SOF Support to Political Warfare

Let me suggest that we address the issue of political warfare (and special operations force support to same) in another way -- but in a way that will be all but too familiar to us old farts, to wit:

As a new Cold War.

In this context (a cold war), does not political warfare -- and special operations force support to same -- :

a. Make the most perfect sense? And is it not, thus,

b. Made much easier to both "do" and understand?

In this regard to consider, for example, this definition of political warfare:

"Political warfare utilizes all instruments short of war available to a nation to achieve its national objectives."

Sound like, to you, what goes on during a "cold war?"

If not, then consider this definition of a "cold war:"

"A state of political hostility between countries characterized by threats, propaganda, and other measures short of open warfare."

http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/cold-w…

Thus: Political warfare = what goes on during a cold war?

So, and as per my suggestions below, after 25 years of exposure to both our soft and our hard power (as wielded by Presidents Bush Sr, Clinton, Bush Jr and Obama), a new "cold war" -- and old cold war (plus) adversaries -- is what we have to show for our quarter-century effort and example?

Given this new "cold war" result (as confirmed by "their" and "our" return to political warfare), this does not seem to say much for either our (a) post-Cold War soft power attributes or our (b) post-Cold War hard power efforts.

(In this stark context, one might say that reality -- and the bucket of cold water thus received -- sucks.)

So I find myself in a peculiar state since reading this White Paper. On the one hand I have a hard time disagreeing that there is plenty of conflict to be had between Paradise and force-on-force battle to the death, much of which would involve alliances, influence, sabotage, etc. On the other hand, I find the idea of "Political Warfare" as constructed somewhat repulsive, especially in modern usage. How simplistic does a mind have to be that in order to impress upon it the burdens of political competition everything that is not idyllic paradise is to be called warfare?

Calling all inter-state conflict "warfare" is akin to calling any interpersonal disagreement a fight. It adds nothing to understanding the conflict space, and clouds everything with the adversarial, no holds barred, everyone-not-me-is-my-enemy type of cynicism.

At first I thought perhaps it's just an unfortunate term. But as I read through the white paper, its logic became apparent and even more disagreeable. As it went through the future environment - the unrestricted warfare of the Chinese, the asymmetric warfare of the Iranians, etc.- the concept started to borrow the terminology of our adversaries. "Political Warfare" then becomes our version of "Unrestricted Warfare". Which brings me to this question: if war is unrestricted competition for power, does that mean every state at all times in history is in a state of war? If that is the case, then we should accept that there are no limits beyond Sovereign interest, international law is only relevant to the extent that it is useful, and all states, be they allies or whatever are adversaries.

I don't necessarily have any problem with this philosophical stance, but we have to be honest with ourselves about it, because that is the logical conclusion of "Political Warfare". And that means our allies have everything to fear from us if they take us at our word (as they should be). Making a term of art out of it where it applies to this but not that, and it doesn't really mean the same as real warfare, etc, is pointless and silly.

Final note on the definition of Political Warfare from the paper:
"Political Warfare requires “co-operation of the [armed]services, aggressive diplomacy, economic warfare and the subversive field-agencies, in the promotion of such policies, measures or actions needed to break or build morale.” Finally,Political Warfare “must be geared to strategy.”1"
I can't tell a difference between that and war. Honest to goodness can't. If it needs to be explained then it isn't a definition. The definition should make this distinction apparent.

Again...I am on board with the ideas behind "Political Warfare", but latching onto terminology developed by the Brits a century ago because it mimics our adversaries' discourse, and just plain sounds cool, is an intellectual cop-out.

COL Maxwell said:

"From our perspective today, the great twentieth-century struggle against communism appears quite different from the current condition. During the Cold War, “winning” was defined as a broad approach to limit, diminish or defeat Communism. No comparable definition of “winning” exists today, as the U.S. struggles to integrate responses to crises as diverse as Ukraine, ISIL, Iranian nuclearization, African Islamist militancy, and even Ebola into a coherent strategy."

Let me suggest that there is, indeed -- if not a comparable -- then certainly a well-known definition of "winning" today.

