Boots on the Ground: The Realities in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria by Anthony Cordesman, Center for Strategic and International Studies
The Obama administration and its strongest opponents in Congress may not have all that much in common, but one thing they do share is the constant misuse of the word “strategy.” Strategy does not consist of stating a broad policy goal and empty rhetoric. It consist of stating an actual plan with clearly defined goals, specific means to achieve, milestones for action, estimates of the necessary resources and their availability, estimates of cost-benefits and risks, and metrics to measure success. A sound bite that fits in Twitter or a fortunate cookie is not a strategy.
Getting this wrong is particularly dangerous when one starts talking about the use of military force and mindlessly throwing around terms like “boots on the ground” with no actual definition of what is involved or what the term is intended to mean. Every American has to accept the fact that the coming presidential election means two years of vacuous partisan political posturing, but any form of war is serious and the stakes in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria are all too real…
Comments
Still cannot understand the drive for "boots on the ground"?
the constant stream of articles around the foreign policy failures of this administration especially in the ME, Iraq and Syria just keep on coming as yet the drive to send troops back into the ME is the "so called strategy" in the face of IS?
The UAE article has been confirmed by other articles and yet the WH/NSS seems to ignore them.
Expert: seizing #Mosul may take 10 months, 30,000 troops http://fb.me/259Wfiait
UAE Amb to the US Yousef Al Otaiba writes in advance of CVE summit that "ISIL Can’t Be Beat on the Battlefield Alone" http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/02/isil-cant-be-beat-on-the… …
The impending massacre that wasn't, Obama's bungled mission, and the Libya that could have been. A devastating piece: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/143044/alan-j-kuperman/obamas-li… …
Now one can start to see the relationship of Russia to the ME especially to Iran, Syria and I hate to say it the Ukraine.
And that was not mentioned in the NSS by the NSC and the WH---there is an old saying from the Cold War days--where goes Soviet propaganda so goes Soviet FP.
Kremlin propaganda ramps up narrative of Putin as the great "hope" for Middle East region http://sputniknews.com/analysis/20150213/1018220221.html …
And it get worse and worse--so again just what was that ME/IS WH/NSS strategy?
Sunni lawmakers will boycott the #Iraqi parliament over abuses committed by Shiite militias.
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/16/world/middleeast/sunni-lawmakers-to-b… …
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/sunni-parties-consider-leaving-iraq… …
And the bad news for the so called IS/ME US strategy just keeps getting worse. Fighting IS for the Iranians seems to might be something the US population might not quite understand if US troops are killed in that fighting.
It seems the US government still has not fully admitted just how many American troops were killed by Shia JAM and SGs until 2010 in Iraq.
Until the underlying core issues are ever resolved bombing and troops on the ground will not solve the IS problem.
Giant billboards of Ayatolllah Ruhollah Khomeini adorn Baghdad as pro-Iranian Shiite militias become defacto rulers
http://wapo.st/1zh3nSn
Does anyone ever remember Khomeini's openly stated Shia Green Crescent and has everyone really forgotten that it was Khomeini who declared to the world the Shia Revolutionary movement.
Does this makes sense to anyone?
MANSOURIYA, Iraq — Shiite militias backed by Iran are increasingly taking the lead in Iraq’s fight against the Islamic State, threatening to undermine U.S. strategies intended to bolster the central government, rebuild the Iraqi army and promote reconciliation with the country’s embittered Sunni minority.
Let's see--we have had the Sunni tribal leader Janabi and his son killed by Shia militia, we have now Shia militia being physically moved into previously Kurdish held and led areas of Iraq, we have Shia militia's basically being armed with Us weapons by the current Iraqi government, we have recorded Shia militias killing Sunni civilians and that is increasing not decreasing, and we have Iran virtually directing the Iraqi Army operations.
AND the US led bombing of IS has openly allowed Assad to bomb extensively the moderate Sunni fighting groups and drive civilians loses into the sky.
Then we have 3.2K US non boots on the ground American troops inside Iraq and another 4K to be based in Kuwait and then this below coupled with the article on IS.
So again the theoretical question do we even have a IS strategy that makes any sense to anyone other than this current NSC and WH?
.@hrw accuse govt-allied militias in Iraq of escalating abuses, including forced displacement, executions & massacres http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/02/15/iraq-militias-escalate-abuses-possib… …
"Inaction is also a policy: Nonintervention produced Syria today." @NYTimesCohen on #ISIS, Islamism and the west. http://mobile.nytimes.com/2015/02/17/opinion/roger-cohen-islam-and-the-… …
I have been writing a large number of comments concerning the IS and Iraq that we never fully "understood" what we were and are still "seeing" and a few readers did understand the meaning between the two words.
