A Lesson About Counterinsurgency That Could Change America’s Future.

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Madhu,

"Why can't it be multifactorial?"

I completely agree! As I said, "CIA bagman are perhaps the most effective weapon the CIA has ever wielded" -- not the <b>only</b> weapon of the CIA, and certainly not the only weapon the USA has.

I believe van Creveld has put non-trinitarian warfare (his term, not exactly the same as 4GW) in a wide frame. See ...
<ol>
<li><em>The Transformation of War: The Most Radical Reinterpretation of Armed Conflict Since Clausewitz</em> (IMO the best work to date about modern war),</li>
<li><em>The Changing Face of War: Combat from the Marne to Iraq</em>,</li>
<li><em>The Culture of War</em> (my favorite),</li>
<li>and most importantly the dense but mind-opening <em>The Rise and Decline of the State</em>.</li>
</ol>

<blockquote>Martin van Creveld: "During the past decade we have deployed our most skilled warriors and most advanced technology in an assassination program with few precedents in history. Result: the Middle East in flames and our foes resurgent."</blockquote>

Trump-like hyperbole. That’s like saying our best police continue to arrest criminals and our court system executes some of the most egregious. Result: Crime and gangs continue? There is no proven causation in either case. We do not produce more criminals by aggressively pursuing them. When leaders of organized crime are taken down, we do not speculate that it will breed more equally capable leadership and technical personnel. Crime and war are unfortunate parts of the human condition. Factors such as greed, lack of education and economic opportunity, motives, opportunistic search for a quick buck, and anger cause criminals. Similarly, Islamic extremists are created by a multitude of factors beyond a skewed version of their religion that include lack of economic or social assimilation and opportunity at home or in adopted nations, and other political and government legitimacy factors.

<blockquote>Obviously van Creveld gets this wrong. "The Middle East in flames and our foes resurgent" is because, as I have outlined below, (1) our determination to transform Middle Eastern states and societies more along modern western political economic and social lines</blockquote>
It confounds me that you continue to make the claim that the West is trying to force its culture on the Middle East and rest of the world when:

• The number of personnel who legally and illegally immigrate and flee to the West (see Libya boat people and Syrian refugees) indicate that we have done a pretty poor job of forcing our culture onto other areas. Otherwise they would have no incentive to leave their homeland.

• GCC countries have modernized quite nicely while retaining Muslim beliefs and cultural norms rather than western ones (although many embrace western practices even if they don’t admit it, no thanks to any organized western efforts)

• OIF and OEF had nothing to do with transforming Middle Eastern or South Asian states. They were about revenge and an errant perception of the need to halt WMD.

• The Arab Spring or more accurate “Fall” was not organized by the West. Our leadership may have tried to guide it through poor support for Egypt’s former rulers and our premature embracing of a Muslim Brotherhood leader who hardly welcomed Western political, economic, and social norms.

• Those who have been to Egypt know it has plenty of modernization and western attractions supporting tourism that largely were eviscerated by the Arab Fall just as we saw the recent Tunisia Beach incident kill tourism. I wouldn’t take my family to Egypt now, yet felt perfectly safe in 1990 during the height of Israel’s first Intifada.

• Turkey was largely secular until recently. As we discussed in the past, Iran and Afghanistan enjoyed modernization efforts for decades in their attempts to move into the 20th and now 21st century prior to 1979. Extremist elements since then have rejected much of that modernization as anti-Islamic.

• Whole of government diplomacy, USAID, and NGO workers attempting to work in many areas today would do so at great risk of losing their head or being ignored. Only sanctions have had some success yet ones on Iran would hardly have been possible had we not free Iraqi oil by our invasion to keep supplies up. That was not our motivation or intent, but it had that unintended effect, just as commitment or lack thereof to any conflict can have unintended major consequences.

