America's Secret Weapon to Stop Russia by Robert Spalding III, The National Interest
… Many have already said that there are no military options in the Ukraine crisis. While Western Europe and the United States do not desire conflict with Russia, the lack of action supporting Ukraine is actually a provocative gesture that invites escalation by the Russians. Fritz Kraemer, a little-known but highly influential strategist in the Pentagon best known for his many years as advisor to numerous secretaries of defense, believed that there were two ways to be provocative. One way was to be threatening, and in so doing provoke an enemy to action. The other way was to appear weak, and thus to provoke an adversary into a similar risky misadventure.
Before the United States Air Force began pounding Saddam’s forces in what would be a prelude to a one-hundred-hour ground campaign, it provided a much more subtle service to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. When considering the first Iraq war, most people think about the offensive campaign that pushed Saddam’s forces out of Kuwait. Few remember the deterrence provided by airpower before allied aircraft began the offensive that would be known as “Desert Storm.” …
Comments
The first article is from last September but it is not a bad thing to revisit this article:
<blockquote>Led by Lockheed Martin Corp., the biggest U.S. defense companies are trading at record prices as shareholders reap rewards from escalating military conflicts around the world.
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Investors see rising sales for makers of missiles, drones and other weapons as the U.S. hits Islamic State fighters in Syria and Iraq, said Jack Ablin, chief investment officer at Chicago-based BMO Private Bank. </blockquote>
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-09-25/syria-to-ukraine-wars…
In a multi-factorial world, money is still a good thing to follow....
The following is also of interest to the larger discussion:
<blockquote>The Israeli foreign minister has repeatedly stated that maintenance of good relations with Russia is a priority for the country.
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Israel, home to millions of people from the former Soviet Union, has refused to support the Western sanctions against Russia over the crisis in Ukraine, and the country's authorities have announced that they will continue exporting agricultural products to Russia, not bowing down to EU pressure.</blockquote>
http://sputniknews.com/politics/20150316/1019543878.html#ixzz3Uf1qga6c
Welcome to the 21st Century, where you have to hold 2, 3, 4, 5, whatever, thoughts in your head at the same time.
Always this way, really, but the little stories the American Foreign Policy establishment told itself about the Cold War and the immediate post Cold War period are so simplified as to be dangerous. As we've seen.
Can't be 1985--or 1995--forever.
Compare and contrast. For every action, a reaction. No one tell the WaPo op ed page or its silly op ed PhD toadies:
<blockquote>The top U.S. military officer said for the first time that he supported the possibility of arming Ukraine in that nation’s battle against Russian separatists.</blockquote>
http://www.defenseone.com/politics/2015/03/dempsey-says-its-time-arm-uk…
<blockquote>Russia says it will no longer attend consultations related to a key European arms control treaty, accusing the West of stonewalling its demands.
The move comes as Russia-West relations have plunged to their lowest point since the Cold War times over the Ukrainian crisis.</blockquote>
http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2015/03/10/russia-opts-out-of…
A new Cold War. Could anything be stupider for American interests, European interests, British interest, Eastern European including Ukraininan interests....
How is it that so many Millenials are being fooled? The 'stans and the Mid East are not the best model for understanding this crazy.
And the old Zbig stuff simply never did work. Is the President someone enamored of his stuff? Or Robert Kagan? Or that 'everything's' a target Brennan? How many things have these people got wrong?
If that world island stuff is so important, why push the Russians and Chinese together? Afraid if Russia integrates into Europe they will be another bloc as competition?
Have you looked at a map and looked at our ability to grow food, our population, our control of natural resources and technologies? Mental. All completely mental.
Madhu----just to keep you confused--right now there are depending on the source 12 or 14.4K Russian troops inside the Ukraine, 21K foreign/mercenary fighters and just 2-4K actual local Ukrainian "separatists".
50% of the Russian mercenary army are in fact "Chechen volunteers" ordered there by the current leader of Chechyna Kadyrov who is a very close friend of Putin's and who received a major award from him today. The second largest foreign fighter mercenary group are then the Cossacks which when inside Russia are a paramilitary unit inside the Russian security system so really they cannot be called "mercenaries".
Notice who was arrested yesterday for the killing of Nemtsov---a member of Kadyrov's SF elite Server BN. Kadyrov knew the arrested individual who also had received a major honor award in 2010 from Putin---and praised him as being a great Russian patriot.
"Georgia,Ukraine all this will go on and on. Its Russia´private affliction.We are a great power.We need to attack" - Kadyrov Dec.21st 2009
20,000 Kadyrov’s soldiers are ready to kill Ukrainians if Putin will give an order...: http://youtu.be/zwZ1yWkhh_s
I have over on the Ukraine thread that is currently being blocked by spammers posted a number of Russian mercenary battle videos showing Chechen fighters shooting/attacking the Ukrainian Army and shouting "Allah Akbar"---so never believe there is only one "Holy War" going on in the world and it is in the ME.
Is this another reason people in the US want to arm the Ukrainians? Got ourselves into a fix and now are afraid of what will rush into the violence? And you will use the term vacuum when really it is the fact that there is violence to exploit that is the problem.
Just no price for foreign policy--or military, politics at the top with our military--failure. It's a good thing Americans don't have ethnic feelings like, well, those horrible ethnics in Asia and the MidEast, so that emotion starts to take over.
Good to have the Cold War back, is it? For others too, I'm guessing. A lot of young people are about to find out it sucked, it all sucked, and it sucked to think your kids are going to suffer a little bit as they grow up thinking about nuclear missiles and the rest of it.
We did you another disservice, young people, we were never honest about how much it sucked to grow up like that. Probably the older guys that remember the Cold War fondly were never even aware of what their children were going through.
I can't embed links today, sorry:
<blockquote>In the West, most look at the war in Ukraine as simply a battle between Russian-backed separatists and the Ukrainian government. But the truth on the ground is now far more complex, particularly when it comes to the volunteer battalions fighting on the side of Ukraine. Ostensibly state-sanctioned, but not necessarily state-controlled, some have been supported by Ukrainian oligarchs, and others by private citizens. Less talked about, however, is the Dudayev battalion, named after the first president of Chechnya, Dzhokhar Dudayev, and founded by Isa Munayev, a Chechen commander who fought in two wars against Russia.</blockquote>
IN MIDST OF WAR, UKRAINE BECOMES GATEWAY FOR JIHAD
BY MARCIN MAMON
The Intercept (First Look)
What is going on? Just like with Syria, everyone has an agenda and things like this may be overblown, or swept under the rug depending on whose agenda. I love it when people say, "oh, Assad is so happy to support ISIS," well, even without ISIS, it wasn't going to be any good for the US to regime change again in that region so even if that is true, doesn't change the basic situation.
The Germans are unhappy with Breedlove too? I've seen more than one story.
Just what the heck is going on? Talk about multifactorial causation and the high-stakes scrum of international geopolitics layered on top of everything else.
Is there one person that can be trusted in all of this? Just one, LOL?
There is massive propaganda on all sides. I just don't trust anyone that can't admit that.
For all I know, our wonderful Sunni allies are trying to punish more than one party for refusing to do their dirty work and regime change in Syria....Ukraine is a perfect place to do that. Where did I read that recently? Real Clear World? But who wouldn't think that given the relationships?
A global leadership test we in the West fail time and time again, inserting ourselves forever into one camp or the other in the MidEast.
Peter Hitchens on his blog also mentions that NATO membership was given instead of EU membership, it was a cheap way of including these nations into the "West" while retaining advantages in the marketplace, business within the EU could always get concessions using the lure of supposed EU membership in the future, or plans of NATO membership.
If you think people are bitter about the US not backing up these nations, ask, say, an average Polish person how he or she might feel being treated by 'big' EU business. "Cheap labor, that's what they want us for," might be an average an answer....
Hey, democracies and diasporas is actually something I know about, especially the mix of ethnicities around me. Next time you have one of your Defense Entrepreneur Conferences, take a walk around, go walk through various ethnic neighborhoods, get a feel for the world that world, get outside the stuffy world of bureaucracy and see a little bit of the Human Domain....
