The Problem with Hybrid Warfare by Nadia Schadlow, War on the Rocks
Europe is now a petri dish for hybrid war. Events of the past decade, not to mention the last few years, have reaffirmed the value of a concept that sought to explain a range of diverse, coercive instruments across the operational spectrum of war. Hybrid warfare is a term that sought to capture the blurring and blending of previously separate categories of conflict. It uses a blend of military, economic, diplomatic, criminal, and informational means to achieve desired political goals. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, has referred to these hybrid threats as an “inflection point” in modern war. Indeed, in the disordered post-Cold War world, hybrid warfare remains an excellent framework for understanding the changing character of war…
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Seems the Russian military are quick learners when they notice a single point of failure within their own UW doctrine or what should be improved.
Russia's army of bots & trolls is getting reinforcements: Moscow plans a special “information ops” military unit.
https://meduza.io/en/news/2015/04/17/russia-to-set-up-information-force… …
NATO is firming up their counter UW strategy in the Baltics:
#NATO will use #SpecialForces in case #hybridwar in #Baltic region.|PL|http://zwojska.pl/4446/nato-wojska-specjalne-wojna-hybrydowa/ … #NSHQ #SOF #NRF #VJTF pic.twitter.com/G2hM0RMVe7
Russia and Putin have truly decided on war in the Ukraine--there will be no compromise.
US and western diplomacy is literally a waste of time and the language of "hard power" is about the only thing he will understand.
This President cannot change his approach at this late of date that makes any impact at all going forward--just reinforces the idea he has swapped the Ukraine for Iran and also reinforces Putin's image that this President is basically weak.
[B]"Waste of time and nerves" - #Steinmeier acknowledges it was difficult to speak 'language of diplomacy' with #Lavrov[/B]http://joinfo.com/world/1001982_
(Edited.)
I believe that you may have left out at least one exceptionally important, glaringly obvious and, historically speaking, most common description/option for describing such international affairs phenomenon as we see today; that of:
a. An omnipresent great power
b. Being on the march.
Let me explain:
"Way One" seems to suggest that an omnipresent great power "recognizes that it claims too much in the world." This is not the lens through which such great powers as the U.S. today, the former Soviet Union yesterday, and Great Britain and Rome during their heyday see/saw their national security requirements and future.
Rather, much like with the U.S. today, likewise with the former Soviet Union then, and Great Britain and Rome back in their day, these entities see/saw their national security requirements through the lens of expansion.
"Way Two" would also seem to suffer from this fatal omission. Thus, while "Way Two:"
a. Rightfully identifies the "nicking away of the edges of the status quo of sovereignty in ways that expand one's own." It would seem to
b. Wrongfully identify these such actions as being the more-common and/or exclusive purview of "challengers."
Given these such errors/omissions, it would appear that "Way Three" (which is said to be dependent upon some combination of "Way One" and "Way Two" as you have described them) will also have some difficulty.
Thus, "threat" and "enemies," as seen by the United States today, by the former Soviet Union during the Cold War, and by Great Britain and Rome during their heydays, to be understood, then as now, as those states and societies -- and/or those individuals or groups -- that stand/stood in the way of (1) where these omnipresent -- and clearly expansionist -- great powers want/wanted to go and (2) how they want/wanted to get there.
Callwell and Kipling knew this back in their day -- made no bones about it -- and defined and explained such things as "small wars" (etc., etc., etc.) within this context.
We would be wise to do the same thing today and, thus, understand such things as hybrid warfare, and nearly everything else we experience today, within this exact same context.
Fear, honor, interests tends to fall under the category of so what except to demonstrate the continuity of why states go to war throughout time. That is valuable in a limited way, but it provides little in the way of "practical wisdom (how the heck do I solve this problem)." CvC's trinity is a useful model for understanding the complexity of interactions, and serves a useful purpose for informing planners and commanders about the reality of war.
Getting to deterrence, I agree states that are internally brittle know they're vulnerable; however, because of that they'll be more likely to implement the most drastic population control measures to pre-empt UW (North Korea, Iran, etc.), and instead of deterring aggression they may feel compelled to take action to foment a nationalistic attitude within their populace. Nothing like a war to get everyone in a flag waving mood.
War? Gray Zone? Why not just call it a low level war? Are traditionalists of the mindset if we don't levee en mass and drag the entire nation into a war, then it isn't a war? I think there are serious issues when we deny this so-called middle area is war (by nontraditional means). This results in a failure to take it serious, at least until we're pushed into a corner and then decide to respond/counter with by declaring (or not) traditional war. If we had doctrine, policy, and a national mindset that enabled us to develop a meaningful strategic approach to conflict in the gray zone, I would be happy to stop calling it war, but we don't. Calling it war doesn't make it total or unlimited war, it simply recognizes the fact that two states (or a non-state actor) are attempting to impose their will on the other through the use of force to harm or threaten to harm the other's interests (not all of it is lethal).
I agree with you that our power is ebbing, and we need to learn where to let go, and where to double down on what we think is worth fighting over. Though I'm concerned your following comment:
"Perhaps allowing Russia more influence in Eastern Europe, or sharing a greater burden of securing the global commons of the eastern Pacific with China. But there is no right answer as to what to hold and where to give, so this approach is always met with powerful debate."
Allowing Russia more influence in Eastern Europe when the countries there don't want Russian influence is not in ours or Western Europe's interests. Russia's interests are exploitation and chest pounding. I'm sure Russia propagandists are photo chopping images now so we see Putin wrestling a bear, or putting the Incredible Hulk in strangle hold. However, we have to deal with reality, Russia's power, what little they have is hard power. They are using it to destabilize and threaten, not promote regional and global peace. They will continue to use their military and criminal power to coerce others to bend to their will.
Power shifts between states have happened throughout history and will continue to do so, we're not immune to this, but we need to choose how we're going to respond to an ever changing world. It does seem that the last few months we have been drifting aimlessly.
This is the perfect example of the current White House failing to "see reality".
Putin convinced pundits that Javelins to Ukraine means WW3 but S-300s to Iran means stopping Bibi from destroying peace in our time.
Actually if one goes back on the various White House comments on the nuclear deal ie "we must do this ie dipolmacy or it is war" is not the White House actually copying Putin's non linear warfare tactics??
Sad if thus is our "reality" of the real world these days.
The art of unintended consequences.
Israel threatening to arm Ukraine & Georgia in retaliation for Russia selling S-300 to Iran
http://newsru.com/world/14apr2015/israelukr.html …
And from the other side of the coin:
"Iranians last time I checked don't have a border w/ #Yemen...no reason for Iran to be involved" #Saudi Amb slams Tehran on arming #Houthis
#Saudi Amb Al Jubeir doubles down on #Yemen campaign, says "will continue until objectives achieved...there will be no half measures"
Robert--here is an example of the "seeing and understanding" this President and his NSC is simply not "understanding".
Putin ever actually since 1995 has had no let up in his belief that he wanted to accomplish three geo political goals when he came to power and that is equally shared within his inner circle.
1. discredit and divide NATO
2. discredit and divide the EU
3. disconnect the US forever from Europe
Non linear warfare is his "means".
Right now I give him a 50% accomplished on all three goals--we are not far from seeing it shift radically to 80% if he decides which I think he has to challenge NATO in the Baltics at a one step below triggering Article 5--which is the single point of failure within NATO.
We absolutely right now unless I am blind have no recognizable clear strategy on anything ---maybe one or two items but it reminds me of "presidential legacy items" not clear cut strategic geo political goals.
This President and his NSC should have seen the Russian move on Iran coming clearly at them for months (it was clearly signaled to them five months ago) now IF they had fully "understood" all political, economical and military aspects that the whole of government approach by Russia in their non linear warfare offers them on foreign policy flexibility.
Russia really wants a "new Yalta" where their "rights as a superpower" are firmly anchored allowing Russian "privileged control--Russian translation not a US term--we call it sphere of influence--see the big difference--the words privileged control" as a regional hegemon over all of Europe--it is that simple. As I mentioned below everything right now is actually simple--and the response to this "Yalta" is also simple--BUT this President is weak in his follow through and Putin is exploiting it to the hilt.