<blockquote>And (2) the resistance of native populations to this initiative. Noteworthy efforts -- undertaken along these "transformational" lines -- include the regime changes, invasions, and/or forced political, economic and social transformations the United States, et. al, have undertaken in various countries in the Middle East (Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya?) over the past 15 years or so. Assassinations? Only a very small (and much less visible compared to invasion) part of this process.</blockquote>

Forced political, religious and social transformation is the modus operandi of ISIL, not the U.S. The resistance of Kurds, Alawites/Shiites, and moderate Sunnis to ISIL and other extremism is evident and the predominant motivation for continuing conflict. Lack of government concern for minorities, and majorities in Syria’s case, have also sparked conflict. Radicalized Muslims living in Western areas are more guilty of trying to transform <strong>our cultures</strong> to fit theirs rather than assimilate or practice their religion quietly within their own groups. Instead, you see calls for jihad and sharia law in areas where Muslims are a small minority.

Generalizations by van Creveld and Fabius about negative and exclusively-responsible influences of external coalition support in “failed” overseas conflict ignore that a multitude of other factors lead to success or failure. What best practices were employed? How long do gains continue? What influences, such as our complete withdrawal from Iraq, lead to subsequent problems? How does continued external support by next-door or ideological neighbors effect the conflict (Vietnam-China-Russia, AfPak, Iraq-Iran, Syria-Iran-Russia, etc).

The scale of the geographical area and size and cultural proportion of its population are another factor. The size and adjacent nature of Northern Ireland and Israel in no way reflect how the U.S. or other coalition fights larger-sized remote conflicts. The availability of tools brought to bear by the U.S. and smaller Western or other countries differ. The historical decade in which the conflict occurred is a factor affecting the effectiveness or very existence of those tools (body armor, MRAPs, helicopters, CAS and precision weapons, UAS). The civil leadership’s errors and commitment to the conflict play a major role.

Beyond that, there is a blurring of lines between types of conflict and plain old deterrence and engagement. Forward presence and its resulting deterrence (as well as peacekeeping), can evolve into insurgency, civil war, or scaled levels of wider conflict and terror that are ignored at our peril. Western isolationist tendencies offer no guarantee that others will not stay the course or join the fray with wide-ranging impacts. We had forces in Muslim areas of GCC nations and Egypt for decades in relative peace. Even Jimmy Carter arranged our troops to be in the Sinai as a buffer between countries that previously fought major wars. Troops have been in the Balkans since the 90s playing a larger role than a brief 78-day bombing spree of 1999. No attempt was made at transforming any of their societies. No large costs in blood and treasure resulted.

Peacekeeping and forward presence for deterrence and raiding purposes do not equal regime change or invasions/occupations. How many U.S. casualties have occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan in the past few years even when we had larger than current numbers? Relatively few have occurred because as we transitioned to host nation control it no longer was necessary for our troops to be outside the wire on the ground. But by drawing down completely, we were unable to provide the raiding enablers that could have precluded ISIL invasions of Iraq and Syria.

The same risk exists in Afghanistan unless we retain forces and monetary support for their security forces for an acceptable number of years at far lower costs than we have borne in Europe and Korea where peace has continued for decades. Even after all that time of forward U.S. presence, one hardly could say that we forced our culture onto them or actually “occupy” their lands. Some folks and religions just need a thicker skin and a willingness to live and let live.

Fabius:

First, let's look at the Darwinian ratchet:

Martin van Creveld: "During the past decade we have deployed our most skilled warriors and most advanced technology in an assassination program with few precedents in history. Result: the Middle East in flames and our foes resurgent."

Obviously van Creveld gets this wrong. "The Middle East in flames and our foes resurgent" is because, as I have outlined below, (1) our determination to transform Middle Eastern states and societies more along modern western political economic and social lines and (2) the resistance of native populations to this initiative. Noteworthy efforts -- undertaken along these "transformational" lines -- include the regime changes, invasions, and/or forced political, economic and social transformations the United States, et. al, have undertaken in various countries in the Middle East (Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya?) over the past 15 years or so. Assassinations? Only a very small (and much less visible compared to invasion) part of this process.

Next, let's remind ourselves -- and re: my "transformation" construct below -- that the application of "CIA bagmen, state department dues, members of our business community, etc., has (a) much less to do with such short-term projects as the coercing and overthrow of non-cooperative regimes and (b) much more to do with (1) working with our and our international partners' whole-of-government assets to (2) transform these outlying states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines. Thus to see regime change, when necessary, as only Step One of a hundred step process.

