Why Body Counts Are a Bad Metric for Judging Islamic State Fight

MF,

Perhaps the thing that’s keeping you awake after watching movies like San Andreas (besides the bad acting and ridiculous plot) is too much Revolution in Movie Affairs - Movie Industrial Complex – Computer Generated Imagery (RMA-MIC-CGI) ;-)

You suggested the influence of marginal elements within the Pak/KSA/Iranian/Rus security services is considerably less than what I believe. IMO our failure to understand the significance of these elements in native governance is a key shortcoming that severely impacts our attempts to shape an effective strategy towards regimes that are so inclined/afflicted.

From a historical point of view our current opponents are feeble. Image the answers you would get if you could travel back in time and recounted the Battle of Wanat, the Battle of Mogadishu, Fallujah to the Doughboys who were slumped in the German trenches at Belleau Wood, a Marine in the caves on Peleliu or a hospital ship heading home from Iwo Jima.

We are currently floundering badly and perhaps we should back up and attempt to get some simple understanding of the mind-set of the traditional political elites – friend and foe – who inhabit the regions we seek to influence.

If, in the first and foremost instance, we do not effectively engage their ancient Machiavellian/Byzantine order of political control we will fail. Our default to a firepower/technical network approach fill our allies with dread as much as it fills our opponents with glee.

If we begin at the basic human level the average western liberal mind-set has tremendous difficulty accepting the charming individual sitting opposite ( whom they are attempting to negotiate some form of violence avoiding agreement ) – be it a Brigadier, Under-Secretary, Congressman, Mayor, Councillor, Tribal elder whatever - will have regular meetings, conversations, emails, disputes with associates or political rivals who actively attempt to undermine, discredit, maim or kill him as well as his friends, colleagues and neighbors.

Strangely enough this sometimes deadly web of intrigue does not necessary need to ensnare strangers. As long as the strangers are viewed as removed from decision-making, they can often move thru these Byzantine political mazes with a degree of safety not availed to a native.

The most ruthless Western military/government functionary would find this Machiavellian construct psychologically impossible to manage. In fact 99.9% of westerners consider such behavior in the workplace and/or a social gatherings as the province of hardened criminals or the clinically insane. IMO this inability to accept this form of political order is why we fail to come to grips with even the simplest problem – whether it be political, religious or military.

In Pak, Saudi and Iran et al it is the way the system works. More importantly it is the only way the system can work. Furthermore; and even more difficult for the Westerner, the swirling dervish of political actors is not just normal behavior but is the behavior of normal rationale people just like you and me. Unlike the popular image of a wide-eyed turbaned figure with a curved janbiya clenched in his teeth these same folks are perfectly capable of moving to any town in the US and leading productive law-abiding lives as millions have done in the past and tens of millions seek to do so.

This approach to maintaining order is not the nefarious duplicity of the ‘other’. It is how normal people condemned to operate in a dysfunctional system carry out their responsibilities so as to prevent their native society descending into ungovernable chaos and slaughter.

And there are plenty of examples – past and present- that illustrate what happens when this Byzantine form of order breaks down and the dogs of war take over. Even a country like India, which is slowly but surely throwing off these Byzantine shackles can flip like it did when they murdered Gandhi.

In the absence of governance that is beholden to regular examination by the popular vote, the cut and thrust of a court of Machiavellian princes is the only form of governance whereby enough political patronage can be cast throughout society so as to quell the revolutionary /resistance energy simmering beneath the communal surface.

Nobody (except the megalomaniac) enjoys this form of governance. Unless you have an ocean of oil from which to draw largesse (and more often than not this is not enough) it almost ensures the general population live in a shit-hole. Your Brigadier, Congressman, Elder etc. might live in the lap of luxury but his underlings/subordinates drink lethal drinking water and take a shit in the open.

