Goodbye to Land Warfare? No, Says Controversial New Study by Richard Norton-Taylor, The Guardian
The Future of Land Warfare, by Michael O’Hanlon of the Washington-based Brookings thinktank, is an antidote to conventional wisdom. The author refers to “the supposed obsolescene of large-scale ground combat”, reflected in official American policy and defence reviews.
He concludes that the size of the US army, which some commentators - notably senior members of other branches of the armed forces - want to slash should stay where it is now: about 500,000 active duty soldiers and 550,000 reservists.
They should have the capability to wage one major “all-out regional battle” while “contributing substantially” to two multiyear, multilateral, operations.
Though O’Hanlon’s arguments are directly mainly at the US, they can apply easily to other Nato members. European countries with the biggest armies are imposing significant cuts…
Comments
Re: my suggestions below -- that "nation-building" may lie at the heart of (or at least as an integral part of) O'Hanlon's "The Future of Land Warfare" concepts,
(Herein explaining, for example, why he suggests that our main combat forces need to be sized and shaped with large-scale counterinsurgency and stabilization missions in mind?)
In this regard, consider O'Hanlon's specific reference to "nation-building" at the following AUSA article/link:
http://www.ausa.org/development/Documents/AMPanel_TheNeedForaMulti-Purp…
(See the 2nd paragraph of Page 1, and the 2nd paragraph of Page 3.)
Move Forward:
O'Hanlon's call for large-scale counterinsurgency and stabilization forces -- in the U.S. Army's major combat organizations -- this call would seem to be based on the O'Hanlon's belief (as verified by recent experience?) that when our Army goes to war -- today or in the future and as a vital partner (hat tip to COL Maxwell here) or on its own -- it must be prepared to deal with:
a. Not only highly belligerent and hostile rulers, regimes and their armed forces -- who do not wish to see their states and societies organized, ordered and oriented more along modern western political, economic and social lines -- but also
b. Highly belligerent and hostile populations -- populations who, likewise, do not wish to see their states and societies thus "transformed".
It is in this regard (acceptance of the fact of populations hostile to "western" transformation) that O'Hanlon appears to -- in his "future of land warfare" presentations -- make special reference to N. Korea. (And thanks for the ROK correction; pretty bad for an old soldier like me.)
O'Hanlon's bottom line realities -- which appear to drive his "future of land warfare" requirements?:
a. The primary source of problems for the U.S./the West will continue to be "outlying" states and societies; that is, states and societies that are not adequately, or at all, organized, ordered and oriented more along modern western political, economic and social lines.
b. Thus, the primary job of the U.S./the West will continue to be -- via war (and unavoidable "nation-building") and/or via other ways and means -- to transform these "outlying" states and societies more along modern western lines; even if such transformations must be achieved against these nations'/populations' will.
c. In wars fought along these lines, and based on our recent experience, we now understand that we must be prepared deal with (via large-scale counterinsurgency and stabilization forces in the U.S. Army's major combat organizations) populations that are adamantly opposed to such "western" transformations as are described above.
Thus, and in sum: O'Hanlon calls -- re: war-planning and force structure -- for:
a. The death of such unrealistic and unproven ideas as "universal values" etc.? (War-planning and forces structure, henceforth, not to be based on these such erroneous ideas?) And
b. The acceptance of the idea of opposed populations and unavoidable "nation-building." (And the large-scale counterinsurgency and stabilization forces needed to stand against these hostile populations and see such "nation-building" missions through?)
(Note: If O'Hanlon did not expect to have to do "nation-building" -- and did not expect to have to deal with populations, in N. Korea and elsewhere, who would oppose these such endeavors -- then his call for large-scale counterinsurgency and stabilization forces in our major combat formations; these such suggestions/ recommendations would seem to fall flat/could not be justified. Yes?)
From a Reuters article today covering a Fareed Zakaria interview of Tony Blair:
<blockquote>Blair apologized for what he described as mistakes in planning and intelligence before the war and in preparations for would happen once Saddam was removed, but said it had been the right decision.
<strong>"We have tried intervention and putting down troops in Iraq; we've tried intervention without putting in troops in Libya; and we've tried no intervention at all but demanding regime change in Syria. It's not clear to me that, even if our policy did not work, subsequent policies have worked better," he said.</strong>
"I find it hard to apologize for removing Saddam. I think, even from today in 2015, it is better that he's not there than that he is there."</blockquote>
So reference the first paragraph, would we prefer to have even fewer Army forces than before WWII to start the next war so our forward presence, intel, and planning is worse than before OIF? Would you like your MSG son to deploy for 9 months five or six times with just 18 months home between tours? Perhaps, you would prefer your MSG son and his troops to have fewer forces in the conflict zone during and after “Mission Accomplished” so that insurgents can kill more Americans and coalition forces and render the combat victory a subsequent stability operations loss?
Note PM Blair’s second paragraph. His first sentence is somewhat incorrect insofar as Iraq largely was pacified due to the Surge and Anbar Awakening when we actually had sufficient stability operations forces in theater to establish numerous Joint Security Stations (COPs). It only fell apart back to 2006 levels after we departed in 2011. Note Blair’s second sentence where he cites the lack of success in Libya where no stability operations occurred. Finally, note his third sentence describing Inherent Resolve where essentially there are no ground forces. How successful has that been?
Is Assad still in power? Are the Iranians and Russians now in Syria and Iraq? Are refugees flooding into Europe and continuing to join ISIL despite huge personnel losses? Do these recruits and refugees threaten the West? Did you see the FBI Directors mention of 900 active cases investigating ISIL-related personnel in the U.S.? Could it be that when we do nothing, things continue to fall apart and get worse?
Bill C, we know you like to slant everything to some claim of spreading our way of life to others and nation-building. Too late. South Korea already practiced osmosis and adapted many Western practices to include their extraordinary version of capitalism. No need for nation-building in South Korea. No need for nation-building by our Army in North Korea because South Koreans likely would want to unify and build up the North themselves to the same standard of living they already enjoy. I would speculate that our Army would stay in the South and protect installations against infiltrators who failed to get the word and to help rebuild an artillery and possibly nuclear-devastated Seoul.