As to the idea of incompatibility re: (a) having our special operations and air forces deal with the elements of the population that are actively resisting transformation while (b) our other WOG assets work with those elements of the population who may be less resistance-to-transformation inclined; this would seem to be a necessary and reasonable hand-in-glove plan. To wit: a "pincer"/"carrots and sticks" effect with one group (SOF; air) taking care of the hard-core bad guys (those that will fight, kill and die rather than transform), while the other group (USAID, etc., etc., etc.,) works with the more malleable members of the populations.

So why does the United States not take the same approach as China ("development" only -- no SOF, air or other military involved)?

Because:

a. China, it would seem, believes that efforts to transform outlying states and societies more along foreign/alien/profane lines (1) does more harm than good and (2) gets in the way re: "modernizing" and, thereby, better exploiting these less-developed nations. While

b. The US/the West seems to believe that political, economic and social transformation (along modern western lines only), while difficult, is essential to properly modernizing (and thereby properly exploiting) these potential assets (which today are -- more often than not -- liabilities).

Herein, it is important to see that:

a. From the US/the West's perspective, it is the harnessing of the "human resources" -- to the commercial plow -- that is considered most important. (Thus, the absolute requirement to transform these folks politically, economically and socially.) While,

b. With China (who is being short-sighted here?) -- at least at this time in their history -- it is more important to simply "mine," more effectively, the "natural (non-human in this case) resources" of these other states and societies. (This such task not requiring that the human resources, therein, be "culturally" transformed.)

<blockquote>a. While we may be fighting "to make the world a safer and more stable place." (Apples.)

b. They, on the other hand, may be fighting for their highest beliefs and convictions, for their very existence and/or for the existence of their group and their preferred way of life. (Oranges.)</blockquote>

Bill C, while eloquent, don't believe it is that simplistic. Many potentially serious second and third order effects could result even from small wars. The reality that some are fighting for their "highest beliefs and convictions" makes them unpredictably dangerous whether Putin in Europe, ISIL in Syria/Iraq, or other state-sponsored extremists like Hezbollah.

For instance, apparently you view the Korean War as a limited war, but what would have happened had it become entirely communist with short-range missiles now immediately adjacent to Japan and no modern South Korea now giving us Samsung and Hyundai. What if MacArthur had not stabilized Japan and the Marshall Plan had not helped Germany with large occupation forces in both. Could the Soviets have expanded East Germany to the West and China gained control of both Koreas, subsequently invading Japan? Those two allied economic power houses would not exist to help stabilize and deter in Asia and Europe. What if we had stayed isolationist sans any Pearl Harbor and had never even battled Japan or Germany in WWII. We now could be facing <strong>their</strong> nuclear missiles aimed our way with them getting the bomb and long-range missiles (von Braun) first.

Martin van Creveld and Fabius appear to believe that small inconsequential wars are the future, yet we should avoid fighting them in any substantially supportive manner. They argue that bad outcomes will result from external leadership even though Iraq was largely stable with our substantial presence from 2008 until our complete withdrawal in 2011. He then argues that intrastate war is unlikely due to nuclear weapons. Rational actors will never pull the trigger it is argued even though little is rational in the Middle East. This does not acknowledge that ISIL or Hezbollah could access such weapons and really not care about concepts like MAD making potential outcomes <strong>very</strong> consequential. It also fails to consider that one state leader may not be altogether rational or may have apocalyptic beliefs.

Whether we want to admit it, oil also is a regional key national interest that guides our actions in the Middle East. We admit that influence in the Pacific when it comes to sea commerce. The secondary effect of the failed no-fly zone and "Oil for Food" imposed on Iraq would have precluded effective oil sanctions on Iran had we not invaded Iraq to free their oil exports. Now we have a potential Iran nuclear agreement giving us time to build many F-35s and perhaps some LRS-B. In the ten years, our F-22s/F-35s/bombers (or Israeli F-35s) will be able to penetrate Iran to take out future nuclear weapons development that Hezbollah or the IRGC might otherwise employ/smuggle under the protection of Russian air defenses that would threaten 4th generation aircraft.

