Can the Counterinsurgency Doctrine Be Saved? By Karsten Friis, The Diplomat
With the apparent lack of progress and success in Afghanistan and Iraq, counterinsurgency (COIN) has fallen out of favor within the political and military establishments in the U.S. and elsewhere. Regardless of whether these failures were due to erroneous implementation or theoretical shortcomings, COIN is no longer considered “hot” in strategic circles. However, one should be careful not to throw the baby out with the bath water. There are elements of COIN worth preserving and retaining for future operations. By modifying our understanding of COIN using insight from security and peace-building literature, a revised concept can be developed which could inform future irregular wars more efficiently than current doctrine. We call it the stakeholder-centric COIN.
An insurgency is first and foremost a struggle for political power over the allegiance of the population in a given territory. It is a method employed by a non-state actor to challenge the existing political authority. Counterinsurgency, on the other hand, is defined as “military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency,” as stated by the U.S. Field Manual 3-24. The concept of legitimacy is clearly the centerpiece of FM 3-24 and defined as the primary objective of any operation. A legitimate government is understood as one that rules with the consent of the governed, providing security and basic services. This has inspired the term population-centric COIN.
COIN has been widely criticized both for its theoretical shortcomings and for its failure to provide victory in Afghanistan and Iraq…
Comments
With regard to the author's "stakeholder-centric" thesis, and in matters relating to the U.S./the West's overarching political objective, to wit:
1, The elimination of alternative ways of life, alternative ways of governance and alternative values, attitudes and beliefs. And, in the place of these,
2. The installation of our way of life, our way of governance and our values, attitudes and beliefs.
With regard to this overriding political objective of the U.S./the West, and as these matters relate to differently ordered, organized and oriented states and societies, who is best described as the ultimate "stakeholder? Is it:
a. The rulers/regimes of these differently ordered states and societies?
b. As per our author here, is it the other "relevant military, political, social, religious" leaders of these alternatively oriented countries/civilizations?
Or, with regard to who is the ultimate "stakeholder" -- of a state, society, culture and/or civilization's unique and time-honored way of life, way of governance and underlying values, attitudes and beliefs -- is it, in fact,
c. The populations/the people of these differently organized countries/civilizations?
To help answer this fundamental question, let's do the "shoe on the other foot" thing and ask who is the ultimate "stakeholder" of the American/Western way of life, of the American/Western ways of governance, and of American/Western foundational values, attitudes and beliefs etc.?
Is the answer to this question:
a. The American/the Western rulers/regimes?
b. Other American/Western military, political, social, religious leaders?
Or, in the final analysis, is the ultimate -- and properly understood -- "stakeholder" of American/Western ways, mores, values, institutions, etc., actually:
c. The American/the Western populations and people?
Our understanding of what actually constitutes a "stakeholder-centric" approach to counterinsurgency to be determined, in large part, by our answers to BOTH of the "a" - "c" question-sets provided above?
Slap,
As you know this is fiction, and fiction that is intended to appeal to the mainstream audience that likes easy answers. If he is referring only to the Islamic State, I tend to agree with his view that their war is very driven by extreme ideology, not simply political power. However, the IS is one of many groups fighting in Syria and Iraq, not to mention all the different state actors involved.
Sending 200,000 troops indefinitely would be a great way to weaken the U.S. strategically. We wouldn't able to afford to protect our interests elsewhere in the world, interests that arguably more important than Syria. Bombing Raqqa into a parking lot would certainly hurt the IS, but it wouldn't destroy their network, which thrives on the idea the operative discussed. On the other hand, building schools, hospitals, and giving other forms of aid won't accomplish much either.
Some simple recommendations that really aren't that simple. First, develop a strategy. O.K., I'm only joking, I know we're not going to do that. However, at least determine what our policy is regarding Assad's regime, does he stay or does he go? If he goes, then what? Let's assume he goes, at this point he is reprehensible war criminal that needs to go IMO.
First, focus our effort on removing him (be prepared to fight Iran and Russia to do so). So it leads to a costly world war, who cares, we have to do something right? Surge whatever forces are needed to install a puppet government we can influence, and then conduct COIN for 10 years to protect it, while we conduct decisive combat operations against the IS in Syria.
We can hope, because hope is a course of action, that the Iraqi government will seize the moment and crush ISIL in Iraq. Of course to consolidate gains they'll establish a government that fully integrates Sunnis, Shia, and Kurds and become one big happy family. Iran will gladly sit by and let this happen.
O.K., this time I'm serious, really! I am serious about Assad, but we better think hard about the morning after. Second, as Americans we generally don't feel comfortable sitting on the side lines while tens of thousands of innocent civilians are slaughtered. There is no reason we shouldn't have established safe zones for civilians within Syria on its borders, which could be controlled with a few thousand troops and air power. This would accomplish a few things. First, it is the right thing to do ethically (values is a national security interest). Second, it gives us a captive audience to influence and identify the potential future leaders of Syria after the wars ends (there are wars within wars), and third it would alleviate an unbearable burden on Europe from refugees. This number of refugees not only challenges the EU's pocket book, but ultimately puts European culture at risk. That is not a minor issue, not every country is a melting pot like the U.S., although Trump is promising to unmelt it.
In the meantime, increase support to the resistance that is fighting Assad, but don't push for a catastrophic victory. The regime and its military leaders need to see the writing on the wall, which could force them to negotiate their ouster and transfer of power with less chaos. For ISIL, absolutely no mercy. We do need to put Special Forces on the ground to work with whatever proxies are willing to fight. U.S. boots on the ground will exponentially increase the impact of our air power.
