America's Secret Weapon to Stop Russia by Robert Spalding III, The National Interest
… Many have already said that there are no military options in the Ukraine crisis. While Western Europe and the United States do not desire conflict with Russia, the lack of action supporting Ukraine is actually a provocative gesture that invites escalation by the Russians. Fritz Kraemer, a little-known but highly influential strategist in the Pentagon best known for his many years as advisor to numerous secretaries of defense, believed that there were two ways to be provocative. One way was to be threatening, and in so doing provoke an enemy to action. The other way was to appear weak, and thus to provoke an adversary into a similar risky misadventure.
Before the United States Air Force began pounding Saddam’s forces in what would be a prelude to a one-hundred-hour ground campaign, it provided a much more subtle service to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. When considering the first Iraq war, most people think about the offensive campaign that pushed Saddam’s forces out of Kuwait. Few remember the deterrence provided by airpower before allied aircraft began the offensive that would be known as “Desert Storm.” …
Comments
Here is where we differ--the corruption seen in the Ukraine is and was no different than any of the former East bloc countries after 1990---they all had the Soviet state enterprise model and Communism was the greatest teacher of corruption and yes even those that are now in the EU and NATO still suffer from corruption even at the highest levels.
When the civil society reached a certain saturation level on the corruption side they took to the streets and this is where Putin decided the colored revolts were in fact a direct threat to even himself.
Then something interesting occurs--it ties nicely into his ethno nationalism empire rebuilding drive that 23 countries have experienced in some form from Russia since 1991 and that tied as well into three geo political goals he has been developing since his days in St. Petersburg that are needed to reestablish the glory of the superpower status he feels Russia lost in 1994.
1. discredit the EU
2. discredit NATO
3. split the US from Europe
We are then off to the races with the arguments of sphere of influence, humiliation, NATO expansionism, US wanting to dominate and restrict Russia and on and on when it has been Russia that has completely violated or ignored all treaties and agreements signed since Helsinki to the Minsk Protocol and completely violated the INF in it's drive to reestablish their perceived ability to achieve a first strike ability on the US and cancelled MAD along the way as well.
Now to argue that regardless of the reasons a country that has been basically invaded by an aggressor and regardless of the arguments being stated by one and all--- it does not have the right for self defense is strange is it not?
Purely defensive weapons such as drones which Russia is flying daily over the Ukraine, to jammers which the Russians have and are using in Ukraine to heavy tanks which the Ukrainians do not have equal ATMs to counter-- to heavy MRLSs with scatter mines and on and on----are not allowed to be provided defensive weapons for at least the defense of their own territorial borders is strange is it not?
This whole thing was originally if one looks back "to defend the poor Russian speakers because they were being massively discriminated against by the junta fascist Nazi Ukraine" trying to destroy their Russian culture.
Now that exact same region is in ashes and basically destroyed and most have fled to the Ukraine and those that fled to Russia are now in the Russian Far East so that argument by Russia seems to be out the window and long forgotten by the West.
After the Russian shellings on two buses and Mariupol resulted in over 70 killed and over 150 wounded and the UN calls it a war crime Putin stated "due to our influence the separatists will return back to the Minsk demarcation line and he/his FM both stated we will do everything possible to return to a ceasefire and what did we get--- a massive offensive and a declaration of war on the Ukraine by the separatists and not denied by Russia---and still no defensive weapons---sounds strange right?
I can give countless reasons that have been mentioned by governments, politicians and Russian trolls and some you have mentioned as to why one should not give the Ukrainians weapons but in the end who was invaded and since when does being invaded not give a country the right of self defense?
If the civil society is supporting the government then we need to let that civil society continue on the path they themselves selected ---the last time I checked that same civil society has not demanded the invasion of Russia.
From someone on the ground fighting Russian tanks and artillery in Pisky near the Donetsk airport which is by the way 14kms past the Russian signed and supported Minsk demarcation line. Notice he says nothing about invading with defensive weapons Russia.
What sort of weapons would u need here to defeat the "DNR" in eastern #Ukraine?
Lt. Andrey Hysyl, DNEPR1 Battalion:
pic.twitter.com/OXgXl77yLD
No one is calling anyone rag tag but reports of desertions and corruption have come from authorities in Kiev itself. And there is conscription. I thought armies were more than their weapons? No one is denying the bravery of anyone. Anyway, I'm not on the ground and neither are others commenting, whatever their personal ties are to friends in foreign militaries.
So, I don't know and I've come to distrust all reporting, whether Russian, Ukrainian or Western.
The article you posted says, "geopolitical instability generating divisions within the European Union.'
These divisions and tensions exist for many reasons and the economic situation is one major complicating factor. So too were divisions inevitable with NATO expanded. For some reason, many people seem to be stuck in the past.
The very reason that some Ukrainians wanted to become closer to the EU is that they thought it would stem corruption. That isn't going to go away over night.
The military cannot suspend itself entirely in its own theoretical worlds, civilian authorities must balance many factors, including the fact that Russia is perceived differently by different people. The same fears do not exist and even if you think they should be understood that way, the polling across multiple countries just doesn't support you on this.
Ukraine is a net arms exporter, or was, and still trades and gets gas from Russia? This cannot be solved entirely in a military way. This is why we keep struggling since Vietnam, actually, since WWII. We won't look at the whole picture. It's become much more high profile than Georgia, so that paradigm may not work. The problem is, there is only talk of escalation, and no talk of what we do if things don't go our way. Even arms have to be tied to some negotiating process precisely because of this.
No one is suggesting that the Ukrainians should be dumped entirely, but arms by themselves won't do anything. They have to see reality, they may not get what the want, or it may not work. Then, what?
As cold as this sounds, Ukraine isn't a high priority strategically (and neither really is Afghanistan). It was wrong to tell them that if they fought in Afghanistan we would be there for everything they did, or wrong to create that impression. Also, if you are going to run a country properly, you have to see reality. You can't make the world into something it's not just through some magical application of leadership fairy dust.
Robert--as always good points especially the UW side of deterrence.
If in fact the US had any strategy whatsoever they would have analyzed the current Russian military options and realized that even with their new UW strategy they still rely heavily on armor as that is the core of the conventional army and their UW depends on a combination of conventional and UW.
If they would have continued the analysis the US would have realized that yes the UA is a rag tag group but they have had excellent artillery groups as the Russians will attest to as they have had massive loses in manpower and tanks because of the UA artillery.
The single point of failure of this current Russian adventure is their armor and the single way to defeat that is via ATMs.
If the US had sent ATM weapons, jammers and secure comms starting last May under the argument they are assisting the UA to defend it's territorial borders under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum the ATMs coupled with UW deterrence would have driven the Russian military costs to a level that hurts all the while staying a half step under a full scale war which is where if the US does not watch out is now occurring.
Seems that Fredrick the Great was correct when he stated that diplomacy without a military is like music without instruments
Shame this NSC and White House never heard about his comment as their timid approaches to the problem over the last eight months is actually driving the escalation.
But maybe their new "strategic patience" was what they were practicing.
BUT what is now interesting is that the fighting qualities of the current UA has been impressive as they are fighting for a civil society that is actually supporting them in ways we have not seen in the West since I am not sure when.
Actually this civil society development is something you have mentioned often--they are crowdsourcing and crowd funding virtually everything while creating a new form of government on the fly--meaning these types of volunteers are actually performing government functions while they are trying to get the needed reforms in place.
This new rag tag army has inflicted major losses on Russia and it looks like the costs will climb in a way that might in fact shock Putin.
