflects an incomplete approach resulting in an uneasy status quo that isn't healthy. However, I am an advocate for applying more and sustained force (surgical as possible) against the insurgents to compel them to come to the negotiating table. After reading through your response you do not seem to be opposed to that.

In my opinion, our idealistic approach that Bush adapted is failing. It has failed in Iraq, and is failing in Afghanistan, despite the repeated claims by authors of how one unit won their war in their portion of Afghanistan. At best, they have effectively employed tactics to suppress the insurgency in their area for a period of time. Our approach is ahistorical, and we have not established a learning system that facilitates effective adaption at the operational/strategic level.

Your comments indicate you may embrace elements of the liberalist worldview (not implying your domestic politics, but your worldview: realist, liberal, constructivist, and their various subsets). In my opinion, this worldview is a faith based view of the world. Liberalists believe, like Bush, that people naturally desire democracy,free markets, and want to be integrated globally (how we ignore the major social and economic disruptions created by globalization still amazes me). In my view, we were (I think we're backing off from our extremes) democratic/free-market/globalizing missionaries in Afghanistan. We attempted to enforce our political religion on them by force, but it was insufficient force to change culture. We probably shouldn't be in the business of changing cultures, but that can be argued. We found that our beliefs/values don't always have the power of attraction we believed they do. Our morals rightly prohibit us from implying force at the level needed to force cultural change, so we're stuck in an uncomfortable place in the middle. All the while the people we aim to help continue to suffer.

I liked your use of cost effective development, and agree we can and should certainly do that as soon as the area is cleared (or sufficiently cleared of insurgents). Your quote from the Sultan was beautiful, but that doesn't represent U.S. COIN doctrine or more accurately U.S. policy. Spending billions to build unsustainable security forces modeling the west, and spending billions on major infrastructure projects in unsecure areas (that often didn't help the locals) is simply throwing away billions of dollars. I think an argument that our development efforts have been as disconnected from our political objectives as our military efforts. In my view, our failure is our desire to create a little us, instead of creating a stable them that can develop over time. You claimed the French failed because they employed a half-assed governance and development model, maybe, but I find it difficult to believe we did any better. We put thugs in the executive position in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and as numerous articles reported the CIA delivered millions of dollars to Karzai, and I suspect to Maliki. Money is power, so we empowered corrupt and illegitimate politicians to do what for us? That approach also seemed to be disconnected from our political aims.Apparently learning nothing from our missteps during the Cold War. Simply throw billions of dollars at a problem, no strategy, no thought, no real analysis required. Now we have three separate lines of effort conducting excellent tactical operations that are disconnected from our desired ends (military, CIA, and State/AID).

Finally, and this deserves more discussion, there are arguments that the character of Modern War has changed, in a political sense, from the Cold War era that our doctrine is based on. Overly simplified, the argument is that wars of ideology are less frequent. We're not seeing as many Maoist type models (politically) where the insurgents attempt to win the hearts and minds based on gaining buy in for their ideology. The West countered, usually ineffectively, with a hearts and minds approach (reflecting our current doctrine). Today, most insurgents leverage hatred (them and us) based on ethnicity. Instead of winning HAM, they kill, expel, suppress, those who are not in their ethnic group. I think we can agree we this in many parts of the world (not just in Muslim lands), and it is now the predominate character of war. Examples outside of the Sunni-Shia divide include Rwanda, tribal wars throughout Africa, what we saw in Bosnia, Lebanon, etc. I suggest we need to understand the character of the conflict. If it isn't ideological, and more about political power, then attempting to impose democracy in its purest form will equate to mob rule (Iraq). Attempting HAM won't be overly helpful. Our focus shifts to protection in the near term, but follows remains problematic. Instead of clear, hold, and build, it may be divide warring parties, and then...?

I enjoyed your comment concerning what you assume are what I either implicitly or explicitly write---and you yet still do not get it.

If you had the opportunity to speak directly to the insurgent leader of the Islamic Army in Iraq and have read his hand written journal you would have seen and heard the following;

1. three weeks after we arrived in Baghdad we were being hit by RC IEDs designed by him--three weeks is what actually a short period to design deploy and test them is it not?
2. he and his Salafist group had been at war with Saddam and an underground war with death by hanging if caught--by the way since 1991 and when did we arrive in Baghdad--2003-----let's see 12 years before we got there?
3. he set up 15 cells alone in Baghdad and in 12 other major cities and towns within six weeks
4. he started actively ambushing and shooting at us within the fourth week after arrival
5. arms and funding had been flowing in via Basra since 1995---again when did we arrive?--again a total of 8 years before we arrived
6. all autos they used up through 2006 arrived as imports from the UAE over Basra and were never interdicted by the US

AND key--he had already been in deep contact with Ansar al Sunnah, and QJBR (AQI) BEFORE we arrived in 2003--contacts started in 1998/99.

AND he continues to fight next to ASA and IS--yes even now he has not broken with them--the core question you fail to repeatedly ask is---Why has he not broken with IS?

Answer that question and you will answer how to defeat IS--quite simple really and yet you fail to ask it.