We do often "lose", in the sense that we fail to achieve our objectives. That I suspect is less about getting "beaten" than it is about selecting objectives that are vague, ephemeral, and in many cases completely unrealistic. Setting out to install a western-style democracy in Afghanistan is a good way to beat yourself before you start.
The difference between involvement and commitment is also a factor. We're involved, they're committed. We can walk away if the costs exceed the benefits, and in many cases the benefits aren't even very clear. The other guys know that. They know they don't have to "win" in any military sense, they just have to endure until we realize that the whole thing is going nowhere, and write it off.
Slap describes our defeats in military terms, which is not accurate. Our defeats are ones of policy and politics.
Which reinforces the point that these are not American wars, and that they do not have military solutions. We need to reframe the problem in order to get to better policy decisions and more appropriate application of military power in support of those decisions.
Winning battles is as moot as losing them in a competition for influence between a population and its own government. Either can help or hurt ones cause if one does not appreciate what type of conflict they are in, and equally what their appropriate role in that conflict is.
"Governments put into power by a foreign government are de facto illegitimate across broad segments of the affected society."
"Governments protected by foreign military power from their own population are de facto illegitimate across broad segments of the affected population."
I believe that it is (a) more what the foreign intervening power REPRESENTS and (b) more what the foreign intervening power SEEKS TO DO that (c) determines whether/why a foreign-installed local government might -- from the get-go -- be considered illegitimate.
Example A: When the Soviets/the communists, using their installed and protected local government, sought to radically and rapidly transform the state and societies of Afghanistan more along the alien and profane lines of communist secularism. And
Example B: When the U.S./the West, using its installed and protected local government, sought to radically and rapidly transform the state and societies of Afghanistan more along the alien and profane lines of democratic-capitalist secularism.
Thus, it is:
a. What the Soviet/the communists and the U.S./the West REPRESENTED (alien, profane and, thus, highly incompatible ways of life, ways of governance and associated values, attitudes and beliefs) which, in both examples here, caused their installed local governments to be seen -- from the get-go -- as, not only illegitimate, but also as poison. Likewise, it is:
b. What the Soviet/the communists, and their U.S./Western counterparts, SOUGHT TO DO (to transform the invaded nations more along the foreign intervening powers' alien and profane political, economic and social lines) which caused, in both cases above, their installed local governments -- from the get-go -- to be seen as, not only illegitimate, but also as many Afghan's mortal enemy.
Thus, I suggest, it is more what the foreign intervening power REPRESENTS, and more what the foreign intervening power SEEKS TO DO that renders (1) the foreign intervening power and (2) its installed local government as (3) immediately illegitimate.
Q: Why is that the Soviets/the communists back then -- and the Americans/the West today -- did not/do not understand this?
A: Because each believed/believes in a version of "universal values," each believed/believes in a version of "the end of history" and each believed/believes in the overwhelming appeal of its radically different (i.e., "secular") way of life/way of governance/etc. And each felt/feels the need to "convert" (one way or another) the rest of the world.
(Note: I believe that, overall, both our questions -- and our answers -- must be framed in the context that I offer in the paragraph immediately above. Thus, much as we might have framed our questions and answers in the context of "containment of communism" in the recent past; likewise today, I believe, we must frame our questions and answers, currently, in the context the U.S./the West's "expansionist" efforts. Thereby, things like "legitimacy" [etc.] -- and/or the lack thereof -- being easily understood?)
Bill,
"The insurgent" is almost always a small group. But the insurgent is not the insurgency. What percentage of the US population is the US military??? It is an irrelevant point.
What was not provided is what percentage of the Colombian population did not recognize the right of the government to govern them? The FARC is a symptom of that population's perception, and the insurgency resides within the population itself.
Historically insurgencies rarely encompass a majority of the population. Revolution may be illegal democracy as I submit, but it is not majority rule. Most of the governments challenged by insurgency are not majority rule either. Life is unfair like that. Hard to feel sorry for the oppressive bastards in power, when the oppressed bastards out of power exert themselves to turn the tables.
But just as our definition and understanding of the nature of insurgency is the number one hindrance to getting to effective thinking on how to resolve an insurgency; so too does our overly legalistic perspective on "legitimacy" hinder our thinking on what aspect of legitimacy is actually in play.
For me it is popular legitimacy, the recognition by some distinct population (regardless of percentage of the total population), of the right of some system of governance to affect their lives. This is pure perception, is subjective, and can only be assessed through the perspective of the population in question.
Governments put into power by a foreign government are de facto illegitimate across broad segments of the affected society.
Governments protected by foreign military power from their own population are de facto illegitimate across broad segments of the affected population. This is why it is so important to recognize that as a foreign power we are not doing "COIN" - because when the host security forces and government are not doing well and we start doing it for them it undermines their popular legitimacy even more as we usurp their duties and subsidize their existence.
We think and act like a colonial power in a post-colonial world. It is a mindset and strategy that has never worked for us. Our only "COIN" successes are where we were extremely constrained by the host nation and forced to respect their sovereignty (Colombia, Philippines being two), forcing us to operate in ways that actually served to reinforce popular perceptions of the host nation's right to govern. We earned those successes more by accident than design, and clamored for more authorities throughout each that would have served to rob us of those successes.
If I interpreted Karsten Friis's argument correctly, then I think he makes a meaningful contribution that should influence doctrine and strategic approaches for countering insurgencies. I agree with the counter arguments below that legitimacy is overrated. As MoveForward points out, in most situations the insurgents represent a small percentage of the population. They won't establish legitimacy, but they can and do establish control. Since this control is imposed, it will be contested. This is the initial contest in a counterinsurgency, and it parallels Clausewitz's description of the nature of war, whether or not we actually recognize as a war.
