Afghanistan a Year After "Transition": Losing the War at Every Level by Anthony H. Cordesman, Center for Strategic & International Studies
It has now been almost exactly a year since U.S. and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) combat forces formally left Afghanistan. So far, the Afghan government and Afghan forces are losing at every level: Politics, governance, economics, security, and popular support. This becomes brutally clear from the metrics available on the war, as well as from virtually all media reporting.
It is also clear from the fact that the Obama administration is steadily having to revise its plans for Afghanistan, extending the military training and assist mission from a planned end in 2016 to 2017 and beyond, and gradually adapting its size and scale to the fact that the threat is steadily gaining both in military terms and in the far more important area of regional presence, control, and influence.
These trends are complex, and they go far beyond the tactical issues that are the focus of many studies and reports. It is also impossible to put them all in proper context, list all of the areas where metrics are not available, or list all of the uncertainties involved. Work from a wide range of think tanks, the United Nations and other international institutions, media sources, and U.S. and other country government reports do, however, provide a range of data that make these trends all too clear…
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Dishonesty seems to have been a very common characteristic among the various organizations set to fixing Afghanistan. Fooling their bosses back home (who usually wished to be fooled) and fooling themselves occupied much of the day in coalition and contractor HQs.
The British called this dishonesty "command optimism" and it appears to have been necessary in increasingly large doses to get promoted past major. Of course the Brits have their own version (perhaps 'muddling through")which is why their MOD thought they could handle Helmand "without firing a shot".
The Canadian government was able to discern that it's military and aid people were lying about progress in Kandahar and pulled out (after a steady reduction in the AOR)several years earlier than their allies. The new government came into to power promising to pull the six (!) fighters it had in Iraq but now is under a barrage of "good news" designed to make them flinch. Hopefully the old PM will call the new one with advice about trusting generals.
As I have noted elsewhere, "strategy," to be of any use whatsoever, must be based on a valid premise. So, let's look at such matters:
PREMISE ONE (the old erroneous premise upon which foreign policy and use of force, etc., was based/employed/pursued):
a. The premise that took us into Afghanistan and elsewhere in the Greater Middle East was that everyone, everywhere, post-the Cold War, wanted to -- and immedialy could -- embrace the values, the ways of life and the related institutions of the U.S./the West.
b. This such premise was proven to be glaringly false/wrong. Accordingly, no amount of "strategy," based on such a false/erroneous premise, could or can save us from such irrational thinking.
PREMISE TWO (the new, correct premise shaping foreign policy, use of force, etc., today):
a. The new premise, now accepted as valid, is that everyone, everywhere, DOES NOT want to accept and/or embrace the values, the ways of life, the ways of governance, etc., of the U.S./the West. Nor can they reasonably be expected to do so.
b. Thus, "strategy," today, now being based on this such valid premise.
Note:
Premise One above (based on the idea that the populations were "with us") suggested that only a small military undertaking, employed for only a short period of time (to achieve regime change) was all the "force" that was needed see the populations of outlying states and societies achieve their dream -- that of being transformed more along modern western political, economic and social lines.
Premise Two above is based on the idea that many populations -- much like many regimes -- have no such "western" ambitions and, thus, are often "against us". This such premise suggesting that "force," per se, is not the manner by which we might, reasonably and intelligently, expect to achieve our political objective, to wit: the transforming of outlying states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines.
Thus, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, best for us to (a) accept this new and valid premise, (b) the understanding based thereon, and (c) go home and regroup accordingly; this, so as to (d) achieve our political objective, outlined in the paragraph immediately above, via other ways and other means (other than by, generally speaking, the use of "force"/"regime change"/etc.)?
"Strategy," today and accordingly, to be understood from the perspective offered by my paragraph immediately above?
Bottom Line:
In Afghanistan and elsewhere, we are caught between (a) the actions (think invasions, etc.) that we undertook based on invalid Premise One and (b) our actions that we now must take based on valid Premise Two (which requires that we extricate ourselves from where we never should have gone in the first place).
Does this imply, much like Vietnam, that because of our improper involvement we will ultimately be forced to leave the country of Afghanistan entirely in the hands of our enemies? Indeed it might.
Thus, to suggest that we may have "lost" Afghanistan -- much as we "lost" Vietnam -- before we even went there; this, based on an invalid/false premise.
"Strategy," therefore and accordingly, to no longer to be seen as the culprit.
Ahmed Rashid has a column in 'The Spectator' entitled 'While we weren't looking, the Taleban surged back in Afghanistan; Fifteen years of western intervention achieved no more than the pretence of a stable state' which I expect replicates this CSIS piece. Link: http://www.spectator.co.uk/2015/12/while-we-werent-looking-the-taleban-…
Somehow I doubt our national (UK) politicians will want to admit what is happening today is beyond our control.