The IS has tried a number of times to talk with the West starting with the recent interview with one of their inner circle who was in jail with al Baghdadi and who made an interesting statement "we do not know where this is really going".
This is an extremely interesting article as it attempts to understand the drivers of IS in a clear and concise manner and those that have dealt with AQI/QRJB and the other Sunni insurgent groups in the past will recognize a number of points as I heard them often when dealing with Iraqi insurgents after they were detained.
"A shot at paradise in the worst place on Earth": @gcaw on how Islamic State sees itself http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2015/02/what-isis-really-wa… …
First there were to be only 300 "non boots on the ground", then the number slide magically to 3200 and the recently it was noted there will be a limited number and now the "limited number" appears to be 4000 based in Kuwait.
And we are not going back into Iraq and this administration claims to have a strategy--still waiting to see exactly what that strategy is?
3200 plus 4000 is just shy of the 10K we pulled out in 2010 so why did we leave in the first place if 5 years later we are going back in.
No defensive weapons for the Ukraine outside of words and yet we are going fully back into Iraq does that make sense?
"BREAKING: More than 4,000 US troops will be deployed to Kuwait http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2015/02/15/More-than-4000-troops-will-be… …"
Link:
http://militaryhistory.about.com/od/vietnamwar/a/VietnamEnd.htm
The quoted paragraph below from that link states it all. As with President Obama stating repeatedly what he would not do, Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 that prohibited U.S. military assistance to Vietnam. This encouraged the North Vietnamese to test our lack of aid in Phuoc Long Province in April 1975. When we did not respond with the same airpower that drove them to a 1973 Peace Treaty and ended the 72 Easter Offensive, the South's fate was sealed. But again the Viet Cong had been defeated thanks to ground troops paving the way for airpower to perform a deterrence function. An exclusive airpower approach never would have eliminated the Viet Cong or solidified control of the South.
<blockquote>With US forces gone from the country, South Vietnam stood alone. The situation worsened in December 1974, when Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, cutting off all military aid. This act removed the threat of air strikes should North Vietnam break the terms of the accords. Shortly after the act’s passage, North Vietnam began a limited offensive in Phuoc Long Province to test Saigon’s resolve. The province fell quickly and Hanoi pressed the attack. Surprised by the ease of their advance, against largely incompetent ARVN forces, the North Vietnamese stormed through the south, finally capturing Saigon. South Vietnam surrendered on April 30, 1975, following the fall of its capital. After thirty years of conflict, Ho Chi Minh’s vision of a united, communist Vietnam had been realized.</blockquote>
Out of curiosity, what would your approach be to ending daesh control? I encourage all to read Outlaw's links posted today particularly the long one at 12:31 about daesh's Islamic motivation and hope for a caliphate that attracts so many recruits. Daesh's current success unaffected by our weak bombing campaign ensures that caliphate beliefs will spread elsewhere. For instance did everyone know that for a brief time both Egypt and Syria were considered one nation called the United Arab Republic from '58 to '61?
It sounds like a broken record when I repeat it but why do we always hear this administration state that a two state solution is the sole solution in Israel, yet a similar three state solution is not considered in Iraq and Syria with Sunni, Shiite (Alawite etc in Syria), and Kurd nations within former boundaries of each. The only way that could occur is a final enforcing ground war by the U.S. and coalition followed by a period of occupation in safer Kurd areas from which we could assist the respective nations with airpower. If we had done something similar for South Vietnam as we did for South Korea, perhaps those boundaries would have remained intact.
Outlaw also captured a key phrase from another article: "Inaction is also a policy: Nonintervention produced Syria today." Going a step further, inadequate military and whole of government actions now will only ensure continued problems with daesh and Islamic extremism.
"Revisionist history" is when one changes the facts of what actually happened to suit their purposes - wisdom is when one comes to appreciate why certain events occurred more accurately despite how that affects them personally.
The official and popular US interpretations of the facts (as we know them) of our experiences in Vietnam and Iraq demonstrate much more US bias than wisdom regarding the whys of what actually occurred.
the "state of North Vietnam" was a Western fiction created part way through an overarching Maoist-style revolutionary insurgency to unify Vietnam under a single, self-determined system of governance, free from excessive foreign influence or control. There was no US victory in the midst of that. Our fears and assessments of Chinese capabilities / intentions were grossly exaggerated, and our appreciation of the ability of the people of SEA to handle their own business were equally off the mark.
Iraq and Syria have become legal fictions as well, and as before, our US bias is blinding us the realities of the nature, intentions realities of things all around.