South Koreans speak the same lingo, have the same culture, and would have an instant affinity to their starved cousins in the North who most likely would not keep fighting after “Mission Accomplished.” They would be too busy making up for lost time and actually getting to eat something for a change. What a novel concept: letting Sunni military forces secure Sunni areas with the same applying to Shiites and Kurds. What a great idea. Let Pashtun troops secure Pashtun areas with the same language and background. Instead we could have Tajik troops try it and not speak much Pashto speaking Dari instead and wonder why it is not working. Maybe it has something to do with Sunnis and Pashtuns not being "enamored with our very different way of life, our very different way of governance and our very different values, attitudes" when the <i>our</i> is the Iranian and Tajik force telling them what to do?
BTW, ROC is Taiwan's Army. ROK is South Korea's.
Roger that, Sir.
However, do you believe that this changes the overall dynamic that we are discussing here, to wit: the dynamic that O'Hanlon seems to be addressing with his "future of land warfare" concepts; this being:
a. That for the U.S./the West
b. The unavoidable requirement of (somewhat immediate) post-conflict "nation-building"
c. This such requirement demands that the main combat forces of the U.S. (et. al?) be sized and shaped with large-scale counterinsurgency and stabilization missions in mind?
d. This, so as to adequately deal with populations that are not so enamored with our very different way of life, our very different way of governance and our very different values, attitudes and beliefs?
Herein, the ROC, much like we ourselves, being compelled to do "nation-building" following their/our victory against N. Korea?
(And, in this regard, needing all the counterinsurgency and stabilization assistance/help they can get from us to accomplish this mission?)
Just as an aside when we talk about the Korean peninsula and especially unification and what happens to the Korean people living in the north we ought to include in the conversation the Republic of Korea who will be seeking to achieve the Untied Republic of Korea (UROK - yes "You Rock" :-) http://maxoki161.blogspot.com/2015/10/infographic-geopolitical-implicat…). Korea is not going to be Iraq or Afghanistan from the perspective of the US operating unilaterally with only a token coalition force. The bulk of the combat forces on the Korean peninsula in either an attack by the north Korean Peoples Army or the catastrophic collapse of the Kim Family Regime will be the Republic of Korea military.
Bill M:
We appear to be in agreement (you, I and O'Hanlon) in that all three of us seem to believe that:
a. Upon the defeat of an opponent nation (one whose way of life, way of governance and values, attitudes and beliefs are different from our own),
b. And no matter what the desires of the native populations (for example: the desires of the brain-washed N. Koreans),
c. The United States will feel compelled (as you suggest, by the American people, if by no one else) to
d. Immediately move to transform the defeated nation more along modern western political, economic and social lines (i.e., to immediately commence "nation-building").
It is based on this understanding (to wit: that for the U.S./the West the requirement of immediate "nation-building" cannot be avoided) that O'Hanlon has told us, in his "future of land warfare," that we must size and shape our main combat forces with large-scale counterinsurgency and stabilization missions in mind. (These such forces being needed to adequately deal with the expected belligerent populations; populations who, as we have learned recently, often have no great desire -- or no desire at all -- to be transformed more along modern western lines.)
Herein, O'Hanlon suggesting that both President Bush Jr. and President Obama were/are clearly wrong in believing that they would not/will not need to do "nation-building." (See my AUSA reference/link above.)
Sparapet, however, (and if I read him right) appears to differ/disagree with we three (you, I and O'Hanlon).
While Sparapet (again, if I read him right) believes that all viable Armies must have the ability (i.e., the large-scale counterinsurgency and stabilization forces) needed to deal with the chaos that immediately follows major combat operations, he does not seem to believe that these capabilities will be needed long.
This, if we, following major combat operations, do not immediately begin the "nation-building" process. To wit: the process of transforming the political, economic and social systems of these nations more along our (alien and often profane) political, economic and social lines.
Herein, Sparapet suggesting that these such efforts be deferred to some later and more opportune time, and that these such radical "reforms" be introduced more gradually/incrementally (???)
Did the USSR or its proxies like Cuba that either invaded or supported the overthrow of multiple governments establish liberal democracies? Regarding North Korea, it is communist in name only. The bottom line is it is a family based dictatorship that terrorizes its own people. Do you think they want communism? Do you think they even know what it means? In fact, North Koreans increasingly are turning to a market based system (in their large black and gray markets) to survive.
So now that we have the facts straight, after we win the war and sacrifice American treasure would we reinstall a terroristic family based dictatorship? If we did, our leadership would be fired. Unlike you Bill, most American citizens care about others. While not every problem in the world is our problem, if we fight a war I don't think we're going to re-establish a form of governance that is repressive to its people intentionally.
Sparapet:
Let's use the N.Korean example to look these ideas over:
Following major combat operations against -- and victory over N.Korea -- would we, under O'Hanlon's "future of land warfare" concept:
a. Move immediately to establish "governance," etc., more along modern western political, economic and social lines? (To wit: as per "nation-building?") Or, with regard to O'Hanlon's ideas, would we, instead:
b. Move to re-establish "governance," etc., along the "communist" and "Kim family" political, economic and social lines that the N. Korean population understands, accepts and is most familiar with today? (Herein, deferring our unwanted and antagonistic political, economic and social "reform" efforts until some time in the future?)
An important consideration here; this being, that nearly everyone in the western world believes that (a) the "root cause" of this conflict is (b) the radically different and grossly incompatible nature of the way of life, way of governance, values, attitudes and beliefs, etc., represented by communism and Kim. Thus, to "secure the gains of battle," in our national leaders' (and the American peoples'?) eyes, we believe we must (1) move to immediately eliminate this radically different/incompatible/ exceptionally dangerous way of life/way of governance/etc. and (2) immediately replace these with our own such versions.
This being the case, then is it realistic to assume that "governance," etc. -- even for a second -- will be allowed to be re-established along "communist" and "Kim" (rather than our modern western) political, economic and social lines? (The answer here would seem to be a resounding "No.")
Thus, in my eyes, what O'Hanlon -- in his "future of land warfare" concept -- is telling us is that we must come to face THREE interrelated and unavoidable realities; these being:
a. That our primary enemies today -- as in the past -- are those states and societies that are not adequately (or at all) organized, ordered and oriented more along modern western political, economic and social lines.
b. That following major combat operations against such different states and societies -- and for the reasons outlined above -- "governance," etc., will be established ONLY along modern western political, economic and social lines (i.e., as per "nation-building"). And that, accordingly,
c. The challenges and difficulties presented by these such unavoidable nation-building requirements (for example: an opposed population); these such challenges and difficulties explain EXACTLY why we must include -- in our main combat formations -- large-scale and highly capable counterinsurgency and stabilization forces.
