Welcome to the Age of the Commando by Matt Gallagher, New York Times
… The mythos of Special Operations has seized our nation’s popular imagination, and has proved to be the one prism through which the public will engage with America’s wars. From the box office to bookstores, the Special Ops commando — quiet and professional, stoic and square-jawed — thrives. That he works in the shadows, where missions are classified and enemy combatants come in silhouettes of night-vision green, is all for the better — details only complicate. We like our heroes sanitized, perhaps especially in murky times like these.
The age of the commando, though, is more than pop cultural fantasy emanating from Hollywood. It’s now a significant part of our military strategy.
Last month the White House announced the nomination of Gen. Joseph L. Votel to lead United States Central Command, which is responsible for military operations in 20 countries in the Middle East and Central Asia, including Iraq, Iran, Yemen, Syria and Saudi Arabia — in other words, the hotbed of our geopolitical conflicts. General Votel has been the head of the military’s Special Operations Command since 2014. His Central Command nomination represents a break in tradition; it has almost always gone to generals of more conventional backgrounds. Military analysts hailed it as a sign of the Obama administration’s trust in, and reliance on, Special Operations…
Comments
One of these days someone will look seriously at what happened in the 102 vs 88 days battling story line (the 102 days is a good start, I am less taken with Grenier's memoir) and that will be the beginning of the real doctrine you need, I think:
I commented earlier with this in the Gentile-Yingling dialogue:
"From an article in Asian Survey by Shashank Joshi ("Assessing Britain's role in Afghanistan", Asian Survey, Vol 55, Number 2, pp. 420-445)
.
"As Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn explain:
There was no significant Pashtun resistance in the south and east of the country. In the absence of any information, the CIA turned to [MI6] for support. MI6 mobilized a number of Pashtun leaders, supplying them with large amounts of cash and weapons in order to persuade them to move into Afghanistan. Much of the group was hastily put together out of old 1980s and 1990s mujahideen or militia commanders.""
Intellectual courage will be found in some quiet out of the way academic place and then the book will be promptly ignored by everyone except a few "in the field" that are serious. That will have to be enough.
(I said I was done posting on the Yingling comment thread, not all together :) )
I hate writing. It's just not my thing. Commenting is easier and it's mostly because a comment stays in my memory somehow so it's nice for self study. As a narcissist, I understand the Deep State psyche. I knew enough to work my way up to Palo Alto and then the Big H for a time, didn't I? People in that system are obsessed with status. They are afraid to leave that world because then they don't exist. It's like that old joke from that 80s movie Moonstruck? Where Olympia Dukakis asks someone why men cheat? And then she answers herself, I think it's because they fear death.
If you are in the Borg, the Deep State, it's not just the money. You exist. You are real. The vampires think the only life is vampirism.
Tkacik sounds like Vali Nasr.
Oh, I'll find somewhere to hang out eventually. What a bunch of moral cowards, the Deep State and its brave, brave politicized warrior generals. I love all the advance kiss-assery toward a possible Clinton candidacy. Brave enough to be a Ranger or other SOF but too weak to imagine a world where you aren't connected to the Deep State.
"Men" and "women". Real "men" and real "women"! Ever thus, ever thus. No wonder The Great Gatsby and other post Great War art is so popular with younger people these days.
From Defense Industry Daily:
"July 26/11: Fragile alliance. At the US House Foreign Affairs Committee’s hearings on “Reassessing American Grand Strategy in South Asia external link,” <strong>John J. Tkacik, the U.S. Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research’s Former Chief of China Analysis</strong>, submits “The Enemy of Hegemony is My Friend: Pakistan’s de facto ‘Alliance’ with China external link” [PDF]. Key excerpt:
“China has always been Pakistan’s most important strategic ally,2 and the intensity of Pakistan’s relationship with the United States has always been a subset of Pakistan’s all-consuming strategic calculus about India… For the United States to achieve a true strategic partnership with Pakistan, it must share Pakistan’s posture toward India. It follows, then, that subduing India also demands acquiescing in China’s ultimate hegemony in Asia. In reassessing America’s grand strategy in South Asia, the United States must first reassess its global “grand strategy.” <strong>If America can live with an Asia under Chinese hegemony, and with a crippled India, then America can have Pakistan’s enthusiastic partnership against the Taliban. Decisions like this are, as they say, above my pay grade.”</strong>"
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/51b-proposed-in-sales-upgrades-weap…
Good old Heritage:
<blockquote>John Tkacik is a China and Taiwan specialist formerly based at the conservative Heritage Foundation. After leaving his position as a Heritage research fellow in 2009, Tkacik joined the International Assessment and Strategy Center, a security think tank that advocates a "strong national defense posture" and aims "to provide policymakers with strategic advice looking ahead 10-20 years and more."</blockquote>
http://rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/Tkacik_John_Jr#sthash.pm3T2NYT.d…
Curiously, Dr. C Christine Fair thinks Lisa Curtis is an excellent South Asian analyst and better than Michael Kugelman who is sober and serious while Lisa Curtis hedges for Heritage.