This and your other post are revisionist history. We were long gone from Vietnam and had won the war (just as in Iraq) when the North Vietnamese violated their signed treaty and invaded conventionally in April 1975. Congress had cut off permission to use military force. So even though airpower could have halted the conventional attack as it did in the Easter Offensive of 72, that was not an option for President Ford. Check out this link if you want a more factual end to the war.
http://www.historynet.com/final-fiasco-the-fall-of-saigon.htm
In particular, note this quote from the link:
<blockquote>In a televised speech to a joint session of Congress on April 10, Ford blamed Congress for not providing "adequate support" to South Vietnam and implied that North Vietnam's invasion was a direct result. He made no mention of Weyand's and Colby's warnings that South Vietnam was on the brink of collapse, but he did ask for the $722 million and an additional $250 million for refugee relief. He also urged Congress to amend immigration laws so "tens of thousands of South Vietnamese to whom we have a profound moral obligation" could immediately enter the United States. Then the president shocked Congress and many Americans when he requested suspension of restrictions on the use of military forces, claiming he needed unrestricted use of military combat units to protect Americans.
Ford's top domestic political advisers, including Donald Rumsfeld, John Marsh and speechwriter Bob Hartmann, were taken aback by the president's confrontational stance. They had underestimated Kissinger, who had worked with Ford on the speech until 1:30 a.m. the night before.</blockquote>
If there is similarity between Nixon's and Obama's approach it was that both assumed in error that the host nation could handle it on their own. If Obama and Nixon had left residual smaller forces the similar outcomes years later may not have occurred.
The mistake was entering Iraq and Vietnam in the first place. There is little argument about that. Thank goodness we did not lose anywhere near what we lost in Vietnam in Iraq. But it is pathetic that President Obama tossed out the gains made due to his premature withdrawal and failure to support Syrian rebels, which led to daesh and the subsequent retaking of Iraqi territory. Don't fault Cordesman for proposing ways to win and consolidate gains made. Fault Obama for having lousy advisors and a flawed perspective on how to solve the current problem he and his created.
<blockquote>1. On getting out of Dodge.
2. On having no more such misguided wars. And
3. On focusing the nation's attention and energies on more intelligent and more pressing things.</blockquote>
1. Getting out of Dodge prematurely was a major mistake
2. Although Iraq II was a mistake, if it had not occurred we could not have imposed oil sanctions on Iran with sanctions on Iraq still limiting its production. The no fly zones would have continued. Having no more misguided wars is easier said than done but I'm sure you could have predicted the outcome years ago, right? If we had left too early right after the first year of OIF, Saddam Hussein easily may have regained power. Would the Arab Spring have resulted had we not done Iraq II? Would Iraq have received Russian support for a new nuclear plant as Egypt now will as Russia returns to friendlier relations there? Could Hussein have resumed his nuclear program underground as Iran has and Syria may?
3. Few things are more pressing than daesh as it expands its influence to other areas and recruits foreign fighters who return home to make trouble as noted in one of the new blog articles and as seen in France, Canada, Australia, and Denmark. Is Obamacare more important as costs and effects are hidden by changes he made arbitrarily to the law passed by Congress? Amnesty for illegal immigrants that he said repeatedly he lacked the authority to order? Pouring trillions into climate change that will hurt American pocketbooks while barely affecting the problem due to other's pollution? Curtailment of homegrown and neighbor energy sources so costs rise due to inadequate supply? More entitlements that working people pay increased taxes to fund? How about his greater focus on police killings with little mention of black-on-black crime that kills so many more? More education freebies so tuition costs will continue to increase with the government footing the bill?
President Obama mentioned in a recent interview that prolonged counterterror efforts are similar to the never ending need for substantial law enforcement personnel in big cities (and small). It's a shame that he endorses the need for a million man law enforcement force in the peaceful U.S. but cannot comprehend the need for larger forward deployed ground forces to keep the peace abroad.