(This argument stated another way and continuing with the N. Korean example: If we, following major combat operations and victory against N. Korea, were to simply re-establish "governance," etc., along "communist" and/or "Kim family" political, economic and social lines -- herein deferring our desired western-like "reforms" to some time in the future -- then O'Hanlon's call for large-scale, highly capable and "standing" counterinsurgency and stabilization forces; this such call would seem to make less sense/be less understandable/not be able -- as easily -- to be justified. Yes?)
Bill C - A land force that does not have the capability to occupy and administer territory and people is basically a raiding party and a defensive line. Raiding parties serve many purposes, long term stability, however, isn't one of them. Defensive lines serve many purposes, however, securing national interests abroad isn't one of them. Bottom line, an armed force that doesn't have the capability to secure the gains of battle is a losing proposition.
However, I don't think "nation building" is a useful way to think about any of this. Governance is more to the point. We can take down a country's armed force and senior political leadership without effectively crippling the society, meaning no "building" need to take place. Iraq circa May 2003 was such a case. We didn't level cities, we didn't destroy infrastructure or disrupt the social fabric any more than a bad natural disaster would. We had to fill the governance shoes quickly, establish the force monopoly, and re-engage the civil institutions. Reform could have come after the fact and more deliberately. All of that is governance and all of that had to come from the Army as the guys on the ground with the shortest channel to coercive force and resources. And all of that failed because the Army decided not to practice or resource any of the required capabilities and the political leaders perversely allowed it and even reinforced this silly idea.
A land Army MUST be able to destroy and replace an enemy military and political structure that exists over any given piece of terrain or population. That is strategic. Everything short of that isn't anything more than a Viking raid.
Edited and added to:
Given the definition of "nation-building," offered immediately below, might we consider that what O'Hanlon is actually suggesting is that the U.S. Army be sized and shaped -- and be trained, organized and equipped -- so as to do "nation-building?"
"Nation-building involves the use of armed force as part of a broader effort to promote political and economic reforms, with the objective of transforming a society emerging from conflict into one at peace with itself and its neighbors. This guidebook is a practical “how-to” manual on the conduct of effective nation-building. It is organized around the constituent elements that make up any nation-building mission: military, police, rule of law, humanitarian relief, governance, economic stabilization, democratization, and development."
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG557.html
In this exact "nation-building" light, to understand O'Hanlon's suggestions that the U.S. Army size and shape its main combat forces with large-scale counterinsurgency and stabilization missions in mind?
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/08/31-future…
Thus, O'Hanlon saying that:
a. Bush Jr. was obviously wrong in believing that -- due to universal values, etc., thinking -- "nation-building" requirements would not be thrust upon him following major combat operations. And that
b. Obama is also obviously wrong, in believing that the enemy does not get a vote. (And in believing, accordingly, that he can simply avoid major conflict operations and/or the "nation-building" requirements that routinely follow in their wake.)
Thus, in O'Hanlon's eyes, the unavoidable (and forcibly and legally interrelated?) requirements of being able to do both (a) major combat operations AND (b) the "nation-building" tasks that follow thereafter?
Bottom Line Question:
Is "the future of land warfare" (as per O'Hanlon") to be based on the (realistic) idea and premise -- that the requirements of "nation-building" -- following major combat operations -- cannot be avoided, and that, accordingly, these "nation-building" requirements must be provided for in the force design and structure?
(O'Hanlon's call for large-scale counterinsurgency and stabilization capabilities, in the U.S. Army's major combat organizations, to be seen exactly in this "unavoidable nation-building requirement" light?)
Bottom Line Example:
Major combat operations against N.Korea.
Thus to ask: Following major combat operations against N.Korea, could we, ethically, lawfully or realistically, simply avoid the requirement -- and/or the responsibility -- to do "nation-building" following our victory? (This, for example, by simply allowing the N. Koreans to return to their radically different, and grossly incompatible, "communist" political, economic and social orientation and way of life, to wit: the elements which together form the "root cause" of the conflict?)
(The need for O'Hanlon's "standing" large-scale counterinsurgency and stabilization capabilities, in the U.S. Army's main combat formations, to be evaluated, understood and determined in light of our answer to such questions as are posed by the nation-building "Bottom Line Example" offered immediately above?)
A/the central theme -- underlying O'Hanlon's suggestions re: land warfare -- appears to be his belief that the main combat forces of the U.S. Army MUST (in direct contradiction to the Obama administration's 2012 and 2014 defense plans) be both sized and shaped -- and, indeed, be trained, organized, equipped and deployed -- so as to be able to accomplish large-scale counterinsurgency and stabilization missions.
In this regard, consider the following from O'Hanlon's "Brookings" announcement of his new "Future of Land Warfare" offering:
BEGIN QUOTE
"In my new book, 'The Future of Land Warfare' (Brookings Institution Press, 2015), I attempt to debunk the new conventional wisdom (which began with the Obama administration but also permeates thinking beyond): Messy ground operations can be relegated to the dustbin of history. That is a paraphrase and dramatization, to be sure—but only a modest one, since the administration’s 2012 and 2014 defense plans both state that the U.S. Army will no longer size its main combat forces with large-scale counterinsurgency and stabilization missions in mind.
This is, I believe, a major conceptual mistake, even if not yet one that has decimated the Army. But it will cause increasing harm with time if we buy into the idea. The active-duty Army is already below its Clinton-era size and only slightly more than half its Reagan-era size. Reductions to the Army Reserve and Army National Guard have been almost as steep. None need grow at this juncture, but the cuts should stop.
Army Annual Budget as Portion of All Department of Defense Spending
I recognize that we need to maintain counterinsurgency and stabilization capacity, as well as a robust deterrent against possible threats to NATO by Russian President Vladimir Putin and to South Korea by North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un, among other concerns.
But we also need to think about nontraditional scenarios. While unlikely—and unpalatable—on an individual basis, they may be hard to avoid. To paraphrase the old Bolshevik saying: We may not have an interest in ugly stabilization missions, but they may have an interest in us. In some cases, the needed response may entail not just trainers and drones, but brigades and divisions."
END QUOTE
( Read more at: http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/08/31-future… )
Thus, from my perspective, and re: the perceived requirement to transform (of necessity) certain outlying and/or belligerent states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines, O'Hanlon seems to label as unrealistic both:
a. The Bush Jr. administration's "universal values"/"overwhelming appeal of our way of life" concepts and
b. The Obama administration's "we can take a break/pawn this off on others" concepts.