In some ways it is really great to see that while in a war a military can in fact modernize itself and a good army maybe in the forming especially since the Ukrainians do have a good track record for military hardware development.
http://cepa.org/content/why-russia-will-escalate#overlay-context=conten…
Why Russia Will Escalate
By Jakub Grygiel
February 5, 2015
The war in Ukraine will not be settled by negotiations and is likely to see a further escalation of Russian military involvement. Russia’s war against Ukraine is an outcome of three objectives pursued by Moscow. First, Moscow wants to have Ukraine in its exclusive sphere; second, it aims to destabilize the European political order by maintaining an open conflict on Europe’s frontier; and third, it wants to avoid a protracted war of attrition.
The first goal has been amply examined: Putin considers Western institutions – EU and in particular NATO – as enemies that threaten not just Russia but also the stability of the existing regime in Moscow (and in Putin’s mind the two – Russia and his personal power – are congruent). The second goal is related to the first one. Given that Russia cannot compete with Europe on the basis of economic efficiency and political appeal, it has to do so with the form of power in which it has some advantage: brute force. Finally, the third objective is a negative one. Putin cannot afford to fight a protracted war because of the economic costs (including those imposed by sanctions) as well as political ones (a steady trickle of Russian casualties will do little to shore up Putin’s popularity).
The problem for Moscow is that these three objectives are difficult to align. In fact, the pursuit of one may undermine the ability to achieve another. Continued tensions sponsored by Moscow in Eastern Ukraine will result in even stronger anti-Russian sentiments in the Kiev, and correspondingly deeper aspirations for close relations with the West. Similarly, a war of attrition may be difficult to avoid if Moscow wants to maintain a prolonged presence in Ukraine in order to keep it a source of geopolitical instability generating divisions within the European Union.
The preferred scenario from Moscow’s perspective would be one in which the war ends quickly, before Ukraine gets its act together militarily (and before the U.S. decides to arm Kiev), while achieving some version of the first two objectives. A territorially truncated Ukraine, with a Russian puppet statelet in the eastern oblasts linking Russia with Crimea, will of course satisfy such objectives as Kiev is unlikely to accept such loss. An unresolved territorial conflict will impede Ukraine’s westward march while at the same time it will be a violent reminder of Europe’s inability to deal with military threats, the Achilles’s heel of the post-modern political architecture built in Brussels.
What this portends is that there is little chance the current war will be stopped by negotiations. A negotiated settlement is simply not in Russia’s interest, as conceived by Putin. Moreover, Russian military involvement in Eastern Ukraine is poised to escalate. Paradoxically, the timid rumors circulating in Washington in favor of arming Ukraine are creating an incentive for Moscow to escalate the war now, to attain the desired territorial gains before it becomes too costly. Once Ukrainian forces possess, for instance, anti-armor weapons, Russia’s advantages decrease and the costs of its intervention increase dramatically. This should not prevent the West from arming Ukraine but, as most often in politics, it is better to do it quickly without a lengthy public handwringing. The purpose of arming Ukraine is in fact not to deter Russia, in which case threatening future actions may have some impact; it’s too late for that. The purpose is to impose serious costs on Russia so that it realizes that its triad of goals – submissive Ukraine, unstable European frontier, and no protracted war – is impossible to achieve. And the way to do this is by establishing the conditions leading to a war of attrition.
"The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting." Sun Tzu
As I look at this, The West does not have a war fighting problem with Russia, what we have is a failure of deterrence.
A favorite mantra among US Army leadership these days is that "War is a contest of wills." The implication of Army leadership is that our current civilian leadership is communicating a lack of will to commit the nation to war, and that aggressive state actors are taking advantage of that lack of will to act. Perhaps. But do we really think it is wise, do we really think it is the "supreme art of war" to engage in major nuclear or conventional war every time some state seeks to adjust their sovereign parameters to ones more appropriate for the facts of today (rather than the facts of when those parameters were established decades ago)?
But clearly we must do something to address the erosion of Western deterrence. We can spend billions on upgrades to our nuclear force. We can spend billions in upgrading, upsizing and sustaining a warfighting ground force in times of peace - but neither of those vast expenditures address the reality that our opponents wisely avoid tripping the clear triggers to generate the political will to employ such extreme counters. Basic math: Any number, regardless how large, multiplied by zero equals zero. If will equals zero, no size or type of force is adequate. We need to find a counter that we have the will to employ, an approach that does not require such a clear breach of sovereign protocol as to generate the degree of political will necessary for nuclear or conventional war. The answer is an unconventional one.
I don't believe that unconventional warfare is much more marketable than attempting to sell nuclear warfare. But while we do not promote nuclear warfare, rely heavily on nuclear deterrence. The credible threat of nuclear warfare to keep those who would conduct sovereign encroachments in check. Perhaps it is time that we rethink deterrence. Perhaps it is time that rethink unconventional warfare. I believe what we need to cause major state actors such as Russia, or China or Iran to pause where they currently press, is the credible threat of unconventional warfare - Unconventional Deterrence.
Unconventional Deterrence shores up the gaps in our current approaches to deterrence (supplementing, not supplanting), and requires a much lower threshold of political will to employ. Unconventional Deterrence also give the West an asymmetric advantage we are increasingly losing in our nuclear and conventional capacities. For all of our flaws and faults, the US has a population-based form of governance that makes us fundamentally stable where other socieites are entering the modern age of empowered populations with systems that are inadequate, rigid and often quite brittle. Certainly Russia, China and Iran are far more concerned about the growing instability of their own internal societies than they are about external challenges. Unconventional deterrence targets those vulnerable populations and plays upon those governmental fears.
Adding a credible threat of unconventional warfare to our current program of deterrence is an idea that is low cost and has the potential to be highly effective. It may even serve to coerce those stubborn regimes into actually taking the concerns of those populations serious and begin working to make the changes necessary to improve their own internal instability. Far more productive than engaging in another contest of building competing nuclear or conventional forces.
It is time to put a bit more art into our approaches, and then perhaps we may indeed "subdue the enemy without fighting." But if they want to fight, we will also be prepared to bring them a fight they cannot handle, leveraging their own weakness against them, rather than hammering at them with our strength.
This comment is a tad off---while everyone has been complaining about the lack of controls or the troops will run desert and not fight or switch sides---this does not fit the current fighting abilities that the Russians have seen from the Ukrainians.
"But the predictive track record is not good for some of these people wanting a Ukrainian surge of weapons. without training or improvements in the Ukrainian military itself and the larger internal political situation, the weapons could just end up doing nothing much, fueling conflict, or, given corruption and 'switching sides', end up where they shouldn't be."
In a recent interview given by the Russian FSB officer Strelkov/Girkin that started the entire eastern Ukraine revolt seems to agree with my comments.
Strelkov: "Over the past 4 months the army of Ukraine has strengthened threefold. They did not give up even after the defeat last summer
Strelkov: "Advance of Novorossiya troops was stopped. We have huge losses. Our fight is hopeless. No troops to encircle Debaltsevo"
Strelkov: "Junta increases flow of weapons, training more troops while militia has no officers. Avdeevka and Pisky are too strengthened
Strelkov: "Novorossiya is great idea, but DPR and LPR are banana republics. Their leaders are junta."
Not bad for a rag tag army in August fighting largely with volunteer troops.
Notice he even compliments the officers of the UA and the reporting is indicating that the front line UA units have great officers from COL downwards and the fighting force itself has been quite motivated contrary to what the Russian propaganda is trying to spread.
With Russian troops KIA numbers standing at 6714, over 8K WIA and another 2K or so MIA since August I would say the UA has earned the right for weapons.
An example of why they need assistance of the non lethal kind---they have been able using free smart phone apps to aim their 203mm (8inch) artillery so accurately that hit can even single tanks.
"Was seeing you on CNN saying about Ukrainians using walkie-talkie.They also use android with GPS to calc artillery trajectory"
Another article of interest for this discussion, although more for the general phenomenon than the specific people mentioned:
<blockquote>Through seven years of war an exclusive club has quietly flourished at the intersection of network news and wartime commerce. Its members, mostly retired generals, have had a foot in both camps as influential network military analysts and defense industry rainmakers. It is a deeply opaque world, a place of privileged access to senior government officials, where war commentary can fit hand in glove with undisclosed commercial interests and network executives are sometimes oblivious to possible conflicts of interest.</blockquote>
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/30/washington/30general.html?pagewanted=…
It is very hard to know from our vantage point all that is going on, the hundreds and thousands of little interactions taking place leading from one event to another.