The problem that I have with Mr. Cordesman's analysis is that he does not seem to be focused on the same thing that President Obama is:
a. Mr. Cordesman is focused on "winning" these wars. "Winning" to him means "producing stable and friendly nations." Thus, when Mr. Cordesman talks about strategy, and boots on the ground, etc., he does so from the perspective of "winning" (trying to produce stable and friendly nations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria).
b. President Obama, however, like President Nixon before him in Vietnam(?), is not focused on "winning" (producing stable and friendly nations).
c. Rather, President Obama has come to understand (much like President Nixon did re: Vietnam?) that such projects have -- and will -- cost much, much more than they will ever be worth.
d. Thus, when President Obama talks strategy, boots, etc., he (much as with President Nixon in Vietnam?) has his attention focused -- not on "winning" (see the definition above) -- but:
1. On getting out of Dodge.
2. On having no more such misguided wars. And
3. On focusing the nation's attention and energies on more intelligent and more pressing things.
Bottom Line:
a. Obviously Mr. Cordesman and President Obama are not on the same sheet of music. However,
b. President Obama, and President Nixon; these guys would seem to be (a) singing in harmony and (b) reading from the same page.
c. This helping to explain why Mr. Cordesman's analysis and suggestions re: "winning" (producing stable and friendly nations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria); these such suggestions seem to be so "out of tune" with President Obama's Nixon-like political objectives (see my "1," "2," and "3" above).
d. In this exact same light (objective is not to "win" but to get out of Dodge) to understand President Obama's -- and President Nixon's -- insistence on setting -- and reluctance to change -- such things as force withdrawal "deadlines."
Mr. Cordesman is consistent and accurate, but he is not any more strategic than than those he criticizes. Applying his own definition, we did not have a strategy for strategic success in Vietnam, we had a strategy for tactical success. To blame the failure on President Ford is unfounded. After all, when one "defeats" a phase 3 Maoist approach to insurgency it does not make the insurgency go away, it merely converts it back down into a lower phase, where it rebuilds energy to surge once again into a conventional state on state battle to attain ultimate victory. Unstated is that the Maoist approach can win in any phases if the government quits.
The US will never understand the strategic lessons of Vietnam and why what we attempted failed there until we are able to step back and honestly assess the entirety of the conflict, and not just the relatively short portion at the end that we participated in, seen in the context of what we hoped to accomplish there.
That is why we applied a virtually identical strategy to achieve virtually identical tactical results with nearly identical lack of durability in Iraq. It is not the fault of Mr. Obama's unwillingness to pour more good money after bad that made the strategy of tactics fail - it was the flawed nature of the "success" itself.
To defeat ISIL only succeeds in turning a weak, emergent state with a government we disapprove of (but are well equipped to deal with) back into a powerful, fragmented revolutionary insurgency. Given our demonstrated ineptitude for dealing with insurgency, why would we do that?
Anthony Cordesman is wrong about Vietnam, and he is wrong about Iraq. There was a time when powerful states could force a suppressed population into accepting an illegitimate political outcome determined for them by that powerful state. Those days have been ending for the past 100 years or so and are probably over.
Time to move on and formulate a new strategy that begins with an understanding of the problem and then moves toward a workable solution; not determining the solution we want, and then seeking approaches to force that end to work.
When I hear someone compare Iraq with Vietnam, I get interested. Our military departed Vietnam with 92% of the population under government control. That statistic indicates some degree of success and popular support. My observation was that the strategy of attrition put in place by Westmoreland was successful (tactical search and destroy with overwhelming firepower). Pacification was successful following TET of 68. There was never an uprising in support of the North Vietnamese nor threats of jihad against the US. There was a Kennedy who put the US in Vietnam in numbers and a Kennedy that led the charge to cut off all funding for South Vietnam. I get upset with those who would put forth Vietnam as a military failure.
First time I heard the parallel, but it makes sense. To be fair, Nixon didn't bail on Vietnam until he pressured North Vietnam to sign a peace deal. He promised to support S. Vietnam if North Vietnam attacked. When North Vietnam made their final offensive, Nixon had been impeached and President Ford was sitting at the helm. He didn't believe the American people had the will to go back. This differed considerably from the way President Obama pulled out Iraq. It was haphazard at best. I'm not sure there was a better way for that place, but it was very different than Nixon's plan. Nixon unlike Obama could conduct effective foreign affairs.
Tell me what you think (good and/or bad) re: the depiction/comparison I have made below:
a. I have read that avoiding future Vietnams was the first priority of President Nixon re: his national security strategy.
b. Likewise avoiding future Afghanistans and Iraqs appears to be the top priority of President Obama.
c. Getting the out of Vietnam appears to have been a top priority of President Nixon back then -- in much the same way that getting out of Afghanistan and Iraq appears to be a/the top priority of President Obama today.
d. Accordingly, in neither President Nixon's Vietnam, nor in President Obama's Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, do we see a serious attempt being made to:
1. "Produce a stable and friendly nation" or to
2. Put more "boots on the ground" in order to achieve same.
e. Nixon had then -- as Obama has now -- moved on.
f. Thus, from Mr. Cordesman's piece above: "U.S. military action must be tied to a civil-military strategy that offers the best possible hope of producing a stable and friendly nation as its ultimate outcome."
g. Again, that does not appear to be the direction that President Nixon was heading re: Vietnam. His strategy was focused on getting out of Dodge only -- and this sooner rather than later. And his strategy was focused on not having anymore Vietnams.
h. Same-same with President Obama and Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria today.
