Regionally Aligned Forces: The Army’s Answer to a Complex World

Regionally Aligned Forces: The Army’s Answer to a Complex World

Philip B. Neri

If you want to go fast, go alone, if you want to go far, go together

In May 2015, M2 Bradleys and BMP-2s churn up terrain as they maneuver and engage their targets in a symphony of destruction demonstrating to any would-be aggressor that together they are capable of meeting any challenge encountered on the modern battlefield.  Simultaneously, these war machines represent a symbol of reassured commitment to European nations that the US Army is engaged in the European Theater.  These forces take to the field to conduct a combined operation in the name of increasing interoperability, deterring aggression, and improving military-to-military relations, but the strategic messaging is undeniable.

The Bradleys are from the 3^rd Infantry Division’s 1^st Armored Brigade Combat Team and the BMP-2s are from the Georgian 1^st Infantry Brigade, both participating in Operation Noble Partner. The Vaziani military base they train at was bombed by the Russian air force in 2008.  While one cannot say for sure how the events in South Ossetia in August 2008 would’ve unfolded had this exercise been conducted then, it’s fair to say that it most likely would not have resulted in a Russian ground incursion into Georgia.  And so becomes clear the power resident in engagement between dedicated US Army forces and partnered nation armies.  The Army’s regional alignment of forces (RAF) attempts to establish commitment to allies and partners despite drawdowns in US forces deployed abroad while simultaneously signifying resolve to enemies and adversaries in various regions around the globe. 

The Army’s new Operating Concept (AOC) published in October 2014 codifies RAF in how the Army will operate today and into the future to carry out its core competencies of Setting the Theater, Projecting National Power, Shaping the Environment, Combined Arms Maneuver (CAM), Wide Area Security (WAS), Cyber Operations, and Special Operations.  One of the key assumptions the AOC highlights is that the “majority of US forces will be US based but remain globally engaged.”  As the Army turns this assumption into a fact, RAF will continue to move to the forefront of Army priorities and suggests that the Army can be the service of choice for partner engagements and a value-added contributor to the greater whole of government apparatus. 

RAF’s full potential for solving today’s complex threats to security cannot be fully realized with existing training models and force structure.  Previous authors have recommended changes to training and force structure that range from intense language immersion to adopting the National Guard’s State Sponsorship Program.  This article seeks to contribute to the ongoing dialogue by suggesting a RAF roadmap, coded billets for RAF personnel, and acknowledgement of RAF’s limits. 

RAF Roadmap

The 2015 National Security Strategy states “We [United States] will lead with capable partners. In an interconnected world, there are no global problems that can be solved without the United States, and few that can be solved by the United States alone.”  Creating “capable partners” is a tall order when juxtaposed with fiscal constraints, the wide-ranging security complexities, and meeting other global commitments.  Despite these obstacles, creating legitimate partners able to address threats to regional security is critical.  Moreover, the RAF concept enhances the warfighter by increasing situational awareness of the anticipated operational environment.  This combination instills confidence in the US government that the Army can provide strategic freedom of action and maintain a reasonable amount of access to geographic locations.

Short-Term. The Army has already aligned Corps and below units to the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) and has begun integrating some level of RAF training with varying degrees of success.  The larger challenge will come in changing the Army’s culture to understand how RAF is different than normal business and necessary in today’s security environment.  Changing an organization’s culture, particularly the Army, requires influential leaders and proven principles that justify change.

Implementing RAF training in the generating forces curriculum will emphasize the premium the Army has placed on regional alignment; it is how the Army will fight and possibly prevent fighting in the 21^st century.  Soldiers joining the ranks today would benefit greatly from understanding this concept upon entry to the operating forces. 

Mid-Term. In the mid-term, 2020-2030, the RAF framework will be tested and retested to develop best practices and determine if the concept amounts to more than just a good idea.  William Orkins’s article, A Laboratory for Preparing Forces to Win in a Complex World suggests that the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) is a prime place to experiment and discover solutions to multinational interoperability.  JMRC could also serve as a model of what it takes to run a Combat Training Center (CTC) on foreign soil.  This model has a practical applicability in the RAF framework by having host nation partners create Regional Combat Training Centers (RCTC) to lead a multinational effort that works in conjunction with the GCC’s theater security cooperation plans. 