And let me do this by addressing what our foreign policy and national security people seem to say these diverse crises -- that COL Maxwell describes above (the Ukraine, ISIL, Iran going nuclear, African Islamist militancy, Ebola) -- have in common.

This being: That all these problem/crises occur in -- and/or emanate from -- states and societies that are not, or have not as yet been, sufficiently organized, ordered and oriented along modern western political, economic and social lines.

(Note here that, in fact, NONE of these such problems occur in, emanate from or exist in the modern Western world? Thus, they exist only outside the modern Western world? Agree?)

Thus, to suggest that, should the rest of the world, much like the modern Western world, come to be organized, ordered and oriented more along modern Western political, economic and social lines, then -- at such a time -- it is believed that these such diverse problems and crises, as COL Maxwell describes above, would cease to exist.

Make sense?

Seen in this specific light, then a clear and understandable definition of "winning" today does appear to exist.

This being: The successful transformation of outlying states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines.

This to be achieved via a very different "broad approach" than "containment;" but via project(s) of similar size, scope and effort.

In this regard, should we say that such things as political warfare, unconventional warfare, etc., -- and special operations force support to same --

a. As in the Cold War (and re: "containment"),

b. Likewise have usefulness and utility today (and re: favorable outlying state and societal transformation)?

(More on this tomorrow.)

(Edited somewhat and added to)

Regarding:

a. The context within which political warfare was waged during the Cold War and

b. The very different(?) context within which political warfare -- or no -- is contemplated today.

I commend to everyone the following document; which in its entirety is exceedingly interesting.

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/whitehouse/nsc68/nsc68.pdf

Specifically, I wish to point to the 1993 address to the National War College, contained therein, by Ambassador Paul Nitze (who essentially drafted NSC-68?). Herein, in this item's Part III: "Beyond Containment" (which begins at Page 131), Ambassador Nitze suggests, post-the Cold War:

a. Where the United States should be going strategically and

b. Where we should not go (this in consideration of, shall we say, our "historic inclinations").

In this regard, consider the following excerpt from Page 135 in the subsection entitled: "The Objectives of U.S. Leadership:"

"The lessons of the past era and the needs of the future argue that the fundamental U.S. foreign policy goal should be accommodating and protecting diversity within a general framework of world order. We should seek a global climate in which a large array of political groupings can exist, each with its own, perhaps eccentric, ways. We should seek to eliminate force and intimidation as acceptable means of resolving disputes between these groupings. To assure progress toward this set of goals we should seek to foster cooperative efforts among the diverse groupings necessary to a resolution of common problems. An emphasis on diversity provides certain guidelines for handling problems that are truly internal to individual nations. THE OVERRIDING PRINCIPLE MUST BE A RESPECT FOR SOVEREIGNTY: THERE SHOULD BE NO EFFORT TO IMPOSE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, OR SOCIAL PREFERENCES ON OTHERS. ... "

(The capitalizing of the words in the last sentence of this quote is done -- for emphasis -- by me.)

Colonel Maxwell, and Colonel Jones, especially, I believe -- and due to their emphasis on and significant beliefs in "self-determination" -- will appreciate these thoughts by Ambassador Nitze.

From my point of view, however, these thoughts point to the fact that the Ambassador Nitze knew well his opponents, to wit: those who would push, post-the Cold War, for a strategic outline that (a) did not respect sovereignty and (b) sought to impose our political, economic and social preferences on others.

Now to ask ourselves the critical question:

Within which of these two competing strategic outlines is our return to political warfare today being contemplated? And, therefore, SOF support thereto?

To help us come to a conclusion, let us ask a different but related question: Within which of these two competing strategic contexts might we best see and understand the way our enemies/opponents -- such as: Russia, China, and various entities within the greater Middle East -- (a) see our strategy and our related actions and (b) have reacted thereto? (The answer here is obvious.)