In defense of those who argue it is not war, I agree it differs significantly from what our doctrine refers to as traditional warfare. When the counterinsurgent attempts to use the conventional doctrines associated with traditional warfare the counterinsurgent will often fail, or if he wins he more often than not creates a situation that far short of a better and somewhat enduring peace. Control should only be the initial phase of the contest, ultimately a better peace means seeking a solution that promotes long term stability and development. Just because this form of contest is not traditional warfare it doesn't mean it is not a form of warfare. Unfortunately traditional views of war and warfare have limited our ability to perceive war as the chameleon Clausewitz told us it was.
In this contest, the opponents (often there are several)apply force as part of their strategy. Albeit, they often do so in a much more discreet manner to achieve their political ends. The insurgent is often constrained by means, and the counterinsurgent by perception. Still, to the extent possible each tries to impose their will upon the other. Instead of total defeat, they often strive just to get their opponent to acquiesce or compromise to achieve limited objectives. If I read the article correctly, the author suggests the counterinsurgents should use their means to seek a political agreement with the various stakeholders.
"Acknowledging the crucial significance of the stakeholders, we propose the end-state for a COIN operation as: a political agreement between the main stakeholders in the conflict that is regarded as legitimate and ensures a stability acceptable to all. The goal is to enable a political process that leads to an agreement between the main stakeholders that will allow the external forces to withdraw."
To me that doesn't differ much Clausewitz's argument that war is a means to an end, and that end is always subordinate to the object. He also points out that the object over time will often change due to multiple factors. Once it is accepted that total victory is not possible, then lesser objects may become the end.
How that plays out in this type of conflict is more complex due to the potential number of actors that have a voice in the negotiation process. It becomes more challenging when they don't have a political body (many of the communist insurgencies had a political party in exile that could be negotiated with) that one can negotiate with. If the aim of the counterinsurgent is to "defeat" the insurgency, then they'll have to go down a bloody road to get there. Just killing off the leaders won't get them there. If the goal is to end the insurgency, then the counterinsurgent must take a more complex approach to set conditions to reach that settlement. That doesn't mean security forces won't be employed to apply force, and often a good deal of force, because first the insurgents must be convinced they can't achieve their ends militarily. However, that fighting would be in support of achieving political agreements (compromises) to bring the conflict to an end, instead of the fighting becoming the defacto strategy.
As the author points out, we need something between population and enemy centric COIN. These approaches are not working.
He recommends, "instead of seeking to build the legitimacy of the political system in the eyes of every single individual (‘the population’), he focuses on the relevant stakeholders in the marketplace. And instead of building legitimacy through government structures and provision of services, de Waal emphasizes the power-relationships between the stakeholders in the political marketplace."
I tend to agree with the argument, but it is always situation specific. I do not think the U.S. military or the UN is structured to do this. Furthermore, the U.S. is philosophically constrained to try to impose a democratic state solution on every problem. So in the end we still have a disconnect between ends, ways, and means.
One problem with this argument is that <i>stakeholders</i> extend beyond the confines of existing nation-states. MAJ Farhad’s article points out that Pakistan's ISI was driving Afghanistan insurgency even back in the 1980s, not to mention the Soviets and British before that. This article and the very existence of Central Asian “stans” that are largely ethnically-based on Afghanistan’s northern borders ensure stakeholder interest in the similar peoples that live in Afghanistan. Colonial ill-drawn boundaries and the very credibility of the Neapolitan state itself cause many problems.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/11/04/in-norther…
Tajikistan has Tajiks. Uzbekistan has Uzbeks. Turkmenistan has Turkmen. Afghanistan has all those ethnicities in large numbers along its northern borders but no similar “Pashtunistan” or “Baluchistan” exists in areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan thanks to a Durand Line purposely drawn to allow the Brits to “divide and rule.” The Pashtuns think Afghanistan <i>is</i> a Pashtun state. Northern Alliance ethnicities that outnumber the Pashtuns think otherwise. In addition, far more Pashtuns live on the Pakistan side of the Durand line which guarantees both Taliban sanctuary and Pakistan/ISI fear of a Pashtun insurgency within their own borders not to mention fear of Indian influence in non-Pashtun areas of Afghanistan.
Geoff and RCJ are talking about Columbia and other insurgencies in their comments citing legitimacy as a factor in COIN. However Dr. Demarest points out that perhaps one tenth of one percent of Columbians make up FARC. That and many other oft-cited insurgencies have little bearing on the legitimacy of governments and security forces in current insurgencies in the Middle East, Levant, and Central Asia. Columbia is primarily a Christian country with a unified Army, with 99% speaking Spanish, and comprising an 86% Mestizo and white population unlike the multi-ethnic, multi-language, multi-religious Levant and Afghanistan. Unlike Columbia, the ANSF, Iraq, and Syrian Armies and militias <i>do not</i> represent large segments of the populations of those “countries.” If you go to the Wikipedia for Columbia, you also note a figure that shows the changing boundaries of that nation during the time of its independence. Yet we seldom seriously address such a possibility in fixing boundary-driven problems in Islamic nations---while simultaneously insisting on such a boundary change in Israel??