The HoS are the masters of these political intrigues and whilst the natives (not the imported labor) live comfortably the enormous wealth of the HoS hasn’t stopped (IMO facilitated) their political domestic rivals wreaking havoc across the globe.

The Ayatollahs are not as masterful as the HoS but like the Soviets if you make your leaders old enough, decrepitude ensures pressure releasing change is built into the system of governance.

Putin’s unprecedented youth and good health is having a destabilizing effect on the health of many inside and outside Russia. IMO his attempts to become a Tsar will cost him his head.

The Chinese system of Byzantine order has replaced shooting the politically ambitious in the name of running dog capitalism with runaway capitalism landing the overly-capitalistic being thrown to the dogs.

The Pakistanis have a political class of generals who understand their time in the sun will last a few years before they must make way for some more generals and they retire into comfortable obscurity.

When westerners make the mistake of inserting their influence into this Byzantine ‘order’ they are confounded by allies, enemies and neutrals flipping then flopping, throwing their lives away in defense of the West, kill themselves in defiance, appear completely indifferent or place IEDs everywhere or nowhere.

When our friends or foes lose their Machiavellian mojo it never ends well. Qaddafi is a perfect example – stability borne of longevity, ocean of oil, endorsement from Nelson Mandela no less and killed in a ditch like a rabid dog. Khrushchev said it best when he said the most surprising achievement of his tenure was nobody got shot when he was oust from the Kremlin. Morsi not so lucky. Neither both Bhutto’s in Pakistan, the Shah of Iran by the skin of his teeth (but not his supporters). Perhaps the most illuminating example Machiavellian ‘reset’ – from a US military perspective – is the killing of General Zia-ul–Haq and US Ambassador Arnold Raphel.

The military need to become expert in engaging this form of governance. It predates our own Greek inspired form by two or three millennia. Drones, satellite surveillance, cell phone intercept blah, blah, blah will give you very little insight - or worse the wrong insight. We must have our people on the ground in the mix who understand the dynamics and most crucially, are trusted by those who live and die by the sword of Byzantine governance.

Without this Mark-One-Eyeball lens all efforts will amount to so much piss and wind. A native source doesn’t help because they must dance the Machiavelli so as to avoid losing their head and as such their Intel remains confounding. More often than not these infidel courtiers act as a neutral conduit thru which blood enemies can make deals without losing face.

The ever-present Westerner who inconspicuously ‘gets it’ act as the focusing medium when our decision-makers decide we need to be involved. When our military and political masters peer thru the lens into the eye of the beast our own Byzantine courtier will need to be whispering in their ear in the manner of the triumphant Roman general upon entering Rome. The victorious general would have the lowest of the low slave riding on his chariot whispering in his ear ‘Respice post te! RQ-4A Accipiter Magnusum te momento!’

You mentioned how much our RMA-MICkey mouse has evolved since back in the day. I’ve no doubt that is true but Haqqani, Hizbi, and Jamiat al have all regressed as a military force since the Charlie Wilson days. The Taliban, who are a post-Soviet entity, are equally toothless.

Hillbilly stump removing explosive and heroin are now the spear-tip of our current nemesis. Indeed as you say things have changed but our 21st century RMA MICkey mouse has failed to impress upon the Pakistan proxy that has a fraction of the combat power and popular support of the Mujaheddin – and they were no great shakes either.

The body count our RMA MICkey has inflicted is measured in the thousands. Apparently 15,000 foreigners are ranked in the IS. None of them will be missed by the locals in event of their ‘martyrdom’- not a single one. In other words if the body count was 15 times greater it would have absolutely no effect on the disposition of the native body-politic.

How much has killing these non-entities cost the US taxpayers? The supply is endless and unless the body count climbs into the millions it has no lasting attritional effect on the elites of KSA, Pak, Iran or Russia. We have spent $5 trillion killing maybe 100K – whose going to pay ten times as much?