Difficult to accept as the citizen of a Republic.
I don't believe it is always about money; they exist in a world of their own with its own peer pressures, group think and status posturing. Plus, friendships and so on.
I am so sorry to hear about your health issues. I hope you are feeling better.
The lines are blurred in my life between military and medicine; I see veterans every day. It's not so easy for me to pull the two apart, although perhaps you make a good point. There are more productive uses of my time.
There is no great secret behind any of this commenting. I have a mild chronic illness, mostly a nuisance, but occasionally I like to rest and when resting, read a little, comment a little, comment a little, read a little. I know it looks excessive but it's really not much of anything, and the quality of my writing shows that :) I'm just resting because it's needed and I am privileged enough so that I am able to take the time to rest.
For discussion:
<blockquote>The United States is on a dangerous trajectory in its relations with Russia, a nuclear superpower that believes itself to be under direct threat. Several former U.S. officials and top think-tank experts released a report calling on the West to provide military support to Ukraine. (Two of them, our colleagues at the Brookings Institution, expanded on the report a week ago on this page [“Ukraine needs the West’s help now”].)</blockquote>
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/giving-weapons-to-ukraine-could-…
The authors disagree with escalation and lay out their case. It is more complicated than even the nuclear escalation risk (although that is the most critical, you only have to be wrong once, and we are not in control of all factors, accidents happen), there are issues of the future of North-South European relations, US/European relations, etc.
But the cavalier way this is being done under the uncertain nature of a nuclear competition or framework is shocking.
Our society was not like this always; during the Cold War everyone understood the stakes, and everyday people knew the risks in a visceral way I am not seeing today. Those that don't remember the Cold War don't seem to have a visceral understanding of its dangers, and, yet, this is wrong too, as older members of our society seem to miss the Cold War and wish it back for complicated emotional reasons.
The fates are cruel, if they won't teach us about war in one way, perhaps they will in another. And proxy wars bleed the people that are the proxies. Bleeds them terribly.
As always, military matters are embedded within a complex framework of competing desires, interests and events that go their own way.
From SWJ, author Miguel Nunes Silva:
<Blockquote>Difficulties in coordination can easily be explained by game theory as the Organization has for the past decades expanded the number of its members and lost its most common of goals. From 1989 to 2009 thirteen – if one counts East Germany – new states joined NATO’s ranks almost doubling the number of members. The more voices the more watered down any agreement will become given the increasingly divergent interests being pursued.</blockquote>
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/nato-‘victory-has-defeated-you’
There are other articles by the author at The American Conservative, I believe.
90s critics of NATO expansion warned of just such pressures within the alliance if it was expanded, and, now, with Germany and France trying to negotiate separately, and Poland suggesting it could give weapons, we see that a unified response is not possible in all situations because national interest is defined in ways the diffuse modern nature of NATO cannot handle in its current understanding of its own roles.
<blockquote>I was so horrible about General Breedlove earlier on in this thread. Move Forward tried to get me to shut up and be more careful, to his credit.
I have limited ability to understand what is going on from my vantage point, don't I? It's all moving too quickly and there are too many parties involved.</blockquote>
You often bring up good points but I don't recall what you said about General Breedlove. I recall once questioning a comment you made about General Hayden or maybe Alexander.
My point is there are enough problems in the medical community that more of your focus should go to criticisms there. It gets old hearing isolationist eye doctor Rand Paul, his dad, family doctor Howard Dean, and neurosurgeon Ben Carson trying to advise us on geopolitical matters when their own field is so screwed up and constitutes 1/6th of our economy.
In late January, a relative's girlfriend was sent some distance with premature pregnancy problems, I marveled at the quality of the care, and was somewhat puzzled that Obamacare was still not showing its worth since they were young and uninsured...so what's the point. She was hospitalized for weeks and finally delivered in a quite modern hospital. Kudos, but costly to someone other than them. Days later I stood up and was extremely dizzy and it did not go away, plus I started vomiting. I had zero chest pain or other heart-related problems as tests would later show. I hope not because my work outs include both weights and cardio and my blood pressure and cholestoral are OK. We also are insured through my wife's Federal Blue Cross Blue Shield, so I was not too worried about the cost.
Then a hospital administrator mentioned that if this had happened before Obamacare it would not have cost nearly as much but now it probably would. I had a $600 ambulance bill of which we will pay just $100. No problem. It is the $10,943 hospital bill that concerns me for tests, medical care, and drugs for a 16+ hour stay in the ER and a shared room. Since we also pay a just increased $213 every two weeks for health insurance, you may forgive my impatience with doctors giving non-medical advice since they can't seem to get their own field right. I still have no idea how much of that we will pay because inquiries are occurring.
It isn't just a doctor and health care system problem, though. An E-4 with four years service makes roughly what my 30+ year civil service wife makes. But the young E-4 has extensive tax-free pay and does not pay health care costs of $426 a month that my wife pays with high deductibles and co-pays. Doctors may have questionable advice to give us on National Security, but I also tire of hearing some active and retired service members complain about this or that when my wife got zero pay raises for three years and works harder than any E-4 I have ever known. Plenty of officer retirees who make more in retirement than my wife makes working are also part of the military budget problem for thinking they should not pay more for retiree medical care. Military daycare costs often depend on your rank. Perhaps officer retirees should pay more for Tricare than enlisted troops. It would be a start.
James Kitfield has an article (and the author doesn't mention that the military people he quotes might have a financial interest in all of this? Do they? Don't they? Disclosure should be routine) where he basically uses the Afghanistan model for what should be done in Ukraine.
And closer scrutiny of that showed that perhaps our efforts didn't work as well as we had thought because the money wasn't really going where we thought it might be. Can't track money in that environment so everything is speculation.
Yes, turning a country in the middle of Europe into Afghanistan is a good idea. How's Afghan security doing again?
http://breakingdefense.com/2015/02/how-to-manage-putin-russias-escalati…
The larger strategic situation of the Soviet Union and its leaders and Putin and Russia today are different too.
Another reason I stopped reading some blogs is that many rarely disclosed their buddies' ties to various consultancies. And not just the "pro war" ones, it's a bit of a male military coffee klatch, friends of friends and things I cannot understand.
So, I whittled it all down to just one blog comment section and, really, that too I need to stop.
Don't try and guess who I mean because I read a lot of different things :) Some old friends are fine, I just want to stop commenting altogether but I won't.
If you go back and look at writing during the 90s that criticized Strobe Talbott's writing on NATO expansion, you will find the worry that expansion will weaken NATO itself because of a north-south divide:
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/05/us-nato-usa-hagel-idUSKBN0L92…
There are a few articles expressing this worry here at SWJ too. I can't remember the author's name right now.
None of the 90s critics wanted to abandon smaller or more vulnerable nations in Russia's orbit, either. They wanted a different security architecture that took these tensions into account.
Not an easy situation. But internal governance matters, and so too corruption in militaries within those small vulnerable nations. I do worry about them but I also worry that they think that outsiders can essentially solve a situation that requires both outside help and internal reform.
This piece on "muddlers" by Andrew Bacevich is quite interesting, and, again, all the talk of a grand strategy obscures the fact that in our system it's always a big, messy battle.
I was so into the Grand Strategy stuff in the past but I think it's another thing I got wrong, too.
http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175949/tomgram%3A_andrew_bacevich,_a_hu…
Wasn't there an article in Foreign Policy about the Brookings/Atlantic Council/Chicago Council on whatever paper as an audition for a possible Clinton presidency?
