Nation Building: Impossible Missions by Thomas L. Friedman, New York Times
I just read a book that Barack Obama and Donald Trump would both enjoy.
It argues that the last two decades of U.S. foreign policy were an aberration — an era when America became so overwhelmingly more powerful than any rival that it got geopolitically drunk and decided that it didn’t just want to be a cop on the beat protecting our nation, but also a social worker, architect and carpenter doing nation-building abroad.
It was all done with the best of intentions, and in some cases did save precious lives. But none of the efforts achieved the kind of self-sustaining democratizing order we wanted, which is why neither this president nor the next wants to be doing any more of that — if they can at all avoid it.
But can they? …
Comments
Curmudgeon: Above you said:
"To say that the population is more likely to be your enemy than your friend, or that there are a set of universal western values, are both equally narrow and simplistic."
I think you have something there.
But in my defense, note that I tend to discuss "the population" -- and "universal (western) values" -- in the context of:
a. States and societies being organized, ordered and oriented along other than modern western political, economic and social lines. And these "outlying" states and societies:
b. Being targeted -- by the U.S./the West -- for transformation more along modern western political, economic and social lines.
In these instances, there are at least two possibilities. These being:
Scenario 1: If "universal (western) values" HAVE, in fact, obtained throughout these very different states and societies, then, in these very POSITIVE circumstances,
a. Liberation of these populations -- from their oppressive regimes (to wit: those denying westernization) -- might make sense.
b. "Transformation" might indeed prove to be a "down-hill" slide.
c. The population indeed might prove to be more friend than foe.
d. The population indeed might be counted to help see these "transformational" projects through. And
e. Chaos and suffering might, logically it would seem, be kept to a minimum.
The problem, of course, is that the above are not the scenarios that we have been discussing here. Rather, what we are discussing are:
Scenario 2: Instances in which "universal (western) values" HAVE NOT, in fact, obtained -- much, if at all, throughout these outlying states and societies. In these such very NEGATIVE circumstances:
a. Liberation of the population from the oppressive regime may not make much sense.
b. Transformation is likely to prove to be an exceptionally difficult "up-hill" slog/battle.
c. The population is more likely to be foe rather than friend.
d. Logically, in these instances, the population cannot be counted on to see these "transformational" projects through. (Just the opposite in fact, as the population, in these instances, are more likely to attempt to undermine and/or sabotage these -- generally unwanted -- transformational projects.) And
e. Chaos and suffering -- because of the "resistance to transformation" outlined immediately above -- may become rampant, extreme and spread elsewhere.
In the first instance above (the POSITIVE scenario wherein universal western values HAVE, in fact, obtained generally throughout the country), possibly the population CAN be blamed for transformational failures.
If, however, the second instance above is the true case-in-point (to wit: the NEGATIVE scenarios wherein universal western values HAVE NOT obtained generally throughout the country); then, in these such instances, I suggest that it is unfair and illogical to blame the population for these transformational failures. Herein, to properly blame for these transformational failures, instead, those idealists who failed to account for the reality of the very different values -- and thus the very different loyalties -- of the populations of these very different states and societies.
Curmudgeon: Does this further, admittedly needed, more-detailed explanation help?
(P.S. Look forward to your reading of the book and bringing us up to speed as to the foundations of and justification for the author's ideas.)
To say that the population is more likely to be your enemy than your friend, or that there are a set of Universal Western Values, are both equally narrow and simplistic.
There are a multitude of factors that go into a population's poitical leanings. Per Capita GDP; Life Expectancy at Birth; Literacy and Average Education Level; Whether the local economy is based on trade, or agriculture, or centralized natrual resources; How cosmopolitan is the poulation; what political leanings are the States directly adjacent to the target State; what is the weather like (Yes, statistically that matters); what is their religious and political history?
Your simplistic proscriptions are just as narrow as the belief in a single value system. In fact, it is a single value system with coercion being the only value.
Nation Building is not "Impossile" given enough time. The fact that humans have Nations is proof of that fact. But transplanting them borders on the impossible becuase it goes against human nature.
Let me offer some "Maxims" that explain why I believe that circumstances matter.
1) Human nature is a constant. All humans in all places are equally affected by the basic requirements of human survival. They all evolved with the same basic motivational scheme.
2) Under similar circumstances, given a long enough time to adjust, humans will act in a similar manner. The variable IS NOT human nature. The variables is the environment the humans are living in and the cultural baggage that they arrive in that environment with. Sometimes that baggage is a blessing, other times a burden.