You mentioned our victories. The goodwill that existed towards the West when the Soviets departed was squandered when we abandoned them to Punjabi paranoia and KSA fruit-cakery.

When the Paks and the Saudis laid waste to the little the Soviet had not destroyed the Saudis attacked the WTC. We bizarrely took revenge on the Saudis and the Paks by bouncing Afghan rubble and then invade Iraq. I personally fail to see victory anywhere.

You mentioned the Iran-Iraq war’s WW1 tactics as not having much relevance in UW. Very true but my point was to give a tangible example of the spiritual credentials of the Ayatollah’s in the mind of the Iranian populace (along with those in KSA, Pak, Iraq, Af etc.) being essentially zero. IMO folks who attempt to explain the actions of the ruling elite in terms of the population’s religious convictions are hopelessly misguided and as such doomed to fail.

In closing I would remind you there is one body count that actually does make a difference. Since the Soviets left AF, the Pak Army’s efforts have killed approx. 1 million westerners – 250K Americans. Our RMA MICkey mouse hasn’t come even close to that mark. Furthermore unlike our bells and whistles that have cost the US taxpayer $12 trillion in that same period the strategic arm of the war against the infidel is paid for by their Western victims with their lives and the taxes of infidels like you and me.

I don’t know where you got the impression I advocate we should disengage? I must confess despite my experience being completely different I drank the RMA-MICkey mouse Kool-Aid and believed the GPF could pull it off against such feeble foe. At this juncture no one is more bitterly disappointed than I. Unfortunately we are going suffer for it if we don’t come up with a solution – and fast.

I don’t mind getting vaporized for our failings but my children and grandchildren don’t deserve it.

Like RCJ says we need to get back to being smart. I get the impression RCJ is not a great fan of RMA-MICkey mouse but I disagree with his weighing of the Jeffersonian solution. I wish he was right and I was completely wrong - but that’s not what my eyes, ears and aching bones have told me over the last thirty years.

IMO the Jeffersonian approach is a dangerous fantasy and will flounder badly in the Machiavellian/Byzantine politic of the OE. Furthermore in my experience 99% of the native population also believe it is an unattainable dream.

I mean how many slaves did ‘two nations’ Thomas Jefferson ‘own’ anyways?

Good talking past you – who needs a disaster movie?

RC

RC,

Insomnia sucks. A matinee of "San Andreas" and a subsequent bad dream involving car jacking (heh, if police pilot "The Rock" can car jack trucks, helicopters, planes, and boats for personal use, it could happen) leave me hours of long-winded response you get to endure.

<blockquote>'But they did not cause the fight, and it is a fluke of geography and demographics that makes that issue part of this fight.’

I have a question for you. Do you believe that it is a revolutionary/resistance energy that is driving the warfighting in the Donbas? I personally do not see any difference between what the FSB is doing in the Ukraine and what the ISI is doing in Afghanistan.</blockquote>

Don’t leave out the pertinent parts of RCJ’s comment.

<blockquote>The core issue that started this conflict, however is very different and rooted (edit out: rioted?) in the VERY reasonable and widely held belief of the Sunni Arab populations of Syria and Iraq that they have little hope for a viable future under the Shia dominated governments of those two countries. When revolutions grow, exploiters gather.</blockquote>

Believe RCJ has identified reality on the ground and you are comparing apples and oranges. The Machiavellian influences of East Ukraine and along the Durand Line differ from those of the larger Sunni-Shiite divide. A small part of Ukraine identifies with Russia and that has become an excuse for Putin’s actions born out of his fear that the Maidan Revolution’s will expand eastward and Ukraine will align with the West. A large part of Afghanistan and Pakistan are Pashtun and that scares the ISI. Putin and his KGB past drive the FSB actions in Ukraine, but the successes are largely won and supported conventionally so why call it UW? The Pakistan intelligence ISI may drive some of the AfPak problem, but are you certain there is universal government support for actions there? If there was, would we see recent air bombing and Pak Army efforts in Northern Waziristan that previously were lacking?