PS: deleted by me (too political for the intended purposes of this site)
Many interested in this topic may have seen the following article or similar articles:
<blockquote>"Everything we do we have to look and evaluate as to will (it) advance the ball toward that political solution that we have to find here," Breedlove told The Associated Press in an interview here. "So all manner of aid has to be taken in light of what we anticipate would be the Russian reaction."
Breedlove would not talk about what advice he gave the administration or his NATO leadership, but he said the situation in eastern Ukraine is deteriorating and any action the U.S., takes must help move the conflict toward a political solution.</blockquote>
http://news.yahoo.com/top-nato-general-warns-russian-reaction-arming-uk…
I was so horrible about General Breedlove earlier on in this thread. Move Forward tried to get me to shut up and be more careful, to his credit.
I have limited ability to understand what is going on from my vantage point, don't I? It's all moving too quickly and there are too many parties involved.
<blockquote>Lacking a grand strategy, the US executes multiple <em>strategies</em> that compete in a Darwinian forum to gain prominence, influence policies, and determine resource commitment</blockquote>
<em>Going Big by Getting Small: The Application of Operational Art by Special Operations in Phase Zero</em>, Brian S. Petit (Introduction)
But this always happens in DC, whether there is a grand strategy or not? The Cold War in the States was a massive domestic argument and "competing Darwinian forum."
The intellectual back-and-forth going on at Brookings is part of this, isn't it? Are people asking for more arms for Ukraine positioning themselves for a future Clinton presidency, or is it the bureaucratic deep state stirring itself because a new focus on NATO would mean a return to prominence?
But the predictive track record is not good for some of these people wanting a Ukrainian surge of weapons. without training or improvements in the Ukrainian military itself and the larger internal political situation, the weapons could just end up doing nothing much, fueling conflict, or, given corruption and 'switching sides', end up where they shouldn't be.
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2015/02/03-why-arming-ukr…
<blockquote>Hillary Clinton has conceded that she "did misspeak" about landing in Bosnia under sniper fire, blaming tiredness for a dramatic description that was shown to have been significantly exaggerated.</blockquote>
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1582795/Hillary-Clintons-Bosn…
#GRAVITAS
Play acting and political positioning in the background of nuclear weapons. Well, wasn't it Andrew Marshall that was fascinated with the use of tactical nuclear weapons? No wonder so many American military members of a certain age and generation weren't much bothered by Pakistani development of certain nuclear doctrines, how different was our system at the intellectual level?
Well, whatever you all do, just don't blow up the world. The military is in a tight spot, I don't think the frustration of the past decade or so is going to go away, the system is confused and so the policy guidance will be confused and you will be asked to do many strange things.
#HumanDomainInsane
From @JustinLogan:
https://twitter.com/JustinTLogan/status/563008654165942272
"On offensiveness/defensiveness, there is, fortunately, literature:...."
The linked pdf names a lot of big names and makes reference to a large body of literature. Naturally, I would think I could solve a huge area of controversy with a few bad mannered comments. Typical.
So, it's an area of controversy, then? Seems like a cause for caution but the current reporting makes me think I know where this is going.
We need a new narrative in the MidEast and Jordan is ready to take the gloves off and we will support the anti-ISIS coalition partners, including a newly moderately run Saudi Arabia.
Putin has Asperger's and thus we should play nuclear chicken with his "regime."
Scanning headlines is always a good way to see how the leaks are going to favored journalists and how the line will be played out to the general public.
The big study about Putin and Asperger's from the Yodas at the Office of Net Assessment? 2008? Interesting year, 2008, in terms of American opens in WaPo and other bits of information doled out.
PS:http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/02/04/putin-aspergers-…
And the 'meddling' ope ed was 2004, but, of course, all the 'Georgia' op ads 2008? Well, to be fair to me, you've all made me borderline nuts.
PPS:
<blockquote>Did Americans meddle in the internal affairs of Ukraine? Yes. The American agents of influence would prefer different language to describe their activities -- democratic assistance, democracy promotion, civil society support, etc. -- but their work, however labeled, seeks to influence political change in Ukraine.</blockquote>
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A15131-2004Dec20.html
<em>Stop me, oh, oh-o, stop me
Stop me if you think
That you've heard this one before</em>
The Smiths - Stop Me If You Think You'Ve Heard This One Before
Well, what else is a Gen Xer going to post then?
As long as I'm at it, take a look at the various state committees of this organization:
<strong>Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, Inc.</strong>
Very active in parts of the country with Ukrainian diaspora. Remember when I posted about Imran Khan and the different British MPs that invited him to talk, and of their own constituents and South Asian diaspora? This happens all the time, it's part of the system, it's fine, people have a right to organize and lobby, but it's only one part of a larger picture. And the well-meaning everyday people are often, well, I don't like the word used, but this all connects with various power structures in complicated ways.
It's both real and manipulated, sincere and insincere, all at the same time, as a larger phenomenon.
Again, I saw this with the Indian diaspora and the Kashmir and Punjab insurgencies. It always was complicated on the ground but depending on the political situation in the West, one or another faction was viewed as the "true voice" of the situation.
I know you all hate it when I do this, it doesn't help with the military discussion, does it?
I just don't see a primarily military solution here, though.
Interesting use of language, as in <strong>defensive</strong> versus offensive:
<blockquote>With Russian-backed separatists pressing their attacks in Ukraine, NATO’s military commander, Gen. Philip M. Breedlove, now supports providing <strong>defensive</strong> weapons and equipment to Kiev’s beleaguered forces, and an array of administration and military officials appear to be edging toward that position, American officials said Sunday.</blockquote>
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/02/world/us-taking-a-fresh-look-at-armin…
Earlier in the thread, I had written:
<blockquote>NATO was about Western Europe. Ukraine is not Germany. And nuclear weapons change things so that the other examples seem a bit odd to me.
.
But what I really wanted to say is that the Council on Foreign Affairs seems to have this long time confusion between NATO as a defensive military alliance and the EU as a long term project to create a zone of peaceful activity and a collective or community.</blockquote>
And
<blockquote>Offense: Democracy promotion via extensive activity within the state in order to promote pro-Western groups in Ukraine; working with Western friendly oligarchs in a game of economic chicken with Russia friendly oligarchs, promoting the US role over those things that our NATO allies can help the Ukranian military do, such as better training which apparently didn't happen, and so on.
.
Defense: Clear lines such as thinking of NATO's Article 5 in only a defensive way (against this line you will not cross, nor will we cross the other way, etc.), not confusing regime change/democracy promotion/nation building, EU competition, or pandering to domestic constitutencies, etc. with security. And so on.</blockquote>
But I screwed up, didn't I? For this to work in a purely defensive way, as we understood it during the Cold War, the system itself has to be stable. This is the bedrock, the first principle? Even the former East and West Germany don't fit into this paradigm given the problems within the Ukrainian system itself.
So, if the Ukrainians themselves were more united, then, well this concept of defensive might work but if they were more united then the situation itself would be different. How much of our democracy promotion (and the intelligence activities of other outside parties, including the Russians and other European nations) helped to destabilize all of this? Like Assad and Syria and all the outside parties meddling which, when added to the organic on the ground events including Assad's repression, spun off in a direction we still don't entirely understand?
Interesting language.
A primarily military solution is not to be had.
Michele Fluornoy wants a Ukraine surge, essentially? Did I read that somewhere? Fond of surges, because that is the pattern here again. We surge because we don't know what else to do. I'm sure I read that somewhere else....
Many outside factions wanted to destabilize everything, didn't they? The poor Ukrainians. They thought outsiders wanted to help, and some factions did, some didn't, and they misjudged it because it was all a hall of mirrors?
Human beings aren't chess pieces on a chess board. This is very wrong.