Regional Combat Training Centers.  The Army can lighten its RAF load while remaining actively engaged by encouraging partner nations to construct RCTCs that allow for other regional partners to conduct training similar to the existing US CTCs.  In the name of exporting best practices, the Army could serve as the proponent for assisting partner nations in the creation of RCTCs aimed at increasing operability of regional forces.  RCTCs that are manned primarily by regional partners with US assistance empower partners to become better combat organized forces.  Imagine three to six regional partners deploying a battalion each to form a brigade-size Combined Task Force (CTF) and one brigade HQ’s.  This could demonstrate the intricacies required to conduct power projection on a small scale while simultaneously training with other partners in the region. 

This “coalition training” would increase interoperability prior to the commencement of potential hostilities when coalitions are usually first formed.  Additionally, the RCTC could be used to host both US Army and Marine forces engaged in theater security cooperation activities when the RCTC is not hosting a CTF rotation.  In addition to JMRC, the US Marine Combined Arms Training Center in Camp Fuji, Japan already has a leg up in this endeavor.

Long-Term. The year 2030 and beyond timeframe is when the US Army and indeed, the United States, can potentially expect to see significant gains from the Army’s RAF efforts.  After more than a decade of land-based engagement with regional partners, the potential exists for RAF activities to generate a substantial amount of reporting that adds to the reservoir of intelligence reports available to the intelligence community to analyze.  In addition to sister-service engagements, the Army’s RAF units will contribute to developing a comprehensive picture of the host nation and neighboring state security apparatus; particularly their army in the case it becomes necessary to assess their capabilities for future operations.  Additionally, sister-services and coalition partners can take advantage of RAF units on the “inside” of potential anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) environments enabling friendly ground, maritime, and air forces in a crisis response scenario.

Crisis response situations clearly demonstrate how RAF enables the Army to carry out its other core competencies of shaping the security environment and setting the theater while also offering the opportunity for the Army to be integrated into the emerging Air-Sea Battle doctrine being developed by the DoD.  For example, joint forces communicating with ground forces ashore can build a better common operational picture and potentially complicate an adversary’s operational concept in Phase I or the early stages of Phase II operations.  

Personnel Requirements to Support RAF

As with other programs in the Army, maintaining organizational continuity and stability with a significant rate of turnover in personnel becomes an enduring challenge.  Rather than suggest a monumental change that disrupts the entire manning process overseen by the US Army Human Resources Command, it would be more beneficial to isolate a small portion of an organization’s population.  Soldiers interested in additional RAF training would be briefed on the program and tested for cognitive abilities at Basic Combat Training and commissioning sources to determine eligibility. 

A predetermined level of personnel stability is essential to building and maintaining institutional knowledge in RAF units, particularly during the inception of the program.  Stan Wiechnik’s article, Regionally Aligned Forces and Global Engagement, highlights the benefits of a stable personnel system in the National Guard’s State Sponsorship Program.  This program partners state ARNG units with a foreign country and is not subject to the turnover rates of active duty units and enables the foundation of a lasting relationship between US and foreign units.  He also alluded to the perception that some Army senior leaders may not fully appreciate the importance of stabilizing Soldiers in a position; in this case, stabilization equates to approximately a decade in the same unit rather than a training cycle. 

The task organization of active duty RAF units would be adjusted to reflect coded billets with additional skill identifiers from company through corps level.  These coded billets designate officers and NCOs as “RAF cadre” that periodically attend cultural and language training and possibly travel to a regional partner’s military schools to meet their PME requirements.  Upon reaching a requisite skill level, RAF cadre would then lead in-house RAF training for the unit.  To minimize disruptions to the MTOE, the RAF cadre’s primary duty would be their primary MOS.  The two significant differences between RAF cadre and their fellow soldiers is the lack of turnover causing them to remain at the installation for many more years than normal; conducting a PCS maybe only 3 times throughout a 20-year career. 

Jason Kim’s article, Cultural Awareness and Language Proficiency: Critical for RAF communicates an aggressive concept of utilizing Defense Language Institute instructors and military personnel who already possess language skills to train units on language and culture.  This may be possible for a minority of RAF units, but less feasible as a sustainable Army-wide solution.   At issue with utilizing these personnel is that they have “day jobs” and their bosses/organizations will be reluctant to release them to conduct RAF training.  Even if able, they are likely to find it challenging to maintain productivity on their primary job while conducting the in-depth training required for RAF units.  An exchange program that sends US Soldiers abroad to partner nations and brings partner nation personnel to the RAF unit for 6-12 months for them to teach language and culture would be more enlightening.  Lining up the exchange program with a unit’s red cycle would be ideal, but this would be challenging, and overlap with green and amber cycles should be anticipated.