Pakistan’s newfound actions are similar to Saudi military support against ISIL and Yemen. Pakistan’s government now fears the spread of Pakistan Taliban, Haqqanis, and foreign fighter influence within its own borders. Likewise, the KSA government knows it is a target of ISIL and Yemenis Houthis. So although some in the ISI support trouble, and those with more money than sense in the KSA support ISIL, not sure you can attribute widespread support from their governments and militaries.

<blockquote>As you often remark we need to develop a different approach. In the current interesting time our RMA- MICkey mouse approach is failing badly. IMO the FSB, the Mabahith and the IRGC have all been inspired by the ISI’s UW success in AF against the Soviet Union and the US led coalition. Where we feel agonizing failure they see great potential for enduring success.</blockquote>

And the different approach could be Machiavellian attempts to attempt post-“mission accomplished” negotiation of divided power/boundaries, and if that fails imposition of new borders and self-rule in future areas we stabilize. The RMA-MICkey mouse approach seemed to work pretty well in the past few days against al Qaeda’s number two and another Algerian terrorist. Thousands of other terror leaders and HVI have also been dispatched in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen by technology perhaps aided by HUMINT. However, without insulting your past associations and historically heroic battles, the world has changed since the 80s, 70s, and 60s.

The Montagnards no longer are a factor in Vietnam even if SOF/SF mobilized 40,000+ of them at the time. The same applies in Afghanistan where VSO/ALP did not always appear to further the intent or control of the larger GiROA government or assuage Pashtun-NA disagreements. Likewise, your cited 80s Iran-Iraq war is no longer relevant other than assuring Iranian control over a larger Iraq if the Sunnis and Kurds can’t succeed in gaining self-rule there. Nor, is the fact that the ISI may have cooperated with you and yours back in the day. I can’t envision you garnering much cooperation from HIG or the Haqqanis today, or surviving to sneak and peak around ISIL territory with head intact. Mickey on the other hand can roam free and never needs to sleep or save its own neck.

<blockquote>From my experience I consider the ISI the masters of UW and their IED-centric approach gives their Ways and Means a virtually inexhaustible capacity - as opposed to our own financially and politically bankrupting RMA-MIC beholden failure. The rulers of the 5 rivers (Punjab) have had 6000 years of UW experience. Needless to say we have a great deal of catching up to do. Perhaps an examination of the approach of those currently ahead of us in the UW race might be helpful:-

The KSA God is Great/foreign fighter approach lacks the enduring simplicity of the ISI approach but their deep pockets and Wahhabi fruit-bakery ensures their Ways, Means, Ends can be facilitated by a steady stream of paid-up foreigners and local zealots.

The Iranians choose to lean heavily on the region’s largest pool of manpower and throw bodies at their UW approach. In the recent past this has proven to be a politically risky approach. The Iraq-Iran War came down to the lack of Iranian men willing to be used as cannon fodder in the ‘Jihad’ against Saddam.</blockquote>

When you have more money than sense, <i>some</i> in the KSA with deep pockets can be facilitators. When you are powerless and paranoid conventionally against India, UW against a weak Afghanistan may be your sole realistic response. Others in charge in KSA and Pakistan recognize the danger inherent in too powerful an ISIL and Taliban. Sure, there is some KSA government involvement in quelling excessive Iranian influence in both Syria and Iraq. That is a side-effect of our own half-hearted efforts of limited bombing and not going outside the wire.

IMHO (mine is necessarily humble without your actual experience) the human wave attacks of the Iranians would hardly be considered UW. The Mickey capabilities of Iraq born out of lessons of such attacks in WWI did their job in the 80s, as well. Yet despite that experience, they suffered devastating losses against our military in Desert Storm and OIF---thanks again to Mickey and his Joint Force, not the CIA or SF/SOF.