(Here is the new, added section to my comment here; which is based on some further research:)

With regard to the specific strategic approach that Ambassador Nitze suggested that we adopt, to wit: that of embracing political diversity, consider this thought from the ambassador in his earlier and related article entitled "America: An Honest Broker;" which is to be found in the Fall 1990 issue of Foreign Affairs Pages 1-15 (sorry, I do not have a link):

"The emphasis on diversity derives from one of the most important lessons of the past few years: the near impossibility of erasing cultural ties, ethnic identities and social practices in a world where communications and ideas cannot be suppressed. Despite the efforts by communist leaders for decades to impose a common culture and society on their subjects, a Europe with a rich mix of nationalities and cultures in once again reviving. A similar process is occurring on other continents as well."

Thus, and re: political, etc., diversity, to:

a. Stand in the way, adopt a West v. the Rest approach, swim upstream, get run over and pay the price; much as was the case with the communists in the second half of the 20th Century (Nitze's specific "lessons of the past era") or

b. Adapt and lead -- by embracing diversity.

Such a decision must be made, I suggest, before we can (a) adopt (IF NECESSARY!) a meaningful "political warfare" approach to our goals and (b) tailor (IF NECESSARY!) SOF support to such an effort.

(My enduring contention? The decision has been made -- and it ain't diversity -- thus, we have our marching orders and must comply accordingly.)

The West's retreat from political warfare, its preference for large-scale combined arms operations and "regime change" and its reliance on public diplomacy for "telling America’s story;" all this can be explained, I believe, within the context of our post-Cold War belief in such things as "universal values," the "end of history" and "everyone wants to be like (and join) the West."

Post-the Cold War, we came to believe that the United States/the West could achieve its historic political objective -- of "converting" one's adversary(ies) over to our way of life, our way of governance, etc. -- by simply (a) liberating the populations from their outdated and oppressive regimes and by (b) giving these liberated populations (who all wanted to be like us) a good "development" leg up.

The problem with this post-Cold War foundational idea was that we learned, the hard way, that once these diverse populations were liberated from their outdated and oppressive regimes, they wished to organize, order and orient themselves -- not as per Western interests -- but as re: their own diverse and conflicting ideas and goals.

It is because of this unexpected turn-of-events that our operations in such places as Afghanistan and Iraq (and now Syria and Libya?) became (or are now considered?) prohibitively costly and politically unsustainable.

And so it is for this exact same Cold War-like reason (then as now, we cannot count on either the rulers/regimes or the populations) that the United States/the West is now considering a return to political warfare.

To sum up:

Much as in the days of the Cold War, the United States/the West now understands -- as we did back then -- that in such hostile environments as these (not welcoming as we recently believed), the United States must employ "all the means necessary -- short of war -- to achieve our national objective" (to wit: the converting of one's adversary[ies] over to our way of life, our way of governance, etc.).

Why such drastic measures? Because it appears that both (1) these hostile rulers/regimes and (2) these hostile populations need further "convincing," "compelling and/or "softening up." This, if we are to expect to be able to achieve our political objective in a way other than (much too costly) war.

Bottom Line?

In discarding such things as "political warfare," post-the Cold War, we jumped the gun. Neither many rulers/regimes -- nor many populations as we believed -- are ready, as yet, to throw off their own individual aspirations, ways of life, values, attitudes and beliefs, etc., and -- in the place of these -- adopt modern Western ways.

It appears that much more time -- and much more effort -- is needed to "prepare the ground" (via such approaches as "political warfare") so that these such transitions may be achieved more-peacefully and, thus, with acceptable cost.

Double post

Read through this quickly last night. Found good points but also problems made clear by Outlaw’s CSIS video link posted in one of his comments below. In it Dr. Phillip Carver gave an hour-plus brief on the Ukrainian-Russian war based on his multiple travels there. What became clear is that this has morphed from political war to full scale conflict. He cited one of the most extraordinary mobilizations and movements by the Ukrainian Army in recent history, matched by equally impressive movements of Russian battalions from great distances.

In his brief he presented slides showing that Russia purposely moved some 52 battalion tactical groups with maneuver, artillery, and air defenses with primarily professional contract troops and volunteers. This allowed his conscripts to fill out the remaining two battalions in brigades left behind in other military districts farther east and south. What was transported ended up being his most elite troops and a quoted 970 tanks, 2571 IFVs/APCs, 1067 artillery tubes, 763 MLRS launchers, 126 attack helicopters, and 230 combat aircraft to Ukraine and its borders.