Training suitable to meet all Army installations and the coding of each individual billet is beyond the scope of this article, but it’s essential to open up the dialogue of adjusting the Army’s archaic personnel system, however slightly, to support the RAF framework.

Limits To RAF

Organizational Limits. RAF advocates may have to navigate a few roadblocks to build support for the strategy.  Challenges are to be welcomed however; as they prove to be a formidable test that can be used to justify the investment required.  Like many other grand concepts, critics will lie inside and outside the traditional defense establishment and some will have legitimate arguments from their point of view.  One sound argument is that it will be difficult to implement meaningful RAF training into current training timelines.  For example, depending on what level of proficiency and readiness a unit is currently operating at, it may be more beneficial for the unit to train on its METL tasks to ensure appropriate readiness levels prior to deploying the unit or packages thereof to partner nations. 

This is why it is imperative that the Army encourage partner nations to deploy leaders and forces to the US to not only observe forces conducting an integrated training strategy, but to also continue the partnered engagement in support of the GCC’s theater security cooperation plan regardless of where the unit is in its training cycle. 

Another valid argument is that the Army’s task organization for tactical units tends to cause Soldiers and leaders to focus on their traditional warfighting tasks without the ability to devote much time to other training.  These skills are highly valued and the RAF mission requires competent and capable units able to demonstrate how to employ combined arms formations and train host nation forces to do the same.  Again, bringing units to the US to observe this progression or at least the key gates will give partnered armies an appreciation of what is required to build, maintain, and employ combined arms formations while mitigating any negative impacts on the unit’s training progression. Lastly, it is critical that units do not resolve to “check the block” training to support the RAF concept, but instead ensure partner nations have the capacity to absorb RAFs to train and operate with in value-added training and exercises.

Operational Limits.  As RAF units engage their partnered military forces, they will undoubtedly encounter practices that are not in line with US Army core values and democratic principles.  Corrupt and unethical military leadership may have to be tolerated based on the authorities granted RAF units in a particular region.  SOPs, briefs, and supervision will create an environment of shared understanding of actions to take in these circumstances.

Partnered nation interests must always remain at the forefront of partnership exercises and efforts--if a state does not want the US there, then US forces will not be there.  To illustrate, NATO ally Turkey did not allow the US Army to use its territory to initiate an attack to form a northern axis of advance into Iraq in 2003, the US honored Turkey’s wishes.  RAF will take a similar approach.  RAF will not be able to have the desired impact in all cases; there may be opportunities that emerge via neighboring states or others in the region. 

Conclusion

Regardless of one’s feelings towards the RAF concept, RAF is here to stay.  The ambiguous and complex contemporary operational environment calls for a concept that allows the Army to remain engaged in order to keep a pulse on today’s operational environment; ally and adversary alike.  The opportunities that RAF offers the Army, GCCs, and the nation are immense.  As RAF continues to become a proven concept it will open the doors that allow partner nations to leverage their geographic, political positions, lead with US support, and achieve shared objectives.  The utility of RAF will be fully realized by its stakeholders once the Army adapts.  The training culture for Soldiers entering the ranks and increased access to trained RAF cadre and foreign military leaders are paramount to that change.  The fact that risks and costs will be assumed in implementing training and force structure change and the assumption that it will be difficult should not prevent the Army from embracing RAF in earnest. 

The AOC’s emphasis on “Engage regionally and Respond globally”  clearly communicates that regardless of where Soldiers are aligned, they can and will deploy wherever necessary to answer the call to fight and win our nation’s wars. Committing the Army to any theater, in peace or war sends the unmistakable message to allies and adversaries that the Americans are here to stay.  The RAF concept will demonstrate to the American people and the world that the US Army is a noble partner indeed.

Bibliography

Grater, Mike. Why do we RAF? Retrieved from Small Wars Journal website http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/why-do-we-raf

Kim, Jason. Cultural Awareness and Language Proficiency: Critical for RAF. Retrieved from Small Wars Journal website http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/cultural-awareness-and-language-proficiency-critical-for-regionally-aligned-forces

Moore, Jay. RAF: Less About What it is, More About What it Can Be. Retrieved from Small Wars Journal website http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/regionally-aligned-forces-less-about-what-it-is-more-about-what-it-can-be

Orkins, William. A Laboratory for Preparing Forces to Win in a Complex World. Retrieved from Small Wars Journal website http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/a-laboratory-for-preparing-forces-to-win-in-a-complex-world

Wiechnik, Stan. Regionally Aligned Forces and Global Engagement. Retrieved from Small Wars Journal website http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/regionally-aligned-forces-and-global-engagement