I said over a year ago shortly before he entered the Ukraine that he had a geo choice to make war or compromise--I indicated he would go the war route to obtain his goals as his "means" were working well at that specific point in time.
They are by the way right now struggling in the Ukraine as the UA picks up their fighting skill sets which have improved vastly in the last year and they even with lost territory and manpower are making Russia pay in treasure and blood. Interesting to watch a civil society fully and clearly back their military.
Notice the comments by Nikolay Kozhanov that indicate this geo political thinking at work and the concept of a "new Yalta" driving those thoughts.
If I have seen this since he entered the Crimea and if of all people Bloomberg "sees" it--where has our NSC been--sleep walking by chance?
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-14/putin-s-mideast-gains…
As Russian President Vladimir Putin has shown in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, he’s willing to take an economic hit to expand his political influence.
He’s taking the same approach with Iran.
Lifting sanctions and allowing Iranian oil onto global markets would threaten to deepen the plunge in crude prices, curbing revenue from Russia’s biggest export. The cost: about $27 billion, based on estimates from the central bank in Moscow.
“The strategic benefits are much more important for Russia,” said Nikolay Kozhanov, an expert at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London and a nonresident fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center. “Incorporating Iran into pro-Moscow organizations, Russia is hoping to secure its share in this market or divide zones of influence.”
Putin will get an opportunity to bolster an ally, stymie regional adversaries and open business opportunities. The approach was underscored by his decision this week to lift a ban on shipping S-300 air-defense missile systems to Tehran under an $800 million contract.
A deal with world powers over Iran’s nuclear program has the potential to shift the balance of power in the Middle East as Iran competes against Saudi Arabia, a U.S. ally.
I know LTG Hodges well from our time together in Afghanistan. nuff said.
And you will not convince me that Presidents who brought us stupid, meaningless warfare in Vietnam, Afghanistan or Iraq have some sort of strategic edge on our current leader. Problem with having a war-fighting army sitting on the bench, is that far too many Presidents see it as an easy solution to fix out of sort policies. Be glad we have President who appreciates that throwing the Army at a problem is no solution. Armies are for fighting wars of necessity, not enabling wars of choice.
Robert--"a strategist" must be able to dance at six weddings if necessary but the President has not been able to do that--basically because of a weak NSC who must in the background constantly monitor the world using indications and warnings.
But when you get even General Hodges here in Europe stating the IC got caught off guard because there were no I&Ws for hybrid warfare which has been now corrected we are in trouble.
Secondly, the ability to drive a whole of government approach such as does Putin is simply better at addressing multiple events than does our "democratic ways".
In some aspects the US needs to "adopt" some of the non linear warfare aspects--remember we tried to do whole of government approaches with COIN and that was not successful as we know all to well.
Part of the current failure of Obama is the inability to coordinate multiple different agencies with a single focus AND the failure to believe that nation states such as Russia can have multiple drivers and will lie, steal and cheat to achieve those end states.
In some aspects the President reflects a shift in generations which to a large degree never fought as a soldier, never fought a Cold War, never had to use hard power to back up soft power--Obama himself even stated as much during a recent interview when he stated--I am not going to fight that war as I was born after it.
He fails to understand that the "others" ie Russia, Iran, China, and even the IS "understand" how to mix politics and military action--this President needs a fast education in that.
The world has changed because of the speed of information and how civil societies "learn about the world around them"-- this President must operate as well in this speed zone. But history is playing a large role right now that we seem to have forgotten over and over--the Shia Sunni divide, territorial borders drawn on a map with a pencil, perceived humiliations, globalization with haves and have nots, ethnic unrest-it has been there in the past and mostly never resolved.
Take all of that and mix in a healthy dose of disinformation and you have what we now have in Europe, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen.
As a side comment he needs to urgently "understand" that when red lines are drawn and stated one must follow through and backing down tends to reveal you in this current world as "weak" and without morals.
GermanForeignOffice ✔ @GermanyDiplo
#Steinmeier on #Ukraine crisis:There are lines that shouldn’t be crossed even in times of conflict.They were crossed w/annexation of #Crimea
"understanding" being the essential task.
We are too busy being a victim and looking for people and things to blame for our troubles to think clearly
Then mix in politics, particularly in a country like ours that is inefficient by design to protect our citizens from deliberate abuse - often sets us up for inadvertent abuse in stead.
As a strategist I actually think the President is doing a fair job. It would be nice to arm him with a viable strategic framework to help guide and lend clearer context to his decisions.
Robert--actually tend to disagree--the problem is actually simple and the solutions if correctly looked at are actually also "simple" we though tend to make them difficult because we somehow feel "that problems demand complicated solutions" if not then it is not really a problem.
"Seeing and understanding what is being seen" is a skill set that we abandoned long ago after 9/11.
But and there is always regardless of what people think a but--when the current US administration is being accurately viewed as weak in foreign policy and has chosen the use of "soft power" you open the gates of "Pandora's box".
This administration and it's NSC is being viewed by Putin as inherently weak and unresponsive just it is being viewed the same way by the Iranian Supreme leader and his inner circle.
There is something to the Russian, Chinese and Iranian forms of UW that actually extend into the realm of foreign policy--just short of actual warfare--thus a mixture of soft power but with an extremely aggressive "hard power edge" that is constantly checking the US to see how it will respond.
The problem right now is that is great if we see the "real world" but somewhere along the way no one in DC can clearly define what that "real world is and or should be" and at the same time forsakes the use of hard power if needed.
I have stated here a number of times and over on the Ukrainian war thread--this administration has felt that it needed Russian assistance in getting something achieved in the areas of terrorism and the ME because it was felt Russia could somehow influence the Iranians and Assad.
There is some serious comments floating in Europe that basically Obama traded the Ukraine for Iran and to a degree Syria in not rocking the Russian boat to hard on the Ukraine to signal the US needed Russia and Russia was an important global player regardless of the Ukrainian events.
If one takes a seriously long look at the Obama response and or lack of response to the Ukraine outside of sanctions and words nothing really has transpired other than constant comments by the US Ukrainian ambassador.
What was the last so called "red line" out of DC---"if Minsk 2 is not implemented correctly things will get harder--we judge Putin by his actions not his words" Unquote.
Well things exploded over the last five days and Ukrainian soldiers are being killed at the rates seen before Minsk 2 and what is that "red line" DC response--silence.
How did that DC foreign policy of using Russian influence in Iran work as of yesterday???
Yes we must view the world in a reality focused way, we must constantly ask ourselves what we really do want from the world and what we are prepared to provide the world--but our current internal politics precludes this kind of discussion and will into the near future thus we are kind of stuck in what we can and or cannot do as we simply do not have a unified accepted by all foreign policy.
Reaction mode is our current foreign policy along with a super number of stumbles along the way.
The Russian non linear warfare is a perfect fit for the current events and allows Russia maximum flexibility in it's aggressive actions--again just one step under general war.
By the way--yes Russia ie Putin does in fact hate the US's form of neoliberalism both in the general civil society and in it economic form.
This has been repeated by him and his closets advisors especially his chief ideologue since 2002 in speeches, press conferences and TV interviews--cannot believe that still has not made it to DC.
Khamenei the current Iranian Supreme Leader voices similar comments about the US civil society --being "godless" also since 1979.
This is an interesting insight into the current failed US foreign policy in the nuclear talks that relied heavily on Russian support--why the White House and the NSC "felt" they could "trust" Putin is beyond me--sometimes it really does appear from afar that the US is simply naïve in the ways of the world.
http://freebeacon.com/national-security/russian-missile-sales-to-iran-c…
Russian Missile Sales to Iran Cross White House ‘Red Line’
White House narrative on cooperation with Russia collapses
BY: Adam Kredo
April 14, 2015 5:00 am
Russia’s announcement on Monday that it will proceed with the sale of advanced missile systems to Iran crosses a so-called “red line” established by the Obama administration in 2010, according to comments by senior administration officials.
Following years of dissent from the United States, Russia announced on Monday that it would proceed with the sale of the advanced S-300 air defense missile system to Iran, which has been vying to purchase the hardware for years.
The announcement sparked criticism from the Obama administration, which has been pressuring Iran since at least 2010 to withhold the sale.