No conflict can be labeled as a "large" or "small" war when its outcomes are so thoroughly unpredictable in terms of scale and effect. The counterfactuals and second/third order effects of any-sized conflict can be realistic and scary. This is particularly true if other external parties choose to continue participation in any-sized conflict and we do not. Likewise, bad outcomes may result should we limit our involvement excessively as currently appears to be happening with ISIL and Ukraine, previously occurred in Libya and Yemen, and with Afghanistan threatening to go light-to-no U.S. footprint, as well.

A key tool to creating regional stability in any size war is persistent air-ground forward presence, air-ground maneuver should deterrence fail, and stability operations. Below in this thread, Fabius posted a Marine's article and video on Maneuver using the British spelling. A key theme in that video is the idea that exploitation and pursuit are key elements of maneuver that we seldom practice in training and completely avoided in Desert Storm leading to OIF and today's ISIL problems. One aspect missing from exploitation and pursuit is its military attribution to solely "offense" when "stability operations" also is a good fit.

In addition, the Marine Captain's and van Creveld's/Fabius views of blitzkrieg miss the key aspect of logistics. By culminating rapidly during WWII, the Germans were able to avoid the shortcoming of their largely horsedrawn sustainment. When they could not culminate on the Eastern Front, and became mired in the cold and later mud, it led to disaster with the Soviets giving us time to come to our senses after Pearl Harbor. Logistics is a key aspect of any war and a reason why friendly support originating from an external coalition far from the conflict vs. adversary support operating from adjacent country sanctuary can spell much of the difference in conflict outcomes.

So when Fabius speaks of how our Revolution defeated the British it fails to consider the months it took to move British forces and supplies by sea. It again was a factor in the War of 1812 which essentially was a draw and saw Washington D.C. burning. If the British had been next door to America as they are in Northern Ireland and as Israel adjoins Gaza and Lebanon, the logistics and mobilization aspects would have been far less challenging. Plus, no large overseas deployment and movement far inland would have been essential. That was the bulk of the cost in treasure in OIF/OEF and led to blood losses due to IEDs in resupplying forces spread over a wide area.

Rebuilding bombed out infrastructure and securing it and urban areas was another large cost in blood and treasure in Iraq. Ground maneuver has potential to seize and stabilize during exploitation and pursuit while special operations and airpower have much less potential in that respect due to shortcomings in equipment and motivation of their partners being trained on the fly.

Bill,

I agree. You describe what might be a decisive factor in the frequent defeat of foreign armies by insurgents since WWII. And not just in modern times. It was a factor in our successful Revolution.

The narrower question discussed in this post (and the others I cite) is why long and large military expeditions fail -- so that the project loses support at home? Developed nations and less developed nations, with almost every form of advantage in equipment and training, using all manner of tactics (including almost genocidal force), consistently lose.

MF: For those reasons and others, I've always found it baffling that the British treat The Troubles as the gold standard of COIN case studies. The British have certainly conducted successful COIN operations in the past, and Northern Ireland is one of them (though there's speculation in the UK that the current peace is merely a temporary lull). That said, in the same way that I've previously criticized the DoD's myopic focus on the Gulf War, the British focus on Northern Ireland is comparably myopic. It was a fairly limited campaign, under extremely specific conditions, most of which don't apply the the wider range of insurgencies. (I came to a number of these conclusions after being dumbfounded at a number of the claims made by Louise Richardson of Harvard's Radcliffe Institute when <A HREF="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TxwNOZQZzLk">interviewed by Berzerkeley's Harry Kreisler</A> in 2007 - most of which was derived from her experiences in Ireland.)

Not much difference that I could ascertain. I noted one 2008 speech added (?) in which he proposed using either a Northern Ireland let-them-kill the British counterinsurgent without becoming provoked approach or using Assad's father's Machiavellian genocide approach in which 30,000+ were slaughtered in one area during a brief time frame. Seems that Assad learned his dad's lesson well and has far surpassed him in death tolls. You may think I'm not portraying his suggestions accurately but read it for yourself. I won't address the Machiavellian slaughter approach as it is unrealistic for the Western world.