Thus, the idea that SOF alone could halt the Russian armor is pretty far-fetched at best. SOF working with Ukrainian armor might be more plausible but Karber cited that 85% of casualties to Ukrainians were due to Russian artillery and MLRS rockets with DPICM, scatterable mines, top attack munitions, and fuel-air explosives. Targeting coordinates were provided by unmanned aircraft with one instance cited where a Ukrainian commander warned that the sound and visibility of an unmanned aircraft meant they had about 10 minutes to move or be destroyed by artillery. It ended up taking 15 minutes but fortunately they moved in time, although no explanation was given as to why the “drone” did not follow their movement and retarget.

Dr. Karber also showed images of Russian armor parked next to individual homes and urban areas to preclude Ukrainian targeting with their own artillery. Those 13 “humanitarian relief” convoys of white trucks we saw repeatedly closely paralleled lulls in Russian fighting caused by lack of supplies followed by a resurgence in attacks after the convoys returned to Russia. He pointed out that the Ukrainian Army had inflicted 3-4 times as many casualties as the Russians. However, that was surprising since he also mentioned that Ukrainians lacked ATGMs with tandem warheads able to blast through reactive armor on Russian tanks. He said the ATGMs they did have only functioned about 1/3 of the time with many duds. The Russian winter offensive ended along a river bank. Karber mentioned that if crossed once the ground dries and rivers lower there would be few natural obstacles to the Russians to moving farther west.

Thus, our SOF could sneak and peak and politic all they like, attempting to train Ukrainians who appear to know what they are doing. Without NATO air support, however, and without the ATGMs, counterbattery radars, and air defenses to go with that “political warfare” UW, Russian armor would likely prevail. As Outlaw quoted below, Dr. Karber said “Ironically, the most successful Western sanction has been in preventing a friendly country from defending itself”---kind of like the Kurds in Iraq and Syria.

There was a quick rush through alarming slides (I paused it) and some discussion at the end about Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons. Dr. Karber mentioned entire Ukrainian battalions being wiped out in a matter of minutes in motor pools targeted presumably by Iskanders and MLRS with top attack munitions and fuel-air explosives. They showed images of burned out armor parked together in mass. True, SOF are smaller and harder to find targets, but are vulnerable with little armor. If teamed with Ukrainian armor they are more easily found. Plus, their coalition firepower alone is not likely to help Ukraine's military much unless their Army also has weapons able to battle Russian armor and artillery. He specifically cited Javelins and TOW 2s would have sufficed early in the conflict. Now, he said, something more mobile is required. He mentioned giving Ukrainians excess Bradleys which hardly seems politically likely under President Obama with European leader objections to boot.

That last point illustrates that while political warfare sounds great in theory, it depends on an administration’s willingness to take a chance using it and deploying more overt and covert support. Movement of one hundred pieces of U.S. armor and additional airpower back to Europe is one good signal to Putin that is clear and unambiguous. In contrast, UW alone would bring out the worst in Putin who already believes that Maiden revolts were prompted by covert U.S. action. If Putin’s paranoia has some basis in reality, who knows what he might do. However, Dr. Karber mentioned that despite sending his best troops to Ukraine, Russians have experienced numerous losses. He downplayed the ability of Russia to send conscript battalions away from the Chinese border and questioned their effectiveness in a major attack on NATO or west Ukraine if we did better arm the Ukrainian Army and other Baltic states.

In both peace and war, the United States seeks to transform other states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines.

In this regard, consider this from Henry Kissinger re: George Kennan and his "X" article:

"What conferred a dramatic quality on the X article was the way Kennan combined it with the historic American dream of the ultimate conversion of the adversary. Victory would come not on the battlefield nor even by diplomacy but by the implosion of the Soviet system."

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/13/books/review/george-f-kennan-an-ameri…

(Herein to suggest that -- for the United States -- there is, indeed, a very well-known "definition of winning;" one that transcends the Cold War.)