<blockquote>One way was to be threatening, and in so doing provoke an enemy to action. The other way was to appear weak, and thus to provoke an adversary into a similar risky misadventure.</blockquote>
There is something a bit vapid about this; why can't a weak party appear threatening and so provoke an adversary? For instance, Al Q and 9-11 or falling into traps in the way the Georgians did under Saakashvili?
No wonder many people with intellectual roots in the neoconservative movement get so many things wrong, it's the sort of thinking that appears to be more deep and intellectual than it really is, it's the appearance of deep thought, so satisfying to world filled with those who want to be given permission to do what they wanted to anyway.
Forget COIN vs. COINTRA, just plain old hard thinking might do the trick....
Boston received $7 of the estimated $15 billion it cost to build the Big Dig from the federal government. With debt it will end up costing $24.3 billion with annual debt payments of $550 million until 2038.
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/2012-07-10/big-dig-costs-pegged-at-24-do…
It kind of seems to respond to your statement below particularly if an entire nation is saved due to far less aid than $7 billion from the U.S. BTW, if you search "Big Dig" you also find an article stating that the entire undersea train tunnel from U.K. to France cost less than the Big Dig. Now shall we talk about the waste, fraud, and abuse in the medical system? Physician heal thyself before passing judgment on everyone else:
<blockquote>Ukraine has received billions of dollars in aid. Aid is fungible. If they lack the resources to war on their own people in the East sufficiently (or fight proxies), then I reckon its mismanagement of resources by its governing classes.</blockquote>
It amuses me that this piece uses the phrase "lack of action." Ukraine has received billions of dollars in aid. Aid is fungible. If they lack the resources to war on their own people in the East sufficiently (or fight proxies), then I reckon its mismanagement of resources by its governing classes.
Washington's democracy promoters don't tend to do a very good job, do they? Their students rarely learn but do develop healthy personal bank accounts.
I cannot believe the careless attitude displayed in this article. OTOH, at this point, I should get ready to believe anything. At one time I went through and tracked back funding for this think tank. Nothing major, superficial searching. And I believe people believe what they write, no accusations here. It's just that group think is toxic.
What a world, that town of DC. No wonder so many are looking for a plan B to Washington. It's because of too much interference, too, not too little.
Tilting at windmills online, my speciality.
You don't have to buy all of this from Pundita blog (Washington and the Ukraine Crisis) to see that Americans have some serious thinking to do, which likely won't happen until a new generation rises within military and foreign policy circles:
<blockquote>Another downside to USA covertly intervening in the affairs of other nations -- intervention that never stays covert for long -- is that it makes it easy for governments of all stripes to blame the USA for situations in their countries that are not of American making. The U.S. democracy doctrine, foolishly applied, has been the gift that keeps on giving for foreign governments that don't want to clean up their act. So I'm not sure that the weaponization of democratic ideals can be considered decent and humane.
What does seem certain at this point, nine years out from Bush's historic apology, is that Washington has not entirely absorbed the lesson of the Yalta Agreement. Not to rake up the past too much, but when I consider that the rise and expansion of the European Union have been largely funded by Germany, it's looking to me as if Germany's government is accomplishing with check writing and legalese what Hitler did with standing armies before the Allied powers chased him into a bunker.
There will be no chasing the European Union into a bunker. And on any serious U.S. objection to EU expansion, the United Kingdom will not be acting on the side of the USA as it did during the first two world wars.
As to when and if these same thoughts will ever occur to policymakers in Washington -- perhaps someday, after all the Mediterranean countries, to include Egypt and Israel, have been folded into the European Union, someone in the White House or Congress might observe, 'Gee, those Europeans sure are expansionist, aren't they?'
By then, however, it would be too late in the day for anyone in Washington to appreciate the idea of Russia as a countervailing force against European Union expansion.
The current headlines about Ukraine suggest not much has changed since 2005 concerning the European Union's perennial tussles with Russia. The big change came the year before, when Latvia along with seven other former Soviet countries, including Poland and Hungary, joined the European Union.
As to Washington's role in Ukraine, a country high on the European Commission's list of next candidates for inclusion in the EU, it's not been the only meddler in Ukraine, any more than it's been the only meddler in the affairs of the Mediterranean nations of Egypt, Syria or Libya; EU countries have also meddled. Yet it's never Berlin, Brussels, Paris or London that's left holding the bag when meddling goes seriously awry. It's always Washington.
So while I'm still wishing the European Union well at this point in history, I'm afraid I no longer buy Washington's rationales for the EU piggybacking on NATO. It's not pukka sahib, in my book, to justify use of an American-led military defense pact to support continued expansion of a powerful trade bloc on the grounds that its members always feel threatened by Russia.</blockquote>
http://pundita.blogspot.com/2014/05/washington-and-ukraine-crisis-and.h…
Perhaps Drucker, not Kraemer, should have been the secret weapon:
<blockquote>Drucker insisted on the importance of economic power, but Kraemer believed economic matters could not substitute for or trump military strength.</blockquote> - The Forty Years War (The Rise and Fall of the Neocons, from Nixon to Obama), Len Colodny and Tom Shachtman
But maybe there is another way to look at Kraemer in this instance. The EU, US and NATO 'bloc' was involved in economic warfare with Russia and using various nations as their proxy, all while telling those nations it was about strengthening their democratic system and protecting them from Russian aggression.
WIthout understanding this background, any attempt to counteract this supposedly new Russian warfare (really, what were you all doing in Afghanistan for the past thirteen years that you cannot see it is the same proxy stuff you were dealing with, and which can be nicely paralleled historically with Kashmir and Punjab within the context of the Cold War) will backfire. Once again, it is a focus on an enemy without context.
As an ironic sidenote, one reason the US doesn't have as much economic power in the region is that I wager there are DC "Atlanticist" lobbies that attempted to prevent greater US economic investment in Russia out of fears of the US changing its basic calculus and thus being less useful.
The Indispensable Nation conceit is a perfect argument to cultivate an American mark. (I had to correct dispensable to indispensable, lol).
The sad thing is, our machinations didn't help these nations firm themselves up against outside attack. Of course, bad governance and poor choices were the real problem to begin with, as usual. If your leaders leach off state assets, and a revolution to change that government excludes people in the process while not recognizing how you were used by outside powers, then you may become hostage to that tussle instead of protecting your own nation. There is more than one scholar at a Ukrainian think tank I've found that says the same thing. Sound voices drowned out in the heat of the moment.
For more on the "tussles", see the link above to the Pundita blog. But I've posted some books and articles that deal with this subject too, around here, and will try and find them again.
Thanks, Outlaw. I had read this article prior to the response to comments following the 'How do you solve a problem like Russia?' post. This article is excellent. My gut says that President Putin is acting quickly before the consequences kick in. The easy pickings of Crimea merely emboldens the Kremlin truly to dismember Ukraine before it is too late (i.e., the U.S. and N.A.T.O. actually do anything). Yes, I am a simple-minded Republican as evidenced by this exchange between Secretary Kerry and Senator Rogers.
http://www.c-span.org/video/?c4494967/green-light-anschlu
This quote from Mr Aslund's essay zapped me right between the eyes: "Crimea was not a victory, only an appetizer. To achieve a victory, Putin has to proceed to widen his aggression. He faces three options: to control, devastate, or incorporate Ukraine." Some situations require forceful responses. Look for for some fuss to emerge in Syria during which Putin executes the roll-in of his Anschluß.
Ned---this article does not seem to gain traction in the media in the States but it hit here and has the interest of the Ukrainians.
http://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/op-ed/anders-aslund-putin-needs-victory…
Outlaw-09,
I agree with you that Madhu has decried the emperor's new clothes (in the sense of a directionless policy). Nevertheless, even in the absence of a policy, one can infer a strategy, because an unarticulated one exists. To me, at least, we have chosen the path of appeasement.
Consider the President's response to Syria. If there is cowardice involved in his approach, it is in persisting with the fiction that the only choices are to invade Syria or to continue nothing more than humanitarian aid. Such a binary choice is intellectually dishonest.