<blockquote>The low casualties of the Ayatollahs current ‘Jihad’ (as opposed to the hundreds of thousands KIA in the Gulf War ‘Jihad’) has yet to provoke the political skepticism of the past but the Ayatollah’s God-given authenticity has a limited political shelf-life.</blockquote>

Part of that is that they are getting Iraqi Shiite militias to do much of their dirty work. I recall a recent network news interview where Shiite militiamen were asked if they would fight Sunnis or Americans if more Americans joined the fight. He said they would fight both. Perhaps that casts light on recent articles that military leaders lacked any desire to escalate boots on the ground. The Iraq Sunni and Shiite fighters of today with only small U.S. elements escorting them likely would turn on Americans in Green-on-Blue style attacks. Similarly, without major forces on the ground, QRFs and rescue crews could not responds to TICs and downed aircrews as readily. The prospect of You Tube videos of beheaded American troops and airmen would not go over well stateside.

However, you must admit that the era of huge friendly losses (what the enemy would call body count) of the past is not the new reality. Despite the tragedy of our losses, they pale in comparison to those in Vietnam, Korea, and earlier, which is why major terror attacks and WMD are the evolving means of attacking America and the West. The new reality, unlike the past, is that Surges and upfront Powell-Doctrine-strength reduce casualties and focus the battle overseas rather than on our own and European shores.

The challenge is getting civil leadership to commit to such efforts and follow-on stability operations at the start of the conflict. A quicker stabilization and transition of new government forces with a residual coalition force in our own QRF sanctuary is less costly in blood and treasure. The challenge is getting the Machiavellian-like decisions from Presidents and diplomats on redrawing state boundaries and installing new self-rule governments rather than dreaming that Sunni-Shiite-Kurd or Pashtun-NA reconciliation can be achieved overnight.

<blockquote>Putin does not have Stalin’s Red Army nor his intellectual cunning and as such his efforts strike me as foolishly short-sighted.</blockquote>

Yes, and he is removing any hope of making NATO and the EU go away. Empty threats of nuclear weapons ring hollow given history’s experience with MAD. Likewise, China’s current milder expansion at sea is equally unlikely to win friends and influence people.

<blockquote>And the purpose of me boring everyone rigid with my rant?</blockquote>

Boring, never! Contrarian, always. Correct, frequently. However, not in this instance reference Mickey and “native political revolutionary/resistance energy” discussed in your next paragraph.

<blockquote>Most people acknowledge destroying the village in order to save it has never worked and will never work. You believe a new approach is necessary and I would hazard to guess few disagree with you. However I would suggest if a tiny elite’s quest for money and power (my contention) is mistaken for native political revolutionary/resistance energy (your position) our 50 years of military failure will continue.

One of the fundamental planks of Machiavellian deceit is to hoodwink the population into believing they are fighting for the promise legitimate native governance will deliver. The ISI, Mabahith, IRGC, FSB et al apply enormous energy into propagating the message that their interests are aligned with the revolution and resistance native energy you contend we fail to recognize. As a consequence of this lack of understanding we fail but our equally foreign opponents (Pak, KSA, Iranian Russian) succeed!.</blockquote>

Have they really succeeded? Have we really lost? Yeah, we lost Vietnam despite Outlaw’s heroic effort with Montagnards and those of hundreds of thousands of often drafted patriots. But which direction does Vietnam lean today and how did that war slow the domino effect and hurt proxy supporters monetarily more than it hurt ourselves. Would a USSR not supporting Vietnam and the 80s Afghanistan have devoted more interest in attacking NATO? You conclude with a comment about losing 5 wars over 30 years. What were we losing in the early 1980s and beyond? Certainly not the Cold War or Afghanistan thanks in part to you. We did not lose in Grenada, Panama, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Columbia, or Haiti (or did we over the long term with numerous socialist governments in Central/South America today). Cuba no longer is the perceived power house that spawned “Red Dawn” and the non-fictional Cuban Missile Crisis of earlier. Venezuela is a joke.