Compounding that legitimacy problem are the <i>external</i> and internal stakeholder fears that exists in the Levant, Turkey, and Iran where Kurds live in large numbers without their own state. Turkey does not want Kurds to have a state in the Levant because of their own Kurds in Turkey nor do Iraq, Iran, or Assad. Many recognize the Kurds as aggrieved stakeholders just as the Sunnis are within the Levant oppressed by both Assad and Iraq’s Iranian-influenced government. Yet because we have a large embassy in Iraq and a NATO ally Turkey providing us a base at Incirlik, we continue to be a half-hearted stakeholder at best in supporting Kurds and Sunnis and in attacks of ISIL while Russia and Iran are far more aggressive (although not against ISIL).
Beyond that, the linked article up above shows Chechnyans showing up in Afghanistan along with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan that previously had hung out in Pakistan, now driven out by the Pakistan Army and trying to set up shop in Uzbek areas of Afghanistan. Chechnyans have no stake in Afghanistan, yet because they are radical Islamists, they gain a stake by religious calls for Jihad. The same holds true for ISIL both within the Levant, north Africa, the Sinai, and now in Nangarhar province, Afghanistan. Foreign fighters with an Islamist and youth-driven ideology based on tenets of Jihad and fun-travel-adventure flock to war-torn areas without really understanding what they will face. Russian stake-holders soon make that evident with 800 October airstrikes in Syria that kill Sunnis combatants and civilians alike with both classified as “terrorists” that threaten Assad and their port at Tartus.
Now we see a probable bomb on a Sinai-launched civilian Russian aircraft. So being a stakeholder in foreign wars can have a price. However, this morning on CNN, a Robert Pape who is the Director of the <I>Chicago</I> Project on Terrorism used the Sinai potential bombing as an argument against the U.S. becoming a greater stakeholder in the Levant. His basic argument: get involved, become a target of terror. Russia’s likely counter-response? We crushed Chechnya, we can crush Syrian Sunnis and ISIL as well with little regard for civilian life and property.
We can choose to be a half-hearted stakeholder in foreign wars and insurgencies and it will mean we lose influence in those parts of the world. We alternately can demonstrate a prolonged commitment and forward presence as we did in Korea, Japan, Europe, the Balkans, Diego Garcia, Kuwait, and the Sinai and our stake and influence remain a factor. We are unlikely to stop being a target of terror just because we are half-hearted in our efforts. That merely emboldens ISIL and other Islamic extremists. It also signals to autocrats in Russia and China that they need not fear that the U.S. will adequately stand behind its own stakes in the world, and those of its allies.
Che went to Bolivia to conduct UW, with the goal that he could start an insurgency in the center of South America with ideology, and that it would spread across the entire continent. But he picked a country that had just completed a revolutionary effort that resolved the main issues with governance and he died in the jungle with less support than the US was able to drum up among the Sunni Arabs of Syria and Iraq to fight ISIS.
Che didn't understand insurgency any better than the US does. One cannot create insurgency where conditions do not exist, and one cannot drum up COIN support where the population perceives the insurgent to be the party offering the best solution.
But you continue to speak of the insurgents as if they are the insurgency. That is like assuming that the American Army is the American people. An insurgent force can be defeated while making the insurgency resolve within the population they rise from even stronger. Likewise, one can defeat an opponent's army and make the will to resist within the population that army rises from stronger as well.
The modern example is the brutal crushing of the Tamil Tigers by the government of Sri Lanka. Does anyone think the defeat of the Tigers resolves the motivations within the Tamil population for rising up in insurgency in the first place? Military operations can create time and space for governance to evolve and address the drivers of insurgency with a population, but when one comes to believe the insurgent IS the insurgency governments tend to think the "war" is "won" and continue on with the same practices that created the conditions that supported the rise of an insurgent challenge to begin with. That is not resolution of insurgency, that is suppression of insurgent.
In another time, with another mission, suppression of the insurgent is good enough. If we were a colonial power only seeking to keep our puppet regime in power and to maximize profits from our extraction operations, suppression is good enough. But that is not our mission, and in this globalized era such behavior creates the powerful motivations and connectivity between disparate insurgencies that we call today "transnational terrorism."
Governments could afford to be cavalier about insurgency in the past, and simply employ governmental power to suppress those who dared to act out. Repeat as necessary. But this is no longer the case. Insurgency has not changed over time, but the balance of power between governments and populations is currently shifted rapidly and significantly in the favor of populations. Now government must actually have the consent of the governed (the form of legitimacy that matters), and must work to operate in a manner that is equitable across the entire population, and that is consistent with the cultural expectations of that same population.
We conduct regime change or regime stabilization operations that take the population out of the equation. We think "legitimacy" is a government blessed by the consent of the legal community led by the US. We create governments designed to favor one segment of the population we think will most likely go along with what we think is proper, and that attempts to govern in a manner consistent with OUR cultural expectations. Then we attempt to build local/national security forces in our image to defeat the insurgent challengers to the government we have created and to our own presence necessary to create and preserve these fundamentally illegitimate regimes.
This strategy and this understanding of insurgency failed in Vietnam, it failed in Iraq, and if failed in Afghanistan. The facts are different in each case, but our strategic understanding and approach were largely the same. Proven failure after failure, yet we keep riding that horse. We blame the host nation for lacking will, we blame our own civil officials for lacking will, we blame complexity, we blame ideology, we think of these as American wars that we lost. This latest effort to blame "impunity" (and Michelle Hughes is a friend and we have had long talks where I challenged her on the premise of her recently released book by that title) is another effort to rationalize why our thinking and actions were right, and that it is something done (or not done) by others that caused the resultant failure. This thinking borders on insanity.