3) Because Humans have identical needs as well as an identical motivational drives, humans living in similar circumstances will tend to find similar solutions to their problems, including the problem of government.
The problem comes when you try to "transplant" a goverment system from one location to another. Unless you can change the conditions the people live under - economic, educational, health, culture - they will resist that change and prefer the system that actually works for them under the conditions that actually live under.
But now we are far afield of the original idea behind the book. I received it in the mail yesterday, so in a few months I can speak more intelligently on its thesis.
Another way to look at these "nation-building" failure thoughts/questions:
First, from the perspective of the idealists, to wit: those believing in such things as "universal values" (for example: Bush Jr., Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz and, indeed, our authors Mandelbaum and Friedman above):
In these folks eyes, to achieve successful transformation -- of non-western states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines -- all that was needed was for the populations of such entities (all pining for "westernization") to be liberated from their oppressive regimes and to be given, thereafter, a modest modernization "hands-up."
Thus these idealist folks, placing their faith in such things as "universal values" would, understandably (and indeed consist with their such "universal values" faith/belief) send in only moderate numbers of military units (needed, per "universal values" thinking, only for regime decapitation); forces which were inadequately manned, trained or equipped to meet the diverse and indeed massive numbers of "non-universal values" enemy populations that they would in fact encounter.
When things go South, these idealists (most recently, Mandelbaum and Friedman above) blame failure on the population -- which is said to "not have been up to the transformational task"; this, rather than attributing failure, as they rightfully should, to the fallacy of very own idealist "universal values" ideas.
Now it was left for the realists (who understood from the get-go that [a] such "universal values" ideas were indeed folly and that, accordingly [b] the cost in blood, treasure and political capital of pursuing "transformation" was much too great?) to somehow clean up the mess that had been made for them by these ill-informed idealists.
Bottom Line:
The blame for transformational failure in the Greater Middle East and elsewhere lies not with the populations of these regions -- as the idealists (such as Mandelbaum and Friedman above) would suggest.
Rather the blame for these transformational failures lie --clearly -- at the feet of the idealists, to wit: those individuals that, imprudently, (a) embraced these questionable "universal values" concepts and who (b) acted upon them.
Thus, nation-building as an impossible mission?
Not if you understand, from the very beginning, that the population is more likely to be your enemy rather than your friend. And, accordingly, that you can only count on the population as standing against you. In this manner, likewise, to understand that you, obviously, cannot count on the population to do the transformational "heavy lifting" for you; this, re: your -- not their -- transformational effort/cause.
Given these such negative factors, to understand that in the present post-Cold War World, as indeed was the case during the Cold War World of old, that one is more likely to achieve one's political objective -- transformational or otherwise -- via the standing regime rather than via the populations?
This, given our understanding that "universal (western) values" -- which was not present in the Old Cold War of yesterday -- is still not present today even a quarter century thereafter?
Such things as foreign policy, national security strategy, tactics, thoughts on intervention, etc., accordingly, to be considered and developed as per this exact negative -- and indeed realistic ("universal western values" have still not become manifest) -- understanding of our present world?
Rather than beat my head against the wall you have built up around your argument, lets try something different.
Did
1) Trump create the wildly fragements, anti-imagrant, anti-muslim, quasi-conspiracy theorist, ultra-right wing section of the Republican Party that will make him the Republican Nominee for President; or
2)was there in society a wildly fragements, anti-imagrant, anti-muslim, quasi-conspiracy theorist, ultra-right wing section of the Republican Party that Trump simply took advantage of that will make him the Nominee?
Here is the question in a nutshell - Did Trump create the movement or did he step in front of the Parade?
According to you, 2) can never happen.
Edited and added to a bit:
The difficulty we would seem to be having is in determining:
a. Whether it is the population -- as you say -- and via such things as the appeal(???) of a foreign civilization's alien and profane culture and history, etc., ("soft power"???) that provides for success re: such radical state and societal changes as we are discussing here. (Herein to suggest that the alien and profane way of life, etc., of a foreign entity would, logically it would seem, be more likely repel a "different" population rather than to attract them. This, unless one is a believer in such things as the Soviet/communist and/or U.S./Western versions of "universal values," etc. -- both of which seem to have been disproved.) Or:
b. Whether, in reality, it is actually someone standing above the population -- as I say -- and re: these much more powerful entities' ability to compel the population into such, otherwise unwanted, state and societal transformation along the alien and profane political, economic and social lines of a foreign civilization. This (the determination of rulers -- foreign and/or domestic I suggest) decides whether such difficult transformational attempts, as we are discussing here, succeed or failure. Praise and blame to be allocated accordingly.