(Thus, in both cases described above, to see that our presidents were prepared to accept -- as "ultimate outcomes" -- something other than "stable and/or friendly nations.")
i. To conclude: Nixon then -- and Obama today -- considered that the wars that they had inherited were gross mistakes. Accordingly, these executives, when they came to power, moved to -- not win these wars -- but to put them in our rear view mirror. And they simultaneously moved to focus our attention, and our efforts, on other, more pressing, more important and more intelligent priorities.
<blockquote>Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria do not have that much in common, but one thing is clear in all three cases. <strong>U.S. military action must be tied to a civil-military strategy that offers the best possible hope of producing a stable and friendly nation as its ultimate outcome.</strong> No amount of tactical victories in the field, and no amount of U.S. military force that merely defeats the immediate enemy threat, will create that stability. Military success is critical, but it is only a means to an end.</blockquote>
In the highlighted section above, it no longer is possible to conceive of an Iraq with current boundaries under exclusive Shiite/Iran control or a Syria under exclusive Assad/Iran control in some areas and daesh control in others. Likewise, Afghanistan will probably evolve to areas under Taliban control and other areas under Afghan and ANSF control.
Self-rule, if not outright new boundaries in particular areas, is a probable prerequisite for stability. Kurd and Sunni areas require greater autonomy from Assad/Iranian and Iraqi Shiite/Iranian control. Tactical victories <strong>could</strong> be designed to achieve that strategic self-rule to promote stability if the U.S. and other coalition partners could agree ahead of time and place coalition, Syrian, and Iraqi Sunni forces in Sunni areas, Iranian, and Iraqi Shiite forces in Shiite areas, and Kurd and U.S. forces in their northern territories. The U.S. then would be positioned for this (edited) TTP outlined by Cordesman:
<blockquote>This has very real meaning in terms of “boots” on the ground. The real need may be for high mobility strike forces that can support a local or host country force immediately and anywhere in the area of combat. In large, dispersed areas, this is more likely to mean forces like rotary wing and close support air units (AH-64s, armed helicopters, UCAVs, A-10s), air mobile land combat units, rather than brigades of regular U.S. troops. The ability to rapidly insert small cadres of “stiffeners” like Special Forces, Rangers, and Marine combat teams may be more critical than to try to move large U.S. combat units—even if they are in country and have a credible line of support and supply once they move. </blockquote>
Such U.S. and non-Arab forces based in Kurd areas could respond to emergencies and conduct raids into Sunni and Shiite controlled areas without actually “occupying” those areas. Likewise, other U.S. forces in Jordan could raid into Syria from the south as required to reinforce other Jordanian and Sunni coalition elements. Someplace like Al-Assad airbase is centrally located to provide other reinforcement east or west without actually being around Sunni or Shiite populations on a routine basis. This would preclude the condition noted by Cordesman in this quote, by only “holding” populated territory with forces unlikely to incur the ire of the population:
<blockquote>Similarly, anyone calling for “boots on the ground” needs to realize that even the best such effort will fail if it simply produces short-term tactical victories and not the ability to secure the population and hold territory, particularly populated areas and key parts of the economy. It will equally fail if the civil side cannot build the kind of governance and civil efforts that win broad support and bring lasting stability. “Win” is purposeless without “hold,” and “hold” is purposeless without “build.” </blockquote>
Not sure that the “build” part of the last sentence above still applies. “Transition” seems more appropriate in this case to credible forces able to hold and governments able to rule their respective Sunni, Shiite, and Kurd areas. The areas of southern and western Syria also would require some alternative to Assad/Iranian rule that is not addressed by current bombing strategies and proposed training of moderate Sunnis. Substitution of Sunni genocide of Alawites and others is just as unacceptable as Assad/Hezbollah and ISIS genocide of Sunnis and Kurds.
<blockquote>At the same time, no such effort can work if the local or host country forces are too weak and the United States does not provide reinforcements or “enablers.” Every military force faces the threat of being attacked were it is weakest or there are combat units that are ineffective and incapable of protecting the flanks or positions of the combat units that can actually fight. These threats are far higher in newly forms and inexperienced forces.