In today's world governments must govern, and insurgency must be avoided if possible through mechanisms like the US Bill of Rights, or resolved when necessary - as suppression of symptoms by the military is no longer good enough.
Bob
Legitimacy is NOT the fundamental issue. I agree words matter and definitions matter, and after all we’ve little choice but to use them. My take on ‘legitimacy’, as to its communicative value, is that it is ebbing, and that what it transmits is at best no more precise than the term ‘good enough’. While societal adequacy might be a reasonable goal, it’s tough to achieve directly through the use of force, and hard to measure. We can confront badness with force, but the building of acceptable societal conditions is almost always someone else’s business, not ours. I like to use the example of the American revolutionary framers. The ultimate goal was liberty, but the framers argued so much over the proper contents and details of that concept that they could join together only over the idea of opposing and confronting its opposite, tyranny. So it is for me with the idea of legitimacy. I think it wasteful effort for us to be building some abstract ‘good’ societal condition, the specifics about which we cannot agree. On the other hand, we might all agree that we should oppose impunity. A practical advantage becomes apparent. A cartography of legitimacy might be very complicated, while a cartography of impunity can be quite simple. After all, if someone is getting away with something we don’t want them getting away with, they are getting away with it somewhere. The physical geography of a perpetrator’s impunity is his sanctuary.
You ask has an insurgency ever been beaten by force. Well sure, happens all the time. Have well-developed insurgencies been defeated that way? Yes, bunches of them. Ask Che Guevara how his Bolivian insurgency went after he was killed. An insurgency that only ‘pops up’ again after twenty years? To me that sounds like a pretty good rate of recrudescence -- a guy could finish his career.
I agree with you that there are lots of places in the world that are not especially nice places as far as human flourishing is concerned and where some sort of insurgency is bound to spring up. I just don’t think it is the US military’s job to go fix those places (maybe an exception or two). The ‘underlying socio-economic causation’ as it is called, the ‘root causes’, are not our business, we do not understand them well enough nor can we agree on them. For the most part, I don’t think it is the US military’s job to stop insurgencies, either (maybe an exception or two). I would just as soon we started them, but I don’t get the impression that most of the strategy and military thinkers in the United States understand why it is that our own society works as well as it does in terms of human flourishing. Accordingly, the run of our community’s ideas for improving the ‘legitimacy’ of foreign places is whack.
Colombia has interested me for decades. The FARC has been there the whole time. However, there have been several other Colombian ‘insurgent’ movements and organizations over the years that have been mostly or completely dismantled and defeated -- militarily for the most part. As for the FARC, to argue that they have succeeded because of underlying socio-economic conditions would be at once obvious and fatuous. They formed an army and have had tremendous international support including the benefit of foreign sanctuaries, as well as a moral allowance to survive on landmines, murder, extortion, kidnapping, coca sales and predation of every type. I think you have that oncology thing backwards. To point at some sort of ‘root cause’ in Colombian society is to look at that rash you’re talking about instead of the cancer that is the FARC and its backers. The FARC, at its apogee, never enjoyed five percent active support of the Colombian public, with 30,000 arms bearers (absolute max) out of a population of more than 30 million at the time. That’s what, 1/10 of a percent? Now the population is 45 million and the FARC at less than ten thousand. And yet they are negotiating at parity with the government on the back of an argument that the government is morally just as bad, the military worse, and that it’s all society’s fault. And, of course, they create fear. If a Colombian were to speechify Rooseveltesque, “The only thing we have to fear is fear itself,” the FARC chiefs would happily think to themselves…excellent, that’s plenty. We do better not to hoist and wave the narrative flags of the FARCs of the world. We don’t have to. The fundamental issue is NOT legitimacy. The fundamental issue: Is someone overseas behaving in a way that America cannot abide and do we have the affordable wherewithal to punish, stop or deter them?
Geoff,
Legitimacy IS the fundamental issue - but legitimacy is a word with many meanings. Our doctrine latched onto the right word, they just applied the wrong definition. Words matter. Meanings matter even more.
I have to ask you though, where has defeating the insurgent as you advocate ever resolved an insurgency? Sure, I have read the history books, the RAND study, etc that take the position that a COIN victory is where the government is uncoerced and the insurgent is defeated. Please ignore that pesky insurgencies continue to pop up every 10 to 20 years despite the previous "victory."
A COIN approach that focuses on insurgents is like an Oncologist who focuses on defeating the rash on your skin, while ignoring the high stage cancer within. It is mere suppression of symptoms that did nothing to make the problem better, and most often contributed to making the problem worse.
Our problem in the military is that we attempt to force all forms of insurgency to fit the round hole of "war." Most successful insurgency is non-violent. Insurgency often exists for decades or even centuries latent within a population, much like a volcanic mountain in the ring of fire, only flaring to deadly life when some catalytic even occurs, and too often going dormant due to the application of suppressive and deterrent power by the government, only to flare again as opportunity presents.
We will not get to a good manual on COIN, until first we can get to a more accurate understanding of insurgency. Given the fact that populations will continue to be empowered in ways that are increasingly difficult for government to simply suppress and deter, this is probably a task we should take on with some alacrity, and not cling doggedly to Colonial and Containment perspectives that were never accurate, but that were once adequate to the task.