(BOTH of which suggest[ed] -- erroneously -- that the U.S. Army's main combat forces need not to be sized, shaped and/or employed to [a] do large-scale counterinsurgency and stabilization missions [b] in the service of transforming outlying/belligerent states and societies more along modern western lines?)
By the way, I am a discussant on a panel tomorrow with Michael O'Hanlon at the Heritage Foundation.. Although it is focused on Korea security issues we will likely address his new book as it pertains to Korea. If anyone has any burning questions they would like me to try to ask please feel free to send them my way.
http://www.heritage.org/events/2015/10/icas
Co-hosted by the Institute for Corean-American Studies Liberty Foundation
The Korean Peninsula Issues and U.S. National Security
Click here to RSVP
Featuring
Joseph Bosco, Senior Associate, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Glen S. Fukushima, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress
Bruce Klingner, Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation
Joon Oh, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the U.N.
Michael O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow and Director of Research, The Brookings Institution
and Discussants
Joseph Bosco, Senior Associate, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Peter Huessy, President, GeoStrategic Analysis
Tong Kim, Washington Correspondent and Columnist, The Korea Times
David Maxwell, Associate Director, Security Studies Program, Georgetown University
Larry Niksch, Senior Associate, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Chaired by
Synja P. Kim, Fellow, President and Chairman, ICAS
Moderated by
Sang Joo Kim, Senior Fellow and Executive Vice President, ICAS
~ Reception Following ~
<blockquote>Like I said, our very worst policy decisions have been enabled by having a war fighting army on the shelf.</blockquote>
Our worst policy decisions of late have not involved our large warfighting Army. They involved plenty of airpower and SF, or in some cases a low number of regular and SF forces stuck on FOBs. The unwillingness to employ any or sufficient Army forces in country and outside the wire also may explain the failure of the policy decisions in places like Libya, Ukraine, post-OIF Iraq, recent Afghanistan, Syria, and Yemen.
<blockquote>Not taking the time to raise, pay for and train an army has also served to disconnect the American people from the military and also to remove them and the Congress from the decision process if employing the military, shifting too much and unintended powers to the President.</blockquote>
Are you implying willingness to raise, pay for, and train our active Air Force and Navy? If that is the case, the poor policy decisions of late would have occurred even if we had a small active Army. We bombed Libya by air and from the sea. We are bombing Iraq and Syria by air and from the sea. Our weak deterrent force in NATO has largely involved weaker airborne and Stryker units, along with limited air and seapower deterrence. Putin has not been impressed. We have shown an unwillingness to arm the Ukrainian Army and the Kurds elsewhere. Putin has not been impressed, but both he and Iran have been more than willing to arm and support their proxies.
As a result, an active Army tired from the 90's Balkans was forced to bear the burden of repeated year-long OIF/OEF deployments in many cases occurring <strong>every other year</strong> due to an insufficiently-sized active Army at the time of 9/11. Your proposed solution of a larger National Guard with rules limiting deployments to only one out of five years would require a larger Guard. Often with turnover its members would be entirely new and not combat-experienced during each new deployment. In some cases, even combat-experienced NG troops would be five years older the next time they fought which when added to an already older average age would further reduce physical fitness.
You can decry that we never declared war, but we must recall that Congress and the UN, along with multiple allies did authorize and support use of military force in both Afghanistan and Iraq. As for Presidential power, the opposite recent tendency of a President unwilling to use military force due to reelection concerns/promises has been every bit as much a contributor to poor policy as President Bush’s willingness to use force. We also built-up and drafted our active Army during Vietnam and rarely used Guard troops there, and somebody mentioned that LBJ acknowledged that we could not win there but that withdrawing would help Republicans.
In addition, the Clinton-sized active Army did in fact require time to build up to support OIF and OEF which explained early under-resourcing of manpower and resultant instability after “Mission Accomplished.” The Army procurement holiday of the 90s, while simultaneously requiring enormous overseas commitments in the Balkans, forced a sudden ground-force spending spree that would have been far less costly had normal funding been maintained during the 90s.
<blockquote>Wars will be fought more by draftees than by the Guard, but the Guard would be much of the initial force to deploy as in WWII, as the Regulars form the cadre to build an army around.</blockquote>
Many might agree that some sort of draft or national service would be a good thing, particularly if paid substantially less than current junior Soldiers. As mentioned in the past, even a junior married E-4 makes as much as my GS-5, Step 10 wife with 30 years of child development experience. That E-4 doesn’t pay $426 a month for medical insurance and much of his/her pay is tax free. But even a lottery-style draft now would include women and ample ways of avoiding being in that lottery for both genders. Would being a non-high school graduate, a drug-user, overweight, and under-athletic be means of avoiding the draft? Do you want an Army with lots of dumb, druggee, fat, weak, or couch potato privates who can’t run? I saw that Army that included sergeants and officers in the mid-70s. Not a good model.
C.
Thank you for offering this, but this does not counter my point, rather this makes my point.
The types of conflicts that you and CvC are talking about here are not internal revolutionary insurgency, but are instead resistance insurgency by one population against an external system of governance that is seeking to exercise its dominion over them. Resistance insurgency as a significant aspect of war and warfare between distinct states/systems of governance, and is very much within the purview of what Clausewitz analyzed and wrote about.
As I have always said, I believe that the writings of Clausewitz apply to all forms of political war and warfare. What I have said that makes some uncomfortable, is that I strongly believe that revolutionary insurgency that is internal to a single state/system of governance, is not a form of political war or warfare at all. This is much more accurately a form of illegal democracy and civil emergency. When we classify this type of political conflict as war and apply war theory against it, it is as unhelpful and illogical as calling a presidential election war and applying war theory to plan and conduct one's political campaign. Apples and oranges.
This remains the case even when external parties get involved in the conflict. The involvement of the US in the internal revolutionary insurgency of the "small t" taliban against the government of Afghanistan does not change the illegal democracy nature of that contest. However, at the same time there is a "big T" Taliban resistance insurgency against the perceived illegitimate occupation of Afghanistan by the US and the NATO coalition we brought with us. A single insurgent actor in such a situation is often motivated by both lines of provocation. To "defeat" the resistance line of provocation one must either defeat the resistant segment of the population, or simply leave them to their country. To "defeat" the revolutionary line of provocation demands that one actually address the political grievance between the revolutionary segment of the population and the government. This invariably demands some degree of compromise and reconciliation.