(Note that if opinion "b" above prevails; this, rather than opinion "a," then the argument of Mandelbaum and Friedman above, to wit: that the transformations attempted in the Greater Middle East failed because the populations "were not up to the task;" these such arguments would seem to be called into question.)
Herein to note -- and as per the "b" rather than the "a" argument above -- that in both the case of pre-capitalist China cir. 1979, and the case of the Soviet Union cir. 1989 -- it is the STANDING COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP (following nearly a half-century of exposure to Western hard and soft power), and not the population as it were, that ultimately determined if, when, where and how their states and societies would be transformed more along modern western political, economic or social lines.
Bottom Line:
The population being responsible for success or failure -- and this, re: such radical political, economic and/or social changes as are being attempted along the alien and profane lines of a foreign civilization (to wit: via the, thus understood, seemingly ridiculous notion of "soft power????")? Counter-intuitive, illogical, incorrect and ahistorical it would seem; as both argument "b" and the cases of China and Russia above would appear to indicate.
Those standing above the population (for example a foreign intervening power and/or the individual state and societies' own leadership), instead, being responsible for success or failure re: such alien and profane political, economic and/or social changes as we are discussing here? This would seem to be the much more reasonable, the much more understandable and the much more plausible explanation; one better supported, one would think, by both recent and past history.
Thus, and as to such things as the critical nature of "political legitimacy" to achieve such massive and radical foreign/alien political, economic and social changes as we are discussing, note that it is -- oddly enough -- the standing political leadership that often (a) holds all these such cards and, accordingly, often (b) holds the necessary power, influence and control needed to see such extremely difficult "transformational" missions through. (The population, for their part, often having no such common/singular vision for their future, no such political legitimacy to work with to get the job done, and, accordingly, none of the power, influence and control needed to see such transformational missions through; all of which are, indeed, essential to achieving such a difficult, "up-hill" task.)
I disagree with your "a." One two counts. First, the insinuation that soft power does not work. I offer China and Cuba as evidence that it can work where the conditions are favorable. Second, the further insinuation that it failed in Iraq and Afghanistan. It was never tried in Iraq and Afghanistan. Soft power does not involve forcible regime change.
Curmudgeon and Warlock:
Gentlemen, have you perused COL Maxwell's item below -- re: the use of force generally -- and specifically the use of force associated with political warfare and unconventional warfare in support of same -- which COL Maxwell suggests as an option for the purpose of, in this instance, unifying North and South Korea?
https://www.kinu.or.kr/eng/pub/pub_03_01.jsp?bid=DATA03&page=1&num=996&… (Go down to Item Number 5 and punch in PDF at the article there entitled "Unification Options and Scenarios: Assisting A Resistance"
This is the general world-wide trend that I seem to be seeing today, to wit:
a. An acceptance by the U.S./the West that our "soft power" (attraction) simply cannot do get the transformational job done; as Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Libya would seem to indicate. (We cut the head off the snakes but the people did not, as we clearly expected, move out smartly in our direction.)
b. An acceptance by the U.S./the West that "hard power" (force) -- in the form of such things as "political warfare" and "unconventional warfare," etc., employed in the service of same -- these must be used to achieve our such political objective. (Using elements of his own people against him, we will step on the head of the snake -- bring pressure to bear thus on him -- herein hoping to cause him to move out smartly in our direction.)
In this New/Reverse Cold War of today and re: the U.S./the West contemporary expansionist agenda (as was the case in the Old Cold War of yesterday and re: the Soviet/the communists expansionist agenda back then) note that ALL "different" states and societies are targeted for transformation; whether these such states and societies are "threatening," actually attacking us, or not. In this regard, consider former National Security Advisor Anthony Lakes (exceptionally "Soviet"-like?) such words in 1993:
"During the Cold War, even children understood America's security mission; as they looked at those maps on their schoolroom walls, they knew we were trying to contain the creeping expansion of that big, red blob. Today, at great risk of oversimplification, we might visualize our security mission as promoting the enlargement of the "blue areas" of market democracies. The difference, of course, is that we do not seek to expand the reach of our institutions by force, subversion or repression."