As for Northern Ireland, it is actually smaller than Israel where van Creveld hails. It also is immediately adjacent to the rest of the U.K. greatly simplifying British logistics and transport. The size and scope of the insurgent Catholic population (under one million) and the area in which it lives in Northern Ireland was relatively small as it is in Israel. Ireland itself is similarly small and poor unlike GCC and Iran that could support insurgents from nearby. The often-referenced Dhofar rebellion area was similarly small in scale and scope. Israel similarly is immersed next to its insurgent Palestinians which also reduces sustainment and maneuver challenges. Both countries appeared to make good use of walls to separate the populations in conflict. Both appeared to have had success.

External help was provided to both Northern Ireland insurgents and this is an area van Creveld and Fabius still have not addressed. We can avoid providing external counterinsurgency support but that does not preclude others from actively supporting insurgents over a prolonged period, particularly if they are sharing common borders.

Northern Ireland is 98% white so there was no ethnicity diversity compounding the religious differences driving some of that conflict. With the exception of Northern Ireland, there has been little conflict between Christian religions for many centuries. So that conflict largely appears to be as much about governing autonomy vs. disagreements over religion in contrast to the Shiite and Sunni divide. As I tried to point out to Bill C in an earlier article about asymmetric warfare written in 1975, the U.S. had been actively supporting Afghanistan in Little American Helmand province for nearly 30 years until the Soviet invasion in 1979. Likewise, we had good relations with the Shah of Iran until 1979 and Iranians there were modernizing. The Arab-Israeli wars of the late 60s/70s, the 1979 Soviet invasion, hostage crisis in Iran, and other events appears to have radicalized many Muslims in ways previously not seen.

Thus in our current Iraq and Afghanistan we have two insurgencies that were Texas-sized rather than Israel-sized challenges far from our shores and that of other coalition members. The borders were too big to secure to preclude sanctuary just as in Vietnam. Compared to Vietnam, the cost in blood was not nearly as severe except perhaps in Iraq. The cost in treasure has been far more extreme driven by the distances involved far from our shores and far inland from sea transport.

Bill,

That is the kind of out-of-the-box thinking that can help us break out of the post-WWII tactical rut that's led so many armies to defeat fighting foreign insurgencies!

My scary proposal for why we "lost/lose" post-World War II conflicts:

Because -- during conflicts of the Cold War and re: "containment" -- and during conflicts of the post-Cold War and re: "expansion" -- we relied (imprudently it now appears) -- too heavily -- on the (supposed) overwhelming appeal of our way of life, etc.; this, to:

a. Garner for us much more of the viable (fighting; supporting) population and much more of the population as a whole. And, thus, via the overwhelming appeal of our way of life, etc., to

b. Win the battle almost immediately (via regime change; partition, etc.) and/or to decisively turn the tide of battle in our direction.

Because:

a. "Overwhelming appeal" was disproved/failed us during the Cold War (in such places as Korea, Vietnam, etc.), and because

b. It appears to have been disproved/failed us again in the post-Cold War (in such places as Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.),

We have had to go back to "square one."

To wit: trying to find ways to make our way of life, etc., become (a) sufficiently attractive so as to be (b) strategically effective. (This as re: combat/interventions, etc.)

Via this "make ourself look better" approach to, hopefully,

a. Win these conflicts "without fighting." Or

b. Win them should fighting be required.

<blockquote>It’s a paradox of war: <i>The United States loses because the world is peaceful.</i> The decline of interstate conflict and the relative harmony among great powers is a cause for celebration. But the interstate wars that have disappeared are the kind of wars that the United States wins. And the civil wars that remain are the kind of wars that the U.S. loses. As the tide of conflict recedes, it leaves behind the toughest and most unyielding internal struggles.

It’s also hard to win great victories in an era of peace.</blockquote>

I read Dominic Tierney's article several days ago when it appeared on Google News under <i>The Atlantic.</i> In the quote above from that article, the italicized section and first sentence of the subsequent paragraph indicate Tierney’s mischaracterization of current and past proxy war and a skewed understanding of what constitutes peace and consolidation of gains following any conflict. WWI led to WWII. The Cold War led to today's UW and Political Warfare. Korea and Vietnam were proxy wars and it defies reality to count Korea as a loss given the enduring separation of adversaries for the next 60+ years.