But because we simplistically take a "war is war" perspective and apply Clausewitz to both, we do not make this distinction, and continue to wage war against both lines of provocation. So our efforts reasonably designed to defeat the resistance insurgency actually serving to make both lines of provocation even stronger, and doing little to resolve either one. And this is why the insurgency grows in strength every year, and why the existing government will collapse within months of the US withdrawal.
Best,
Bob
For a long time I was under that misconception. I was taught it at CGSC. But Clausewitz did write about internal conficts.
"What Clausewitz helps to understand is the political and military difference between big wars among states and small wars between states and (more or less) non-state actors. The strategic aim in big wars is the abolition of the enemy through the destruction of his army (Clausewitz 1980: 952); the tactical means are combat and ultimately the decisive battle. In symmetrical wars, Clausewitz argues, it is important not to get lost in tactical skirmishes, but to seek the strategic decision. Therefore, conventional big wars tend to be waged tactically in the defence, strategically in the offence. In unconventional small wars, this relationship is reversed. Since the non-state actor is militarily week, he cannot directly assault the enemy forces, but must resort to small scale attacks against detachments, logistical outposts and lines of communication, as Clausewitz describes so meticulously in his lectures. In this sense, small wars are waged strategically in the defence, but tactically in the offence.
Clausewitz proposed such a small war for the national liberation of Prussia from Napoleonic forces in 1812. Prussia would be too weak to meet the French in open battle, he argues. The alternative, however, should neither be surrender nor an unholy alliance with France, but the strongest possible defence through a “Spanish civil war in Germany” (Clausewitz 1966 [1812]: 729) in order to mobilise formerly unused resources. These ideas were clearly too revolutionary for the Prussian King, Friedrich Wilhelm III, who opted for the alliance with Napoleon instead. As a consequence, Clausewitz left Prussia and joined the Tsarist army to witness the strategic defence bearing fruit. Clausewitz later described the Russian campaign in detail and drew the theoretical conclusion that an attacking force loses momentum over time. At the “point of culmination”, when Napoleon took Moscow without resistance, the superiority of the offensive forces dwindled away and the defensive force gained the advantage (Clausewitz 1980: 879; 980). Although Prussia lacked the strategic depth of Russia, Clausewitz was convinced that unconventional forces and civil unrest would have been just as effective to frustrate the imperial army, if not to destroy it completely.
The crucial element, it seems, is time which works against the offensive force while it does not affect – or does so to a lesser extent – the defender. Small wars, waged by a population on its own territory, can be sustained for a long time. States, on the other hand, waging a counterinsurgency campaign are more restrained. Without tactical results, they lose strategic power. Thus, for offensive and defensive forces in small wars, different criteria for success apply. Henry Kissinger summarised this Clausewitzian insight, when he reflected the U.S. experience in Vietnam by declaring that “the guerrilla wins if it does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win” (Kissinger 1969: 214)."
Bob,
You make me chuckle. A week after 9-11 and long before you returned to active duty at 1-1 we presented an analysis that said that the terrorist threat was part of a broader insurgency campaign by AQ. We proposed a comprehensive effort to counter that in Asia. In 2003 while i was at the War College i briefed that to GEN Brown and gave him my critique of the GWOT which he did not like and banished me again to Korea for my 5th time. We were thinking about countering UW long before you returned to active duty from your long hiatus.
I do not ever recall you coming to my office when I was the USASOC G3. All I remember is your strategic appreciation briefing to the USASOC senior leadership. And long before your strategic appreciation we had proposed countering UW to the USASOC leadership for inclusion in the capstone concept but we were unsuccessful for the very reason that you wrongly accuse me of - that it is nothing more than FID (and there are those in DOTD at SWCS who feel that way today - though I have also said we do not need new doctrine for C-UW -my whole intent is get people to recognize that nations and organizations around the world are conducting their own unique forms of UW and we need to think strategically about how to counter them. And of course they are not conducting UW by our strict definition but our UW education and training can help to devise strategies to counter them and this will also keep our focus on our own UW capabilities to be able to employ them when feasible, acceptable and suitable and to employ the techniques as necessary to support other campaigns and actions that may not require a UW campaign or a UW supporting plan.
Your use of Clausewitz and dogma confirms Bill M's assessment about misinterpretation of Clausewitz. He provides us no real answers but by engaging with him (and Sun Tzu as I have written about timeless theories in the 3d volume of Small Wars Journal at the link below on pages 23-30) you can develop an understanding about the character of the conflict. The problem with your criticism and use of dogma and memorization is that Clausewitz is not something to be memorized (though the sound bites take from his dialectic are spouted as gospel which they should not) but rather something with which to engage intellectually to understand the nature of conflict from political to war. You have to understand the two purposes of On War - one was his personal wrestling match with trying to understand the nature of conflict and war and second was to provide officers with something that would help develop coup d'oeil or military genius. But to know that you really have to engage with Clausewitz but as we see here on SWJ too few do.
But I will give it a rest because too many already have their thought processes carved in stone.
Bob,
Your interpretation of Clausewitz is flawed, but your interpretation is a common interpretation. So by default you may be right, since joint doctrine has dumbed down Clausewitz to identifying (imagining)a center of gravity, then tie every objective to that imaginary center to achieve a decisive victory. A deeply flawed approach that has failed US repeatedly. Targeting has replaced strategy.I suspect Clausewitz would shake his head at our foolishness.
Dave,
As you know, I am not as dogmatic as most, and I fully realize that most do not recognize or appreciate a fundamental distinction in political conflict between two or more separate states, vs. political conflict (revolution) within a single state. I do make that distinction, and I believe it is an essential one to make.
I also recognize that many also quite happily apply Clausewitz to both types of political conflict with equal abandon. I do not, and I believe much of the struggle and failure the United States has had in its dives into the revolutionary, internal political conflicts of others has been directly linked to our insistence by out "experts" that we properly apply our Clausewitz.
I may be wrong on this, and as Einstein pointed out to his more dogmatic critics - a thousand experiments cannot prove that I am correct, but a single experiment can prove that I am wrong. When you make, or come across that single experiment please share, as I absolutely am in the pursuit of the best possible understanding in this area of political conflict.