For War on the Rocks and those that have failed upward from Abu Muqawama, are lectures on civility and the seriousness of Robert Kagan so much more important than financial disclosures?
102 Days Versus 88 Days:
<blockquote>“If there had been equitable investment in all SOF, instead of just fixing Desert One for the last 20 years, where do you think counterinsurgency and occupational doctrine, human intelligence networks, cultural training, language training and language technology, indigenous technical equipment, the art of caches, biometric and historical contact records (<strong>all lost from earlier SF involvement in Afghanistan)</strong>, and general-purpose force understanding of irregular warfare would have been by 9/11?” </blockquote>
http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/support-grows-for-standing-up-an-unco…
Because the military --or more accurately the <em>Deep State</em>--as Mike Lofgren uses the term:
<blockquote>I use the term to mean a hybrid association of key elements of government and parts of top-level finance and industry reference to the consent of the governed as normally expressed through elections</blockquote>
cannot look honestly at what happened in Afghanistan, it can never really write a true history or have a better understanding of what SOF needs, aside from careerist or money making aspirations.
It is a shame in so many ways, not least of which would be an intellectual revitalization of a strangely dead intellectual field, a complete lack of rigor and creativity.
The peer reviewed journal <em>Small Wars and Insurgencies</em> does have several new articles on Afghanistan that look promising. Washington operators are not remotely interested in reading these things and are in love with their own ignorance--or the ignorance of the larger public.
From that article, SOF has to be supportive and supported. It's always a joint endeavor.
A containment ring for ISIS is half built, half in, er, flux, in the MidEast. The Kurds, Assad/Russia/Iran and whatever we are doing with the Iraqis, part of a ring in a way. Turkey, the Saudis in Yemen, etc., the CIA doing whatever it's doing with supposed moderate anti Assad opposition, actively dissolving parts of the ring.
ISI will not be defeated, neither Al Qaeda, only starved and made an nuisance eventually. The language of the twentieth century and WWII never seems to leave the NATO Western world, even as one member of NATO actively supports ISIS in the Turks.
You go to war with the intellectuals and propagandists you have, alas....
Well, we shall see. The overall strategy is to avoid being drawn in further, fI suppose, for the Lilliputians to not tie us down.
Was this 1999 Colin Gray piece mentioned here before?
http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/99sp…
<blockquote>SOF need to meet the distinctive policy demands of each era. SOF are useful in all kinds of conflicts. Nonetheless, the policy demand for their strategic services varies from decade to decade. Notwithstanding the experience of Desert Storm in 1991, US policy today places demands upon SOF principally in the region of low-intensity conflict.[5] Just as the redesign of US grand strategy and defense policy reflects changes in international security conditions, the course of events as interpreted by policymakers shapes demand for the services of SOF.</blockquote>
That <em>Parameters</em> article pretty much covers everything.
Slap,
If you go down this well-trodden path you must be willing to give up your uniform and all that entails.
Sure there're folks who are willing to do that but the military find such folks difficult to process / control / recognize - especially if it goes badly.
The fact ghosts are always sent to shit-holes makes the recruitment that much harder/complex
RC
From the author's article above:
"In the political sense, the policy works. The secrecy surrounding Special Ops keeps the heavy human costs of war off the front pages. But in doing so, it also keeps the nonmilitary public wholly disconnected from the armed violence carried out in our name. It enables our state of perpetual warfare, and ensures that as little as we care and understand today, we’ll care and understand even less tomorrow."
BINGO ! There you go ! Exactly ! In a nutshell !
In this regard to especially focus in on:
a. The specific words above, to wit: "enables our state of perpetual warfare, and ensures that as little as we care and understand today, we'll care and understand even less tomorrow." And to.
b. Compare this to my similar explanation below -- which is to be seen, likewise and in this exact same "perpetual war" terms -- as how we are to understand "The Age of the Commando" today and going forward:
BEGIN EXPLANATION:
President Obama's (and future presidents') use primarily of special operations and air forces must be viewed from the following strategic point of view.