We see the same pattern re-emerging in Ukraine. Current Presidential statements narrows the choice to another bogus dilemma. When President Obama basically says that we will not go to war over Crimea (now Eastern Ukraine; tomorrow the whole country) he is incurring costs.
Again this rhetoric presents a falsely binary choice between invasion and waiting for the current 'costs' to kick in. Like the statements that much of the humanitarian aid is not getting to refugees in the Levant, the sanctions are next to nothing in impact.
Were the President serious about either policy, he would take steps to try to assure prompt delivery of humanitarian supplies and assure the injury to Russian interests. Chancellor Merkel needs to hear only two words to firm up her stand: "East Germany".
Nevertheless, she will not step up alone; waiting for Obama is like waiting for Godot: insidiously absurd and really rather boring. Carl is sadly accurate. There will be blood-stained costs to pay for this incompetence. The Anchluß rolling into Eastern Ukraine is a matter of days.
What makes me especially bitter is that our younger ,brothers and sisters in uniform will assume the heaviest burden in war, one that can be prevented. The measures I proposed are risky and may not be feasible. Nonetheless, I submit to you the longer-term risks of appeasement are far more hazardous
Ned---Madhu has hit it on the head--there is absolutely not a single/no strategy coming out of the WH--example---the EU sanctions were reported in a Berlin newspaper today to have frozen exactly one single account---that must have really hurt Russia. Example---What has the US sanctions achieved if viewed against the actions in eastern Ukraine starting this weekend---absolutely zip, zero, nada, nothing and the sanctions were to "cost" Russia ---that is suppose to impress Putin---evidently it has not? I guess the "cost" statement was just another "red line in the sand" statement---all words but no actions.
If one is supposedly a superpower in a unipolar world --bluffing and hope are not strategies.
As a private person I could list four items that will get immediate Russian attention and not involve military actions or troop movements--so if I can do that as a private citizen then where is the WH in their thinking and actions.
If the US does not lead in this critical moment in the 21st century then hang it up and Europe will turn from the US which is actually something Putin has been doing with the Ukrainian crisis.
Germany has basically walked away from the Ukraine and is not even via Merkel saying anything---some statements today from lower ranking but not from her personally---you have noticed a distinct lack of anyone from the EU visiting in the last week and even Biden is not scheduled until after the so called meeting of the 4.
The WSJ had an article in their Opinion comments that was highly critical of the US and the EU towards their non actions in support of the Ukraine.
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023041179045794997620…
Russia today via Interfax virtually threatened the eastern flank of NATO by saying if troops are send there Russia will be forced to counter and the assumption was militarily.
18:21 Russia to take measures in case NATO force configuration changes - Grushko (Part 2)
Some of my comments here were echoed as well in a very good article linked below which was released in the Kiev Post today and comes from an author out of DC. It is really a telling article.
http://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/op-ed/anders-aslund-putin-needs-victory…
Reference the NSA---in over 12 videos being published today by proRussian eastern Ukraine supporters there is virtually always a cellphone being used in the middle of the event---based on Snowden's releases one would assume the NSA had everything being monitored--why not release to the world the conversations---no----why not provide just basic intel to the Ukrainians on Russian troop concentrations--again a no---Breedlove had to resort to Digital Global to release open source photos.
Does this sound like a US government that has a strategy?
FROM PAGE-33 of the magazine you referenced:
"But the Association is essential for the EU too. With a highly educated population of 46 million, Ukraine offers the EU a skilled workforce, a growing market of middle-class consumers, the third-largest shale gas deposits on the continent, and farmland that has been called the ‘breadbasket of Europe’."
Ukraine's interests are clear as are the benefits to Europe. Time to:
1. quarantine Sevastopol;
2. aerial quarantine Eastern Ukraine;
3. California national guard exercises in Western Ukraine under N.A.T.O.;
4. support Ukraine in repudiating debt owed to Russia; as well as,
5. work with O.P.E.C. to supply Ukraine and, if necessary, release reserves immediately from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve.
Otherwise, kiss Eastern Ukraine goodbye and destabilize N.A.T.O. partners on the Eastern flank of Europe.
The 2012 NATO conference in Chicago was supposedly quite the networking opportunity for:
1. Local business.
2. International business.
3. Local, regional, international and other politicians.
4. Young professionals of the foreign policy intellecual class.
5. Some military leadership.
6. Domestic political groups, etc.
Always so, always true, nothing new here.
Still, quite a different narrative than some of the commentary. Interesting.
<blockquote> "I am pleased to present you with the fourth edition of Ukrainian Dialogue, the annual publication of the British Ukrainian Society, where you will discover more about Ukraine’s current affairs, culture and people."</blockquote>
- Lord Risby, Chairman of The British Ukrainian Society
http://www.britishukrainiansociety.org/en/
The loans held by the Ukranian government are held by a lot of Western banks? So, what happens with the IMF aid that the US or others in the West are giving? It goes to pay that debt/banks? I know I'm taking this discussion far afield but I still feel like I'm not getting the whole story and it's disinformation from the Russians, the EU/US, the Ukranian leadership, everyone.
Was their ever any real strategy behind enlarging NATO or was it just this haphazard thing that was enlarged for a whole host of reasons?
1. Domestic pandering by various politicians from various countries.
2. Economic competition; national, international, and by individuals seeking influence via NATO and related organizations.
3. Genuine worries about security.
4. Vague theories from the Foreign Policy elite and its ideas of internationalism?
5. Keeping the Americans in so that we pay?
6. Americans afraid of losing their hegemony in Europe?
And so on....
What exactly was the strategy behind it all? Even if you view it as an important defensive alliance, it still has to fit into a strategy. The US can't just pick up weak and troubled clients because it's no help to those poor souls either if it's not thought through properly.
How is it that the economic competition and the NATO action plans all became mixed up? There is no discipline to our unruly system. The people's fault, I suppose; everyday people like me have trouble telling what is real and what isn't.
That's why this piece confuses me.
PS: Why does the Gene Sharp/Michael McFaul democracy promotion so infatuate some in the military? Is it because you idealize it, whereas I look at it as a way for some to meddle in systems for their own reasons, quite aside from the will of the people.
<blockquote>This "test of the West" must be met with "political and economic sanctions" if Russia proceeds in annexing Crimea, Mr. Durbin said. But he did not elaborate and did not hint at support for any U.S. military action.
The trip is set to last just two days. Mr. Durbin is scheduled to be back in town by March 16, when he is set to meet with — who else? — local Ukrainian community leaders (and voters) here.
It's worth noting that Mr. Durbin has been a longtime backer of democracy movements in Ukraine and visited there in 2012. He also is a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and serves on its Subcommittee on European Affairs.</blockquote>
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20140314/BLOGS02/140319803/dick-…
Now, do the same for various constituencies in Russia and European countries, the UK, etc.
What now is the context within which you would consider some of the miitary-centric discussion taking place? How well does a focus only on American capabilites reflect reality?
<blockquote>There’s Dominique Strauss-Kahn, who seems to be on every other panel over the two-day event, and is accompanied by a youthful looking French woman, who sports thigh-high leather boots that match her (also leather) miniskirt perfectly. DSK’s date is not being paid by the hour, another conference attendee confides, she’s a high-level French TV executive.
He speaks in a gentle, almost incomprehensible voice and calls upon political leaders to show some courage to reform governmental institutions. When one attendee asks which world politician might be able to do that, DSK looks around the room and shrugs his shoulders. It’s not attainable, he admits, but it doesn’t stop him from repeating that tired line and others.
“Globalization is a war,” says the man who would now be president of France, if not for allegations that he attempted to rape a New York City hotel maid. “A new kind of war. One that very few parties, especially in the EU, are prepared to fight.” He’s a man of many deep thoughts.