But as you also may recall, you were not very comfortable with my position when I mapped out on your whiteboard in your office at USASOC years ago that AQ was more accurately conducting a UW campaign rather than a terror campaign, and that we were more apt to attain our desired strategic results by adopting what I called a Counter Unconventional Warfare Approach. You assured me there was no such approach in doctrine, and that such activities were covered under the broad area of Foreign Internal Defense.
Sense that time you have come to see that issue differently, and now are a major advocate for C-UW. Perhaps at some point in the future you may come to appreciate that internal political conflict requires a different theory than that designed for, and based upon a study of war between discrete political elements. Perhaps not. But given our struggles in attaining durable and desired strategic results through the application of traditional thinking, it may be time for a bit more non-traditional thinking to have oxygen space in the conversation.
Very Respectfully,
Bob
I have red and continue to read CvC and in the section called "arming the population" he openly admitted that he did not understand guerrilla actions and more needs to be written about it. In other words CvC doesn't do UW/Small wars. So why does the US military continue to try and apply theory that doesn't apply? Open question to anyone?
Bob's World is closer to the answer than anyone except me of course(JOKE calm down). Systems analysis is the way to go.
Yes, Clausewitz applies to war. Political conflict between two or more distinct systems of governance. But the insistence on attempting to apply it to political conflict internal to a single system of governance - revolutionary insurgency- has not, and will not work. It is a different genus of conflict.
You can disagree, but the facts of history suggest that you are more "wrong" than I am. Untill we stop attempting this one size fits all approach we are doomed to struggle with revolutions that can be suppressed with Clausewitzian approaches, but not resolved.
Strategy begins with understanding, not memorization, and yes the first and most important thing is to understand what type of conflict one is in. All war is political conflict, but I think the facts are bearing out that not all political conflict is war.
Bob,
You continue to misunderstand Clausewitz. His theories apply to the full spectrum of conflict and applies to and starts with the political - internal as well as external.
You might want to read Sir Lawrence Freedman's book on Strategy. But since it is longer than Clausewitz you can read HR McMaster's 13 page cliff notes book review at the link below. Here are a few excerpts from HR's essay and the abstract. After you read HR's essay and hopefully some of Freedman's work I would be happy to have a discussion about Clausewitz and strategy and internal and external political conflict.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00396338.2015.1008323#.VhaA…
Excerpts:
QUOTE:
The book gains contemporary policy relevance in revealing how a neglect of these factors can undermine both strategy in war and defence planning for future armed conflict. In Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, gaps between prior visions of future warfare and the nature of the eventual wars themselves complicated efforts to adapt strategy over time. Minimalist, linear plans – in place at the outset of both wars – were disconnected from the ambition of broader policy objectives and the complexity of the operating environment. Indeed, recent war plans have, at times, been essentially narcissistic, failing to account for interactions with determined enemies and other complicating variables. In extreme cases, plans were based on the assumption that a war would end with the disengagement of one party to the conflict.
...
Here, readers might reflect on how the lack of popular emotion towards – or even interest in – contemporary wars may place at risk the effectiveness and integrity of the military instrument in the service of strategy. As Christopher Coker wrote in The Warrior Ethos, ‘If we become what we sing, today we sing in minor key. The muse is beginning to fail us.’8 It seems possible that the West's lack of passion for its wars not only risks separating society from those who fight in its name, but also risks undermining the warrior ethos of shrinking professional militaries. Freedman quotes Tolstoy to make the point that it is not only the decisions of leaders or the strength of military forces, but also the ‘sum of individual wills’ that determine the outcome of war (p. 99). In Part Three, Freedman considers the importance of popular will in sustaining strategies for achieving political and social change over time. He describes efforts to influence popular thought and behaviour through mass media, propaganda of the deed and, today, social media and the Internet. His focus on the role of popular will in strategy reflects Richard Betts’ observation that:
Strategy is the essential ingredient for making war either politically effective or morally tenable. It is the link between military means and political ends, the scheme for how to make one produce the other. Without strategy, there is no rationale for how force will achieve purposes worth the pride in blood and treasure.9
...
Freedman acknowledges that technological advantages are important, but points out that creative enemies can fashion strategies to avoid those advantages. In his section on asymmetric warfare, he identifies measures
that the weak could adopt against the strong: concentrating on imposing pain rather than winning battles, gaining time rather than moving to closure, targeting the enemy's domestic political base as much as his forward military capabilities, and relying on an unwillingness to accept extreme pain and a weaker stake in the resolution of the conflict. In short, whereas stronger military powers had a natural preference for decisive battlefield victories, the weaker were more ready to draw the civilian sphere into the conflict while avoiding open battle (p. 220).
While Western governments seem keen to avoid repeating recent (and ongoing) experiences with protracted counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism campaigns, Freedman's analysis raises the prospect that advanced military technologies may drive future enemies off conventional battlegrounds and make those kinds of campaigns more likely. END QUOTE
ABSTRACT:
Lawrence Freedman's Strategy: A History draws out the need for strategy to be consistent with the enduring nature of war.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00396338.2015.1008323#.VhaA…
In Strategy: A History, Lawrence Freedman, professor of war studies at King's College London and author of many books, asks rhetorically, ‘can the same word apply to battle plans, political campaigning, and business deals – not to mention means of coping with the stresses of everyday life – without becoming meaningless?’ (p. x). In The Direction of War, historian Hew Strachan provides an answer: ‘the word strategy has acquired a universality which has robbed it of meaning, and left it only with banalities’.1
This is not merely an academic problem; it is a danger. Incomplete plans disconnected from the problems they are ostensibly meant to address masquerade as strategies and establish a deceptive rationale for folly. Loss of precision in the word strategy has encouraged in the West a narcissistic approach to national security; ‘strategies’ are frequently based on what the purveyor prefers rather than what the situation demands. Although Lawrence Freedman's effort at ‘an account of the most prominent themes in strategic theory’ might compromise precision for comprehensiveness, readers should not be disappointed. Freedman's discourse, organised into five parts, spans the early history of strategy, military affairs, radical and revolutionary movements, business and interdisciplinary theories of strategy. The ability to craft and execute effective strategy is increasingly vital to national and international security because, as Henry Kissinger observes in the introduction toWorld Order, we may be ‘facing a period in which forces beyond the restraints of any order determine the future’.2 Freedman has provided readers with a valuable resource for engaging with a vital subject in an increasingly complex and dangerous world.