I thought this article might be of interest. Back to the old Kraemer vs. Drucker debate:
<blockquote>According to Ilves, as soon as Estonia broke free of the collapsing Soviet Union, its government made membership in the military alliance a foundation of its security strategy. The project was tough, but after 15 years, the goal was achieved. Ukraine, by contrast, never bothered to take that road while Russia's military was still weak. "I had some Ukrainians here two weeks ago, and they said, 'You are lucky. You got independent and you just joined NATO'," Ilves says. "We had to work at it. Constant reforms, being constantly inspected, pulled apart, looked at every which way, as it was with the European Union. I was foreign minister for five years and I aged about 10 years during that period."
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Estonia's other barrier against Russian aggression is its relative economic well-being. </blockquote>
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-03-03/estonia-did-its-post-s…
I've mentioned several times that an Estonian commenter in the Council wrote that "we told the Ukrainians to close the border and grab Russian passports," and, I assume, more advice was given over the years on how to integrate difficult troubled regions toward the so-called center which never took place. American advice and money hasn't seemed to help over the years, either, or we all wouldn't be in this mess.
Understandable given the terrible history in that region but that doesn't change the facts on the ground. I had previously posted some comments by T.V. Paul from his book on Pakistan, The Warrior State, and in it he talks about how prioritizing the security state within a Cold War context prevented necessary reforms from taking place.
Those reforms are part and parcel of protecting any nation, as much as arms selling, actually, probably more so.
At any rate, our elites have decided that Ukraine is somehow essential to American security. Everything is these days.
I suppose it keeps us involved in Europe and the Mid East (UAE really going to sell weapons to Ukraine? Broke Ukraine?) and in that sense disorder serves many parties, including arms sellers in both the West and Russia, and those fearing a pivot to the East or the US losing interest in either place.
It's a funny thing. We basically are committing to forever protecting Europe. What is the end state so to speak? When Russia is no longer Russia? From expanding NATO comes changing Russia, which is what we tried to do in the 90s to disastrous effect. This is where some of the fear and paranoia might come in, I'm guessing. We tend to want to change other nations into our image. We in the vaunted West are all nation builders all the time and everywhere.
Why does the suffering of Eastern Europeans move most Americans while the suffering of the Russians seem less important? Unless it is something that places our elites--in conjunction with reformers--at the center of the story?
Is this the psychological profile of the standard foreign policy PhD? What is at the center of wishing to be the star of every story?
Why did we even have an American Revolution? Are we going to take the lead forever and ever, until our collective GDP is swamped by others?
I guess the Army is glad to have Europe back.
I am not as naive as I used to be. For sure, factions in the Army lobby for this and play politics so this discussion belongs here. Shame a big play by various EU factions for economic contracts got turned into this (yes, yes, I am only discussing the factors from the West, add in the Russian factors in this multifactorial process. Unlike some, I'm not going to be bullied into thinking things just because all the fashionable people are afraid to have their own opinions and afraid they won't be with the in-crowd if they don't toe the party line. Weak, weak, weak....)
Let's try this again without links:
Going through old links that I had collected and came across this article:
<blockquote>You may have missed it, but last month two key members of Congress asked the military to move additional U.S. nuclear weapons and dual-capable aircraft into Eastern Europe.</blockquote>
The Wrong Move: Adding Nuclear Weapons to the Russia-Ukraine Conflict
FEBRUARY 9, 2015 BY LT. GEN. ROBERT GARD GREG TERRYN
Defense One
General Dempsey has said that Russia is trying to break NATO, yet he thinks sending weapons to Ukraine (a non-NATO country, btw) will help to strengthen the alliance?
I understand the difficult position he is in and perhaps the best one can say is that troops to train Baltic nations might prevent such dangerous notions as nuclear weapons in Eastern European countries. (Again, which countries are in NATO and which not? It's as if the tenders of alliances have no idea how they are built or run properly).
On strengthening NATO, quite the opposite actually, given the tensions within NATO and the different "camps". Perhaps Washingtonians and NATO generals think that the US aligning itself with the UK/Eastern European camp within NATO will quash any sort of independence by various countries such as Germany and France? Given the combined economic power of the EU, it is more likely to hurt our position but emotion over reason.
It's as if people that are of European heritage (Western or Eastern) think they can't act in the emotional way those horrible Indians and Pakistanis do, I mean, how dare they nuclear saber rattle? I mean, I am continually being told that we in the West are calm and rational and those people--those types of people--well, they need our guidance!
Everyone craves national greatness, at least, purported leaders seem to crave some sense of it. I blame reading too much of silly shallow history books and imagining oneself a great leader, never to be forgotten by time.
Well, I haven't been in the morgue for years, but the experience teaches you a thing or two, and if you think being a national greatness leader (West or East, Russian or American), or arm chair saber rattling, changes how it all looks at the end, then you are a fool. As you come in to the world, so you go out of it....
The human face of war: fear, honor, and interest. Fear of being forgotten, pride as honor, and who knows what interest?
How dangerous this all is. And yet, almost no sense of it in the public, Western reporting, among the increasingly dulled DC glitterati, desperate for foreign policy relevance in an age that requires quietness over bluster.
I had no idea--no idea at all--how much a certain caricatured notion of exceptionalism was important to the psyche of so many people in various prominent positions. Sad.
Anyway, Kingston Reif has articles on the subject of nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe in The National Interest and at WoTR. (Can't embed links today).
How is it that Americans seem not to see the dangers, feel the closeness of this period to other dangerous periods of the Cold War? It's all those super hero movies we watch, I guess, substituting fantasy for reality.
By all means, let's put NATO and US troops right up next to Russia, nuclear armed, without buffer states, and with citizenry on both sides that yell insults at each other. What careful, thoughtful people.
Weak-minded. Who will be the man or woman to, well, be this man this time around?
<blockquote>"I'm not going to start Third World War for you," General Jackson told the US commander, according to Newsweek. In the hours that followed General Clark's order, both men sought political backing for their position, but only General Jackson received it.</blockquote>
The Guardian, 1999, <em>"I'm not going to start Third World War for you," Jackson told Clark</em>
How have we gotten here?
Who is stupid enough to think this is simply a reprise of the 80s without the key difference that the tripwires weren't so close? Well, a great majority it seems.
PS: Relax, I'm just venting. I'm not calling any one particular person out. But this little venture is only going to make things worse in the long term in terms of NATO. And when we need our strengths in the face of other challenges, once again, we will be sorry that we put a conflict about economics into this nuclear saber rattling realm.
Governance and borders, borders and governance. Brennan "everything's a target" never did understand this stuff, in AfPak or Ukraine.
PPS: Is Disenchantment with a capital D the only realistic endpoint for any honest person when looking at all of this.
I am sorry for the morale issues in the military, I really am. When this stuff really gets to me, I go all nerd and read more calm things and focus on what is possible, what is reality, I am nobody with no power, but I can educate myself, vote in a particular way, pay attention to daily duties, refrain from adding to the hysteria. I don't know. I never know. I just know that Disenchantment with a capital D is the only realistic endpoint for a generally honest person when looking at all of this.
I posted the following on a different thread (this is a part of the comment):
"Recently, I listened to a talk by Hew Strahan on YouTube (Europe, Geopolitics and Strategy) and he makes fantastic points about the increasing divergence of geopolitics and ideology within the western foreign policy community, such as it is.
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The most recent hysteria about Russia and Nemetsov underscores this tension (and he makes mention of Ukraine).
The two camps are not even speaking the same language. Such overt hysteria. Worrying. A perfect situation for introducing missiles and more nuclear weapons....(uh, extreme sarcasm), NOT a good situation)."
Discussions of the expansion of NATO and its outcome are hampered by this divergence between ideology and geopolitics. NATO has many different meanings and for some critics of NATO expansion, the language is one of geopolitics and NOT necessarily spheres of influence but of basic military alliance building and game theory. The bigger it is, the hard to control and focus.