There’s also Gen. David Petraeus, the war hero and former CIA director, who tells me to bug off when I ask for an interview, and at a more gentle moment admits that he’s suffering from a hamstring injury that’s keeping him from running his morning miles. He, too, is hoping to say nothing worthy of being quoted. And he succeeds.
Larry Summers is here, too, in his first public appearance since withdrawing from being considered by President Barack Obama to be the next chairman of the Federal Reserve. I move in to ask about his withdrawal—was he pushed out by Obama, or did he willingly remove himself from consideration for a job he badly wanted? “I said no,” he screams at the reporter beside me who beats me to the Fed question. “I said no. I said no. I said no. No.”</blockquote>
http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/another-yalta-conference_757228…
What happens when attempted good deeds (n the best case scenario) collide with the power competition between states? Did we not see variants of this in Iraq and Afghanistan? Failed and weak states is the 90's era concern of the American Foreign Policy establishment but we saw that great power competition and various proxy conflicts affected our on-paper reality.
<blockquote>The projects of the foundation include the largest private scholarship program in Ukraine Zavtra.UA, the international scholarship program for Ukrainian students WorldWideStudies, public lectures with international leaders for Ukrainian students and the creation of the Kyiv School of Economics; a network of modern neonatal centres throughout Ukraine; the largest and most dynamic contemporary art centre in Central and Eastern Europe PinchukArtCentre – free of admission and with over 1.7 million visitors as of today – with the biannual global prize Future Generation Art Prize for artists up to the age of 35 and biannual PinchukArtCentre Prize for young Ukrainian artists; the Davos Philanthropic Roundtable and the Davos Ukrainian Lunch organized annually at the occasion of the World Economic Forum's Annual Meeting in Davos.blockquotes>
On the academic subject of Democracies, Diasporas and nation building attempts via international elite institutions and connections:
<blockquote>Mr. Pinchuk, 53, is one of Ukraine’s only oligarchs to have deep ties to Washington. Many of the country’s richest businessmen are suspected of having links to organized crime and do not have visas to the United States, much less a relationship with a former and potentially future American president.
Still, Mr. Pinchuk’s image is not without blemish: His father-in-law is Leonid Kuchma, who was president of Ukraine from 1994 to 2005 and led a government criticized for corruption, nepotism and the murder of dissident journalists. As president, Mr. Kuchma privatized a huge state steel factory and sold it to Mr. Pinchuk’s consortium for about $800 million, which competitors said was a laughably low price.
Since 2006, Mr. Pinchuk has donated roughly $13.1 million to the Bill, Hillary & Chelsea Clinton Foundation. Mr. Clinton attends Mr. Pinchuk’s annual conferences in the resort city of Yalta, Ukraine, and Mr. Pinchuk attended the former president’s 65th birthday party in Los Angeles.
He was first introduced to Mr. Clinton in 2004 by Mr. Schoen, a New York-based pollster who has advised both Clintons. Mr. Pinchuk immediately began building a friendship with the former president and enthusiastically donating to Mr. Clinton’s causes, including an H.I.V. program that was later expanded into Ukraine.</blockquote>
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/13/us/politics/trade-dispute-centers-on-…
<blockquote>So how and where do we start? Successfully linking military engagements within diplomatic realms means less books by George Patton and more by Henry Kissinger. Currently, you won’t find too many Kissinger books in military curricula. Conversely, you’ll find fewer books on special operations in diplomatic circles. A new operational art will require closing the cognitive gap between engagements and strategy within military and diplomatic practice and culture. This doesn't require resources. It simply requires will.</blockquote> - Peace, Art and … Special Operations by Brian S. Petit
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/peace-art-and-%E2%80%A6-special-op…
If one were to take unconventional warfare doctrine and look at in two ways (Russian toward Ukraine, and the US/EU toward Ukraine), what would one find and how could various narratives be developed, regardless of whether you support one or the other?
The military doesn't control policy but I am intrigued by the "First, Do Harm" attitudes of our foreign policy and how it affects military activity. It's the strangest thing. It's also strangely destabilizing and dangerous business and it seems our Western and American traditional bureacracies are making a messy, multipolar situation worse, IMO. The creation of chaos and disorder in reality; nation building and stability on paper. Very Council on Foreign Relations.
Carl,
You and Mr MoveForward have had an interesting debate. This final comment of yours is by far the most troubling. It reminds of the time in Iraq when I said at dinner that I did not want four twenty-something soldiers guarding me; especially the nineteen year old jutting out of the roof. They had their whole lives in front of them. As a civvie in his late forties at the time, I felt that were I to be unlucky, at least I would have had a full life, if early end (or untimely incapacitation); that I would have had my triumphs and sorrows.
These guys still had their story in front of them. People from the embassy (civilians) were dismissive sayng, in effect, that these guys were paid to do what they do and that getting killed was a possibility they signed up for; that nobody made them enlist. I shuddered at the immorality of that statement as I realized that many view the military as hired help, to be used most often to bail out failing civilian policies.
Three more years of what you describe as 'this' vaguely nauseates me because President Obama and his 'trusted' advisors will not suffer or pay the price if the region descends into a shooting war. I remain convinced that, were we to make a concerted effort to stand tall, others would stand with us. Otherwise, current responses make President Obama look like he is running in place in front of the men's room without bothering to knock to see if anyone is there.
Ned:
Mr. Obama won't get it. He can't get it. He's a horse in the face of a coyote, not a burro.
We have three more years of this before possibility of change. I think we had all better start thinking, especially the military guys, about what we can do to dig ourselves out of the deep hole we will be in once we can again use a shovel.
It is obvious that any response to the events in Ukraine will be not be perfectly good. Yet the continuation of the current high-decibel dithering will prove to be perfectly bad.
The U.S. need not go it alone; Europe will step up if we do. While Ukraine arguably lies in Europe's sphere of influence, it is difficult to expect the E.U. to take a lead while it lacks the instruments to project the power.
When will President Obama get it? He need not be the commander-in-chief writ large but the coordinator-in-chief standing tall among like-minded commanders.
Move Forward:
None that addresses the point that there just aren't very many F-22s and they can't be everywhere at once, especially after you start losing some, and you always lose some. In the Pacific that means a whole lot because it seems inevitable that there will be 4 engine US aircraft flying along alone say between Japam and Guam hoping a J-20 doesn't show up.
If you are suggesting the F-35A or C will see service in useful numbers before J-20s do all I can say is...Wanna bet? B models don't count, they are just USMC stunt machines.
Suggest you read the defenseindustrydaily.com history of the F-22 and read the part about increment upgrade costs which approach $12 billion to fully upgrade just 143 aircraft to fire AIM-120D and AIM-9X and another 36 aircraft to a lesser level. Imagine what it would have cost if more aircraft had initially been produced. This does not even include costs of the oxygen generation fiasco.
Think about what you are saying about the Growler not being an especially long-ranged aircraft...that is flying near a couple of orbiting aerial refuelers.
I may buy an argument that the F-35 lacks all-aspect stealth that could be dangerous against hidden air defense threats. It lacks F-22 supercruise and altitude capabilities as well, meaning the oxygen-generating issues should never materialize for the lower-flying F-35. But the jamming and lower interception aspects of the F-22/F-35 AESA radars are similar against X-band radar as it would appear in open source literature that is all I access and would otherwise discuss.
The F-22 also can team with F-35s and other non-stealthy aircraft to assist their engagements once F-22s run out of missiles. Unlike one RAND study, those other allied and joint aircraft actually <strong>will exist</strong> on the battlefield, and F-22s will launch from and return to more than just two locations...for instance choosing to land in the Philippines or an isolated Japanese base rather than electing to crash into the sea out of fuel.