Russia’s previous ban on selling Tehran the powerful defense system was hailed as a coup by the Obama administration and promoted by it as an example of President Obama’s ability to rein in Russian intransigence on the military front.
.........One senior Obama administration official speaking in 2010 described the S-300 sale as a “red line” for the United States that “couldn’t be crossed,” according to Foreign Policy.
“They’ve made that very clear to us for the last two years that this is not a symmetrical transaction for them and they don’t share the same threat assessment as us vis-a-vis Iran,” the official was quoted as telling Foreign Policy in a 2010 article focused on “how the Obama team convinced Russia not to sell arms to Iran.”
The White House claimed that Moscow’s decision to ban arms sales to Tehran would usher in a new era of cooperation between the United States and Russia.
“The decision was a bold one that acknowledges how important it is to us and how important [Former Russian President] Medvedev takes this reset with President Obama,” the administration official said.
Obama administration officials also told Foreign Policy that it had “made clear to Medvedev and other Russian officials that the sale of the S-300 to Iran was a red line that couldn’t be crossed.”
Monday’s announcement by Russia flies in the face of this purported diplomatic success and left the Obama administration scrambling to respond. Officials in both the White House and State Department declined to discuss with the Washington Free Beacon its previous declaration about Russia’s deal with Iran violating a so-called red line.
.........“American ‘red lines’ aren’t what they used to be, Medvedev is gone, and the ‘reset’ with Russia is an embarrassment,” Abrams wrote at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).
“So is the way the Obama administration claimed credit for changing Russia’s policy toward Iran.”
So much for viewing the world in real terms.
We live in the real world, right? Sam Huntington once observed that one of America's challenges was that we did not see the world as it actually exists.
I see people struggling to create new names, and find new reasons for age old dynamics. Better we focus on ensuring our deterrence is tuned for the modern age. A credible threat of UW seems a great addition when challenged by states who know they are internally brittle. Also to ensure our policies do not over-reach, but are fair and reasonable in the world as it actually is.
But yes, the great theorists are great because they focused on fundamental aspects of human nature in competition, and did not look for clever boxes to hide problems within.
Bill's C and M; Outlaw
Bit of a "Chicken or Egg" argument going on. Truth be told, the fortunes and limits of Sovereignty ebb and flow like the tide. When US sovereignty was "flowing" - often through what we are now calling "hybrid warfare" it was not a problem. Now, as our sovereignty ebbs a bit in this natural cycle, we see ourselves surrounded by "threats" and "enemies."
For me the simple perspective is this: "Sovereignty follows power."
It is that simple. Most recognize that there is a tremendous re-balancing of global power taking place. This is true between states, and also true within states. It is only natural that sovereignty will re-balance as well. This can happen in three broad ways. Pick one.
Way one: Those who's relative power has ebbed recognize they claim too much in the world they live in now, and make concessions to share more effectively the rights and duties of sovereignty they claim. Perhaps allowing Russia more influence in Eastern Europe, or sharing a greater burden of securing the global commons of the eastern Pacific with China. But there is no right answer as to what to hold and where to give, so this approach is always met with powerful debate.
Way two: Gray zone competition, or hybrid warfare to nick away at the edges of the status quo of sovereignty in ways that expand one's own. This is what challengers do. The US, Japan and Germany a century ago; others today. It flirts with war. As Spain atrophied within their sovereignty box, the US burst at the seams of our own - so we broke into their box and took what we felt was now better owned by us. Russia and China play a similar game today.
Way three: War. Two and Three blur and blend. Does not make it all war, but if one focuses on the why over the how one maintains a clearer perspective, IMO.
Seen in a most positive light, Gray zone activity and hybrid war reduce the likelihood for major war by reducing the Jus ad Bellum. Or, they can lead into war. Depends on how the situation is addressed.
The US owns two parts to the areas where we feel challenged in this way. We need to re-assess what we claim to be our right and duty around the globe; and we need to shore up our deterrence to approaches that actually create a deterrent effect in the world we live in today. Focus on our part of the equation, and stop the hand wringing over what the other side of the equation is doing.
So, we did not cause this by over reaching in our sovereignty, or by overly compressing others - but that did have a contributory effect.
Good news - if we fix our deterrence now, then there is a good chance that fortunes will change and China will implode, and Russia will fall off of the false summit they currently stand upon. But they naturally seek now to expand their sovereignty while their hands are hot.
I would like to make three points:
First, about revolutions and "Hybrid War" as practiced in the Ukraine. Clauswitzian war pits two nations against each other – not two elements that are strictly internal to a single country against each other, even it one of those elements is receiving external support. You should use a "but for" test - “but for the intervention of the external nation, would the events have unfolded as they did?” If the answer is no, the events would have unfolded even without the external support, then it is a revolution. If the answer is yes, external support was required to cause the hostilities to commence, then it is war. This does not mean that what starts as revolution cannot transition to war, but whether the events are internally driven with external support, or externally driven with internal cooperation, makes all the difference between revolution and war.
Second, assuming you accept the idea of Hybrid War, it is unfair to say that the U.S. is not engaged in conflict. It is currently sanctioning many members of the Russian elite. That would meet the definition of hybrid warfare. So these statements that NATO and its allies are not currently engaged in war are false as long as you accept the “total war” definition Hybrid War offers.
Third, the tactics involved may be more complex than open war, but Hybrid War is the wrong way to define this conflict. This is a war of Identity, and it will only extend as far as required for Russia to protect what it feels are ethnic Russian. So Estonia and some of the other former Eastern Block countries could have real concerns as they have significant ethnic Russian populations, but to pretend that this is a Russian war with the West ala the Cold War, overstates what is happening. Yes, Russia will rattle the nuclear sabre to get what it wants, but I doubt they would be self destructive enough to actually use it against America or any other Western nation.
That is a bit simplistic. States have always built alliances/coalitions to increase their power relative to others. Russia didn't invade Ukraine because he hated the West. However, since the West is weakly opposed to Putin's actions, and the West is a combination of a large alliance/coalition Putin is seeking to build an alliance to achieve a balance of power.
It further demonstrates Russia's weakness, because their partners are literally broke countries in Latin America, Iran, Central Asia, and North Korea. Strategy or desperation? The political leaders of the countries he is partnering with tend to hate the West, but it is questionable how deeply that hate runs through their societies.
It is still a dangerous situation, since WMD makes the weak strong in a limited way.
To build on the previous comment.
We have been discussing the Russian non linear warfare more in the line of actual combat UW BUT Dave Maxwell might in fact state that non linear warfare also supports what and when ---- when Russia defines what it's geo political goals are to be via political warfare which can be non violent.
If we look at these specific phases of Russian's eight phase non linear warfare one might in fact "see" and "understand" Russia's foreign policy moves referencing Syria and Iran and how Iran intertwines their form of non linear warfare with the Russian moves.
IE the constant Russian blocking of any UNSC decisions and humanitarian aid to Syria at the same time trying to hold political meetings between the factions in Moscow that never go anywhere to yesterday's announcement that Russia will deliver S-300 missile systems to Iran all the while "claiming" they are defensive while they are in fact nuclear capable to resisting any US ATMs being delivered as they are "offensive".
Why do if both mistrust each other--why then do they cooperate together?
They are bound by a deep hatred of the West and perceived "western intentions" and both might in fact be tied via two distinct forms of "fascism" if we look hard and they themselves will never admit in fact exists.
So the inherent question is in fact Russian foreign policy just another form of "non linear warfare" and not really what we in the West refer to when we speak of foreign policy???????
Taken from the Russian eight phase non linear warfare doctrine.
First Phase: non-military asymmetric warfare (encompassing information, moral, psychological,ideological, diplomatic, and economic measures as part of a plan to establish a favorable political, economic, and military setup).
Second Phase: special operations to mislead political and military leaders by coordinated measures carried out by diplomatic channels, media, and top government and military agencies by leaking false data, orders, directives, and instructions.
HAD Obama and his NSC paid far more attention to the Russian non linear warfare coupled to the Russian political warfare instead of his "legacy"
they might have anticipated this Russian move and countered it before it even occurred---
Transfer of S-300 missiles to #Iran reverses Obama's foreign policy achievements, says Abrams:
http://on.cfr.org/1zar0fr pic.twitter.com/CQ0SmqG7fo
Notice the use of Russian informational conflict being used by the Russian FM in his S-300 lies--who says the Russian non linear warfare cannot be used in other areas of the globe outside of the Ukraine?