Yet if NATO is an ideology, than its expansion is on moral terms and the argument takes a different tenor. But I would argue that even on moral terms it is problematic because it is problematic to promise things and then break promises, and that adding to disorder doesn't help people on the ground.
Yes, it's time to consider something more formal in terms of my own online study, but, unlike many foreign policy and military strategists, I do prioritize and a chronic illness always requires strict daily prioritization. Only so much time for this, and no more....
Would be strategists, please note.
As I said to MF, all my comments here are entirely pertinent to the main discussion of this article. No mention of weapons should be made without understanding the larger strategic context, or the various reasons for promoting weapons giving and selling:
<blockquote>The U.S.-Ukraine Foundation, in cooperation with the Embassy of Ukraine in the U.S., hosted Ukraine in Washington 2012, its second annual Conference and Gala Awards Dinner, on November 30th and December 1st.
BREAK
<strong>Financial Support</strong>
The U.S.-Ukraine Foundation is deeply appreciative of the generosity provided in support of Ukraine in Washington 2012 by individuals, non-profit organizations, governments and commercial companies. We extend a special expression of gratitude to Ambassador Motsyk and staff from the Embassy of Ukraine in the United States.
The sponsors and partners for Ukraine in Washington 2012 included Bingham, <strong>Clinton School of Public Service – University of Arkansas</strong>, Coca-Cola, National Projects Agency – Invest Ukraine, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, IRASET Group LLC , McConnell & Associates, Monsanto, Natalie Shear & Associates, Open World Leadership Center, Orbital Sciences Corporation, <strong>Raytheon</strong>, Self-Reliance NY – Federal Credit Union, System Capital Management, <strong>The Bush School of Government and Public Service</strong>, The Heritage Foundation of 1st Security Savings Bank, The Livingston Group, Ukrainian American Coordinating Council and UkrAutoProm.</blockquote>
http://www.usukraine.org/gala/ukrainian-stars-shine-in-washington-dc
There was no reset within the Clinton State Department, only fund raising and creating connections for a future presidential run.
It's awfully nice of Raytheon to be so concerned about democracy and the pro-West orientation of Ukraine.
I'm sorry that complicated and layered thinking is required. It's just too darn bad, I guess.
Continue on with fantasy discussion of which weapons or how many boots will magically wish away all other considerations.
My dear MF:
Everything I have posted here is pertinent to the main discussion of the article because no discussion of arming any nation should take place without understanding the larger strategic picture:
FYI, did you know that Russia has a lot of nuclear weapons? And accidents 'care' nothing about ideology or who is right, and who is wrong.
As 9-11 showed, catastrophic system errors within the American system never occur. All defenses are perfect and the unimaginable can never, ever happen.
I prefer to deal with reality, not the military fantasizing.
Ukraine is not actually in NATO--also FYI--although General Breedlove said in a recent article that we had been working with the Ukrainians for some time and we know what they need.
An ersatz NATO, indeed. It's terrible of the Russians to surround our clients with their country. They should pick up and move.
(No one is defending Putin here. But expanding NATO only weakened it, as many argued in the 90s and onward. The non-expansionists preferred a different framework to protect such fragile, troubled nations. Not all were dreaded appeasers, they simply understood the strange mixed up nature of an expanding EU as a trade union and NATO as an expression of national power would not work as a strict military alliance. Those critics have been entirely vindicated.)
The reason the Cold War was fought around the "periphery" (terrible way to dehumanize entire peoples, that language, the post modernists aren't always wrong) is because of this very fact. Despite the hot rhetoric of even the most hawkish Cold War president, direct engagement was viewed with great alarm because of the fact that the US and the Soviet Union had so many nuclear weapons. Many here are fondly remembering only the rhetoric, and not the actions.
And Ukraine is broke. Really, really, really broke. The economy just imploded. Weapons thrown into that will only make the Ukrainians suffer more, in addition to potentially bringing the world to a dangerous showdown between Russian and the United States. This behavior is harming our credibility. No, not our refusing to engage, but that we look so irresponsible in the way that we engage. We no longer know how to conduct diplomacy and rely mostly on threats. In many ways, many peoples are looking to firm themselves up from our system because they are freaked out by our erratic behavior.
Returning to the article's primary content, Carl and myself discussed Small Diameter Bomb II and F-35s within these comments. The following defensetech.org article talks more about it:
http://defensetech.org/2015/02/25/small-diameter-bomb-ii-completes-live…
So given that we can keep Putin from destroying Ukraine, the Baltics, and Poland over the next few years until lots of these and the F-35 are fielded (and President Obama is out of office), methinks Putin would think twice before getting too aggressive with NATO. Offset Strategy? We don't require swarms of vulnerable, airspace nightmare, high-cost loitering munitions when large manned aircraft a few years away can launch multiple 208 pound bombs from a distance with 100+ pound warheads.
Picture stealthy F-35s launching from 40 nm away at medium altitude. Four plus minutes later, lots of Russian tanks start blowing up. Try that with an A-10 and you have a downed crew requiring rescue due to Russian air defenses.
Madhu--after reading Clapper and Rice's comments today see below and then the social media comments out of the Ukraine today---think there is a disconnect which there clearly is?
Susan Rice on Trusting Putin: "How Dumb Do I Look?" (Feb. 25, 2015) #Ukraine https://m.youtube.com/watch?feature=...&v=zKINy2LLRbE …
Clapper: "#Moscow sees itself in direct confrontation with the West over #Ukraine and will be very prone to overreact to US actions."
James Clapper: "We do not believe attack on #Mariupol is imminent."
James Clapper: "it's not our assessment that (#Putin) is bent on capturing or conquering all of #Ukraine...."
AtlanticCouncil ✔ @AtlanticCouncil
Rose sums up US domestic political constraints: don't run, don't get into a war, sound tough and seem to do something
Carl Bildt ✔ @carlbildt
Putin in Minsk:"Either we accept his conditions and stop any resistance or we cease to exist as an independent state."http://www.ukrainebusiness.com.ua/news/14828.html
Press Review: 'Russian aggression against #Ukraine getting worse every day' http://uatoday.tv/politics/press-review-411998.html …
David Patrikarakos @dpatrikarakos
Khodorkovsky: what does Putin want? He wants to negotiate with US to create a 'new old' world order where each powers has own interests
David Patrikarakos @dpatrikarakos
2/2 and you don't interfere in your opponents sphere. And forget about human rights. You can't negotiate with someone who holds these views.
#Zaharchenko issued ultimatum to #Ukraine through SMM: withdraw by 18:00 27th or "DPR" returns troops to front line. http://lifenews.ru/news/150432
Pro-Russian militants still refuse to grant safe access to OSCE monitors in #Donbas
http://uatoday.tv/news/pro-russian-militants-still-refuse-to-grant-safe… … pic.twitter.com/4jarw4VFyK
Terrorists of "DNR" claim that Mariupol is their territory http://liveuamap.com/en/2015/26-february-terrorists-of-dnr-claim-that-m… …
David Patrikarakos @dpatrikarakos
Khodorkovsky: nationalism a problem in Russia. Important to see existence of 2 Russia's. Putin's Russia & other more open Russia 1/2
David Patrikarakos @dpatrikarakos
2/2 these people do exist & we mustseize opportunity when regime falls and need to do quickly so get to know people from this other Russia.
David Patrikarakos @dpatrikarakos
Khodorkovsky: don't paint Russian society in one colour. The embryo of new Russia is there and Europe needs to speak to these people
David Patrikarakos @dpatrikarakos
Khodorkovsky: Kremlin propagandists are skilled but have a problem in that what they say is forced to diverge further & further from reality
Another in a line of multifactorial pieces, from Politico:
<blockquote>Yet even if the fondest dreams of these slumbering Western politicians had come true and they had encountered a Nice Putin—a hypothetically more friendly Russian leader—they would still have gotten him wrong. Russia will, one hopes, eventually change its leadership, but it is not going to be able to change its geographic location, or its historic associations, or its longstanding wish to keep the West—which hasn’t always crossed the border bearing flowers—at bay. And that holds many lessons for the future.