Bob
Dave,
I guess I don’t have to tell anyone not new to these SWJ conversations that I’m not a fan of COIN. I think the manual should be graded as a net negative as to our understanding and performance. Sure there are “elements of COIN worth preserving and retaining for future operations,” but I don’t think we’re zooming in on those elements. It seems we’re defending what’s wrong with COIN. ‘Legitimacy’ is a siren, a red herring and an inducement to equivocation and moral compromise. In big English it is best described as BS. And yet, we have, approvingly, “… legitimacy is clearly the centerpiece of FM 3-24 and defined as the primary objective of any operation” as received knowledge. Ouch. Money paragraph: “COIN has been widely criticized both for its theoretical shortcomings and for its failure to provide victory in Afghanistan and Iraq. Critics have called for a more traditional military approach, arguing that the focus should be on the insurgents, not the causes of insurgency.” That part’s not a too-far-off description of how I feel. Then comes, “However, as we see it, the enemy-centric approach is unsustainable: by seeking a purely military solution it ignores the local politics at play and its importance for a future peace.” It would be a sloppy strawman to claim I would seek a PURELY military solution. Little is pure, and I’m always ready for the exception and moderation. Still, why accept that the term COIN is a keeper when it is connotatively tied so tightly to ‘underlying causes’, ‘population-centric’, ‘legitimacy’, and other crimes against clear thinking. COIN, to me, means doing good things, however abstract, inappropriate and ill-conceived they may be, and therewith pave roads to hell. I agree wholeheartedly that the standard slate of actors, especially if we’re one of them, is anti-govt (maybe insurgent), govt (maybe counterinsurgent), foreign intervener (maybe on behalf of the govt). I think it is a rare struggle indeed that is entirely internal, and there is usually more than one anti-actor, the government is often divided and changing, and there are several foreign actors -- all that mess. I prefer an intellectual model of approach to that messiness wherein we focus on those organizations able to provide impunity to their people. Such a model gives us the possibility of mapping the physical geography of that impunity and then measuring if we’re closing it or not. All this legitimacy stuff has become vexing, if not totally meaningless. It was used 170 times, in varying ways, in the last manual attempt.
Geoff
The government of the China cir. 1979 and government of the former USSR cir. 1991 faced such horribly wrenching state and societal "change" requirements as we are discussing here.
Should we say that it was the "good governance" characteristics you describe above (came to power in ways recognized by the people; governed in ways perceived as equitable; provided trusted, certain and legal means for the people to express their concerns with governance and to shape same in ways consistent with their cultural expectations); were these the reasons why the governments of China and the former USSR were able to achieve radical and rapid state and societal change; this, minus major revolts/insurgencies?
Or
Might we consider that it was some other reason/factor, for example: the degree of coercive control exercised by the governments of China and the Soviet Union, which, more accurately, accounts for why these (communist) governments were able to (a) achieve such radical and rapid transitions (b) relatively peacefully and (c) in such populous and otherwise challenging settings?
If this latter reason is believed (as per the Chinese and Soviet "communist" governing examples above) to more accurately describe why these such major transitions were achieved so peacefully, then should we not consider "good governance" in a different way? For example, more along the lines of S.P. Huntington's "Political Order in Changing Societies;" which suggests that it not so much to the form of governance that we should be concerned with but more the degree of governance?
This such understanding of "good governance" allowing us to pursue our goal of fundamental and complete state and societal change in other countries minus the (self-defeating?) requirement of war, regime change, COIN, etc.?
Governance that comes to power in ways recognized by the people they affect; and which attempts to govern in ways perceived as equitable across the entire population; while providing trusted, certain and legal means for people to express their concerns with governance and shape the same in ways consistent with their cultural expectations is inherently possessed of popular legitimacy and highly unlikely to be challenged by revolutionary insurgency.
When governments get into trouble is when they ignore these concepts, or when they follow them at home, but ignore them in their adventures abroad.
Many of our current partners in the middle east are of the former, while we are of the latter.
Let me humbly attempt to put some contemporary "meat on the bones" on your insights and suggestions -- so that I might, hopefully, view these matters in a proper context.
Here goes:
If we understand that the "root cause" of many insurgencies today is a somewhat common revolt against the radical, rapid and unwanted political, economic and social changes desired by certain powerful people. This:
a. Whether such unwanted change is decided and attempted somewhat independently; for example, by a local government/governor (but consistent with, for example, the desires of the U.S./the West) and via this local government/governor's issuance of unpopular state and societal "change" edicts/policies. (A condition which would seem to kick-in your "insurgency as internal revolt/illegal democracy" argument above? And, potentially, kick-in our FID efforts? Example: Columbia?) Or
b. Whether such unwanted change is decided and attempted by a foreign intervening power (for example, by U.S./the West) and via invasion, regime-change and occupation. And by way of this foreign intervening power's issuance -- via its newly-installed government/governor -- of similarly unpopular state and societal "change" edicts/policies. (A condition which would seem to kick-in your "insurgency as a continuation of war and warfare" argument? And, potentially, kick-in our COIN efforts? Examples: Iraq and Afghanistan?)
Then, and if I have represented these matters correctly, how is it that:
a. The local government/governor -- seeking fundamental state and societal change in his/her own country or
b. The foreign intervening power -- seeking fundamental state and societal change in another country.
How is it that these powerful officials believe that they might -- against the will of both the population and the current stakeholders (both of whom will often be disenfranchised by such radical and rapid state and societal changes as these powerful officials desire?) --
1. Retain their legitimacy,
2. Avoid a fight (and the resulting instability) while still
3. Achieving their objective of rapid, complete, fundamental -- and undesired -- state and societal "change?"
Herein, the realities of FID and COIN suggesting that this simply is not possible? Something (either a degree of legitimacy and stability -- or a degree of rapid and radical "change) has to give?
"An insurgency is first and foremost a struggle for political power over the allegiance of the population in a given territory. It is a method employed by a non-state actor to challenge the existing political authority."