Here, it is important to realize that unless major U.S. combat forces are deployed in significant enough numbers to actually do all or most of all the fighting, local or host country forces will fail if they cannot get emergency support and reinforcements.</blockquote>
This gets back to having safe haven in Kurd areas, Jordan, and isolated areas like Al-Asad for air-enabled forces that can raid, air assault, and perform CAS and close combat attack, plus MEDEVAC/CSAR. Having such safe havens also would simplify supply as Kurd areas could be resupplied through Turkey, Jordanian areas through Jordan, and Al-Asad by air.
It seems unlikely that Iraq forces or newly trained Sunni elements could retake lost urban areas along the Tigris and Euphrates. A lead armored BCT and U.S. Marines would probably need to retake respective river valleys en route to Kurd areas where a residual U.S. force would remain. Just as the 82nd and 101st cleaned out bypassed cities during the first OIF, Iraq and Sunni trainees could be left behind in river valley cities to "hold" and transition to stability operations. U.S. forces would not be far away in Jordan, Kurd areas, and Al-Assad if the locals required assistance.
Bill---the problem with the so called Obama ME strategy if there is one ---as I indicated--it does not answer and or addresses the core ME problems and bombing/ground combat are not the long term strategy needed in the ME.
With the killing of a key Sunni tribal leader and his son by Shia militia in Baghdad this effectively kills the rapport the US was trying to reestablish with the Sunni tribes in getting their support against IS.
Janabi was critical--
So what is now Plan B?
Michael Weiss @michaeldweiss
Janabi and son's murder by Shia militiamen will also reverberate at Centcom, if not at the WH.
Bill---know this focuses on the Russian side but it bitterly reflects the lack of an Obama strategy for just about anything to include the ME and Russia where as we have seen it has been a total failure.
If one wants a solid look at Russia and Putin follow the trials and tribulations of Bill Browder.
http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/02/13/bill-browder-and-obamas…
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/02/02/how-to-become-putin-s-…
The Daily Beast article reserves some choice words for this Obama policy:
To anyone who harbors illusions about Obama’s foreign policy, Browder’s account of the struggle to get sanctions passed into US law will be a salutary lesson. He received staunch support in Congress. But the Obama presidency and the Clinton State Department opposed him until the last minute. Their resistance was a bleak tribute to their greatest foreign policy misjudgment. They imagined they could “reset” relations with Russia. If they were nice to Putin, Putin would be nice to them.
The Obama administration was participating in the immortal turn the “progressive” West took after Iraq. It reasoned the Bush presidency had been a disaster, and that was true. Apparently hostile forces, it continued, were a rational reaction to western provocation, which was at best a quarter truth. And if we removed the “root cause” of our aggression, our enemies would vanish, which was pure fantasy.
Future historians will discuss the naiveté of the Obama Administration’s approach to Russia for decades to come, marveling over the fatuous reset and the willful blindness to not only the dictatorial character of the regime but also its bitter hostility to the values that liberal American democrats care most about. As the Daily Beast article, which we encourage you to read in full, says of Russia under Putin, “in Russia…there is no state above the crime gangs. They are all one.”
Not denying the apparent problems, but I think we are looking at differently. I don't think there will be a military strategy, because the military can't solve this problem. The military will only buy decision space at this point. That decision space is an important role, because the decisive shaping phase can happen within this space. I recall some analysts calling our victory over Saddam during the initial phase of the war a catastrophic success. There is some merit to that, but only because we weren't ready to exploit our military success politically. In the end, we pulled defeat out of the jaws of victory. A lot of that had to do with Rumsfeld, Wolfawitless, and Cheney providing asinine strategic advise based on deeply flawed assumptions.
Assuming we're capable of learning, I think we trying to set shape the political environment first this time. Shape it in a way that will enable a decisive victory over time instead of resulting in a victory parade in NYC, while we watch the region collapse in chaos. There is no doubt in my mind we can defeat the conventional IS military forces with our military. t will be difficult, but the outcome is not in doubt (pardon my hubris). The question is, then what? I think, I hope, I pray, that is what is going on now behind the scenes.
Even when there is a "hidden" strategy so that others do not know of it--one always sees elements ie indicators of that strategy whether in troop movements, internal US politics ie Congress, AF movements, SF on the ground movements, UNSC and or meetings with key allies etc. Strategy in order to be implemented always has some moving parts that can be detected.
Again where has and or is that happening? Nowhere that I can see thus the simple statement--- there is none and it is hard to be actually refuted that there is in fact one.
It is embarrassing that we are even having this debate about --is there or is there not a strategy--a WH should be able to articulate clearly their agenda, goals, and strategies---and here we are debating is there even one?