The Navy is publicly trying to sell Congress on buying more EA-18Gs because they can alter frequencies to address lower band VHF radars that can see smaller stealth aircraft. Another argument would be to simply take out those long-range radars early and often using the F-22 and B-2. Just knowing our stealth fighters are out there is a far cry from getting a firing solution against them in a head-on engagement.
Move Forward:
The Growler isn't an especially long ranged airplane and there aren't that many of them. So you have the same problem. You may end up with a group of airplanes that can do nothing but fly around in circles protecting itself. Not to mention all those cargo airplanes going from to to fro that have to be protected
I think you hugely misinformed about the capabilities of the F-22 vs the F-35 if you think them interchangeable as implied by using the construction "F-22/F-35".
Use the EA-18G to protect the tankers. Suspect the J-20 would get a salvo of missiles off before it is taken out by F-22/F-35. EW could defeat those long-range missiles I suspect with no personal knowledge thereof. Also read about the miniature air launched decoy and the jammer version that would give air defenders and Russian/Chinese fighter pilots fits.
Move Forward:
You don't have to exactly match them. You just have to build something good enough to beat your air forces, not the individual airplanes. If you can do that, then our ground forces get attacked from the air or at the least have no air support, neither of which we have any idea how to handle since it has been over 70 years since that last happened.
You hit upon the most important and vulnerable part of American air power, tankers. You knock out the tankers or make it impossible for them to operate close enough to the fight to be of any use and you cripple American air power. You had better take as much care to protect those tankers as anything else you have, including in the air.
And that is the trouble with having only 180 F-22s. In order to get those airplanes to a long range fight, they have to have tanker support but in order to protect the tankers against something like J-20s, F-22s have to protect the tankers. So then you may use most of your force protecting your force's ability to fly around in circles protecting your force. That is not to mention having to protect things like C-5s, C-17s, C-130s without which the ground forces can't operate.
My opinion is a big fast capacious airplane like the J-20 is made to kill tankers, AWACs, JSTARS and cargo airplanes. To do that it doesn't have to turn and burn with an F-22, it just has to have enough range to get to the really critical airplanes mentioned above. I wouldn't be too certain about our ability to achieve air superiority against a country like Red China at all in 5-6 years time.
Again, think about the prospect of topping off a B model via aerial refueling to include F/A-18 buddy refueling shortly after take-off. It costs more than the newest Gripen because it has far greater potential to survive against both Chinese/Russian air defenses, and their longer range air-to-air missiles. What you really should be comparing is the relative survivability of a Harrier vs. a F-35B. One is ineffective in a non-permissive environment. One is an integral team player.
Move Forward:
Why not just buy JAS-39s and disperse the airplanes around the countryside to operate from road segments as the aircraft was designed to do and as the Swedes planned to do? Or make sure we design small fighting airplanes to be based like that in the future? That would work quite well in all sorts of places and enables you to really well disperse airplanes.
Rather than leave all those MRAPs behind in Afghanistan or tanks and Bradley in the states, why not exploit their armor to protect our F-35s and Apaches.
If you look at the dimensions of both types of aircraft, you could probably fit at least two Apaches or one F-35 in a 60' x 50' protected area. But today's short to medium range missiles could penetrate any protection without much problem and with adequate accuracy. So instead of heavy concrete protecting every aircraft...until actually engaged by a missile or bomb, why not play a shell game?
In a 150' x 180' area you could potentially hide 9 such 60' x 50' cell shelters. However, if you plan to initially put one aircraft in that larger area, the threat now either must engage nine different cells or try their luck at guessing where the 60' x 50' protected area is inside the larger shelter. Park tanks, Bradley, and MRAPs adjacent to the protected mobile 60' x 50' area rolling around under the larger area. Make the overall shelter larger area's roof impregnable to radar, infrared, or regular satellite electro-optical coverage but not intended to stop munitions. Just melt the snow (in Europe) and run-off the water. Surround the shelter with concrete walls with other tanks, Bradleys, and MRAPS parked outside the walls for added protection.
If we eventually put active protection on our tanks and Bradleys, their location adjacent to shelters would protect against RPG attacks and mortar rounds if augmented by laser weapons. Unless we provide such protection, adversary special forces can engage our airpower with snipers, RPGs, and mortars, and conventional attacks ala Camp Bastion/Leatherneck. Smaller submunitions dropped from larger bombs might also be addressed by Army armor active protection.
<blockquote>That big myth about the USAF (and USN and USMC) keeping our ground forces from being attacked from the isn't. That is what fighters have been doing so effectively for the last 70 years ground guys forget that isn't the natural order of things. Besides you contradict yourself in the sentence immediately following when you say Russian and Red Chinese aircraft won't survive long against our aircraft.</blockquote>
We have spent so much on our fighters that no other nation can afford to match them. Think about your typical $10 billion threat defense budget and calculate how many $100 million to $800 million stealth fighters and bombers those threats can afford per year let alone the operating costs per flight hour.
We already spend a vast amount on nuclear weapons to deter the two nations that do have more threat aircraft. $355 billion over the next 10 years is planned to be spent on nuclear weapons that never will be used...and we complain about similar amounts spent on the F-35. Neither side expects to actually use nukes despite public proclamations, so conventional missiles and air defenses claimed to see them are the poor nation's response to our stealth fleet. There is no contradiction. We will achieve air supremacy in a matter of weeks against Russia or China and in days to hours against any other threats. No adversary aircraft will be attacking our ground forces that are still en route or dug-in or in dispersed armored vehicles.
If we are smart, we don't need to build one super-hardened aircraft shelter per F-35 and F-22 in the Pacific first island chain, Europe next to Ukraine, or Middle East near Iran. We have lots of aerial refuelers that enable a degree of aircraft parking stand-off. For the aircraft shelters more closely located that we do need, I would suggest that they be designed for the F-35 and Apache...the two aircraft that actually can address Russian armor or Chinese amphibious elements. I will now offer an unconventional idea for how to build such shelters.
I often talk about democracy and diasporas in the comments section and Small Wars Journal has more than one article on the subject.
In this case, one interesting domestic factor to consider is the way in which NATO expansion has been presented to domestic constituencies such as Polish Americans from the 90s onwards. Some live in states like Illinois and Ohio and are swing voters in key areas. As Sec. State, Hillary Clinton spoke of the future of NATO as one of expansion and she did it in Chicago which has large Eastern European diasporas. The choice of venue and the talks given definitely fall into the nature of what some constituencies--immigrant and otherwise--have long been working toward. Couple this with Robert Kagan as a part her then Foreign Policy Council (I believe it was called this) and you have an example of an intellectual community embedding itself within institutions; in this case, the State Department.
This is what I meant in another comment. Power, ideology, immigrant diasporas, political blocs--these matter because events have a multifactorial basis. Faceless Bureaucrat at Kings of War has a brilliant post on multifactorality. There is a lot of propaganda out there from ALL sides. Fascinating.
And not a little scary given how things got in Kosovo when various militaries came up against each other.
Apologies. Council on Foreign Relations.
Offense: Democracy promotion via extensive activity within the state in order to promote pro-Western groups in Ukraine; working with Western friendly oligarchs in a game of economic chicken with Russia friendly oligarchs, promoting the US role over those things that our NATO allies can help the Ukranian military do, such as better training which apparently didn't happen, and so on.
Defense: Clear lines such as thinking of NATO's Article 5 in only a defensive way (against this line you will not cross, nor will we cross the other way, etc.), not confusing regime change/democracy promotion/nation building, EU competition, or pandering to domestic constitutencies, etc. with security. And so on.
It's not true that there is no "Europe" when it comes to European defense. There were always attempts and options but they were quashed by various factions within Europe and the US because if you can get the US to pay for it, great.
And for the US FP elite, if you can get cover with out of area NATO, then the UN doesn't have to matter and you can do what you want when you want in ad hoc coalitions.
Between nuclear powers, this sort of blurring is not strategy, it is the opposite of it. Whatever you think of the contemporary Russian state and its leaders.