That more accurately describes "An insurgent" than "an insurgency." It is very important to note, I believe, that the insurgent, is not the insurgency. The insurgent is a symptom of insurgency, and exploiter and manifestation of a negative political energy when one or both of two types of conditions exist.
Internally is revolution, illegal democracy if you will. A belief that rises within a population that they have no choice but to act out illegally, and often violently, to coerce their own government. This may be to force some change, as with the US Civil Rights movement; or this may be to break off some territory to form a new state, as the Sunni Arabs of Syira and Iraq feel is necessary for their future and is currently exploited and led by ISIS - or as the American Colonies did; or it may be to overthrow a regime completely, as in the French Revolution. All of these are forms of internal revolutionary insurgency, none of which that were actually "war" or "warfare" or that would have responded in a productive and durable way to a war or warfare response by the government/counterinsurgent. Revolution is like a dispute between a son and a father. The father may be violently attacked by the son, but to simple defeat the son is no real solution and only suppresses the symptoms. To bribe the son (pop-centric COIN} is no cure either. One must actually address the issues at the root of the dispute. Mitigate the violence, talk, reconcile issues, evolve governance. This is illegal democracy and typically occurs when and where trusted, certain and legal means of affecting governance do not exist, and in times when populations are either evolving rapidly in expectations, or are being stressed by some condition of weather, economy, governance, etc. It is natural, and a right and duty of populations everywhere IAW the US Declaration of Independence.
The other form of insurgency is a form of war and warfare. That is resistance insurgency. When two or more distinct states or systems of government wage war, or in other ways impose upon the sovereignty of one by another. Typically this is a physical occupation by one. Often the population fights along with the government and the army, as in the Russian resistance of Germany in WWII. Often it is a population that remains in the fight long after the government and the army have been defeated or surrendered, as in the French resistance during WWII. More modernly we need to also consider that "occupation by policy" can create a resistance effect as well. The example of a US foreign policy for the Middle East designed for the Cold War and extended largely unchanged into the post Cold War era is our current case. This is the energy that allows AQ and ISIS to unite disparate revolutionary insurgencies to a larger common cause of resisting against excessive incursions on their sovereign rights as populations to have governments that are responsive to their evolving needs. This is a form of war, and Clausewitz applies.
I believe not understanding insurgency for what it truly is is the primary reason that US COIN doctrine, strategies and tactics ultimately fail. Couple with our strong sense of "American Exceptionalism" that our actions cannot possible cause these perceptions in others like the actions of any other nation behaving similarly would. Also an American "strategic culture" that believes that if we simply dedicate ourselves completely to some project (Panama Canal, WWII, man on moon) we can make it happen when others would fail. Know yourself.
We can be good at insurgency, and as I said, domestically in what is truly COIN for us, we are. But we get confused when we go and initiate or involve ourselves in the insurgencies of others.
Bob
"Acknowledging the crucial significance of the stakeholders, we propose the end-state for a COIN operation as: a political agreement between the main stakeholders in the conflict that is regarded as legitimate and ensures a stability acceptable to all. The goal is to enable a political process that leads to an agreement between the main stakeholders that will allow the external forces to withdraw."
First to understand that neither "stability" nor "withdrawal" were, or are, the primary goals of the U.S./the West intervention.
Rather, "transformation" (of outlying states and societies along modern western lines) and "incorporation" (of such "transformed" states and societies more into the western-led international community and global economy); these are our primary goals.
And to understand that, to achieve these goals, we have shown that we are willing to sacrifice both "stability" and "withdrawal."
"Professor Mads Berdal ... argues that if there is one overarching lesson from the post-conflict interventions from the 1990s on, it is that stability cannot be imposed on war-torn societies from the outside."
Note that Iraq and Afghanistan were not "war-torn societies" at the time of our interventions and that, accordingly, "stability" could not have been what we sought to impose.
Rather, our intentions were -- in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere -- to (a) transform these outlying states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines and to (b) incorporate these transformed states and societies more into the western-led international community and global economy.
"Professor Alex de Waal at Tufts University similarly criticizes the very idea that “Western” state institutions are a necessity for peace, a premise shared by both COIN and UN peacekeeping doctrines. He questions if state-building is the right remedy for war-torn societies with limited historical experience with centralized states."
Again to note that (1) "war-torn societies" with (2) western military forces deeply embedded therein; this is not what we encountered as we began our recent escapades.
Rather, what we encountered were states and societies (a) not organized, ordered and oriented more along modern western political, economic and social lines and (b) not adequately incorporated into the international community and/or the global economy. These, I suggest, were the "flaws" that we sought to remedy via our "COIN"/"state-building"/"peace-making"/"peace-keeping" etc. methods and operations.
(This given [1] the opportunity for massive intervention presented by 9/11, [2] our rising belief in such things as "universal values" and "the end of history" and [3] our desire to capitalize on and consolidate potential gains re: our recent winning of the Old Cold War.)
Thus, it was to achieve our goals of -- not "stability" and "withdrawal" but, rather, "transformation" and "incorporation" -- that, I suggest, we adopted "population-centric COIN," (etc.) approaches.
Accordingly, the question that must be asked, is whether a "stakeholder-centric" approach is as likely -- or more likely -- to provide that we achieve our properly stated goals; these being: (a) the "transformation" of outlying states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines and (b) the "incorporation" of these "transformed" states and societies more into the western-led international community and global economy?