The Russian FM is basically lying when he denies the S-300 is purely defensive---inside the Russian Air Defense it has a secondary mission—it is nuclear capable.
MFA Russia ✔ @mfa_russia
#Lavrov : S-300 systems do not threaten Israel, other regional countries http://tass.ru/en/russia/788959 …
Lavrov: S-300 is purely defensive system, no threat to Israel
http://www.unian.info/world/1066706-lavrov-s-300-is-purely-defensive-sy… … pic.twitter.com/hauCaDYDvp
Obama does not realize that the Russian non linear warfare applies to any "political warfare target" Russia selects.
To include jamming up the US in the Iranian talks if it feels to speaks to the Ukraine and the Russian demand at being accepted as the ultimate superpower in Europe.
Does Obama have an answer to exactly what the Russian FM means by this statement.
"Lavrov says lifting the ban on the S-300 to Iran was done "to stimulate maximally constructive" nuclear talks." http://m.ria.ru/world/20150413/1058312241.html …
"Lifting the ban" to exactly do what???? "to stimulate maximally constructive"---exactly what is that???
Does the White House realize the S-300 is nuclear capable???
One can see how the Russians are playing the US and yet we seem to think we need them.
Taken from an old newspaper article where the Russians state the UN arms embargo applies to the S-300 and now what do they do--and the White House did not see this coming????
All in a non linear warfare days work.
"Old WPost article on why Russia had to ditch S-300 delivery to #Iran:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/11/AR20100… … (Kremlin said UN ban applied to them)
In order to deal currently with both Putin and the Iranian Supreme Leader one needs to fully have inhaled all eight phases of the Russian non linear warfare as Iran drives on her version of it as well.
When one deals with Iran the axis Russia is not far away just as the axis of Syria is not far from Russia--and Obama failed to incorporate that thinking into his Iranian nuclear deal--he basically backed away from the Ukraine as he needed he assumed "Russian assistance" in the P5+1 nuclear talks.
He did not assume for a second that both Iran and Russia work off of the same sheet of music when dealing with the US and today we got that answer.
Linked are comments on the Russia S-300 AD missile deal as well as two articles on the fact that fascism as a whole is driving Russian non linear warfare moves--nothing the West has done as it is often stated.
Sorry that this article is in Russia as it goes into the tendency for fascism developing in Russia and it was written in 1995!!!!
Prescient piece by the great Boris Strugatski about the potential for fascism in Russia - from 1995. #Putin http://www.gumer.info/bibliotek_Buks/History/Article/str_fash.php?hc_lo… …
Crimean Tatar leader Chubarov says #Russia close to a 'Stalinist regime' http://uatoday.tv/politics/crimean-tatar-leader-chubarov-says-russia-cl… … pic.twitter.com/JJDO7NFAlM
Russia set to give Iran S300s to protect "research sites" against US & Israeli airstrikes http://rt.com/news/249229-russia-s300-delivery-iran/ … pic.twitter.com/fF8fShFwmw
The ink ain't dry on the preliminary nuke deal with Iran, but Putin is already sending Tehran its S-300 missiles. https://meduza.io/en/news/2015/04/13/putin-lifts-the-ban-on-sending-ant… …
Moscow: Iran National Security Secretary Ali Shamkhani: Iran and Russia are on the same side on issues of war and peace.
Now our P5+1 "partner" Putin is sending Iran long-delayed S-300 ADA systems to defend their nuke sites. That's super. http://rt.com/news/249229-russia-s300-delivery-iran/ …
Gosh, if you didn't know that's impossible on Happy Planet Obama, you'd almost think Tehran & Moscow were working together against the West.
Let's be honest---this is taken from the President's comments during an interview concerning his Iran nuke deal:
So let’s be honest: Everything depends on Obama’s hope that nuclear detente will change Iran. “If in fact they’re engaged in international business, and there are foreign investors, and their economy becomes more integrated with the world economy, then in many ways it makes it harder for them to engage in behaviors that are contrary to international norms,” is the way he put it to National Public Radio.
NOW let's be really honest--one could apply the same Obama logic to say Russia and did it stop Russia from using non linear warfare to annex Crimea and to invade eastern Ukraine??????????
So again WHY is it suppose to work against Iranian non linear warfare???????
Not really.
Actually, I do have a simplified way to explain my last comment: just substitute population-centric COIN for hybrid and you have the same process playing out, the same focusing on tactics without thinking about the larger strategy, without thinking about what is really going on, the exact same process where nation building and military capacity building become mixed up with other agendas. It's just the same thing from the same crowd.
Talbott and Bill Clinton were like minded anti-nationalists pushing a globalization agenda in the political and economic spheres. Neither had the power nor influence to shape their agendas in a meaningful way beyond NAFTA. That was certainly a boom for the narcotraffickers and for shifting jobs from America to Mexico. NATO as a whole does not appear to embrace Talbott's vision, so like so many others he was just another voice in the wind. His views don't represent what actually happened.
As for combining nation building and military defense stuff, it works when the conditions are right as demonstrated in Japan and Germany, but we can't make chicken salad of chicken crap as we have repeatedly demonstrated in many locations around the world. We can't afford to separate the political from the military, because that results in winning the battles and losing the war. Forget nation building for now, we need to focus on how to use the military to achieve political versus purely military objectives. Political objectives must be realistic. I would offer a counter argument that we fail because we don't treat these missions like war. We have an astrategic approach that consists of tactics and unrealistic views of social engineering. We are quite capable of being good if we can move past the influence of our ideology. I don't mean getting rid of our human rights values, but to stop trying to impose foreign forms of governance on societies.
Dr. Schadlow makes the same category error Dr. Marin Strmecki made with the initial nation-building proposals for Afghanistan in 2002: nation building while in the middle of an insurgency/outside proxy affair by an outside power is a recipe for failure.
I am not sure I know what NATO is today, it seems to function as many different things, as a militarized arm of EU trading blocs, as a democratizer and bringer of "Western values" and a proxy for anti-Russian forces, AND A DEFENSIVE alliance. The same problem we are having in Afghanistan as we build national institutions, fight a proxy war, fight a localized insurgency, and deal with larger regional and global power politics in South Asia.
Same category error which will only leave ordinary Ukrainians in a dire situation. They, because of very rational fears, will hear only the defensive part. Well, some will and some won't. Those that don't, don't get much play in the Western press.
There are many agendas in DC and while some would genuinely like to help, others view the alliance in a variety of ways. On the ground, this is a recipe for endless conflict.
Everything is being called warfare when we have a mix of governance and military issues. Why then should all solutions be military or military-lite, such as information operations?
Did Dr. Schadlow write the War and Art of Governance paper? This mixed up nation building, military defense stuff doesn't work and that confusion not only can be seen on the ground today in Afghanistan and Ukraine, but the problem can be seen in Strobe Talbott's work in the early 90s. He calls NATO many different things, including a democratizer.
PS: It takes quite a lot of background work to get to this point. You don't have to agree, but my comment won't make sense if the work is not done. If I had the time, I'd try and boil things down to a few bullet points to make it easier as I do when I "round" or teach but I just don't have the time.
(Edited)
Outlaw:
I agree that we need to be discussing "hybrid warfare," "political warfare," etc., in a context much larger than, for example, the perspective of Russia and the Ukraine alone.
Thus:
a. More in terms of the context of the Cold War; when, (1) "they" were seen to be ones on the march and (2) "our" grand strategy, accordingly, was identified as "containment and rollback." This, in comparison to
b. The context of the post-Cold War; when, (1) "we" are the ones that are seen to be on the march and (2) "their" grand strategy looks to be best understood and described as "containment and rollback."
Thus, re: hybrid warfare, political warfare, etc., to move on to the larger, more comprehensive and more relevant context/discussion; wherein, one addresses:
a. Not only Russian efforts to stop contemporary Western attempts to advance its power, influence and control worldwide (via the promotion of our Western institutions, Western political, economic and social norms and our related values, attitudes and beliefs). But also
b. Similar Chinese and Middle Eastern efforts at "containing" and "rolling back" such Western power, influence and control, etc., advancement attempts.