Yeah, Somalia and Lebanon were fiascos and still are. We won Desert Storm but left the job unfinished which required a “part two.” The Balkans overall was successful and even Mickey had his day in 1999 against Serbia although the longer term effort of ground peacekeepers should not be discounted. International troops in the Sinai (to include redrawn borders, hint, hint) have helped stop major wars there. We won OIF after a slow start and lost it again after 2011. We won OEF upfront but due to OIF could not dedicate sufficient assets to it upfront to consolidate gains. Still a work in progress, but with 2200 U.S. losses compared to the Soviet’s 14,500+, one element of “body count” is undeniable in measuring Afghanistan success. It also appears they now have leaders we can work with unlike perhaps in Iraq.

<blockquote>Leaving aside the extreme elements of native revolution/resistance legitimacy epitomized in American suiciders in Yemen, English decapitators in Iraq, British suiciders in Iraq, Pak bombers in Afghanistan, Chechen bombers in Boston, Saudis and 9/11 etc. I still find the logic of a native desire (as opposed to these alien elements) for the wanton slaughter of their fellow countrymen somewhat illusive.

As much as I’d like to agree with your argument that the death and destruction is a frustration borne out of native political grievance my encounters with hundreds of Af, Pak, Arabs , Uk and Russians combatants and non-combatants over the last 30 years suggests your argument is without foundation.</blockquote>

Yet zealot suicide bombers/fighters are effective and armed with WMD would be even more deadly. We generally see suicide attacks only in Islamic extremists or in sheep-like human wave attacks despite your attempt to spread the blame to “suiciders” from many countries. As much as we like to believe that anecdotal experiences in HUMINT and small footprints work, have they? Did the Montagnards or villages of ALP/VSO create strategic victories or merely tactical ones? Did <strong>helping Muslims</strong> in the Balkans in the 90s and AfPak in the 80s stop 9/11? Did our initial light OEF footprint preclude the return of the Taliban after 2002? Has no-footprint worked after we left Iraq in 2011? Is no ground footprint in Iraq/Syria working now or is Mickey supplying the sole real efforts, and weakly at that.

<blockquote>So what?</blockquote>

So what is your point? That screwed up civil leader can make the military’s job much harder? Are you saying that if we don’t persist in forward presence as we did in Europe, South Korea, the Balkans, and Sinai the enemy will carry on as in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan? That we should not engage in the world and instead should retrench to home borders and hope Islamic fundamentalism won’t follow? How is the bomb-and-induce-chaos approach working in Libya? How did SF do it alone with Mickey in Yemen? How is rationed inadequate airpower working against ISIL? How did minding-our-own-business work out in unsuccessful attacks on the WTC in ’93 with eventual terror success in 2001? How many more such attacks would have occurred if we had not diverted fruitcake attention to local theater fights against armed and armored troops rather than U.S. terror against unsuspecting and unprotected civilians?

<blockquote>IMO to shape a better approach to CUW we need to read less into Sun Tzu, CvC, Jomini etc. and more into Machiavelli. With the ugly shadow of rogue-state/ non-state nuclear proliferation looming ever more likely, my grandchildren’s generation need us to stop losing – for whatever reason.</blockquote>

Sun Tzu was incorrect to surmise that battles won without fighting is good (deterrence, prepositioning, and maneuver to a position of advantage today) and wrong to say we need to know our enemy and ourselves? CvC’s trinity has no value? Jomini’s concepts of mass and defensive strength are invalid? Is part of all of the above coalition stability and peacekeeping operations, forward deterrence and redrawn borders? Before we dedicate too much effort to countering UW, let’s make sure first that is what we are fighting. Most could care less about a few lost islands in the South China Sea. A conventional amphibious and missile attack on Taiwan and other allies would be worthy of a major U.S. conventional and SF/SOF response. The FSB may be helping in East Ukraine, but it is the armor and artillery that is causing most of the damage and casualties.