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/lakedoc.html
With the formal adoption of such things as political warfare -- and unconventional warfare, etc., in the service of same -- could ee still say, with a straight face, that "we do not seek to expand the reach of our institutions by force, subversion or repression? I think not.
Bottom Line:
We hoped to achieve our grand political objective, of transforming outlying states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines via our "soft-power" alone, and by simply taking out "resisting-transformation" leaders who -- we believed -- were all that stood in our and the populations' "transformational" way. This did not work, as the populations, it turned out, were not with us in this regard. (The population had other ways that they wished to order, organize and orient their lives.)
Now we believe that, to achieve our grand political objective, of transforming outlying states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines; this will require that we (much to our disappointment, embarrassment and chagrin) bring "hard-power" to bear (in, for example, the form of "political warfare" and "unconventional warfare," etc., employed in the service of same). In this manner, to force the standing governments of these "resisting transformation" nations to (a) change their minds re: "transformation" of their states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines and, thus, (b) do much of the hard transformational work for us. (Examples: The communist Soviet and Chinese leadership were the ones that did the "heavy lifting" re: the -- admittedly incomplete -- "transformation" of their states and societies.)
Arguments which suggest that "transformation" is an "impossible mission" re: certain other states and societies -- or that this such objective should be pursued, re: these very "different" states and societies, in other ways (for example, as per the "economic development first" thesis) -- these do not appear to hold much sway with our national leadership -- republican or democrat -- and not immediately after the Old Cold War nor currently.
Possibly we will need to fail -- re: these suggested "hard power" approaches also -- before such alternative ideas will find adequate purchase?
(Or course we might, as with Russia and China above[?], achieve a degree of success re: this such "hard power" approach also?)
From what was available, Ms von Hippel ignored some very important history: we didn't have to introduce democracy or market-driven economies to Germany and Japan. Both countries had well-established traditions of elected bodies governed by agreed-upon rules (i.e., constitutions) to fall back on. All we did after WWII was install constraints on what the new governments could do. This is entirely different from introducing completely new concepts to tribal/clan-based or authoritarian leader-based governing systems and centralized economies.
So: bad example.
Something I wrote for War on the Rocks some time back. While the article was meant to be a counterpoint to the plethora of articles coming out back then on why we lost in Iraq, it does explain the my basic ideas on forced democratization. Here is an excerpt:
“It was not possible to create a “free, democratic, and stable Iraq.” This was well-known almost from the onset and certainly not in the timeframe America was willing to spend supporting this venture. The process of democratization has been studied for some time. Some of the requisites for democracy — economic wealth distributed across the society, political participation, urbanization, and literacy — were identified by Seymour Lipset as early as 1959. Since that time, additional factors have been identified and the originals refined. Based on these well-known factors, it was clear in 2004 that Iraq was not prepared for democracy. As one professor put it:
Iraq lacks any of the preconditions academics generally accept as being necessary for democratization to succeed. It has no middle class to speak of independent from the state; oil revenues, the life-line of any Iraqi regime, are notorious for their ability to centralize rather than democratize power; the country has no tradition of limited or responsible government; national identity is weak in the face of rival religious or ethnic loyalties; regional neighbors will do what they can to undermine whatever democratizing movements exist; and the democrats themselves lack a figure such as Nelson Mandela or Kim Dae Jung who could give them leadership.
Iraq was possibly the worst place on the planet to attempt to create a democracy. One researcher, taking into account the conditions in Iraq at the time of the invasion, estimated the odds of success at 1,725 to 1. In addition to these social factors, a significant portion of the population of Iraq embraced a tribal value system that was antithetical to democratic legitimacy. The values necessary to embrace power sharing and individual rights were largely absent. Values can change, but that takes time. Given enough time it might have been possible to help the Iraqis build a democratic Iraq. How much time? Twenty years at a minimum for successful democratic consolidation. With all the issues Iraq had to deal with, the researcher estimated it would take 50 years to create a free, democratic and stable government. Even Larry Diamond, one of the more ardent supporters of the Bush administration’s attempt to democratize Iraq, had come to the conclusion in late 2004 that due to the conditions in Iraq and the lack of resources committed to the occupation democracy in Iraq would be a long term project.