Right now all one "sees" as indicators is a disjointed rambling number of indicators that reflect no thought out concept---bomb a little here and a little there targeting key leaders and knowing that by bombing it gives Assad a chance to focus on moderate Sunni groups resisting him, send in advisors and SF troops BUT no "boots on the ground" then asking Congress for "limited boots on the ground", then supply weapons to the IA that end up in Iranian Shia militia hands killing Sunni villagers to include Abrams tanks, to shouting great verbal support for the Kurds in Kobane but in the end not supplying weapons, to shouting support for the FSA and then letting it dangle with virtually no weapons support, supply TOWS but to who and the lst just keeps on getting longer.
Let's not forget those "red lines in the sand" statements or the statements that Assad must go, or the statements that Assad is literally killing off the Sunni population or our comments we are supporting the millions of Syrian refugees etc.
What is being expounded as "limited boots on the ground" and a "ground game" to accompany the bombing is simply a cheap way to explain we are going to be in the ME and especially Iraq and Syria for another 10 or longer years.
Somehow that is being overlooked as recently even those in the know stated it will take decades to combat IS without addressing the core issues.
This is what again --a "strategy"?
Reference the article on the NSS where the supposedly stated ME strategy exists or was suppose to exist---this following comment actually applies to both the ME and Russia in that NSS.
Schindler: "esteemed diplomats r firing off warning flares in mainstream media that Obama White House is dangerously deluded" @20committee
That about sums it up for the current WH ME strategy--somehow without resolving the underlying core Sunni Shia problems, without "fixing broken Iraqi politics" and "resolving the ME regional hegemon disputes" this WH assumes "limited ground troops" combined with bombing will fix everything?
Seems to me they are hoping that Jan 2017 gets here in a hurry. By the way "running out the clock" is a valid political strategy--does not say much for a military strategy though.
Getting back on topic, which is Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan. Cordesman argues that strategy does not consist of broad policy goals, but it consists of an actual plan with clearly defined goals, specific means, milestones, risks, metrics, and so forth. Part of our problem as a nation is we rely on a national security lexicon that largely hails from Clausewitizian days. Today we have multiple definitions for strategy, war, security, and so forth, so we end up talking past each other when we we're often in agreement.
Step one should be coming up a new lexicon for national security in the 21st century. War is war means little for those developing strategy or plans or both, especially when we can't define war and strategy. It is hard to be a profession without a lexicon. The traditionalists will huff and puff that they know what war and strategy are, yet articles written by many so called experts indicate otherwise. Discussions with so called experts also indicates there is no agreement.
I would argue what Cordesman is describing a plan, not a strategy. Agree or not with the President's approach, he does seem to have a strategic approach for dealing with the Middle East. It isn't one amiable to a detailed list of ends, ways, and means. He is trying to shape the outcome, instead of directing a major military operation to produce an outcome. Strategy and plans in my opinion are very different. The second requires the details that Cordesman identified, the first is broader and more interactive as it responds to challenges and opportunities in the strategic environment in hope of guiding the system in a desired direction more favorable to our longer term interests.
I don't think the President, Congress, or the American people want to sacrifice too much protecting a corrupt Iraqi government that is a surrogate of Iran, and at the same time they don't want Iraq to fall to IS. That creates an interesting tension that a deliberate plan with specified ends, ways, and means will not be able to address. On the other hand, if we want to take Mosul from IS, that would require a very detailed plan with ends, ways, and means. If we're trying to shape strategic outcomes in the region we need seek understanding, constantly assess, and seek opportunities based on a very dynamic strategic environment. We're constantly seeking means (partners), we have ways, and ends are unclear because reverting back to the status quo is not desirable. I think that is the biggest rub. IS exists because of conditions in Iraq and Syria that are not sustainable, so defeating IS alone will accomplish what?
Finally, strategy often is often closely held, so critics assume we don't have a strategy because their favorite media outlet says we don't. We might actually have one, and it may be a good one or deeply flawed. Random thoughts to further confuse the debate.
All of the below is/has occurred in the 70 hours Russia "claimed" the mercenaries needed to comply with starting the "so called ceasefire" instead they went over to a full attack to even using "cluster munitions" against civilian population centers.
Outside of strong US Ambassador comments--total silence from the WH, the NSC, the Sec of State personally, and the DoD.
And we have a newly stated "NSS strategy for Russia right'?
Why is it this WH/NSC feels they can "negotiate" ie even trust Putin after he has basically lied to the West in front of TV cameras if one takes the time to count them--- a total of 15 times since Crimea?
AND we really assume that is even a ME/IS strategy?