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Let me be clear: The actual Putin is not at all nice.</blockquote>
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/02/nice-putin-russia-115431…
That can in no way be read as an apologist piece, not with what it has to say about Putin. But the problem with a Putin-centric (the one true COG!) analysis is that it doesn't allow a deeper analysis to take place.
The same happens with Iraq, when we focus only on ISIS (although obviously a key thing), or when we reduced the complex situation in Afghanistan to a Pashtun insurgency, however important or central.
Well, a point of discussion at any rate.
I'm glad Fabius Maximus (the blogger) linked the following article on his twitter feed because I read it before but I forgot to save the link. Glad to see it again:
I like multifactorial analysis as opposed to "what's the one key thing I need to know" executive summary stuff which makes sense given my background.
Previously, in comments here I talked about what I thought were some factors contributing to the current Ukraine crisis:
1. Global power (state) politics.
2. Regional state-to-state politics and economic motivations.
3. Internal fault lines within Ukraine.
This article does a nice job looking at the DC "scrum" and some of the manufactured hysteria around the issue.
(You can get a sense of this if you look at the issue of missile defense and how it has played out in terms of public op ads from the 90s onwards....)
Meet The Forces That Are Pushing Obama Towards A New Cold War, @ChristianStork
<blockquote>Moscow’s national-security interests are clear. Washington’s are as well, albeit unrelated to the security of the nation in any meaningful sense. Given the stakes, the hard line being pushed against Russia can’t solely be attributed to “Great Game” strategy — the long-running chess battle to control global energy flows.
Different players have different motives. At times they overlap; elsewhere they diverge.
As for those in the K Street elite pushing Uncle Sam to confront the bear, it isn’t hard to see what they have to gain: Just take a look at the history behind their Beltway-bandit benefactors.</blockquote>
(from @christian stork, medium. When I include the link, my comment won't appear).
Remember, I used the world "multifactorial." I don't think any of that is the whole issue but it sure is very, very important.
There is also the ideological feeling of many in Washington that have an inherent institutional Russophobia and miss the Cold War. Well, look at our relations with Cuba? Stuff sticks around a long time because it becomes second nature to people.
You only need look at the behavior of our elite classes toward the "Sunni" axis post Abbottabad and compare to this to see that there is really no "there" there, just scrambled up interests, to include those that have a genesis abroad.
It's like the whole chemical weapons Syria thing too. Even normally sensible people were all, "well the angle of the blah blah blah," and I'm all, really, some online dude figured it out? Because there is never any misinformation out there and you can figure things out from YouTube.
I thought, "don't you have to get an actual trained body to the site, examine the actual patient, the actual site, verify who and what, take all sorts of adequate samples, chain of custody to a credible lab"?
I dunno, but it was interesting to see even very savvy people go down that rabbit hole.
I am a creature of habit but I really need to move on from the military coffee klatch. Nothing against this site, I just need to move on. Which I will continually complain about and not do....
Why is it that some people haven't changed at all? Wherever they were intellectually years ago, however well read, better than me for sure, they are in the same place today? How does one get intellectually frozen if you read and study all the time?
Is it that you have to keep improving the things you read, so that if you read the same sorts of sites or books or papers, you never improve?
Maybe I'm into my own form of weird pursuit of excellence, eh? But just for myself, no need to be so goal oriented. Oops, wrong crowd.
PS: In the end, my boring old conventional education, including medical, was the best. That and persistence. I was too impressed early on just because someone read military books or was military.
Why did I behave that way?
Everyone has seen this story by now:
<blockquote>It's not clear what Inhofe's independent verification process involved, but it didn't work. Several national security experts on Twitter immediately set about determining the provenance of the images and found that some of them were from as far back as 2008, and a few were traceable to the conflict in Georgia and Ossetia, rather than the current war in Ukraine.</blockquote>
http://fortressamerica.gawker.com/senator-duped-into-using-old-photos-t…
I'm surprised that anyone trusts any of the reporting on any sort of hot-button foreign policy issue in the US. From all sides, it's just propaganda passed on through favored channels, whatever side of a conflict.
An ersatz NATO, indeed. How do you keep the Americans "in", whatever conflict?
Aw, I don't trust the reporting on ANY side, so no one get all hot and bothered by me linking this post.
A Republic indeed. DC seems to attract the strangest people, the oddest psychology.
PS: If one were worried about the US 'pivoting' away, or about the US showing less interest in Europe, how might you go about keeping Americans interested.
The story of the cultivation of Americans within the context of "South Asia" remains of interest, especially because even some non-interventionists got duped in that little thicket of crazy, too....
@ Rant
I'm sorry, I misunderstood what you were trying to say, completely misunderstood. Apologies.
Yes, there is something very strange about the politics of all of this, especially in relation to Kiev. There are levels of maneuvering going on I just don't understand. I think there are several parties trying to draw in the US for their own purposes.
You know who has become 'radicalized'? <em>Me</em>, it seems, with my steady descent into non-interventionism and skepticism of the Washington Consensus.
I really did go back and read several 90s era op-eds about NATO expansion and they all predicted the situation today. Many of those authors also correctly predicted the outcome in Iraq and with the surge in Afghanistan. So, naturally, I am inclined to listen to them when they argue against arming Ukraine.
BTW, did you read Peter Tomsen's book <em>The Wars of Afghanistan</em>? If so, what did you think?
Madhu,
I have serious doubts that the US military has anything useful to offer the Ukrainian Army, even less so the Ukrainian government. Our command & control has become so obsessed with avoiding promotion-damaging casualties/mistakes that the Ukrainians would find any of our Strategic or Operational advice meaningless.
At the kinetic level the crippling enslavement of our hardware to digitized C4 would be scarcely believed by the UA fighters and the ruinous expense of maintaining all that RMA mickey-mouse hardware in the field would bankrupt them faster than it has bankrupted us.
You mentioned the circumstances leading to the success of the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan as not possessing much usefulness in this day and age and the current geo-political environment. I dare suggest my take on the reasons for Soviet defeat in AF are considerably different to most people insomuch that from my experience the primary reason for the Soviet failure in AF was a consequence of political changes in the Soviet Union and the fighting in AF had next to zero influence on ending the Soviet occupation of AF.
The influence of political grievance within the current Russian population is where I would disagree with your position that the reasons for the Soviet defeat in AF offer no insight into the nature of the political forces that would lead to a Russian military failure in the Ukraine.
Ironically it appears a certain retired KGB Lt Colonel also shares the view that the political grievances that brought down the USSR have no bearing on the current crisis heaped upon the Russian people. In fact he appears to desire the return of a Soviet style Russian political hegemony in Central Europe.
The rat I smell has nothing to do with us nor the snake Putin. From what I can ascertain it is the government in Kiev that the Ukrainians don’t trust. Certainly most Ukrainians believe the lunatics are running the Kremlin but many are equally convinced Kiev is full of opportunists who will do a deal and leave their country in even deeper shit.
This deep mistrust of the ruling elite is a feature of the populations of all of the former communist states. People east of the Iron Curtain lost faith in the Party generations ago – if it was ever there in the first place. I was startled by the bottomless well of cynicism from which Soviet POWs drew their opinions regarding the Party, Lenin etc. and their so-called betters(four legs good, two legs better).
Coupled with a deep Slavic sense of fatalism and a willingness to endure severe hardships the capacity for all this pent up misery to explode is immense.
All it needs is a trigger.
Putin is flirting with probably the most evocative trigger in a Russian’s emotive makeup – the slaying of fellow Slavs. As an American it is similar to the White House ordering US troops to kill Canadians. Certainly troops will do it but their political masters will have to have an unimaginably convincing reason for doing so in the first instance, and an even better one to keep doing it.
Putin has neither and every Slav knows it.
RC
And the Ukrainians aren't stupid, they understand this I am sure. It may even be that they don't think the weapons are going to work but want to pin the Americans to them in a kind of ersatz NATO. As long as they can convince the Americans to give weapons or money, then they think they have us as their proxy ersatz NATO backers. The weapons may have nothing to do with fighting, but to keep the Americans in. That may be why buying other weapons isn't viewed as optimal.