Even worse, what the military was able to accomplish, a partial democracy, is the most volatile and least predictable form of government known. When all the factors that can be associated with political instability are ranked, being a partial democracy is number one. Certainly elections in Iraq were a triumph of democracy, but elections alone don’t create democracy. Iraqis have voted in large numbers in the past and will certainly do so again in the near future, but as Professor Bruce E Moon observes “… history shows that it has never been the unwillingness to vote that prevented democracy, but rather the failure to honor the results of those elections.” This is particularly true when factionalism — a political system dominated by ethnic or parochial groups that regularly compete for influence — is present. Factionalism tends to limit an interest in power-sharing. You might think that factionalism in any system would be divisive, but it is not necessarily destabilizing. As Professor Jack A. Goldstone and his associates noted in their research on political instability “It is only when factionalism is combined with a relatively high level of open competition for office … that extremely high vulnerability to instability results …”
By holding elections and attempting to create a democratic system in an ethnic and religiously factionalized society, we were creating the very instability we were seeking to suppress. But this was inherent in the mission, and since we had no doctrine on creating or consolidating a democracy, we integrated those tasks into our counterinsurgency and stability doctrine almost ensuring a self-defeating situation.”
http://warontherocks.com/2014/05/democracy-in-iraq-the-american-militar…
I am familiar with the document. I read it some time back. It's not bad, although I disagree with certain assumptions about the failure in Vietnam only tangentially related to the inability to create a self-sustainable economic system. Have a more updated journal article I will cite tomorrow.
I think the fundamental difference between my opinion and yours is that you believe that America, or any nation, could invade a country, forcibly restructure its socio-political systems, and, through long term coercion, turn that country into a capitalist democracy. I don’t.
I believe that there are certain parts of the world were capitalist democracy will never blossom, either forcibly or on its own, because the natural and economic resources available to the population are not sufficient to support the individualistic values necessary for democracy to exist.
Curmudgeon, Warlock, et. al: (Moved this discussion to the top of the page so that we can have more room to work.)
I found this excerpt of a publication, which seems to be on-point. I have only glanced at it so far, but it seems to address certain of the issues that we have been discussing below.
Let me know what you think.
The title of the publication is indeed compelling, as this such title is:
"Democracy by Force: US Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World."
(The potential problem here being, however, that this is a year 2000 publication and a great deal of "nation-building" water has flowed under the proverbial bridge since then. On the positive side, and in spite of the title, the author also appears to discuss "democracy by force" in the Cold War and pre-Cold War eras also.)
Excerpt:
"Nation-building has indeed evolved from the Cold War days -- when it was primarily an American or Soviet-controlled endeavor -- to today's occupation jointly run by any combination of the US Government, the United Nations, and some member states."
Bill,
I will try to answer this as succinctly as possible – but in reality this is a long conversation.
1) I acknowledge that it is, and has been, our policy to promote capitalist democracies around the world. This is not for some Pollyanna belief in freedom and liberty for all. This is based in self-interest. The first is economic - Authoritarian systems with centralized economic systems don’t allow free trade or American investment. We can’t make money off them. The second is security related – democracies don’t go to war with other democracies (the so called “Liberal Peace”). We believe that it is in our best interest to have a world filled with capitalist democracies. In theory, it will be peaceful and prosperous.
2) What we lack is an understanding of how to achieve a world filled with capitalist democracies. We fallaciously believe that everyone wants to be like us, and all we have to do is force out the Authoritarian Dictators and install a capitalist democracy and all will be well with the world. That did not work, and we are still trying to figure out why. Until we figure out why, continuing to try to do that in other places will still fail.
3) What we do know is that stable democracies tend to exist in prosperous nations. In fact, we are better off to promote economic stability and development than we are to promote democracy. http://politics.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/2800/sisson.pdf. Also, wealthy counties can afford the education required for a population to be able to support democracy. http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/levitsky/files/lipset_1959.pdf. Conversely, invading a country and destroying its economy is counterproductive.
4) My arguments regarding values fall in line with the above. When a culture has the prosperity to not be consumed with simply survival, their values begin to shift towards ones more compatible with democracy. http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic96263.files/culture_democrac….
5) The contra of 3) and 4) is that, poor countries with limited educations, where resources are limited, will be more interested in maintaining a connections with tribal systems or strong leaders that ensure their survival. Hence, they do not like democracy. Further, you will not be able to force them to like democracy because sharing power or resources goes against their survival instincts.
SO … promoting democracy, however worthwhile the intentions, cannot be accomplished by force. As a general rule, we are better off to promote economic growth and inclusion in the world systems than we are to invade a country. There are exceptions, but they are limited to where second and third order effects dictate action.
Yes, we are expansionist - with good reason (see 1). But that expansionism need not be by force.