In this more comprehensive light to understand:
a. Why the argument, information and comparison provided by yours truly and
b. What appears to be a somewhat similar argument, information and comparison made by the author of my cited April 7th "War-On-The-Rocks" article/link above
c. Might prove valuable.
In both instances (Cold War and today), the relationship between hybrid warfare, political warfare, etc., is viewed in terms of (1) one party being on the advance ("them" then; "us" now) and (2) the other party ("us" then; "them" now) adopting the very smart "countering" grand strategy of "containment" and "roll back."
Made perfect sense when "we" adopted "containment" and "roll back" as our grand strategy during the Cold War. And, given our amazing success back then,
Makes perfect when "they" adopt such a "countering" grand strategy -- and related practices (think hybrid warfare, political warfare, etc.) -- today?
Bill C--you have to love those that write articles and how they jump into the "hybrid fight" to prove just about everything and anything.
The Russian non linear warfare (the means") we are currently seeing daily in the Ukraine is a structured doctrinal approach to Russian "political warfare" which is their defined "end state".
I would honestly argue we had absolutely no idea what we were doing in central and South American during the time period of the article and that all actions were usually carried out by the intel community in an ad hoc fashion with no thought to malice and or expected outcomes.
Has far as history from that period will show us some day--there was no US hybrid doctrinal concept being used and or followed--thus in some ways we are still recovering from the failures of that so called "American hybrid warfare" that the author is talking about.
what the author fails to make the connection on---did our actions in his so called US version of "hybrid warfare" pave the way for the transnational drug gangs in the same countries we supposedly "won in"?
It really is interesting that when authors write now about hybrid warfare one can make it fit virtually anything at anytime, anywhere.
BUT it is not the same as the Russian doctrinal non linear warfare and certainly not "political warfare" in the Russian sense of the word.
Everyone might enjoy this related (April 7th) "War-On-The-Rocks" article also:
http://warontherocks.com/2015/04/america-did-hybrid-warfare-too/
Excerpt:
"The last time Russia and the United States grappled indirectly as adversaries in 'the gray areas' during the final phase of the Cold War, it was the United States that put a hybrid 'blend of military, economic, diplomatic, criminal, and informational means' to effective use, notably in Central America. Of course, there were important differences between the character of that confrontation and today, but much about the goals and the means were comparable, only it was the United States that seemed to 'have it down.'" ...
"The purpose of all this? Defending America from hostile foreign interference — the Monroe Doctrine. But it was also a “forward strategy for freedom,” as Secretary of State George Shultz called it, which above all served to demonstrate that America had revitalized its will to oppose the Soviet Union in the Cold War. Whether or not hybrid war as employed in Central America was a good thing or bad is a matter of political judgement. It associated the United States with unsavory allies and terrible human rights violations, while the misguided evasion of Congressional restrictions on covert action led to the Iran-Contra scandal that nearly wrecked the Reagan administration. Certainly the consequences of protracted war were very costly to the people of the region, even if they could be said to have benefited from the advent of democracy. Objectively, the United States did achieve its stated aims, specifically containing the spread of leftist revolution elsewhere in Central America and reversing it in Nicaragua; lasting peace coincided with the end of the Cold War itself, but it cannot be said that the wars in Central America made any contribution to that outcome." ...
"Employed as part of a broader strategy, what hybrid warfare did was allow the United States to carry out open-ended competition and signal certain confidence that the value of protecting the U.S. sphere of interest was greater than any opponent’s interest in upsetting it."
Today, the shoe simply being on the other foot?
As per my role-reversal (Cold War v. today) thesis?
Bill C--referencing the Putin "end state" he is attempting to achieve with the Ukrainian smokescreen using the "means" to achieve this political warfare he has unleashed in order to achieve his three stated geo political goals that have been out there since 2002.
Illarionov also claims, that Putin wants grand Yalta-style bargain for spheres of influence. http://zn.ua/WORLD/putin-stremitsya-sklonit-obamu-k-raspredeleniyu-sfer-... …
NOW what is important and this goes to the Russian language---the English translation is "sphere of influence" as the closest thing---BUT in Russian it could also be translated "area of privileged control".
A super fine difference in the use of the same terms.
Illarionov states an interesting concept that is in fact Putins’ true “end state” and he is using the smoke screen of non linear warfare in the Ukraine to drive that concept forward achieving his three stated geo political goals; 1) discrediting and damaging the EU, 2) discrediting and damaging NATO and 3) disconnecting the US from Europe and actually thus replacing the US as the single superpower in Europe.
These three goals coupled with this idea of a “area of privileged control” will allow Russia as the single European superpower hegemonial control over all of Europe.
Buried in these tweets today from the Russian FM is in fact that Trojan Horse called “area of privileged control” but packaged nicely and not in those exact terms.
Buried within those tweets as well with the Trojan Horse that is the implied the three geo political goals expressed above "just worded a tad differently".
This so called project from the “Atlantic to the Pacific” has been mentioned many times over by both Putin and his FM since 2004 and it is a total Trojan Horse---why if one takes them at face value—who then if the EU and the newly renamed EEU now EAEU—notice just how easy it would be to melt the two names---will be the dominant military power and dominant economic power once oil and gas prices rise again which they will especially if the single remaining in Europe superpower is at the same time a nuclear power willing to use it as he has expressed himself a number of times against NATO and the US??
What government in this concept will be the superpower thus having de facto hegemonial status over the entire concept and what superpower will be frozen out of the concept—the US.
Why is this project being repeated almost now monthly out of Russia—the deep fear that the EU and the US will in fact launch TTIP their joint new economic union thus shutting the door to Russia and the other members of the EAEU.
When dealing with Russia the Obama Administration made a serious miscalculation assuming one “had to judge Russia on it’s actions not it’s words”---the correct way should have been “let’s fully understand" what Putin is expressing as his defined “end state” then let’s see his “means” and then define the counter “means” to block the achievement of his geo political goals.
All we have is currently silence out of the US.
Read all the Russian FM tweets and read the single words and then review the words concerning the three geo political goals and see how Russia is packaging the concept and now one can fully understand the Ukrainian smokescreen using the Russian "means" non linear warfare.
It has been there since 2002 we just did not understand the "words".
MFA Russia ✔ @mfa_russia
#Lavrov: The Minsk Declaration confirms that leaders of #France, #Germany, #Russia and #Ukraine support contacts between #EU and #EAEU
MFA Russia ✔ @mfa_russia
#Lavrov: Unfortunately, so far Brussels has been reluctant to implement the stated objectives in response to our proposals
MFA Russia ✔ @mfa_russia
#Lavrov: #EU countries should be guided by national interests when choosing economic and political priorities, not farfetched principles
MFA Russia ✔ @mfa_russia
#Lavrov: Putin offered to start dialogue on a free trade zone between #EU and the Customs Union (now #EAEU). The proposal is on the table
MFA Russia ✔ @mfa_russia
#Lavrov: In a highly competitive world, joining efforts in #Europe and #Eurasia, including in the economy, will serve everyone’s interests
MFA Russia ✔ @mfa_russia
#Lavrov: Creating a single space suits both #Russia’s and #EU’s interests
MFA Russia ✔ @mfa_russia
#Lavrov: I’m confident that once the dialogue begins the needed solutions will be found and regional powers will be free from false choices
MFA Russia ✔ @mfa_russia
#Lavrov: The President has proposed to launch dialogue on a single economic and humanitarian space from the #Atlantic to the #Pacific
MFA Russia ✔ @mfa_russia
#Lavrov: Brussels bureaucrats’ attitude doesn’t change, which is lamentable, since #EU leaders once supported Putin’s long-time initiative
MFA Russia ✔ @mfa_russia
#Lavrov: We must join efforts, including within the #EAEU, to overcome the “with us or against us” mentality in relations with #Europe
The Russians have done a fantastic job of influencing the West's so called higher education institutions. It is hard to grasp how anyone could even buy into some of the myths that Russia's and China's aggression are tied to U.S. expansionism. Would Russia and China rest quietly behind their borders if the U.S. disappeared from the world tomorrow?