I don't know. If I were them, I might try it, but they are making a mistake if they are thinking in that way. It will backfire.
This may even be why the UK is so hot for this, to keep the Americans in, otherwise the Germans/French are leaders and not the UK.
This is the way leaders think, can't divorce military affairs from this background.
As for smelling a rat, I agree. The reporting is nothing but propaganda on all sides. I do not trust any of it, whether US, Ukraine, or Russia.
We cannot given them enough arms to beat back a determined Russia and how long did it take to push the Soviets back out of Afghanistan in the 80s, the only conflict that apparently serves as any kind of model for this conflict. Wars of attrition tend to go on a lot longer than their proponents say. It's been how many years since 9/11 and how many years did the Afghans bleed?
Dear Rant,
Ukraine is a sovereign country but it is broke.
You know what an invasion looks like. This is not Afghanistan in 1985, although that seems to be the primary conflict through which the American security establishment looks at the current conflict.
This is an emotional and not rational lens with which to view the situation.
The conflict is some form of an insurgency by disaffected populations that has been militarized within a proxy conflict with Russia (egging on the disaffection), also within a backdrop of global power competition between the US, UK, Europe and Russia.
If simply supplying weapons solved situations, Assad would be removed, Syria peaceful, Iraq stable, and the Taliban would be beaten back in Afghanistan. I know the answer from the military is always, "then let's send more," but the track record post WWII hasn't been good on that front.
A commenter that used to call himself 'Stan from Estonia' in the council mentioned, very early on, that "we told them to close the borders and grab Russian passports." The implication is that they didn't take good advice and couldn't get their act together. They don't deserve to have land taken for that, but outsiders can only do so much.
Well, things have moved on, but there are many aspects to this conflict, just as with the Kashmir and Punjab insurgencies, and with Afghanistan today.
1. Global power politics including nuclear weapons and an uncertain escalation cascade. Enemy focused military may ignore these things, but responsible civilians cannot be so cavalier.
2. Regional power politics including Eastern European nations. Everyone has been meddling in Ukraine, and for ages. This tends to destabilize governance.
Also, NATO nations do, after all, trade with a wide variety of people across borders, including Russia, and of course there are gas sales.
3. Internal politics of Ukraine including issues of corruption, conscription and border management.
Ukraine was a net arms exporter but it's military was starved of weapons, pay, and training so arms are not the only issue, even sophistication of arm.s
Weapons by themselves do not solve the governance issues which are being manipulated by outside proxies.
This episode is also putting huge strain on the Western alliance and NATO, no matter what any one says. The Eurozone is restive, and so are populations within it.
Weapons will also bleed the Ukrainians. During the 80s, the Afghans were stuck between the Soviet invaders and a Western alliance, so to speak, that wanted to bleed the Soviets as much as they wanted to help the Afghans.
So the Afghans bled. The most radical elements were mobilized, and that process is occurring in Ukraine today.
This is not the 80s and I wouldn't dismiss the potential for error in the nuclear realm as alarmism. Ukraine is not Afghanistan and is not perceived in the same way.
Proxy conflict require subtlety. There is no plausible deniability in this era, in this situation. Everyone knows what the stakes are, and they are viewed as existential by the Russian leader, by the Ukrainians, but not really by anyone else, no matter what anyone says.
This will not help the Ukrainians. They require time to regroup and knit their forces back together, as well as their society.
Putin can invade anytime he wants, and no one can stop him if he really wanted to do that. NATO is not going to risk any kind of accident with nuclear weapons, however remote that possibility may seem, and NATO is not going to put its entire future as an alliance on the line, or to restart a global Cold War, for Ukraine. No Cold War president would have done such a thing.
Civilians have a larger responsibility beyond simply throwing weapons around, they have to think how to solve situations in whatever combination of diplomacy and military means are feasible.
But we won't agree on this. It's a shame. They will suffer terribly, the ordinary Ukrainians because our desire to punish Putin outweighs our concern for the fate of ordinary people.
I am serious when I say the Ukrainians should look to someone else for how to think about the situation. American military tend to give the same kinds of advice over and over again, with the results we see today.
I am so sorry to put it that way. My admiration is real but that is what I really think.
Madhu,
Something is wrong here - I'm beginning to smell a rat. The Ukraine doesn't need anyone's permission to buy ATGMs, Comms, Radar etc. on the open market. It is a sovereign state recognized by the UN. Its Defense Department just needs to pick up the phone and they'll be there by the weekend.
If oft-mentioned but never believed plausible deniability is a necessity (why?), then there are plenty of Polish, Bulgarian, Chinese copies of Russian systems on the market. I dare say there are 100K Russian manufactured ATGMs in the stockpiles of various countries across the globe that are for sale and would facilitate the 'captured weapons' element of the plausible deniers.
The country is being invaded - terrorists don't have hundreds of fully operational MBTs, APCs, MLRS and BUK missile launchers. The fact that in the space of 12 months only 5000 people have died in an invasion of a country of 45 million by an agressor with a pop. of 150 million suggests to me that what we are being told in the media is not credible.
RC
Why the noninterventionists and realists don't nail the liberal internationalists and neoconservatives on this point, I don't understand.
Of course, part of the problem is that people that are interested in the unconventional warfare aspect in AfPak are often too hawkish in that venue, so it might inadvertently given them oxygen. Still, it's interesting.
Situations are different, except when they are not. I don't know. I find the DC scrum to be sort of disgusting.
In terms of whether there really is an insurgency versus a proxy affair in Ukraine (probably both), Anne Applebaum had a column where she stated that there really wasn't Russian-speaking disaffection in those populations before the feelings were stirred up.
The Indians often same the same about the Valley and its Muslim population, that disaffection there may have been, but proxy support manipulated it.
The fates are cruel. The very insurgency that might help in terms of study is one that the Cold Warriors of old are not interested in because it never mattered to them that others were used to contain Russia. That other populations suffered at the hands of the anti-Soviet allies never mattered.
There are no true idealists when we deal with 'off the page on the ground' reality.
The Ukrainians should have looked to the Pakistanis for how to cultivate the West properly and conduct a low key military affair, and to the Indians and Israelis for how to think about the mess of borders, proxies and insurgencies. Okay, I don't really mean that, I am making a rhetorical point.
The old DC Cold Warriors didn't even study this issue in that way for AfPak, it seems....
I think it is helpful (for my own education, hopefully for others) to look at the attitudes of some of those arguing for military aid in Ukraine versus their advice in "AfPak", or, at least, the differences in strategic argumentation:
<blockquote>Flournoy Urges Boosting U.S. Military Support to Pakistan
By Donna Miles
American Forces Press Service
WASHINGTON, April 29, 2009 – With a deteriorating situation in Pakistan, now is the time to strengthen the U.S.-Pakistan military partnership to help Pakistan in its counterinsurgency efforts, the undersecretary of defense for policy told Congress today.
“We believe that right now it is more important than ever to strengthen our military partnership with Pakistan,” Michele Flournoy told the House Armed Services Committee.
The partnership is a vital component of the Obama administration’s Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy, she said.
“We have a vital interest in defeating al-Qaida and its extremist allies in the border region,” she said. “We must deny them safe havens from which to launch attacks against the United States and our allies.”</blockquote>
It's interesting, isn't it? Individual sanctions were never considered, while the unstable nature of the situation and nuclear weapons are always used as an example for why aid is so important, and why we shouldn't pressure people. This despite the knowledge that the Taliban was being supported by our allies as our troops were over the border facing Taliban.
Yet, in the case of a nuclear armed Russia, the same people that urge caution want sanctions and pressure on a nuclear state.
Well, pressure on a nuclear state is bad in either case, but it is instructive to look at the Washington Consensus and its attitudes.
It's as if there is no "there" there to any of it, just a host of attitudes of forever enemies and forever allies.
(None of this suggests I want to treat AfPak as some are treating the Ukraine situation. Most of what you can do in a proxy affair is pay attention to governance, and from that place, look at borders and other means of non-military pressure on proxy supporters, IMO. Long term training within that context, too. Well, it's worth a discussion, anyway.)