While your last line above is important, how does “losing a war” or fighting it half-assed prevent nuclear proliferation or terrorist use of WMD? Seems to me that the Syrian/Iraq/Yemen Sunni-Shiite proxy wars (we currently are losing through inadequate participation) guarantee proliferation and WMD use stateside and in Europe. If “body count” is a poor measure of success, at least a dead ISIL fighter does not survive to blow up an airliner, plot a suicide attack in the West, or infiltrate WMD. Which is more of an incentive to join ISIL? An ISIL that appears successful or one that guarantees its fighter’s demise? They may both provide some motivation but at least the latter precludes their return to the West to wreak havoc.

RC, make no mistake, the KSA and Iranians the two external parties with the greatest interest in the larger Sunni-Shia competition that is tied to this particular fight. But they did not cause the fight, and it is a fluke of geography and demographics that makes that issue part of this fight.

The core issue that started this conflict, however is very different and rooted rioted in the VERY reasonable and widely held belief of the Sunni Arab populations of Syria and Iraq that they have little hope for a viable future under the Shia dominated governments of those two countries. When revolutions grow, exploiters gather.

The US is just too wrapped up in ourselves to see that we are focused on the wrong things and applying the wrong solutions.

Bill,

You are adding factors I do not advocate (mobilization, implied formalities, etc). I think the tactics of the parties is largely irrelevant to the nature of their conflict.

The nature of conflict between two or more distinct political systems is the same, regardless of if it is still non-violent, or if it has gone violent. This is, I imagine, the idea driving much of the current thought that it is best to just think of this all as "war"; that the current posturing with Russia and China have not changed in nature if they were to go to more direct and violent competition more traditionally thought of as "war." OK, I see that. But there is great value in creating an artificial line, as it gives all parties a chance to back away from the brink if they should push too far.

The nature of conflicts within a single political system is also constant regardless of if the tactics remain non-violent or have gone violent. But the nature of these internal conflicts appears to be very different than that of external conflicts. I don't think there is much value in creating an artificial line that once crossed turns an internal conflict into "war" - as war solutions have proven time and again to be inadequate for resolving internal conflicts in meaningful, durable ways.

However, if that single cell of governance should divide. As it did in the American Civil War; As it has done in the ISIS led revolutions against the governments of Syria and Iraq - then one has changed from an internal conflict into an external conflict, and war logic applies. BUT - if one's war solution merely devolves the political situation back into a single cell, one has not "won," one has merely converted what had become war between systems back into revolution within a single system. We think we have won and that the war is over, we should be thinking that we have converted this back into an internal conflict and that now he hard part begins.

How does killing 10000 Sunnis fighting under the ISIS flag in the current "war" posture us for reconciliation with the remaining Suuni's once this is converted back into revolution?? We should be planning for that and shaping our current operations to facilitate that eventuality.

But first we must recognize this dynamic, and by and large, we do not.

Character without nature is just data.

Equally, varying characters all considered within the context of the same nature is much like a broken clock - just because it is spot on twice a day does not mean it's a wise way to do business.

The nature of human endeavors are tied to the nature of mankind. Mans nature in an external conflict manifests in very consistent ways, and this is what Clausewitz studied, pondered and wrote about (and resistance insurgency to foreign occupation is a continuation of external conflict. In simple terms, this is "war.". Each example is unique in the myriad factors of character.

Internal conflicts also share a common nature rooted in the fundamental nature of mankind's response to that dynamic of friction between those who govern and those who are governed. A family of 4 trending toward divorce is little different in nature to a nation of 40 or 400 million trending toward revolution. Character again myriad and unique.

We will not be more successful in dealing with internal conflict until such time as we recognize and appreciate the fundamental difference between the two.