<BLOCKQUOTE>By modifying our understanding of COIN using insight from security and peace-building literature, a revised concept can be developed which could inform future irregular wars more efficiently than current doctrine. We call it the stakeholder-centric COIN.</BLOCKQUOTE>
"<I>The</I> Counterinsurgency Doctrine", eh? It's difficult to read any of this and not respond in an immature, despondent fashion. "Stakeholder-centric COIN", "<A HREF=http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/the-third-way-of-coin-defeating-the-ta… COIN</A>"... It's very simple: get about five adults who understand both strategy generally and COIN specifically to write a coherent COIN field manual, and then execute it. (I'm sorry, but those people probably won't be in uniform, and they almost certainly won't work for TRADOC.) As I've <A HREF="http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/no-coin-is-not-a-proven-failure">a… previously</A>, there has been virtually no attempt to do that in the last fifteen years, and America actively opposed it both during and after the Vietnam War. No matter which flashy label you slap on it, COIN is challenging, but possible. It will continue to appear impossible if America continues to pursue an ill-defined "win" by throwing combined arms maneuver and RMA at tactical and operational objectives while ignoring strategic ones.
"Any use of force must be applied to attain political goals rather than tactical military aims."
(Thus, in our case, as the foreign intervening power, the use of military force must be applied so as to facilitate the transformation of the subject states, and their societies, more along our alien, and often profane, political, economic and social lines.)
" ... military force is instrumental in influencing the decision-making calculus of the different stakeholders ... the relevant military, political, social, religious, etc. stakeholders ... to compel them to enter into negotiation and eventually to compromise." (Note: this is a cobbled-together quote -- with items, for clarity, being taken from two different paragraphs of the text.)
(Thus, in our case, as the foreign intervening power, our military force must be used to compel the relevant military, political, social, religious, etc. officials into joining with/cooperating in our efforts to transform their states and societies more along our modern western political, economic and social lines.)
So: To consider the viability of this suggested concept, let's put the shoe on the other foot and ask:
a. Whether such a "stakeholder-centric" approach --
b. Used by a foreign intervening power against the states and societies of the U.S./the West
c. Whether this such approach would lead to our "stakeholders" essentially turning traitor and joining with/cooperating in the transformation of our states and their societies more along the alien and profane political, economic and social lines of the enemy? (For the sake of this question/example/argument, let's say along communist or Islamist political, economic and social lines.)
Finally, I think, the idea that "the people get the final and decisive vote" -- as this relates to our or to some other state and society thus under attack -- this compelling "population-centric" argument also calls this "stakeholder-centric" concept/approach into serious question.
Thus, for "counter-insurgency" -- to be real -- it must deal with, and not avoid, ALL these critical, and dominant, "Red Dawn" aspects of these matters?
Herein, to understand the fundamental problem; which is:
a. That NO long-standing way of life, way of governance and associated values, attitudes and beliefs should be expected to go gently into the night; this,
b. Via a "stakeholder," and/or a "population," -centric approach -- used to deal with the natural/normal resistance that occurs in such forced transformations.
Concur completely with Dave on this point. As I have long advocated, COIN is a domestic operation. In fact, the US is pretty good at COIN, with James Madison and Lyndon Johnson being two of our most reconciliation to re-construct a new Union once that war was over in order to avoid a prolonged resistance insurgency that was certain to occur if we simply occupied or punished them as a conquered nation.
But our "COIN" doctrine does not recognize COIN as COIN, and instead it is primarily about describing our support to some foreign COIN effort as COIN. The strategic effect is that, since we are doing the same operation, we invariably end up adopting approaches that undermine the very perceptions of popular legitimacy necessary to cure the revolutionary, internal insurgency of the partner we are trying to help; and at the same time our we quickly spark a powerful resistance insurgency against our very presence and interference in this internal political dispute.
Both Resistance and Revolution are very different types of insurgency. The first being a form of war, and the second being more accurately thought of as "illegal democracy" IMO. I realize doctrine and I differ on this distinction. Both conditions create lines of motivation, and few insurgents are purely one or the other when both exist. Some Taliban, for example, may be 90% motivated by the presence of ISAF forces and their actions, and only 10% motivated by a desire to overthrow an Afghan government that has small affect on their life. Some are the other way, and many somewhere in between. Good "COIN" and support to COIN understands this dynamic and works equally to reduce both lines of motivation.successful practitioners. Lincoln and Grant both also understood with keen clarity how important it was to both completely win the Clausewitzian war with the Confederate nation, and to immediately adopt full and complete
But our COIN doctrine does not understand insurgency, and sees US support to COIN as COIN. It is a deadly mix. a "zombie doctrine" that seems logical on its face, but that has no soul.
(Oh, and forget any definition of legitimacy created by conference, compromise, and the senior man on the project slapping the table and declaring a definition "correct." Insurgency, legitimacy, and all natural things are what they are, and will not conform themselves to current bias, culture or perception. For purposes of internal revolutionary insurgency, the form of legitimacy that is essential for resolving the conditions behind the insurgency, is best thought of as "popular legitimacy" - or simply the recognition of the right of some system of governance (formal or informal, foreign or domestic) to affect ones life, and the lives of a population group one identifies closely with. This is not a legitimacy that can be created, granted or bought. It is a legitimacy that must be earned...)
COIN is a necessity. It will never go away it is part of the phenomena of the gray area (revolution, resistance, insurgency, terrorism, and civil war). But what we have to learn is that in the fundamental COIN equation of Insurgents + Population + Counterinsurgent (+external support to the Counterinsurgent) that we are the external support and not the Counterinsurgent (unless of course there is an insurgency in the US to be countered).