Bill C--going to the concept that it was US actions that trigger Russia--in the links below you will see articles on the current Russian ideology that in 99% of the time is currently driving Putin--has nothing to do with the West. To argue it is the cause of Western actions flies in the face of actual on the ground reality.
The other link tends to confirm what I have been saying here--there is an economic element we are overlooked--namely Russia is fighting to maintain it's military industrial complex dependency on the Ukraine which is urgently needed as part of their ongoing Force modernization that needs to be finished by 2020. When the Crimea started Russia boasted they could get along without the Ukrainian military products BUT then in about June/July 2014 admitted it would take 6-9 years to rebuild some of the Ukrainian capacity in Russia to fully replace the Ukrainian military products Russia needed.
There had been previous reporting which I posted on the Ukraine War thread indicating 20 trucks here or 40 trucks there, but this figure of 27% and it is increasing basically confirms my theory on the military industrial complex issue.
Russian troops and her mercenaries have stripped 27% of all factories in the occupied zone and shpped them back to Russia.
27% der Industrieanlagen aus #Donezk & #Luhansk wurden demontiert und nach #Russland exportiert, sagt @rbc_ukraine: http://www.rbc.ua/rus/news/tret-promyshlennogo-potentsiala-donbassa-142…
"Russian history has shown that the dominant version of patriotism can lead to the collapse of the state"
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/kremlin-doesn-t-have-mono…
As Russia takes pride in its victory over National Socialism,it moves toward fascism itself" pic.twitter.com/u4wypzaMvl
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/russians-have-selective-m…
Putin’s Five-Year Plan for Promoting Patriotism More Militaristic than Soviet Ones Were http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/04/putins
Part I:
Bill M said:
"I think you err when you describe Russia's, China's, Iran's, and other countries expansionist efforts as directed at the U.S."
I have not, I believe, described Russia's, China's, Iran's and other countries expansionist efforts (directed at the U.S. or otherwise).
Rather, what I have tried to describe is:
a. Western expansionist efforts post-the Cold War and
b. Russia's, China's, Iran's, etc., "reactions" thereto; which I suggest is best understood within the context of a common "containment/rollback" grand strategy.
Thus, suggesting that Russia's, China's, Iran's, etc., grand strategy today is (1) similar to that which we used against the Soviets/the communists during the Cold War and (2) for similar reasons (to wit: to thwart the expansionist efforts of one's enemy).
Herein asking whether, accordingly, we might wish to view:
a. Our opponents' use of hybrid warfare, political warfare, etc., today
b. Much as with our use of these such practices during the Cold War,
c. From the perspective of a common "containment/rollback" grand strategy.
Part II:
Continuing on now to Haass and the idea of "nonpolarity," with (1) various less and more-powerful entities (2) all competing for influence on the world stage.
This seems to be a largely unacknowledged and unaccepted concept, but for the sake of argument, let's run with it.
So: Even if we accept that non-polarity is, indeed, the new national security paradigm, then does this negate the idea that:
a. Such entities as China, Russia, Iran, etc., today
b. In order to thwart the expansionist designs of their common enemy (the United States/the West), might:
c. Adopt the grand strategy of "containment/rollback" -- which was used so successfully by the U.S./the West during the Cold War? And
d. Utilize therein (much as we did during the Cold War) such practices as "political warfare," "hybrid warfare," "information warfare," "unconventional warfare," etc.?
The answer here would seem to be "No." The concept of "nonpolarity" does not seem to negate the logic of a grand strategy of "containment/rollback" against one's expansionist enemy -- nor does it (nonpolarity) seem to negate the logic of using such practices as "hybrid warfare," "political warfare," etc., within such a grand strategy.
Part III:
Finally, as to the two questions that you put to me:
1. "Would I prefer to see an international order as defined and enforced by Russia and/or China, or would I prefer to see an international order guided by U.S. leadership? And
2. "What do I think the masses around the world think?
I, of course, would prefer to see an international order that was guided by (enlightened) U.S. leadership.
As to what "the masses of the world" might prefer, this would seem to be an open question.
Re: "the masses of the world" -- and as was the case during the Cold War -- I believe much will depend on which entity (the West or the Rest) is:
a. Viewed as seeking to undermine, eliminate and radically replace the way of life, way of governance and related values, attitudes and beliefs of other people. And, which entity is
b. Viewed as being the one that will come to the rescue of populations, nations and cultures undergoing such an assault.
During the Cold War:
(1) The Soviet Union/the communists, I believe, were viewed in the negative light of my item "a" immediately above. And, during the Cold War,
(2) The U.S./the West, I believe, was viewed in the more positive light of my item "b."
My concern is that, today, the reverse may be true with:
(a) The U.S./the West -- due to its expansionist designs -- being seen in the negative light offered by my item "a" above. And
(2) The Rest (the Russians, the Chinese, the Iranians, etc.) being seen -- by "the masses of the world" -- in the more favorable light of my item "b."
Bill C.
I think you err when you describe Russia's, China's, Iran's, and other countries expansionist efforts as directed at the U.S. That is only part of the equation, they also make strategic decisions regarding their interests that do not directly involve the U.S., though in some respect to globalization and greater interconnectedness we are probably connected (like other actors) to some degree. China's maritime claims in the East China Sea and South China Sea are not directly related to U.S. expansionism. In fact, there is a good chance they opted to do this since we downsized our force structure in East Asia considerably after 9/11. An effective deterrence posture was removed. A similar argument can be proposed regarding the downsizing of U.S. forces in Western Europe and the failure of NATO countries to invest in their military. Iran and Saudi have sought to expand their influence for decades using similar methods where they leverage their religion, oil money, and state support for terrorism. If you're looking for a common thread or reason why they want to limit U.S. influence, then you need look no further than our push to enforce/push human rights globally. If that makes us the bad guy in your view, I'll gladly where the black hat. Human rights is an existential threat to all the regimes I just mentioned.
As for nonpolarity, I describe it as an international order where there are many state and non-state power centers that have sufficient influence to shape the international order. It implies that nation-states increasingly share power with non-state actors like supranational organizations such as the UN and EU; subnational entities such as insurgencies, militias, tribes, and civil society organizations; and transnational non-state actors such as terrorist and criminal networks, NGOs, and multination corporations. I would add that within this mix, the state-based system will continue to exist among other parallel systems of power, and the state-based system is increasingly multipolar. Why? Conventional military and economic power no longer serves as the only source of power in today's world.
You may have access to a library that carries old copies of Foreign Affairs. If you do, Richard Haass wrote an article titled, "The Age of Nonpolarity" in the May/June 2008 issue.
Bottom line, states and other actors are still competing on the global stage for influence and relative advantage over others. Now I'll ask you a question. Would you prefer to see an international order as defined and enforced by Russia and/or China, or would prefer an international order guided by U.S. leadership? What do you think the masses around the world think?
Bill M. said:
"You can't compare U.S. expansionism with Russia's."
I do not believe that this is what I have tried to do.
Rather, my effort has been to try to compare:
a. U.S./Western expansionism today with
b. Soviet/communist expansionism during the Cold War.
In both instances, the entities concerned (the U.S. today; the Soviets then) seeking to achieve greater power, influence and control -- throughout the world -- via the aggressive promotion of their unique (but very different) ways of life and ways of governance, their unique (but very different) agencies and institutions, and their unique (and very different) values, attitudes and beliefs.
Likewise, and correspondingly, my effort has been to try to compare:
a. The grand strategy of the U.S./the West back then ("containment/rollback") with
b. What appears to be a similar grand strategy being pursued today by such entities as Russia, China and various parties within the greater Middle East.
In both instances (Cold War and today) these "containment/roll back" grand strategies are designed to thwart the expansionist efforts of one's enemy.
Herein suggesting that "hybrid warfare," "political warfare," etc., today, might be viewed -- as it was yesterday (see my "War on the Rocks" link/article above) -- within the context of this expansionist entity versus containment entity light.
Question/thought:
a. If "containment and roll back" -- and such associated practices as "hybrid warfare" and "political warfare" -- worked so well for the United States/the West during the Cold War and re: the thwarting of Soviet/communist expansionist designs.
b. Why would such nations as China, Russia and entities within the Middle East today -- faced with U.S./Western aggressive expansionist efforts -- NOT adopt "containment/roll back" as their defensive grand strategy?