Actually until you have had a deep discussion on the price of Iraqi produced sandals vs Chinese produced sandals with a deep business supporter of IS sitting in a major prison --ie the globalization question--you have not lived nor will you understand what you are currently seeing in Iraq and or Syria.

So just why do you honestly think COIN somehow was addressing a full blown phase two guerrilla war?

Even now you failed to address this exact issue that I have previously pointed out to you--COIN was never as practiced by the US Army designed to defeat and or win a guerrilla war--simply put it was just a regular good old "country building concept" down to the water, electricity, trash and sewage and jobs.

As defined by Mao---take out the Chinese villagers concept and slide in any other country ie Iraq---see how easy it is to both "see" and "understand".

Next, the transition to phase two, guerrilla warfare, armed struggle. In guerrilla warfare, attacks are carefully planned for heightened effect, but usually not for military purposes per se. Instead phase two revolutionaries are interested in using military force for political purposes. What or who is the first target? This is low-intensity warfare at this point so the target will likely be an individual or a small group, a police chief for example, or a village chief, or maybe even a province chief or council. Kidnapping and assassination are the tools of the trade, not so much because they want to get rid of that person but rather to make a resounding point. To what effect? To demonstrate to the populace that the insurgents can get to the enemy, that their force is a real factor to be respected. It also induces fear in the ranks. The first attacks may do little physical damage to the enemy, but psychologically, fears of possible mayhem just around the corner get stoked. Suddenly, formerly comfortable officials begin to fear for their safety. They may then pull their forces further inward for personal protection, which usually made the villagers happy.

If you had dealt at all with any of the Sunni insurgents face to face in Iraq--what you see described above by Mao is exactly what you say in Iraq tailored to Iraq.

To a degree is it the exact same pattern for IS before they shifted to a full phase three guerrilla war that we are currently seeing and yet you still somehow think COIN was what successful?

Again define for me and others here just what was the success again in COIN in Iraq? Well we got out of it so that must be a success right?

Any further questions?

My response -- re: thedrosophils thoughts here -- moved to the top of the page.

See thedrosophil---this interrogator that I previously quoted below learns and learns and learns for the rest of his life and he "gets" Iraq---that is what you are badly missing. The core article is over COIN "A failure or not" and I have constantly stated it failed and you constantly push back and push back.

This is from the NYTs Editorial today and it says a lot about the Iraqi "war of perception" which goes to the heart of why we "lost" COIN in Iraq.

Well worth the entire read in the NYTs as it is seven years after the previously quoted article and while he has moved on and is a Professor-he will remember Iraq for the rest of his life and I am guessing he will tell you COIN "failed" as well.

And I am betting his full story has yet to be said especially from Abu G in 2004.

I Can’t Be Forgiven for Abu Ghraib

The Torture Report Reminds Us of What America Was

By ERIC FAIR DEC. 9, 2014

BETHLEHEM, Pa. — I SPENT this semester teaching creative writing at Lehigh University. I’ve been a soldier, a police officer and an interrogator. So hearing students call me “Professor” and assigning homework was a significant change of pace.

But the course’s title, Writing War, kept me from straying too far from the memories that have haunted me over the last decade. I am grateful to Lehigh for the opportunity to teach the course. The school’s willingness to put a veteran in the classroom is the very thing this country needs to be doing in order to collectively process what the last 13 years of war have wrought. But teaching a class about war reminded me daily that I am no college professor.

I was an interrogator at Abu Ghraib. I tortured.

Abu Ghraib dominates every minute of every day for me. In early 2004, workers inside Abu Ghraib were scrambling to cover the murals of Saddam Hussein with a coat of yellowish paint. I accidentally leaned up against one of those walls. I still wear the black fleece jacket with the faded stain. I still smell the paint. I still hear the sounds. I still see the men we called detainees.

Last month, my students at Lehigh read “The Things They Carried” by Tim O’Brien. During class I talked about the things American soldiers carried in Iraq. I brought in a cigar box filled with the trinkets and mementos I had purchased from Iraqi vendors at Baghdad International Airport. I brought along the black fleece jacket.

When I asked the students to share their memories of the release in 2004 of the Abu Ghraib photographs showing the abuse of detainees, I received the sort of looks students give when they think they should know something and are too embarrassed to admit they don’t. Most avoided eye contact, some gave a sort of noncommittal nod, while others went for pure honesty and just yawned.

A great sign of COIN success---battle video released recently by JaN of a US Prep/Reaper flying near a Syria AF copter dropping barrel bombs and we are not de facto working with the Iranians who by the way supported a number of the Iraqi Shia militias who were killing/wounding us by the hundreds with EFPs.

And those Iranian F4s are not what bombing IS as well? --so do we now a joint group of the "willing" in the anti IS coalition?

First they kill us and then they support us- guess that could at least be a sign of a COIN success?

Or just another example of the enemy of my enemy is now my friend kind of thing.

But wait did not the Sec of State just this last week state it could take years to defeat the IS--but was not COIN so successful that we could leave Iraq?

Your scathing denunciations would carry more weight if you'd bothered to respond to any of the points that I've raised in any of the comments that I've posted. Good day to you, sir.