Thus, it is to achieve this well-known definition of "victory" and "winning" (to wit: "the ultimate conversion of the adversary") that, for the United States,

a. Political warfare must "get after" during times of peace. And

b. Military warfare must "get after" during times of war.

(Thus, to understand "the perpetual rhythm of [America's] struggle, in and out of war.”)

Question:

So what is it that a return to political warfare might tell us today?

Answer:

a. That the United States/the West has been unable to achieve the "historic American dream" of "the ultimate conversion of the adversary" via "soft power" alone.

("A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries – admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness – want to follow it." Joseph Nye.)

b. And that, accordingly, the United States/the West has had to return to the use of "hard power" (as exemplified by the return to both political and military warfare?) to achieve its outlying state and societal transformation/conversion goals.

A 1.24 hour long video from CSIS on the Lessons Learned out of the Russian hybrid warfare fighting in eastern Ukraine---in all aspects to include the latest weapons being used.

When released by CSIS this week---Russian trolls jumped all over it trying to minimize it.

Well worth the read and ties in nicely to the article.

#HybridWar in Ukraine: Lessons Learned http://youtube.com/watch?v=8WA1rP5WGfY … pic.twitter.com/rYSiJ6Zesz

Interesting takeaway from one of the points being made:

"Ironically, the most successful Western sanction has been in preventing a friendly country from defending itself."

This below is why the release of this document is timely--looks like the fighting will be starting again towards the 15 March timeline with both Russia and the mercenaries making outlandish claims that they claim are in Minsk 2 agreement and the Ukraine has been violating.

No. of ceasefire violations up to 61 today from 49 yesterday, #Ukraine's military says. Last ceasefire collapsed completely at 100+ attacks.

If one seriously thinks about it---the current US strategy if there is one of soft power via diplomacy and sanctions has not worked at all and if there had been a C-UW strategy with a creditable UW deterrence in place --this might have gone in a different direction.

But there was nothing in place and we know where this is headed.

Sharing my comments from my blog, http://maxoki161.blogspot.com/2015/03/sof-support-to-political-warfare-…

I know we are deathly afraid of terminology such as political warfare and unconventional warfare. I often hear from military personnel that the civilian leadership and congress do not look favorably on such terms as people recall the friction over the re-invention of irregular warfare post 9-11 (and from a congressional point of view we should recall Congressman Thornberry's recent words in this article with his emphasis on UW: http://blogs.rollcall.com/five-by-five/new-house-armed-services-chairma…).

The common refrain from those in the military who are opposed to the use of political warfare and UW is that our civilian interagency partners do not want to be associated with "warfare." However, I recently attended a conference that was composed of US government civilian and military leadership from desk officers (military and civilian) to assistant secretaries to general officers and ambassadors and I was happy to hear senior civilian US government officials not only using political and unconventional warfare terminology but embracing the concepts. Chatham House rules prohibit naming names but I was gratified that there was no pushback among civilian officials on the use of warfare - both political and unconventional.

This contribution by USASOC should assist in understanding the phenomena we are facing in warfare - it is hybrid, unrestricted, political, and unconventional (resting on the foundation of revolutions, resistance, and insurgency) and all of what is routinely experienced between peace and war. I asked three questions of the participants of the conference I attended:

1. Are we going to get comfortable operating in the space between peace and war that is described by political and unconventional warfare?

2. Are we willing to do strategy in that space to achieve our policy objectives?

3. Are we willing to inform the national leadership that we have the will and capability to operate in that space between peace and war and conduct our own forms of political and unconventional warfare?

I hope that this paper will help contribute to answering those questions and most importantly understanding how political and unconventional warfare can contribute to developing and doing strategy and support achievement of our national policy objectives.