Thus, as a means/method of (1) defeating our enemies' "political attrition" strategy and of (2) achieving, in spite of this, our political objective -- which is -- the transformation of outlying states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines.
Our enemies' "political attrition" strategy is designed to provide that the U.S./the West, via over-extension, over-commitment and associated political exhaustion might, as in Vietnam, have to (1) come home and have to (2) leave the region entirely in the hands of our enemies; this with, and again as in Vietnam:
a. Our political objective -- of transforming outlying states and societies more along modern western lines -- not realized and with
b. Our enemies political objective -- of transforming outlying states and societies more along NON-western political, economic and social lines -- achieved.
Thus, by using primarily special operations and air forces, U.S./Western leaders hope to:
a. Overcome/defeat our enemies such "political attrition" strategy.
b. Never have to go home, never have to leave the field of battle and never have to leave the region entirely in the hands of our enemies. And, thus, be able to
1. Continue to pursue our goal -- of transforming outlying states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines -- indefinitely and
2. Continue to be able to thwart, indefinitely (and via various disenchantment, demoralization and exhaustion means), our enemies' goal of transforming outlying states and societies more along NON-western/less-western political, economic and social lines.
Thus, via the "limited engagement" approach outlined above (the use primarily of special operations and air forces) we might be able, unlike Vietnam, to "stay on" and "fight on" indefinitely.
Such would not be the case if we played into the enemies hands, played by the enemies' rules, took the enemies' bait and "over-committed" via the use of large numbers of ground forces; this in:
a. The endless number of places that the enemy might choose to appear and reappear indefinitely and in
b. The endless number of guise (AQ; ISIS, etc.) that the enemy might decide to take on.
Thus, to understand how:
a. An endless commitment of large numbers of ground forces is not considered to be a reasonable and/or sustainable strategy. And to understand how:
b. An endless commitment of (much smaller numbers) of special operations and air forces is -- in the "endless war" light offered above -- considered to be a much more intelligent approach.
END EXPLANATION
What about "special warfare?"
Certainly fits, I believe, the "more-limited approach needed for endless/perpetual war" mold offered by the author and I above.
But takes someone much more informed than either he or I, I believe, to carefully outline how this approach -- as compared to "surgical strike" above -- will better accomplish the mission of:
a. Facilitating our transformation of outlying states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines and of
b. Preventing the enemy from moving these same states and societies in some other direction.
Herein to ask what seems to be the logical question re: special warfare:
1. If no government exists to coerce or overthrow,
2. Or if a government does exist but we do not -- for newly-made-obvious reasons -- wish to overthrow it; these facts providing us with no coercive leverage,
3. Then how might special warfare apply/find utility; this,
4. As per the mission-set outlined at "a" and "b" immediately above?
As long as we continue to understand and describe problems in "surgical strike" terms, we will continue to provide a predominantly surgical strike solution. SOF is what our policy leaders want it to be.
With better understanding of problems, better education of policy leaders - we get to a more special warfare dominated approach.
Listening to the Presidential debates and various House and Senate forums the majority show little inclination toward evolution; nor do the "experts" who clean a living from the very faulty thinking that has brought us to where we are today.
There is a lit if money in getting this wrong, and both sides if the aisle are equally culpable in that regard.
Very well put, could not agree more. Our much missed Ken White wrote about this in an article on here called "Hard or SOF?" in 2009 - http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/hard-or-sof.
Very well put, could not agree more. Our much missed Ken White wrote about this in an article on here called "Hard or SOF?" in 2009 - http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/hard-or-sof.
WRT FID I think it's clear from the Afghan experience that early reliance on SF for ANA training set things back. Building a rifle company should be a fair task for an ODA but building an army isn't. The expertise in large scale logistics, communications, medicine, intelligence, maintenance and large scale combat ops are what build an army.
In Kabul circa 2002-3 the difference in quality of instruction provided by USSF and the French line unit who were training bns side by side at KMTC was so obvious that I asked a SF COL why he was intentionally not providing good training. He said his job was to provide training that was "good enough". Apparently it wasn't.