Readers may wish to bring their own definitions of strategy to Freedman's book as an aid to engaging his work purposefully and, perhaps, selectively. Those reading from the perspective of diplomacy and international security might consider the simple definition taught in the US military's professional education system: strategy is the intelligent identification, utilisation and coordination of resources (ways and means) for the successful attainment of a specific objective (end). However, as Beatrice Heuser points out in her seminal work, The Evolution of Strategy, strategy depends on ‘variables’ – one's own political aims, the enemy's political aims and others, all partly interconnected, ‘making the whole equation even more complicated’.3As Tami Davis Biddle teaches students at the US Army War College, a failure to consider the variables that complicate the linkage between ends, ways and means risks producing ‘little more than an organizational mantra, an overly-optimistic assertion about the ability of a particular instrument of power to effect a specific outcome, or a facile claim about opportunities presented by an adversary's presumed weaknesses’.4
I have no grievances with Clausewitz, only with those who apply is theories to internal political conflicts, to which they do not apply.
As to the world we live in, it is one where power is shifting rapidly, both between and within states. The US's problem is not these rapid shifts, but rather our outdated idea that stasis of sovereignty is appropriate or possible, or that we somehow are well served by the pursuit of infeasible activities to that end.
We are better served as mediator rather than arbitrator, and by seeking influence rather than control.
Bob,
You offer so much interesting food for thought and I often like your commentary about politics, insurgency, and revolution (which are often very Clausewitzian but I know you do not like to hear that). I too long for the days of the Founding Fathers, George Washington and the American Revolution, and wars with clearly identifiable ends as World War II (which is why I still read the Federalists Papers for lessons on Political Philosophy vice theory as well as de Toqueville to really understand what made us exceptional (e.g., two oceans, Amercian culture of rugged individualism, and abundant natural resources and rivers).
But I have to part ways with your world view because I am a believer in in the old adage of "understanding the world (and dealing with it) as it really is and not as we would wish it to be." I am afraid your string of comments on this and other threads expresses a world view that no longer exists.
Like I said, our very worst policy decisions have been enabled by having a war fighting army on the shelf. Not taking the time to raise, pay for and train an army has also served to disconnect the American people from the military and also to remove them and the Congress from the decision process if employing the military, shifting too much and unintended powers to the President.
Wars will be fought more by draftees than by the Guard, but the Guard would be much of the initial force to deploy as in WWII, as the Regulars form the cadre to build an army around.
<blockquote>Bill, America has never been isolationist, but for 150 years a policy of believing we had no duty or right to attempt to manipulate the politics of others served us far better than the beliefs that have shaped the post WWII era.</blockquote>
How does the above comment jive with your earlier one below? Is it “manipulation” or security self-interest to support allies abroad?
<blockquote>Unless in position and ready to fight, standing armies do not pose much of a deterrent effect.</blockquote>
This earlier comment leads me to suspect you don’t believe we should have pulled troops from Germany and Korea after WWII and Korea. The USSR would have conquered Europe had we left. Korea would be unified under communist rule and threatening Japan without our decades of presence.
Contrast South Korea’s world economic leadership today compared to the North. Look at the human rights differences, even though South Korea started out more authoritarian but has evolved. That isn’t manipulating other’s politics. It’s leading by example. We have self-interest obligations in preventing manipulation <strong>by others</strong> be they communists, Islamic extremists, or neighbor-states manipulating neighbor-states.
<blockquote>As to our ability to raise a high tech army, there is equally no data that we could not do so, only baseless arguments to that point by those advocating for their belief that a large standing army is essential. I think the facts are pretty clear that a large standing army had enabled most of the worst policy decisions in American history.</blockquote>
If active duty units typically require CTC rotations to prepare for combat, how then would a National Guard unit be close to ready for even a CTC let alone immediate deployment and combat when larger units typically do not drill together or conduct broad collective training. Are training facilities required for collective training typically as available to National Guard units as they are for active counterparts? Are the NG units typically in proximity to train together?
How about Gunnery and diverse low-flying facilities? Simulation is great but no substitute for actual large caliber rounds downrange or flying together over other than memorized terrain. Artillery and laser-safe ranges? Today's longer range munitions require large ranges and create noise potentially acceptable to active base locals and not necessarily elsewhere.
Are physical fitness requirements lacking in youth as a whole today generally going to be worse in Guard and Reserve units? A Soldier operating high-tech equipment still must be capable of carrying that added weight and getting up that mountain or bounding toward the enemy.
As for the “worst policy decisions,” we may agree that OIF’s poor outcomes resulted from poor policy decisions made early in the conflict and in premature complete withdrawal. However as others are pointing out in other SWJ threads, the results may have differed had we chosen an alternative of firmer occupation and a forced division of Iraq. Instead, we chose utopia believing in error that a democracy resulting in Shiite domination would be less oppressive than autocracy under Sunni rule.
We disagree that Korea was a stalemate given the diversity of results we see today between the North and South due to active duty forward presence. We disagree on Afghanistan both during Rant Corps tenure and OEF, and it is baseless to believe we would have been granted repeated airspace and ground access to reach AfPak areas had we pulled out early or never went in at all. We disagree that Vietnam had no benefits in preventing the broader/faster spread of communism. We disagree that a sole SF and light footprint approach early in Vietnam was any more successful than it has been today in Libya, Yemen, post-OIF Iraq, or in the early years of OEF Afghanistan.
Even in Central America and in the Philippines, the long-term results of an SF and light approach have been less than satisfying. Panama had better results but that was more overt. Given your background, one might speculate that you support manipulation abroad as long as it is only covert, or limited to SF and a light approach, supported by eventually-ready National Guard?
<blockquote>I also believe that, as we will be recruiting from a high tech citizenry, they will handle the high tech of the modern military just fine. Data and analysis are not everything, but they are on my side of this debate.</blockquote>
That presupposes in error that other than the company IT guy, the other private sector employees are high-tech citizenry. Given the widespread hacking and cyber-attacks inflicted on our civil sector, that is questionable at best. One sees in video games a dangerous trend at “training” lone wolves and the mentally unstable. That is a far cry from the resources required for distributed simulation to allow large-scale realistic collective training.