You offered these two similar metrics:

<blockquote>a. The number of potential Islamic State fighters who are (1) dissuaded from taking up the Islamic State's cause and from (2) joining those that have entered onto the battlefield in this cause's name?</blockquote>

<blockquote>a. Potential Islamic State fighters becoming actual Islamic State fighters</blockquote>

The problem with these metrics is two-fold. First, how do you identify potential fighters dissuaded from joining ISIL? Do you go to the local mosque and ask the disaffected if they had considered joining ISIL but were dissuaded? Second, how do you propose to dissuade them? Do we stop bombing ISIL entirely and let them run rough-shod over Syria and Iraq, spreading their influence elsewhere? Do we implement sharia law in the U.S. or establish no-go zones where Muslims live? Obviously, you have proposed metrics that cannot be measured and that cannot achieve your stated goals without essentially capitulating to radical Islam.

There also is the practical problem (assuming your metrics have value) in identifying what would lead them to result. The one option is surrender and not fight ISIL in the belief that if we leave them alone the recruits will dry up. Let the locals deal with it you may say. The problem is that will lead to ISIL success invariably leading to <strong>more</strong> recruits. The same applies to our current limited approach of letting the Iraq Army fail and supporting them with only limited bombing support and no troops in the field alongside the Iraqis.

You also offered these two similar metrics:

<blockquote>b. The number of present Islamic State fighters who we have convinced to return home/to take up a more-peaceful existence?</blockquote>

<blockquote>b. Present Islamic State fighters -- rather than go home/return to a more peaceful existence -- deciding to remain in the fight?</blockquote>

The problem with this metric is that ISIL won't let them return home even if they try to escape or ask to leave. They kill those who try. The women are enslaved as forced brides. They also use many recruits as suicide bombers which was what led to the retreat in Ramadi when something like 37 suicide bombers in vehicles initiated the ISIL attack. I suspect, that ISIL probably uses some recruits as part of simultaneous attacks of multiple locations knowing that many will be killed by airpower, but there aren't enough coalition flights to address all the attacks or all the infiltrating truck fighters.

This approach also does not address the ISIL fighter who returns home to Europe and the U.S. and then becomes a lone wolf terrorist. The naïve belief of many is that if we don't address Islamic extremism--we don't fight it--it will go away on its own. Yet 9/11 and captured al Qaeda documents plus ISIL proclamations make it clear that no matter what we do in the West, ISIL plans to expand their caliphate extremist rule and extermination of those who don't so subscribe.

This is a war, and measures of any type related to the enemy that the U.S. likes to display in graphs ultimately mean only at the strategic level. Remember McNamara's strategic hamlet metrics? We had similar metrics in Afghanistan for the VSO program. Of course we measured incident reports, especially IED strikes, etc. The metrics in themselves are not worthless, but they their value is limited to detecting trends and at the tactical level where the commander may want to shift resources too. They provide a snapshot in time, a snapshot that will continuously change. We can allegedly secure 15 villages for two years, and the third year they fall under control of the adversary. We can surge ops into an area and reduce IED attacks, yet they surge in another area.

CvC notes that war is a contest of wills, it is human, it is interactive with opponent continuously adapting to the other, which in turn makes war uncertain. It isn't a condition that we can apply to industrial management techniques to in hope of managing our way to victory. Ultimately it is about imposing one's will on the adversary, and we can't measure an adversary's will to resist our will.

Bill,

As with your earlier comment, this is out-of-the-box thinking -- the sort that might break us out of our rut and find solutions for this new age of war.

Robert,

Great point about victory metrics! Organizations are driven by what they measure and reward.

If ground taken is an irrelevant measure, what about body counts? Always useful in the absence of meaningful intel. Here are some quotes about our scores and some thoughts about why we always come back to them: <a title="FM" href="http://fabiusmaximus.com/2015/06/05/use-misuse-of-body-counts-85420/">S… body counts to learn the key facts about our wars</a>