<blockquote>Today, U.S. Senators Rob Portman (R-Ohio) and Dick Durbin (D-Ill.) announced the launch of the Senate Ukraine Caucus. The goal of the Caucus will be to strengthen the political, military, economic, and cultural relationship between the United States and Ukraine.</blockquote>
In some states, there are important Eastern European constituencies and voters in key districts. This happened during the 90s too, during the domestic argument of expansion. Democracies and diasporas. Happens for everything.
American domestic needs often clash with what might be optimal. And, sometimes people grand stand and don't mean it, if you see what I mean.
ttp://www.portman.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=b14a2d78-0f30…
I wonder how many are reading Peter J Munson's "An American cramped by defensiveness" the wrong way? I see it trending from time to time. Or, at least, how I perceive it to be the wrong way?
It's not about will when it comes to aid. This period, this moment, this situation, is not the Marshall Plan after WWII. Even the Marshall Plan is not the mythical idealized thing that DC and the Pentagon make it out to be.
Sometimes, I think the reason some people talk about WWII and Marshall Plans and will is because they lack creativity. They have no idea how to make things up suited to this era, as previous Americans made things up to suit their era.
I can't include the WaPo link, this site won't take a comment with that link, but Ukraine's currency lost about half of its worth and Ukraine is broke.
This is why the early cold war was so hard on some developing nations. When they should have been focusing on governance (even with ceasefires and loss of land), they were being built up as security states by outsiders.
There isn't the money for enough aid too, or George Soros, the billionaire, would have made headway in getting it to Ukraine.
Rich man foreign policy has no feedback loops, you can give money, even for very good reasons, but it's not the billionaire that has to pay up if things go awry. Bad incentive system. The opposite of democracy and self-governance.
No one has to talk about claims of coups to see the problem. The aid givers dilemma.
PS: While I am at it, go read some of Victorial Nuland's work on a Task Force for NATO enlargement. It's from 1997 I believe and on Google books.
Just graze it, as I did. It's a very confused document. It makes no sense, it is filled with non-sequitors, strange branching sentences. It's the sort of thing that you wonder, "why did no one edit this?"
It may be in the 'Crimea Twofer' thread where I posted a link to a 1997 NATO document explaining the various arguments for NATO expansion, including the interest of the UK in expansion.
NATO expansion is viewed not just as a defense alliance, but as a test of UK and American leadership. The article amusingly notes that the UK got over having an empire and Russia should to without noting that both the UK/US and Russia are talking about spheres of influence in Eastern Europe.
This matters because instead of viewing the issue as one of local defense, it becomes mixed up in emotional attachments, unavoidable for human affairs.
I bring this up not to say we shouldn't help, but we have to understand the motivations of those that want to expand or give arms. And Germany has its own notion, as do the Poles, others in the region, of what their sphere of influence should be and how.
Military affairs are never simply military affairs.
Mearsheimer in the NYT:
<blockquote>This coercive strategy is also unlikely to work, no matter how much punishment the West inflicts. What advocates of arming Ukraine fail to understand is that Russian leaders believe their country’s core strategic interests are at stake in Ukraine; they are unlikely to give ground, even if it means absorbing huge costs.
Great powers react harshly when distant rivals project military power into their neighborhood, much less attempt to make a country on their border an ally. This is why the United States has the Monroe Doctrine, and today no American leader would ever tolerate Canada or Mexico joining a military alliance headed by another great power.</blockquote>
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/09/opinion/dont-arm-ukraine.html?_r=2
People are continually telling me that I am ignoring this factor in Afghanistan regarding regional parties, and, it's true, I do focus on the unconventional warfare aspect versus governance, but I've often said that despite walking a different path, I end up in the same place as those that prioritize the insurgency and governance. Most of what we can do is non-military in terms of the proxy conflict.
And Merkel visiting DC (?) shows just how much the US and UK (which cut its defense budget by the way) pushing on this point is going to press on already difficult European fault lines.
Once again, Drucker would like a word with Kraemer.
Washington (and other nations) has a strange notion of sovereignty and this is contributing to what, admittedly, are complex multifactorial problems with local foundations. One only read Anne-Marie Slaughters free form self associated string-terms-together glitter in the form of books to see what I mean....
I think Ahmad Rashids The Taliban actually has an offhand reference to bans on American companies working with Russian and obviously Iranian oil companies in Central Asia during the 90s?
This is a bit of a different narrative than that of a welcoming post Cold War West, or, it could be viewed in that way. In that 'Darwinian' struggle of competing policy agendas in Washington, many different conclusions may be drawn from outsiders.
I'll see if I can find references later.
Here is a link to the paper:
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43…
This is a very complicated business indeed, more complicated than the narratives expressed in various capitals. Joint training between Ukrainian forces and NATO have been going on for some time and this did not by itself lead to the crisis situation.
The crisis has multiple factors, a series of events driven by actions from multiple parties. The military aspect is only one small part of it.
Also, weren't American companies barred from developing certain ties to certain Russian businesses during the 90s? The Strobe Talbott narrative seems very strange indeed, in retrospect.
I trust almost nothing I read. Sadly, a person has to research almost everything her or himself in terms of looking at original documents. This is impossible for to do for everything, and, so, we have the problems we have with self-governance in the US today.
A comment I left at zenpundit. For discussion. I don't know.
<blockquote>The smart thing to do with Ukraine is to facilitate them buying arms from the international market so they have effective counterpressure, not to arm and train them directly or give them weapons that moves the fight up the escalation ladder.</blockquote> (<em>from comment by Zen</em>)
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Interesting. Aid? How much? This polls badly, especially when it is in support of the Ukrainian arms industry vice outside supply.
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Of course, this gets into larger strategic questions, including divisions within NATO, the EU and the Western “alliance” per se, and whether aid is tenable for a variety of reasons. 90s critics of NATO expansion were in multiple camps including those that wanted it to expand but didn’t like the nature of the expansion. They critiqued the actual nature of expansion and its idea of NATO as a market creator and democratizing force. The tensions in the ideas put forth are evident today. If you don’t know how to think adequately about a thing, you can’t get to the correct action. But this requires reading those back and forth arguments to understand what I am saying, I believe.
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I think this episode will put severe strain on the very concept of NATO itself within the minds of Germans and French and the long term consequences are hard to see.
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“Ukraine to Develop Defense Industry Without Russia,” Eurasia Daily Monitor is a good article on the Ukrainians supplying themselves versus outsiders.
Bob,
Concur with all, I was simply pointing out we shouldn't risk our reputation by over advertising a capability. UW may or may not work as a deterrent. We have to be honest about the risks and probabilities of success. It certainly provides more options for decision makers that should be explored seriously. Beyond deterrence, I think UW has much unexplored application in the realm of prevention and mitigation that is currently ignored.
USASOC, SWC, and to some extent SOCOM are advancing some new ideas on UW that are cutting edge. It is refreshing to see the level of strategic thought evolve beyond the tactical seven phases and only SF does UW. The long pole in the tent is not selling these concepts to the TSOCs, but selling them to the GCCs whose officers have only been exposed to conventional doctrine. We also shot ourselves in the foot over the past decade by messaging the GCCs that the only thing SOF can focus is counterterrorism. That has convinced a whole generation of conventional field grade staff officers (the iron Majors and Lt Cols that develop the plans) that SOF only does counterterrorism. I know that message is changing at SOCOM, but the damage has been done, and it runs deep. It will take a concerted messaging effort backed up by actions to change the prevailing perception of SOF. This step is essential for making UW a feasible option.