The paper can be downloaded here: https://db.tt/wsGXrO4S

Key excerpts:

Political Warfare emerges from the premise that rather than a binary opposition between “war” and “peace,” the conduct of international relations is characterized by continuously evolving combinations of collaboration, conciliation, confrontation, and conflict. As such, during times of interstate “peace,” the U.S. government must still confront adversaries aggressively and conclusively through all means of national power. When those adversaries practice a form of Hybrid Warfare employing political, military, economic, and criminal tools below the threshold of conventional warfare, the U.S. must overmatch adversary efforts—though without large-scale, extended military operations that may be fiscally unsustainable and diplomatically costly. Hence, the U.S. must embrace a form of sustainable “warfare” rather than “war,” through a strategy that closely integrates targeted political, economic, informational, and military initiatives in close collaboration with international partners. Serving the goals of international stability and interstate peace, this strategy amounts to “Political Warfare.”

3-1 PROBLEM STATEMENT
How does the United States counter and deter the asymmetric and hybrid warfare employed by our state and nonstate adversaries during both “war” and “peace” across the spectrum of conflict? How can the U.S. respond optimally to hybrid and asymmetric challenges while accounting for fiscal limitations and political sensitivity to large-scale operations? What is the best means to fully synchronize Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) responses to hybrid challenges?

3-2. CENTRAL IDEA
U.S. policy makers require a suite of complementary options enabling them to counter and deter hybrid and asymmetric warfare practiced by state and nonstate adversaries. As hybrid and asymmetric warfare rely on surrogates, proxy forces, insurgents and supporting influence operations, effective U.S. policy responses require capabilities to a) comprehensively mitigate the effect of subversion, UW, and delegitimizing narratives in partner countries targeted by adversaries; and b) dissuade adversaries from conducting hybrid warfare by increasing the cost of such activities to the point that they become unsustainable. The former effort involves strengthening the capabilities, capacity, and legitimacy of partners, while the latter involves aggressively countering subversion and UW waged against friendly states, proactively employing coercive diplomacy, legal-economic measures, and UW against adversaries, and aggressively prosecuting a battle of narratives to undermine adversary legitimacy among critical populations.

The U.S. and its partners can indeed overmatch adversaries practicing hybrid warfare and achieve escalation dominance against future adversaries—but only through a thoroughly whole-of-government approach informed by unity of effort and purpose expressed through integrated strategy and cohesive policy options. This all amounts to Political Warfare, a supple, synergistic, and evolving use of “both overt and covert” tools at America’s disposal, with an emphasis on coercive diplomatic and economic engagement, Security Sector Assistance (SSA), information and influence activities (IIA), and diverse forms of unconventional warfare (UW).

A thoroughly whole-of-government endeavor, Political Warfare is by no means the preserve of SOF. Given its diplomatic and economic content and its focus on achieving political ends, Political Warfare is likely best led by agencies beyond DoD.[i] Indeed, Political Warfare can only succeed if it is conducted in a way to “elevate civilian power alongside military power as equal pillars of U.S. foreign policy.”[ii] Yet, as SSA, UW and IIA hinge on skill sets cultivated by SOF, the latter are uniquely positioned to support both the joint force and America’s agencies beyond DOD leading Political Warfare strategies. Furthermore, SOF are unique in the Department of Defense, suited to integrate Political Warfare’s activities across the JIIM spectrum. Army Special Operators have a proven track record of bridging indigenous forces, local populations, Joint Force components, U.S. agencies, and coalition partners needed for an effective Political Warfare response to hybrid warfare. SOF must be the expert practitioners of this form of warfare to lead DOD's contribution.

[i] See this discussion in the State Department context nearly a decade ago: Dave Kilcullen, “New Paradigms for 21st Century Conflict,” State Department eJournal, June 2007, found athttp://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/new-paradigms-for-21st-century-conflict.
[ii] Department of State & USAID, Leading Through Civilian Power: The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (Washington, DC: 2010), Executive Summary, 2:http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/153635.pdf.

Yes..........SOF has to take the lead just as does the Russian SF/GRU leads their efforts.

Finally movement towards C-UW and an understanding of political warfare driven by non linear warfare ie UW.

The study hit all the points that has evolved over the last year in Crimea and eastern Ukraine and includes the Chinese developments as well.

What is now missing is a coherent counter "informational conflict" ability that encompasses a rapid response "whole of government approach" based on truth however good or bad it is using all media forms---ie from social media to TV and radio 24 X7 365 and not just in "bad times".