As to my suggestion that greater evidence is needed to support your and Outlaw's differing contention, I think more effort must be made here to support the idea that the context within which such things as "hybrid warfare" and "political warfare" occur today is as you suggest, to wit: (1) a new non-polar world wherein (2) multiple actors compete for influence.
This argument seems weak, for example, for the very reasons your provide -- to wit: the fact that "Russia has no version of soft power."
This, combined with the knowledge that Russia, China, etc., (compared to the U.S./the West) also lacks similar "hard power;" this suggest that the answer that we are looking for is to be found elsewhere.
Therefore, and for the time being, I will stick to my alternative theory of "containment/rollback" -- to explain the grand strategy and related actions (hybrid warfare; political warfare) of Russia, China, entities within the Middle East and others.
Bill C.
A lot of nations are expansionist, very few attempt to expand their influence like Russia. Putin is a joke, the only way he can expand his influence is through aggression. Russia has no version of soft power, because people around the world would reject it. He can buy off corrupt national leaders in Latin America and elsewhere that welcome Russian support to stay in power.
You can't compare U.S. expansionism with Russia's. The U.S. is far from perfect, so I'm not flag waving, but pointing out the fact that the way we do business and the way Russia does business differs considerably.
Please clarify what you want more evidence on regarding this comment?
" can see your (and Outlaw's?) argument and your point here (at Contention # 2) -- although these seem to require much more evidence/justification."
Bill C--this is where I remained a somewhat old style believer in the concept that there was never a unipolar world--that is what the US mainstream media wanted us to believe--to me as long as one has nuclear weapons and even with a somewhat weak economy one is still a superpower. Even if in name only.
The belief that swept through the US after 9-11 that we were the world´s Lone Rnager is what is getting us today in trouble--just as with the Russians we believed our own propaganda. When a superpower starts believing it´s own story is when it starts getting into trouble.
The world in general works alot better with mutliple players which allows for alliances to come and go without to much of a thorough distrubence and the rest feeling threatened.
But aside-- Russia is acting out a long hedged concept that has nothing to do with the superpower argument--it truly dislikes the neo liberal form of democracy that the US and Euope represents and feels that it is the root cause of everything that is screwed up in the world since Bosnia and the breakup of Yugoslavia.
AND Russia has in fact found the weak spot in neo liberal democracy that can in fact destroy it via it´s own democracy--think about a single point of failure within any Western democracy---"popularism".
Why do you think that Putin sides up to anything and or anyone in the US and or Europe that smacks of being nationalist and or ultra right as well as his traditionists the left?
Both inherently share the same feelings towards neo liberal deomcracy and it´s related economic system.
Bill M's own words:
"Your definition (of "expansion") helps scope the debate, and now in fact there is no debate that we're expansionist. I don't agree it is a role reversal, because we starting pushing for global influence (beyond Latin America) toward the end of WWII. When the USSR collapsed, we transitioned to a unipolar world where we were the only superpower. I would argue that we're transitioning to a nonpolar world, where multiple actors compete for influence. For one, I'm not opposed to the U.S. seeking to expand its influence. I think it makes perfect strategic sense. We can disagree with how we do it, and what we try to push with our agenda, because in fact those do create unnecessary tensions in some cases. However, you seem to support/justify Russia's actions in Ukraine. On this point, we disagree, and if we don't seek to deter Russia they'll only continue to act out and disrupt the fragile peace that exists in Europe."
So let me see if I understand you correctly.
Your Contention # 1:
While you:
a. Acknowledge that the United States is indeed expansionist (in the sense that we seek to expand our influence -- in multiple ways -- worldwide).
b. Believe that this "makes perfect strategic sense." And
c. Acknowledge that these such actions "do create unnecessary tensions in some cases."
d. You do not think that this is the case with and thus explains:
(1) Russian (and other?) actions/aggression today and
(2) Such things as these folks use of "hybrid warfare."
Your Contention # 2:
Rather, in today's Russian (and other?) cases, you suggest it is better to see and understand these things more from the standpoint of (as you note above):
a. A new "non-polar world," wherein,
b. "Multiple actors compete for influence."
I can see your (and Outlaw's?) argument and your point here (at Contention # 2) -- although these seem to require much more evidence/justification.
For the rest of us, however, the cause-and-effect relationship that you acknowledge, explain and address at Contention # 1 above (1) makes more sense and, thus, (2) explains these matters more easily and more correctly.
Thus, neither of us, re: this debate, are acting as "conspiracy theorists."
This, because your Contention # 1, and your Contention # 2, both appear to be possible and plausible explanations for what we see going on in the world today.
Agree?
The belief that the U.S. caused this with some people has taken on the power of religious faith. The America caused this, America is wrong crowd, sees a conspiracy in every story.
Your following statement is so true, but it doesn't matter. It is like showing evidence of evolution to a devout southern Baptist.
"We really do need to get out of the realm of saying the West caused this thus Russia did that and vice versa and get back to exactly understanding what are Putin's "end states" and how he gets there using non linear warfare is political warfare as his "means"."
Bill C---one needs to go back and really research the development of "Russian fascism" and you will notice it is a rather old concept dating back into the late 1880s early 1900s.
Even the political term "anarchists" came to the US via the Czarist days.
This current form of "Russian fascism" is not a reaction to and or against anything the West has been perceived to have done to Russia but resides inside the Russian culture, language, history and her own internal politics of the Czar, Lenin, Stalin, the inherent internal contradictions of Communism, and the Cold War coupled with a really healthy dose of living within a propaganda world for over 70 plus years--AND let us not forget the Russian Orthodox Church.
I have made a few times here the comment that one of the "end states" Putin is looking for is in fact a "new Yalta" where the world is divided up between the superpowers and each has it's own "sphere of influence"--Putin has mentioned that a number of times since 1999.
This achieves for Putin a number of things--1) it accepts Russia as a superpower and 2) it gives him what he "feels" he is entitled to based on the Czarist Empire and the old Soviet Union--a "Russian Empire in the 21st century." AND it makes his "legacy within that Empire a lasting thing".
What is interesting in his comments about the "new Yalta" he deliberately ignores defining what nations he feels should be in "his sphere".
This comment came out of the Atlantic Council Conference yesterday with a major critic of Putin who was at one time a close advisor to him and who still resides in Moscow.
Illarionov also claims, that Putin wants grand Yalta-style bargain for spheres of influence. http://zn.ua/WORLD/putin-stremitsya-sklonit-obamu-k-raspredeleniyu-sfer… …
NOW what is important and this goes to the Russian language---the English translation is "sphere of influence" as the closest thing---BUT in Russian it could also be translated "area of privileged control".
A super fine difference in the use of the same terms.
We really do need to get out of the realm of saying the West caused this thus Russia did that and vice versa and get back to exactly understanding what are Putin's "end states" and how he gets there using non linear warfare ie political warfare as his "means".
If we use the term "fascism" then we really need to nail down just how it was created and not forget that it sometimes springs up inside a civil society from a historical, cultural and language usage perspective and not from someone's direct and or indirect actions--that is a to easy argument.
Bill C--the author of this article we are discussing had an important point---"non linear and or our term hybrid warfare" is just the means--we need to thoroughly understand the Russian or in this case and specifically Putin's mindset "his end state or goals" where he is using the "means to achieve".
Yesterday at the Atlantic Council one of his former close advisors who is now one of his bitterest critics and who resides still inside Russian made some statements that would "enlighten" us greatly if we would only pay attention to them.
It has more to do with our neo liberalism democratic form of government and economy than the "myths" spread by a well run disinformation campaign.
When we analyze a country we often forget to analyze the use of their language as an indications and warnings system--this comment below clearly depicts Putin's mental shift to viewing the Ukraine as a "none country" and that it should not even exist starting within a specific time frame in 2004 long before the Orange revolts and the Maidan in 2014.
When a preposition is predetermination – Putin began his attack on Ukrainian statehood in 2004
Andrey Illarionov
2015/04/08 • Analysis & Opinion, Russia
Vladimir Putin stopped using the preposition “v” or “in” Ukraine in 2004, reverting to the older form “na” or “on,” in official government documents, an indication that the Kremlin leader did not view Ukraine as a country but rather as a Russian borderland, according to Andrey Illarionov.