For that matter, Desert Storm and the recent Libya were only marginal “wins.” Delayed elimination of Hussein and the inadequate no-fly zone caused continuing Iraq problems. Likewise, Egypt nearly collapsed after eliminating its strong man, the Sunni-Shiite-Kurd divide hindered post-Hussein Iraq, and tribal and extremist elements of post-Qaddafi Libya left unresolved instability. In that context, were El Salvador and other Central American IW (and Panama) wars a win when decades later many of those nation's have socialist governments? Likewise, was Vietnam a loss when today’s regime is our friend?

As for interstate war, Outlaw gives us daily updates on fighting between Russia and Ukraine. Syria and Iraq are affected by the interstate claims and fighting of ISIL and state-sponsors supporting both sides. China and its neighbors (and their U.S. ally) quarrel over interstate claims over resource-rich waters. Yemen, that once was two states, now has internal conflict supported on one-side by Iran and the other by the GCC and Sunnis. Africa fighting often involves Islamic extremism rather than internal ethnic civil war.

However, beyond these points, Tierney fails to recognize how WMD turn civil war into an interstate and cross-territory threat. More on that in this next quote from his article:

<blockquote>Battlefield loss can leave leaders facing what chess players call zugzwang, or “move anguish,” an unfortunate situation where every possible move worsens your position. You might prefer not to move at all but you have to do something—and that something hastens your downfall. Leave too quickly and everything might collapse, forcing your return. Leave too late and you may expend blood and treasure only to alienate the local population and step further into the mire.</blockquote>

His mention of not moving at all and leaving too quickly exemplify problems in Syria and Iraq and Assad’s genocide of Sunnis that led to an ISIL that crossed state borders and created millions of refugees . He could have added that half-assed initial commitments likewise lead to problems evidenced by OIF’s under-resourced initial Stability Operations phase, and OEF’s first 8 years. The air war over Iraq and Syria are another example where attempts to save blood and treasure will ultimately prolong the conflict and spread ISIL’s influence through the appearance of success.

But Dominic Tierney fails to recognize that as WMD proliferate, so too will availability of nuclear and other modern weapons to non-state actors. Hezbollah and Hamas may ultimately gain access through Iran’s nuclear program. ISIL and al Qaeda may finally realize such weapons from Pakistan and GCC countries that react to Iran’s nukes. That’s why Martin van Creveld is wrong to believe that an Iran bomb is not a threat to Israel. Even if Iran is a rational actor, the same cannot be said for its proxies or those of their GCC nemesis factions. You don’t need a missile or aircraft to infiltrate a nuke into another state.

Worst of all as in Fabius Maximus and van Creveld’s works, Dominic Tierney’s article is rich in Captain Obvious criticism without offered solutions to problems that won’t evaporate just because we don’t want to commit ground troops into what we perceive to be “other’s” civil wars.

Sparapet,

Lots of great material in that comment! Here are two brief notes.

(1) About controlling the local populations

One reason there are no more colonies is that mustering sufficient troops to control all but the smallest foreign nations is not practical (and seldom profitable). For details see "<a title="Parameters" href="http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/1995…; target="_blank">Force Requirements in Stability Operations</a>", James T. Quinlivan, <em>Parameters</em>, Winter 1995.

The COIN manual, FM 3-24, echoed Quinlivan's conclusions:
<blockquote>No predetermined, fixed ratio of friendly troops to enemy combatants ensures success in COIN. The conditions of the operational environment and the approaches insurgents use vary too widely.

A better force requirement gauge is troop density, the ratio of security forces (including the host nation’s military and police forces as well as foreign counterinsurgents) to inhabitants. Most density recommendations fall within a range of 20 to 25 counterinsurgents for every 1000 residents in an AO. Twenty counterinsurgents per 1000 residents is often considered the minimum troop density required for effective COIN operations; however as with any fixed ratio, such calculations remain very dependent upon the situation.</blockquote>

(2) "The CPA was nothing less than that. It was not a foreign power in the sense of far off influence...it was foreign in terms of understanding."