Pyatt: "Russian units along border are preparing a large shipment of supplies to 'seps' fighting in eastern Ukraine" pic.twitter.com/I4mVoC69Vb
The U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine @GeoffPyatt says the separatists in E Ukr now have a larger fighting force than some NATO/European countries
US posts satellite picture of major Russian artillery deployments by Debaltseve in Ukraine. pic.twitter.com/hxNN98g3Ps
US Mission to NATO ✔ @USNATO
The situation on the ground in Ukraine -- action is what matters, not words | Slide 1/3 pic.twitter.com/OBnZ5d8EJu
US Mission to NATO ✔ @USNATO
The situation on the ground in Ukraine -- action is what matters, not words | Slide 2/3 pic.twitter.com/6UgxPgQgsH
US Mission to NATO ✔ @USNATO
The situation on the ground in Ukraine -- action is what matters, not words | Slide 3/3 pic.twitter.com/fp1o55VYhV
What amazes me is that we are still having this debate "strategy or no strategy referencing the ME"--many do not like my attempt to drag the conversation back to Central Europe where right now and since the Crimea the West in particular the US has been at "war" with Russia and it seems that the WH and his NSC seem to want to ignore it.
I also keep asking the same question over and over since Crimea--"where is the strategy or at least something that looks like a strategy"?
And yet we seem to keep getting articles that actually question it as well and still no answer from the WH and NSC outside of a recent "feel good" NSS.
Right now we have a serious major European war and invasion even using only the UN Charter's definitions in the middle of Central Europe 25 years after the Wall came down and 70 or so years after the European border questions "should have been resolved".
When one side fires over 150 tons of artillery and rocket shells a day and in the last 1.5 days it seems to have gone to the 250 ton ranges it is in fact a "war".
Then when one sees some of the statements from the Dept of State complaining the fighting has increased not decreased since Minsk 2 JUST what did they think would actually happen when you give the Russian military 70 additional hours to complete their mission?
Samantha Power ✔ @AmbassadorPower
G7 stmt of support for yesterday’s Minsk Package of agreements on #Ukraine. Extremely troubling Russian attacks cont pic.twitter.com/LprakO1Rpa
@GeoffPyatt: #Debaltseve. We are confident these are #Russian military, not "separatist," systems pic.twitter.com/vVuH7USqyL #GEOINT
AND yet we worry they have no strategy for the ME??--I am worrying they simply are ignoring anything anywhere in the world that will force this WH and NSC into a decision making mode other than using words which has gotten them nowhere in Syria, Iraq and Israel not to speak of the Ukraine.
Diplomacy is a great thing but it requires two sides willing to negotiate and when in the case of Russia diplomacy is in act part and parcel of their new UW strategy for political warfare and yet when this WH and NSC does not see that we are again in serious trouble. Fredrick the Great even stated that diplomacy without a military is a waste of time.
At one time the US had prepositioned equipment for 24 brigades in Europe and what do we have now in Europe three and 12 A10s.
When top US military leaders openly state the Russian threat, when the Sec of State is finally releasing sat photos confirming actual Russian troops inside the Ukraine when bloggers have been doing it daily since Crimea, MH17 and now eastern Ukraine-and when the NSC/WH utter not a single word that has a serious ring to it--that is not a comforting thought and it definitely does not give one a warm and fuzzy feeling this WH and NSC knows what they are doing?
OR is it simply "easier" to "win" against a bunch of black flag wavers that do not have a nuclear trigger finger than an aggressor that indeed has one and has threatened to use it against the US.
But again many of the NSC and this WH never sat under their desks/tables in grade school during nuclear practice drills.
Look at the media over the last two days after Minsk and the heavy fighting that is on going using basically pure Russian troops and units--not a single public press conference from this WH---ever wonder why.
Think Iran and the personal legacy of this WH and you will find the answer measured against the outcome/future of a 43M civil society.
"Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria do not have that much in common, but one thing is clear in all three cases. U.S. military action must be tied to a civil-military strategy that offers the best possible hope of producing a stable and friendly nation as its ultimate outcome. No amount of tactical victories in the field, and no amount of U.S. military force that merely defeats the immediate enemy threat, will create that stability. Military success is critical, but it is only a means to an end."
Why is it that "no amount of tactical victories in the field, and no amount of U.S. military force that merely defeats the immediate enemy threat, will create the stable, friendly nations that the United States desires?
Because the underlying problem is not thus addressed and, thus, will remain.
This underlying problem being that the populations of these states and societies have no intention of -- and will not tolerate requirements to -- adopt such broad-reaching, alien and profane political, economic and social changes as the United States/the West now requires.
(In this light, to consider if Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria actually do have something in common.)
Thus, "strategy" (civil-military or other) to be determined -- and developed -- with this reality in mind?