From the time he became president in 2000 through March 2004, Putin used the preposition “v” exclusively in official documents he signed, but beginning on April 5, 2004, he shifted to “na” and since Putin returned for his third term, such documents have used “na” exclusively.
In his own speeches, commentaries and responses to questions, Illarionov points out, Putin has gone from using “v” in 87.5 percent of the cases in 2002 to 70 percent in 2007 to 15.4 percent in 2012 to 8.2 percent last year, thus ever more often replacing it with the “na” and thus showing his lack of respect for Ukraine’s status as a state.
Since April 5, 2004, 99.4 percent of the official documents Putin has signed which refer to Ukraine have used “v” rather than “na.” Most of these 11 exceptions reflect either statements about the past or about the work of specific Russian officials of various kinds in Ukraine, he says.
“The last time the grammatical form ‘v Ukraine’ was used in official documents of the Kremlin was about five years ago on July 1, 2010,” concerning the presentation of an award to the head of ITAR-TASS in Ukraine. And that order was signed by then-President Dmitry Medvedev.
This refers to a chart in the article:
The use of "v" (blue) and "na" (red) prepositions with the word "Ukraine" in official documents signed by the President of Russia in the period 2000-2014 (Source: Kremlin.ru)
The use of “v” (blue) and “na” (red) prepositions with the word “Ukraine” in official documents signed by the President of Russia in the period 2000-2014 (Source: Kremlin.ru)
Since that time, “v” has not been used in the official documents of the Russian president and his administration even once. “In 2011-2015, 100 percent of the cases have used the form “na Ukraine,” Illarionov reports.
This allows one to conclude, the Russian analyst says, that the decision to shift from “v” to “na” was taken “in the period between March 1 and April 5, 2004” – quite possibly immediately after Putin’s winning a second term as president and thus an indication of his intentions toward Kyiv at that time.
Certainly by April 16, 2004, Putin had made a decision to shift gears with regard to Ukraine. On that date, Illarionov recalls, Putin told the Ukrainian President Viktor Medvedchuk, “You know our position.” Working with Ukraine is “the top priority and the most important for us.”
“But however that was, the beginning of linguistic aggression by denying the statehood of Ukraine by the Russian authorities begins in March-April 2004,” Illarionov says. That was before the beginning of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in that year and long before July 2013 when Putin began his hybrid war against Ukraine.
“In other words,” Illarionov concludes, “the decision about the denial of the statehood of Ukraine was not provoked by any real actions of Ukrainians, be they from the Ukrainian authorities or Ukrainian society. This decision was taken by Putin personally, independent of the situation in Ukraine and as a result of his own ideas and in correspondence with his own plans.”
Outlaw, Bill M., et al:
1. If the decision to expand NATO happens in the 1990s, then why do we find it surprising that Russia begins prepping for the Ukrainian war about that time/soon thereafter? Not surprising to me.
2. Outlaw tells us that Russia is going fascist. Why do we find that surprising? Germany went fascist after World War I and due to Versailles. As John Maynard Keynes noted at the time, the central failure of Versailles lay in the fatal miscalculation of how to deal with a demoralized former adversary. That miscalculation cost the West much in the 20th Century. And the similar miscalculation in 1990s -- re: Russia and expanding NATO -- may well cost the West much in the 21st Century.
3. Thus:
a. Much as it would seem not be "hubris" to associate Versailles with Germany going fascist.
b. Likewise it would not seem to be "hubris" to associate NATO expansion with Russian reactions thereto.
In fact, and re: contemporary discussions of hybrid warfare, etc., the best way to understand -- not only Russian, but also Chinese and Middle Eastern "reactions" today -- is via:
a. Western determination to advance (as Bill M. notes) its "values and institutions" and
b. Other states and societies reaction to this such assault.
Herein, much as with Versailles and World War II, likewise today, there would seem to be a price that must be paid for one's foreign policy decision.
For more on the Versailles/NATO expansion comparison, see the following:
"Another participant in the 1990s debate was Rodric Braithwaite, Britain’s former ambassador to Moscow. His Prospect essay from 1997 asked which path is better for victors after a war: the models of 1815, when a defeated France was brought into the “concert of Europe,” and 1945, when Germany, or much of it, was integrated into the Western system; or Versailles, where after World War I a defeated Germany was humiliated and made to pay. It is clear that the first George Bush, in the early 1990s, was thinking along 1815 and 1945 lines. But incrementally his policy was reversed by his successors, first by the Clinton-Albright duo, and then by his son, and now by Obama, the latter prodded by his belligerent assistant secretary of state Victoria Nuland."
http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/natos-wrong-turn/
These are a few of the live comments today from a former Putin advisor who has become his most serious critic not residing in Russia.
So all the initial "myths" feed to the West --humiliation, NATO expansion, wanting to stop Russia were evidently all falsehoods to cover they true intentions starting in 2000.
Notice the first comment on the length of time it took for the prepping for the Ukrainian war.
AtlanticCouncil ✔ @AtlanticCouncil
.@AnIllarionov: preparation for the Russia-Ukraine war took 11 years, with some aspects of prep up to 14 years
AtlanticCouncil ✔ @AtlanticCouncil
In 2000, it was Georgia. In 2010, it was Kyrgyzstan. The hybrid war in Ukraine began many years ago. -- @AnIllarionov
AtlanticCouncil ✔ @AtlanticCouncil
.@AnIllarionov on Russia-Ukraine war: Essentially the main target is the West, rather than just war against Ukraine.
AtlanticCouncil ✔ @AtlanticCouncil
.@AnIllarionov on why Russia-Ukraine war is worse than 'old Cold War': US reluctant to act, Europe not united, nuclear blackmail
Eurasia Center @ACEurasia
Russia started stockpiling gold in the mid-2000s in preparation for the war in #Ukraine
AtlanticCouncil ✔ @AtlanticCouncil
.@AnIllarionov explains the many facets of the Kremlin's hybrid propaganda & aggression in Ukraine which began as early as 2004
Eurasia Center @ACEurasia
#Kremlin changed official documents to refer to Ukraine as a territory rather than a country in 2004 @AnIllarionov http://www.echo.msk.ru/blog/aillar/1525824-echo/ …
The separatist war was planned in #russia by the #Kremlin starting in 2004 http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/events/upcoming-events/detail/how-putin-… …
Eurasia Center @ACEurasia
#Russia started military preparations for the war in Ukraine in 2008 days @AnIllarionov #ACUkraine
AtlanticCouncil ✔ @AtlanticCouncil
'Kremlin's alarm' was Merkel removing obstacles for Ukraine's association with EU in June 2013 -- @AnIllarionov
I have commented here a number of times that the Russian "end state" has three geo political goals that their non linear warfare and remember non linear warfare does not exclude the financial and political side of "political warfare".
One of those goals has been the discrediting of the EU as an economical and political bloc using what Putin clearly dislikes--neo liberal economics.
Kwasniewski: Russia’s policy aims to break up EU
http://www.unian.info/politics/1064001-kwasniewski-russias-policy-aims-… … pic.twitter.com/X6x98oZFqJ
"Russia earlier conducted not one European policy, but ‘28+1’: The 28 – these are bilateral relations with the EU member states, and the one policy was the most unimportant – it was with Brussels," he said.
According to Kwasniewski, the European Union and the leaders of European countries should make every effort "so that this does not work."
"This Russian policy in relation to the European Union can be explained by the fact that Russian President Vladimir Putin believes that the EU is an artificial structure, that it will not stand, and that he has to work with different EU member states in order to split the EU, just as the Soviet Union was split before," Kwasniewski said.
AND if one really thinks through the Russian aims inside the Ukraine there is an inherent "financial and business side" we do not talk much about as we in the US would not believe one would go to war over it.
I have made the comment here to the effect that Russia might in fact be fighting the 21st centuries' "first raw resources and globalization effects war".
Really read the link on the dependence of Russia on the Ukraine and notice that Rostec their leading defense industrial complex is laying off 40K.
http://ukraineatwar.blogspot.nl/2015/02/russia-needs-ukraine-to-fulfill…
Russian Defense Industry's Rostec to Lay Off 40,000 Managers
http://www.interpretermag.com/russia-update-april-6-2015/#7805 …