Next steps must go well beyond a doctrinal joint pub on UW, but nesting UW/special warfare like thinking into our joint capstone and keystone doctrine. We need to move beyond the UW belongs to us mindset, which has got us no where over the past several decades, to UW belongs to the joint force (SOF are the technicians who execute it primarily). Most recent issue of Special Warfare in the article "UW: Putting It All Together" the author mentions the GCCs having a UW line of effort in their plans. Point taken, but that won't happen unless GCC (read joint) planners understand it. In another article written by a ADM Stavridis titled "The New Triad," he said it is time we stop considering cyber, SOF, and ISR as adjunct capabilities that are often considered after plans are almost complete, and consider them as core capabilities. I agree strongly with that. To make that happen we need to change our behavior in relation to the joint force to get them to change their behavior in relation to us. That is a significant cultural for most SOF guys, it was certainly a hard step for me. Heck, restoring relations with Cuba may prove to be easier, but both need to be done.
Robert---Russian example of the use of their SF in a conventional role---moving fast forward with an armored unit to secure an important road cut--we would probably use Rangers for the same mission but it is interesting just how Russia is interchanging CW and UW in their SF mission sets.
Russian TV shows Russian special forces cutting off main route to #Debaltseve where Ukrainian forces are encircled pic.twitter.com/Hq8fQWvIW0
Madhu - completely agree. As my contracts professor would always point out, one must look to "all the surrounding facts and circumstances" to appreciate the full terms of a contract, not just the words on paper that were originally agreed to by the parties. Same with deterrence. US deterrence is based upon the full bundle of carrots and sticks we possess, multiplied by our will to employ some mix of the same to prevent certain things we deem as detrimental from occurring.
I do not think the credible threat of UW is some silver bullet that changes any of that - but it is a "stick" that could be given a new priority and focus that may well help thicken a comprehensive scheme of deterrence that is currently both over-taxed by what we claim is important, and under-resourced to appear credible. We also send mixed and changing signals about what and why we'd be willing to act. A layer of unconventional deterrence could be very helpful in some of the circumstances we currently find the most vexing. But it is no panacea and comes with its own nasty baggage of unintended and negative side-effects.
Pushing Russia or China into an era of major internal unrest could be far more than we bargained for, and much more detrimental to our overall interests that the issue that provoked us to act. These are not easy decisions. More options is typically a good thing though.
Bob
There is more to political will than military capability. In many instances, the strategic interests for the US are not vital although we claim them to be. There are vital for the other party.
Not understanding this and barging in anyway is why we end up in these fixes, and, sadly, we give other people unreasonable expectations of how far we are willing to go.
Deterrence is about more than simply military capability. I am continually told that in Afghanistan, governance matters as much as outside help when it comes to the messy proxy, insurgency, unconventional conflict.
And, then, in the context of Ukraine, only the outside help is noted without noting the internal difficulties or larger strategic competition within the background of a rival party.
It's strange. We all prioritize that which we think is most important in a complicated multifactorial affair based on our own emotional attachments.
There is perception and reality. Sometimes there is just rationale for action that is neither perception nor reality.
Your points are well taken. SOF rarely leads anything or anywhere. We support the GCCs militarily, and we would be in support of the CIA for much of any deliberate scheme of unconventional deterrence. Many in SOF are putting a lot of energy into selling UW - I think we advance the message more effectively if we put it in the context of how UW can help shore up our flagging deterrence based in more traditional approaches to that mission.
As to control, what do we control anywhere? Certainly we have no control over the degree of escalation of any nuclear exchange; nor any conventional approach. That lack of control is a major reason why we lack the political will to employ those approaches, and why actors seeking to expand their sovereign influence are increasingly undeterred. I don't see any changes to the "will" aspect of the equation for nuclear or conventional, so investments in those areas don't yield much gain. UW is an area with a different "will" factor, so perhaps an investment there actually serves to move the needle on our overall degree of deterrent influence. Maybe not. It is a relatively low-risk, low-cost investment though, so one worth exploring.
Your linked article was interesting in showing two women wearing T-shirts with pictures of missile TELs and a caption. One caption said "Topol-Not Afraid of Sanctions." The other said "Sanctions? Don't make my Iskander laugh." Topol is a mobile nuclear missile and Iskander is a mobile missile that can be either nuclear or conventional. It seems to show that Russia sees its missiles as a solution to depleted conventional strength. However, it also raises huge escalation issues if we seriously plan to penetrate Chinese and Russian airspace seeking out TELs.
The Iskander and Chinese 2nd Artillery missiles are reasons why I wonder if a train-based prepositioning TTP might be effective, particularly if its armored vehicles on train cars had either individual active protection to combat submunitions, or reactive armor for the same top attack defeat.
The high loses of Russian troops is starting to worry the powers to be in Russia---below is a result of this fear.
Soldiers' Mother Head in Stavropol Territory Charged w Fraud; Raised Cases of KIA in Ukraine
http://www.interpretermag.com/russia-update-february-9-2015/#6750 … pic.twitter.com/ax9qMuEBHz
There are currently four Russian brigades from Stavropol fighting in the Ukraine and their loses have actually be on the high side as a number of their units have taken direct rocket strikes.
MF--the figure of 6712 Russian troops KIAs is coming from the "Mothers of Russia" who are tracking what Russian families are reporting to them, tracking the "quiet" military funerals where the Russian units are located and have sent observers to both the Ukraine and Rostov to visit the various mortuaries.
They have a web site that was recently taken down by the Russian government where families could enter the names of their relatives they have not heard from since they left their Russian military bases.
Actually I am anticipating the numbers to be higher--- why---most of the so called separatist units are filled by Russian troops and or mercenaries to about 90%---and loses in the recent fighting has been massively high due to accurate artillery strikes. IE over 200 KIAs were being reported yesterday by the UA in one battle area.
Battle for #Debaltseve - Ukrainian soldiers fight Russian-backed militants near east #Ukraine hub town https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wRUdA8YZsyw
A video I posted yesterday on the Ukraine thread depicted an UA artillery strike on a Russian convoy---how is it possible to ID them as Russian--one of the burnt out vehicles is so new and is only assigned to Russian Airborne, GRU and Spetznaz troops---has never been previously allowed out of Russia.
One of the elite Airborne units still fighting in eastern Ukraine:
247th Paratrooper Regiment from Novorossiysk active in Donetsk Oblast pic.twitter.com/fJ9JGJT04A
The entire convoy was wiped out --utter destruction and the UA troops were only able to find an occasional Russian military ID and or passport--but no bodies.
The Ukrainian SSU recently released also posted an intercept of the Russians in Rostov complaining to Donetsk that the dead Russians arriving there had mixed up death certificates--ie papers did not match the respective bodies--reports of the "200" convoys are in the range of 3-5 daily crossing back into Russia.
Remember a large number of the Russian troops in the Ukraine are conscripts and vastly under trained mixed in with some elite units which are also being hit hard.
There have been a number of unconfirmed reports that the Russian GRU has teams behind the attacking forces shooting at their own soldiers who were fleeing the fighting and or deserting much like the old NVKD did in WW2.
What is not being reported is that the UA has devised an interesting battle field tactic---they fought hard to hold small towns and villages but to a large degree station their forces in the field and forests around them knowing the Russians are using the roads and they engage them on the move thus keeping the house to house fighting to a minimum--the Russians are suffering high loses from their tactical movements which opens them up to accurate artillery strikes and which the Ukrainian Army seems to be really good at that.
They refer to this as "fire boxes" which seems to me to be preplanned target sets just waiting for someone to drive into them.
<blockquote>I agree that UW could deter some countries, especially those vulnerable to internal dissent that can be exploited. However, it seems Russia's aggression, at least according to its CJCS equivalent, is part of their counter-UW campaign. <strong>Russia thinks the U.S. has been fomenting all these color revolutions (which would be a form of UW) throughout Eastern Europe and the Middle East to begin with, and now they're countering it.</strong> That would imply they already think we have a UW capability and the will to use it, and it hasn't deterred them.</blockquote>
On one of this AM's news shows, the former U.S. Ambassador to Russia stated essentially what you said (about Ukraine) in the bold part above. He mentioned that Putin was obsessed with the CIA which is understandable for a former KGB-type. A UW approach therefore might bring out the worst in him.