I got it Dave but IMO we are turning everything into a Commando Operation and with the Volunteer Army and it is bleeding the regular forces. And because of the things that you just mentioned I believe we need to think seriously of placing SF in the CIA Special Activities Division which is already authorized by Congress to conduct covert operations and maintain plausible deniability.......that would truly be Special Warfare IMO.
For J Harlan and Slapout9. I would just like to say that special operations encompasses a lot more than just providing infantry skills training. You are quite right that our great regular Army can provide effective combat infantry training. But UW and FID in particular require much more than training on infantry skills. Again and not to beat the horse to dead, we need to use the right forces for the right missions.
Special Operations — Operations requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and characterized by one or more of the following: time sensitive, clandestine, low visibility, conducted with and/or through indigenous forces, requiring regional expertise, and/or a high degree of risk. Also called SO. (JP 3-05)
A lot to your comment. Big concern about high school fitness back in my day. Here is a JFK recommendation. Infantry skills are infantry skills doesn't matter what color your headgear. I am about to comment some based upon my experiences going through what I called the one minute Green Beret course. Until then enjoy High School PT from when America was great!!!
https://www.bing.com/videos/search?q=jfk+high+school+fitness+video+at+c…
SOF should exist for crucial missions where technical skills (mountain climbing, diving, using submersibles)or rare personal skills (the ability to pass as an Arab etc.)are a must. Variations of standard infantry tactics such as the raid or ambush or teaching locals how to be infantrymen shouldn't require SOF to execute them. If they are it is an indication of shortfalls in infantry recruiting, training and leadership.
One could also question if it's wise to officially inform most of the army that they are not elite or are 2nd or 3rd Tier. Creating a situation where ambitious soldiers spend a great deal of time trying to escape to a more fashionable unit can't be good for the force as a whole. Better they spend their time trying to improve their current unit so it's recognized as first rate.
I think Anthony Cordesman might have coined the phrase of the era: "Strategic Tokenism" for the use of SOF. http://bit.ly/1PYsPJj
But this article, although written by a former Army Captain with no love lost for special operations, should make one think. This entire article focuses on only one aspect of Special Operations and the smallest part at that. This is all about the forces that conduct surgical strike (the execution of activities in a precise manner that employ special operations in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover or damage designated targets, or influence adversaries and threats.) It does not talk about the vast majority of special operations being conducted around the world that are defined as special warfare (the execution of activities that involve a combination of lethal and nonlethal actions taken by a specially trained and educated force that has a deep understanding of cultures and foreign language, proficiency in small-unit tactics, and the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment.)
This article and all the emphasis on surgical strike (despite the words of senior leaders, to include GEN Votel who try to talk about the importance of special warfare and unconventional warfare see the JFQ article: http://bit.ly/1SRbTVV ) really should lead one to think of whether we are correctly organized for special operations. The dominant special operations organization is JSOC and its national mission forces. Is there really a need for 4 star functional combatant command? Why does JSOC need a higher headquarters? What value does USSOCOM add to JSOC operations?
I am coming to think that the Army actually appreciates the special warfare capabilities that reside in Army Special Operations more than the rest of USSOCOM. After all it is the Army that has incorporated special warfare and surgical strike as the doctrinal descriptions of special warfare and surgical strike and not USSOCOM. I think General Votel is the only member of USSOCOM in Tampa to use the words special warfare (again see this JFQ article http://bit.ly/1SRbTVV)
What we do not have is an organization that is organized and optimized to conduct special warfare. Perhaps the Army ought to recall its special operations forces (assuming that Title 10 Section 167 could be repealed) and form a Special Warfare organization that would be organized, trained, equipped, and optimized for special warfare. The forces exist to conduct special warfare but there is no organization to conduct special warfare with the priorities, authorities, and resources similar to the scale of those that exist with our premier surgical strike organization. Of course my words are sacrilege and I will probably be forced to turn in my SOF union card but my extreme rhetoric is really meant to ask are we giving sufficient priority to our special warfare capabilities. Again, I think the Army appreciates them perhaps a bit more than the broader SOF community and certainly more than our policy makers and political leaders who desire the strategic tokenism offered by employment of our surgical strike forces (and I do not mean to disparage those forces at all - we have the best in the world and we need to sustain the highest level of capability within that force). But I am not the first to ask these questions. In 2009 someone named Yasotay asked whether we still need a USSOCOM at this link: http://bit.ly/20fhBWf (Full disclosure - I do believe in USSOCOM but I believe we need to place greater priority on our special warfare forces but not at the expense of our surgical strike forces.)