I agree, but there is another dimension to this. The major factor is, imo, how the locals regard us. To them we were infidel foreigners in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Bill,

That's taking this reasoning to the next level, moving from describing "how" we have acted to the more difficult question of "why".

Most of these interventions have worked through the locals (e.g., CIA overthrowing local elected governments, DoD arming & training local governments), often successfully -- at least in a short-term sense (i.e., ignoring the long-term hatred and mistrust produced in the local people).

How much of this m.o. will work in the 21st C? Perhaps more importantly, how must our goals change? So far we've pursued something close to the opposite of John Boyd's ideas for grand strategy.

Interesting times ahead.

The following quote from Manea's interview of Dave Maxwell fits this argument:

<blockquote>You first have to have the ability to understand the problem that you have and then apply the right ways and means to address the problem in accordance with national policy and strategy. The important thing is that we cannot look to any model to copy. I am really resistant when I hear people talking about models. The conditions may be different. You just don’t apply models. You’ve got to develop a unique strategy for each situation.</blockquote>

As Dave points out, any historical comparison that purports to be a model involving countless diverse variables renders history, particularly non-recent history, a poor teacher. The 2008 RAND study's number of variable and extensive conflicts are too old, too different, and too dissimilar in how they were fought and by whom to narrowly pass judgment on foreign influence's effect on insurgency and counterinsurgency. At least the 2010 RAND study attempted to cover some of the other past best and poor practices that differentiated the conflicts. Even then, ancient <strong>past</strong> by other parties in different places under widely varied conditions and motivations <strong>is not prologue</strong> for future insurgencies elsewhere.

As for your points one and two, you asked us to accept that intervention by foreign armies has limited value--but caveated it to say it was acceptable provided it was limited in scope and not in the lead. I offered the immediate, very recent examples of Iraq following the Surge in 2008-2011 where we still had a dominating presence, and what happened after that became far more limited post-2011 when we departed, and Iran gained a greater foothold in Iraq.

Libya, Syria, Ukraine, and Vietnam demonstrate that insurgency and counterinsurgency go beyond <strong>our</strong> support for one side. Other parties invariably support the opposite side. Thus your immediate comparison of who leads the COIN effort fails to consider who is supporting the opposition. Obviously, when we do little to nothing to support:

1) stability in Libya after bombing it,
2) the opposition in Syria or enforce red lines,
3) the Kurds/Sunnis after our withdrawal in 2011 when ISIS seized territory,
4) the government and Army of Ukraine,
5) South Vietnam by adequately bombing sanctuaries of North Vietnam that forced the North to the Peace Table and could have halted their conventional invasion in 1975,

things tend to go to hell in a hand basket.

When the other side continues to offer support and we do not, the other side has the advantage. External and internal radicals are helping Libyans oppose any reasonable government. The Russians and Iranians help Assad. The Iranians help the Shiite militias and GCC radicals support ISIS. The Russians help create an artificial insurgency in Ukraine that actually is a Russian-sponsored "stealth war." The Russians and Chinese supported North Vietnam. Pakistan's ISI and Haqqanis, and now ISIS outsiders influence the fighting in Afghanistan.

As for your point three, I read Martin van Creveld's conclusion only (from a 2005 article lacking updated lessons of recent conflicts) and saw no solution there to current world events in areas that are vital national interests. I will offer my suggestions frequently made here:

1) Surge early with the Joint force to include an adequate ground force to counter insurgents <strong>or</strong> provide deterrence to attacks
2) After our Joint victory or deterrence (with limited air attacks on infrastructure that therefore does not need rebuilding) <strong>stabilize</strong> with ground forces
3) Negotiate and establish new borders if necessary to eliminate sources of future conflict. Build walls and fences as in Israel and Iraq to separate sectarian and external influences.
4) Train separate forces in new borders, build combat outposts for them, and transition rapidly
5) Retrograde to our own safe haven area (e.g. Kurd) where a residual force and whole of government can continue to influence events through aid, and aerial QRFs of air attack and air assault by conventional and SF/SOF forces to assist host nation forces.
6) Employ best COIN practices throughout as illustrated by the 2010 RAND study, but with less emphasis on Build

This section edited due to poor original wording:

Please provide your own specific solutions or those of Martin van Creveld. Hopefully, your or his solution does not include the belief that vital national interests will fix themselves with only limited U.S. and "coalition" support involving just airpower and SF/SOF. If important enough for U.S. involvement, all elements of national power are required to include more than just token forces in the air, ground, sea, and human whole of government domains--particularly when external parties show no hesitation to continue exerting their own influence. If the solution involves spoons immersed in salt water as in his conclusion, that is insufficiently specific.;)

Read your new piece and still don't see a solution to the problems we face in many insurgencies. Let's start with this quote from your piece:

<blockquote>In January 2007 I gave a more detailed explanation to van Creveld’s conclusion. As a simple dichotomy for analytical purposes, we can sort insurgencies by the degree of involvement of outside armed forces (of course, there are other ways to characterize 4GW).

1.Violence between two or more local groups, who can form from any combination of clans, governments, ethnicities, religions, gangs, and tribes.
2.Violence between two or more sides, where at least one is led by foreigners – comprising, as above, any imaginable combination of factions.

Local governments often win conflicts of the first kind, often with valuable foreign assistance — so long as the locals control political strategy, tactics, and the major combat forces.</blockquote>

If reading it right, the main thing you adjusted was that some foreign assistance is valuable "so long as the locals control" the items mentioned.

That being the case how do you explain the Iraqis having control over all that since 2011 and everything going south vs. 2008 when we still had primacy and Iraq was largely at peace? Iran has provided limited assistance to Iraq wouldn't you say? How does your theory explain Assad being unable to control the insurgency of ISIS and now more moderate opposition despite the limited assistance of Iran?

How does this theory explain Ukraine where major assistance from Russia has enabled crushing defeats of the main Ukraine government? There is nothing limited about that assistance other than empty claims of non-involvement.

And once again, you fail to mention the later RAND study that showed that multiple best practices play a role in success or failure of counterinsurgencies. Military assistance alone is not a determinant.

Finally, you seem to criticize the role of U.S./Coalition/NATO primary assistance without providing an alternative that would work in Iraq and Afghanistan. Certainly you aren't claiming that were we to abandon Afghanistan now that all would fix itself...like it has so far in Iraq, Libya, and Ukraine?

Move Forward,

(1) I appreciate the complement, but calling what I wrote a "model" seems a bit grand. It's just one insight from post-WWII history about what has not worked, plus pointers to what has worked.

(2) "As for your points one and two, you asked us to accept that intervention by foreign armies has limited value--but caveated it to say it was acceptable provided it was limited in scope and not in the lead."

We have been over this too many times. I said that *one* form of foreign intervention has not worked -- armed force, where the foreign party takes the lead. Your repeated generalization of what I wrote -- to the point of absurdity -- suggests either a reading FAILure or debating trick.

(3) "Please provide..."

An essay of under 2,000 words can only go so far. The comments here suggest these points remain unclear to this audience, so further expansion hardly seems worthwhile at this point in time.

Also, I appreciate your implied praise by asking for more. But I don't believe comments here or anywhere are a useful forum for so large a work.

I suggest that <I>you</I> read "World Politics and the Evolution of War" by John J. Weltman, as he explains the wider strategic context of the "loss" in Vietnam. Vietnam was ceded as part of the American overture to China, which further aggravated the Sino-Soviet split and facilitated the strategic defeat of the Soviet Union by 1990. Vietnam was an operational loss (aggravated by Congress' failure to fund the Vietnamese after 1975) that facilitated a long-term strategic victory.

Post WWII, the United Kingdom fought two insurgencies in Oman, the Jebel Akhdar War and the Dhofar Rebellion, and won both. Post WWII, the United Kingdom fought an insurgency in Malaya and won. Post WWII, American special forces fought a small scale insurgency in El Salvador, and won. Post WWII, America has fought and facilitated a lengthy counterinsurgency campaign in Colombia, and although the commitment is ongoing, substantial progress against the FARC rebels has been made at a fairly low cost. Post WWII, America has fought and facilitated a successful COIN campaign in the Philippines. I'm sorry, sir, but you are simply wrong in your blanket assertions.