CNN's GPS talked a lot about Ukraine this AM. They mentioned only about 5,000 dead and that on both sides. Wonder where Outlaw is getting his figure of 6500 Russian dead? That would be pretty astounding if true. I'm not sure what to think with some saying arm the Ukrainians and leaders in Europe feeling that might escalate matters. But moving heavy armor back to Europe is a good first step staying in NATO territory. There is little covert about armor which might upset Putin less.
I do recall reading a recent article saying that most Russian oligarchs have abandoned Putin now due to huge personal monetary losses. Only a few top military advisors are still part of Putin's inner circle and that eventually could become his downfall should the economy fall apart further.
I was actually thinking of the CIA more than the military in this case. SF could bring much more to the table, but policy wise we don't seem ready to go there yet.
I agree that UW could deter some countries, especially those vulnerable to internal dissent that can be exploited. However, it seems Russia's aggression, at least according to its CJCS equivalent, is part of their counter-UW campaign. Russia thinks the U.S. has been fomenting all these color revolutions (which would be a form of UW) throughout Eastern Europe and the Middle East to begin with, and now they're countering it. That would imply they already think we have a UW capability and the will to use it, and it hasn't deterred them. Also, war appears to be a nationalizing force for them, it seems to make their identity stronger, or so it seems from reading media reports.
We certainly need new thinking about prevention, which deterrence is a subset of. UW capabilities can play a role, but it will be challenging to demonstrate that it is a viable threat to an adversary without actually employing it. I don't think we will have as much control the level of escalation UW may take as some may think. It could serve as a deterrence if it was nested with intelligent information operations, but my grumpy old man comes out when I put intelligent and information operations together. Our past efforts have been disappointing in this area.
Bill,
We have a force that is trained, organized equipped for UW, but that is a very different thing than giving that force the specific mission to prepare to conduct UW against specific states as part of a comprehensive scheme of deterrence, and to then communicate in no uncertain terms to the leaders of those states that we will conduct UW among their vulnerable populations if they should decide to engage any manner of activity that would contribute to outcomes that we wish to prevent.
Just as having a nuclear device in a storage bunker someplace is not deterrence. It must also be postured for ready use and the threat of that use must be clear and credible for it to generate a deterrent effect.
Just because an opponent has began to conduct some manner of warfare themselves does not mean that we have to leap into warfare as well in that same location. Unconventional deterrence can be an indirect approach, targeting a vulnerable population far removed from where the current aggression is taking place. But we have not been given this mission, and are not postured or prepared to make a threat of UW credible. As the SOF community works to elevate the idea of UW as being an approach to warfare that is becoming increasingly important, I believe we would have much more success in advancing that idea if packaged in the context of deterrence of warfare, rather than the conduct of warfare. But one must clearly be prepared for the later if the former is to work.
Bill---you go in the general direction I have been stating over and over---with the "so called" hybrid warfare which is really just good old fashion UW coupled with a conventional threat in this case Russia nuclear weapons.
The trick that NATO faces is that at what point do they pull the trigger on Article 5 and does in fact Article 5 cover this "so called" hybrid warfare?
Out of the MSC 2015 meetings there are in fact voices coming up pointing this out---secondly, yes NATO wants a QRF first of 5K now they talk about 30K but that takes time a lot of time to get moving.
Robert hits it on the head---UW teams from the UA are on the ground today carrying out strat recon artillery missions for greater effectiveness, they are ambushing senior officers and reporting on movements all the while killing whatever comes across their AOR--coupled with a very effective ATMs coverage one takes the Russian tank advantage away from them.
Right now a bulk of the Russian successes on the ground comes via tanks not infantry which because of no adequate ATMs simply rolls over UA positions.
Where those positions have the heavy Russian ATMs combined with artillery support a recent outpost destroyed over 20 plus tanks and IFVs while sustaining limited manpower loses ---video has been posted on the Ukraine thread.
Right now the Russian loses are at roughly 6715 KIAs, the missing are high and the wounded even higher and he is still pushing forward---there are some indications that this is impacting the mental state of the young conscripts and they are running when taken under fire forcing the Russian Army to use the old NVKD tactic of standing behind them and shooting them if they desert or run. It is also being reported and to a degree verified that the mercenary loses are extremely high as well due to their being basically criminals with little to no military training and lack good officers.
The loses are so high they are running "200" convoys (bodies) across the border to Rostov almost daily--Ukraine posted a SIGINT intercept yesterday by the SSU where they even got the bodies mixed up with their death certificates (died of a training accident/heart attack etc.)--meaning certificate did not match the right body.
The ATMs are critical simply to slow down the Russian advances causing the increase on manpower loses that cause Putin to think but also really to hold the demarcation line which by the way was signed by Russia by holding the line reasonably well that gives the negotiation table a better chance and keeps it from becoming a "frozen" war.
By the way Russia will not escalate to a full war as they still inherently fear NATO winning in the end--but bluffing as if they will go to war over the ATMs has basically frozen this NSC and President out of fear. they have already escalated twice Aug/now and I think they are realizing the West is getting fedup with their constant falsehoods and SWIFT is staring them in the face.
What the core problem is that Russia and Putin are being driven by a ideologue named Dugin who feels and openly states that the Ukrainians are a "race" that needs to be eliminated---much like the Jewish pogrom by the Nazi's.
Americans might take another view of the Ukrainian events if they fully read and understood Dugin's influence on Putin and his inner circle.
AND he has been close to and worked with the new Greek government leaders on the radical left over the last few years.
What is also interesting is that inside NATO there is a new "left" ie Poland, the Baltics, Romania and Bulgaria that are expressing the fact they do not believe Article 5 would ever be implemented.
This is one of Putin's three geo political goals for the Ukraine adventure--discrediting NATO and he is doing well at that goal with this weapons debate.
Surprisingly this weapons debate strengthens Putin--it does not weaken him at all and he knows it while our NSC and President "seem" to not get that point.
AND in the background this debate points up the simple fact we signed the Budapest Memorandum and yet we do nothing to support the very country we stated we would support--now if you are Iran would you believe the US on anything they signed with the US--not really.
Right now the Iranian negotiations are actually stalling over this critical point---if the US had from the beginning totally supported the Ukraine all the time shouting we are defending their territorial borders under the 1994 Agreement--Iran would have paid attention to what they US says not doubting them as they do now.
Bob,
I think we have a credible nonconventional warfare capability (including UW) now, and the will to use it. I just don't think it is enough to deter some actors, to include Russia. Have to assume the CIA is providing some support, there is diplomatic pressure and targeted sanctions being asserted, and obviously the reduction of oil prices aren't helping Russia.
Yet, nationalism and the associated pride enables them to ignore these pressures, and in some ways the pressures actually make them stronger. UW, just like conventional warfare, must eventually put enough pressure on the adversary to compel a decision. Different adversaries will have different risk versus gain calculus equations, but I don't think our low level support for Ukraine and other actions will turn the tide anytime soon. Over time Russia may tire of their mounting casualties, we'll see.
Actions today may deter Russia from attempting this in additional states if the costs are sufficient enough for Ukraine. Deterrence as a concept seems to be losing relevance in today's world since as you pointed out our competitors have found ways to stay below our threshold for responding. It isn't deterrence when you counter their aggression it is warfare [label here (law, unconventional, hybrid, conventional), then fare].
Wars of attrition can go on a lot longer than people think. Ordinary Ukrainians will suffer greatly, as the refugees show.
Ukraine doesn't exist in a vacuum, a determined foe can make trouble in other areas. In the end, this is all emotional. A nation decides it cares about this or that issue and quite a lot of it is simply tribal, emotional. Americans en masse, Eastern Europeans as a varied group, Ukrainians (obviously) and Russians will care about Ukraine to varying degrees. This won't change. National interests differ. It's not fair but it is reality.
The author of that article also writes of Washington "this should be done without a lengthy hand-wringing."
Does the author know anything about Washington, especially post Iraq, or the American mood? It's not enough to just understand Putin, you need to understand a little something about the system you are trying to get to help you or cultivate. Someone has given the poor Ukrainians some terrible advice about how to approach this issue and how much help they would get or could expect, and in what order. Very sad. It's really wrong to do that to people.