Internet savvy citizenry have proven susceptible to manipulation and recruitment by ISIL. That is because youth in general are idealistic sans exposure to the real world other than that depicted by propaganda and college professors who never had a real job. The problem lies when these recruits mass in places like Iraq and Syria, and then spread abroad via mass refugees and further recruitment of large-population Muslim countries. Unless we address the problem abroad early through forward presence, counter-terror, raids, and active engagement, the problem spreads in scope and geographic area.
When coupled with suicidal and apocalyptic beliefs, the eventual proliferation and access by terror to WMD is when “other people’s problems” become our own. MAD may work with superpower and near-peer states. It does not work with a suicide bomber with an apocalyptic vision using WMD believing it will bring the 12th Imam or final Syrian battle, oblivious to the retaliation in kind that may result.
Bill, America has never been isolationist, but for 150 years a policy of believing we had no duty or right to attempt to manipulate the politics of others served us far better than the beliefs that have shaped the post WW II era.
As to our ability to raise a high tech army, there is equally no data that we could not do so, only baseless arguments to that point by those advocating for their belief that a large standing army is essential. I think the facts are pretty clear that a large standing army had enabled most of the worst policy decisions in American history.
I also believe that, as we will be recruiting from a high tech citizenry, they will handle the high tech of the modern military just fine. Data and analysis are not everything, but they are on my side of this debate.
Bob,
We're not isolationists, so while our geographical position is advantageous, it alone doesn't define the army's size requirement. Our foreign policy must be taken in account also. Furthermore, if you think we can mobilize a high tech army quickly in response to a crisis, I would like to see the analysis behind that claim.
The facts are:
America is a nation at peace, and has been since 1945. The conflicts of choice we have sent the Army in to force a political outcome we believed would be best for US interests have been a mixed bag, with 1 win, 1 tie, and 3 very expensive, influence draining losses. Those three losses (and one win) would likely have never occurred but for the fact that a containment strategy demanded we keep a war fighting army on the books in a time of peace. Not a resounding argument for keeping such a force.
Keeping such a force in peace is arguably unconstitutional.
Based on US geostrategy and our strong alliances with the island nations of Britain and Japan we are immune to rapid land invasion and have a luxury of time and space that our competitors appreciate far more than we do.
The army more than any other service is a wartime force that is not very good at peace.
Domestic peacetime requirements that an army can help with are served far more effectively by the National Guard than by the Regular force.
Unless in position and ready to fight, standing armies do not pose much of a deterrent effect.
I could go on. We are very lucky to be American citizens, but our strengths will always be a point of frustration for a regular army that by design is only to be a very small core, with a fighting army of citizen soldiers to be raised for war, and demobilized right after.
The only organization out there with angst about land armies is the U.S. Army. The budget-driven (of course) arguments have not been about role of or necessity for maintaining the Army, but rather what drives any particular end-strength. Oddly enough, the U.S. Army itself has been its own worst enemy in this discussion. They responded to the Navy/Air Force AirSea Battle concept by essentially making the argument that waging war anywhere revolves around land warfare, a difficult position in a theater dominated by ocean, and where the primary (and vital) role of land forces in the last decisively resolved conflict was to secure island anchorages and airfields.
When it came to the end-strength debate, rather than making a case that current U.S. policy in the Middle East makes a 450,000-man Army a poor idea (if it indeed does), pundits resurrected old, now improbable Cold War scenarios -- defending Taiwan against a cross-strait invasion (easier for the Chinese just to buy the rest of the island), refighting the Korean War of 1950 (back when Seoul was an oversized village, rather than a mobility-killing metropolis), or staring the Russians down over the Estonian border (as even now we scramble to work out operational control measures to avoid accidental contact over Syria). O'Hanlon's book doesn't look to bring more sanity to the debate -- according to the review, we need to size forces to intervene in any conflict that springs up on the face of the earth? Does anyone really believe that we're going to deploy ground forces in strength to maintain order in Saudi Arabia, or to hold India and Pakistan apart? Or invade Iran?!
In the end, none of that contributes to answering the real question: a professional land force of some size is essential to waging war. How many active duty troops are necessary to accomplish what the Army is really expected to do?
If a New Cold War is, indeed, our new paradigm, -- one which finds the U.S./the West today doing "expansion" (of our way of life, our way of governance, etc.) and our opponents now doing "containment" -- then considerations re: land forces and land warfare, one would think, would need to be significantly informed by this new paradigm.
In this regard, consider the following challenges/problems -- which appear to be common to the "expansionist" element (whether, for example, the former USSR/the communists in the Old Cold War days or the U.S./the West today):
1. State actor challenges/problems:
a. Lesser rulers/regimes: Who resist/fail to adequately support transformation of their states and societies more along the expansionist power's political, economic and social lines. (For the U.S./the West today, for example, Assad of Syria, Kim of N. Korea, etc., etc., etc.?)
b. Great nation rivals: Who use "containment" as their "spoiling" weapon of choice; this, so as to thwart their opponent's efforts to gain greater power, influence and control -- in various regions of the world -- via these such "expansionist" efforts/attempts. (Our "containment-doing" great nation rivals today: Russia and China?)
2. Non-state actors challenges/problems:
a. Resisting individuals, groups and populations (for example conservative groups): Those who do not wish to see their states and societies transformed along, in their view, alien and profane (for example: "secular?") political, economic and social lines. (Example: the Islamists; whether we are talking the Soviet/communist's "secular" expansion attempts during the Old Cold War or our such attempts today.)
b. Inept population groups: That is, populations who simply cannot make such rapid and radical transformations as the great power -- the one now doing "expansion" -- desires/requires. (Found everywhere, both back-in-the-day and again currently.)
Possible bottom line consideration re: a Cold War paradigm and the land forces/land warfare needed for the expansionist power to prevail therein:
Attempts by great nations -- to accomplish radical and rapid state and societal change in other states, societies and/or civilizations (as with the Soviets/the communists back then; and as with the U.S./the West today) -- these such great nations and their such expansionist endeavors, one might suggest, are not normally associated with the term or idea of "stability." ("Stability," in fact, being the attempted calling card and selling point of the rival "containing" great nation?)
This being the case, and given the specific challenges/problems commonly encountered by the great nation attempting expansion during a Cold War (see my Items "1" and "2" above), then:
a. Must not today's expansionist power (the U.S./the West)
b. Operating in today's New Cold War
c. Determine his land forces/land warfare requirements with these such challenges/problems well in mind?
(Either that, or abandon, exceptionally scale back, or simply put on long-term hold his expansionist efforts and agenda?)