I contend that we did not set out to transform post-war Germany and Japan into anything other than non-belligerent versions of what they were before. Any transformation came about as a result of their being wrapped into the evolving effort to contain the Soviet Union, which meant occupation troops that would have departed by 1947/48 stayed in place, and mutual defense alliances formed with a substantial political component. Those resulted in close and sustained exposure to American culture and politics, not by design, but just because they were there. You could argue that MacArthur was a bit more proactive in dictating development of Japan's post-war government, but that was largely MacArthur acting on his own.
I contend our goal during the Cold War was to prevent the Soviet Union from transforming more than they already influenced. If our intent was to transform them, we failed miserably. Certainly we presented a competing model, but by example rather than coercion. Where we involved ourselves in conflicts, it was to assist the locals in resisting what we perceived as Soviet-influenced UW (Greece, Italy, Caribbean, Central and South America), or outright armed invasion (Korea, Vietnam). Any political or cultural transformation was limited towards trying to professionalize their armed forces.
And I'll contend we didn't really go into Afghanistan with the intent of transforming Afghan society -- it was to drive the Taliban from power as punishment for backing the wrong side. Only after the neocons steering U.S. strategy woke up to find the Afghan population didn't think much of the guys we left in charge did anyone set out to change hearts and minds. Much the same thing was true in Iraq -- it started out as "in and out", but when the population didn't follow the script, we stayed.
So...you can make a case that we stumble into transformations accidently.
Warlock:
If the U.S. did not believe that the central underlying problem with Nazi Germany, Fascist Japan, communist Soviet Union, the religious Taliban and Islamists, etc., etc., etc., was not then, and is not today, that these such entities were/are "different,"
Then why would the U.S. feel compelled to transform such states and societies, more in our exact image, (a) following these conflicts of old and (b) in advance of these and other such conflicts today? (THIS is the pattern that I see.)
If it were perceived that the central underlying problem with Nazi Germany, Fascist Japan, communist Soviet Union, the religious (rather than secular like us) Taliban and Islamists and other "different" states and societies were/is that they were/are simply hostile and aggressive, then would we not -- for expediency and costs sake if for nothing else and following these conflicts -- simply allow these states and societies to re-constitute themselves in their previous (certainly considered legitimate in the eyes of much of their populations?) form? Thereby, avoiding all, or most, of the exceptional costs and effort otherwise to be incurred/required?
The fact that we did not go this route, and that we took then and are taking now, instead, amazingly great, entailed and costly pains to ensure that this "return-to-the-way-they-were, in fact, did not and does not happen, this should tell us something.
Herein, I would agree with you that there is -- most obviously -- "no secret conspiracy to recast the world in our image" -- by attraction and example if possible and quick enough (not working/not happening in the Greater Middle East and elsewhere throughout the world) and by force if not.
In fact, one sees instead the U.S./the West today (a) literally "shouting out" that we will transform the different states and societies of the world and as per our image (see the full text of U.S. Sec. of State document provided above) and (b) openly moving to embrace such force/coercive measures as are thought to be needed to see this mission through (such as are found in political warfare, unconventional warfare, etc). These such "hard power" measures to used now to achieve our "transformational" goals for other states and societies and, this, in the light of our recent "soft power" failures.
Indeed, the U.S./the West clearly wears its heart on its sleeve -- for all the world to see (and to worry about and react to) -- re: our such "transformational" ambitions for "different" states and societies (aggressive and hostile or not).
Thus, to see -- in the New/Reverse Cold War of today -- the obvious "resistance" to this such initiative. This coming from, much as it did in the Old Cold War of yesterday and re: the Soviets/the communists similar effort, both state and non-state actors who do not wish to see their states and societies "transformed" along such alien, profane and/or otherwise contrary lines as the "expansionist" great intervening foreign power requires.
(Herein to note, that in the Old Cold War of yesterday, the Soviets/the communists likewise "shouted out" their transformational intentions, likewise adopted such "force" measures as political warfare and unconventional warfare and likewise faced both state and non-state actor resistance to these such initiatives and approaches.)
Thus, and based on the above-provided explanation, would you say that I may, indeed, still be "on track?"
You're stepping on your own argument.
We didn't go to war with Nazi Germany because they were different -- we supplied war materials to countries they attacked, and ultimately went to war against them because they declared war on us.
We didn't go to war with Japan because they were different -- we went to war with them because they attacked us.
We didn't attempt to constrain the Soviet Union because they were different -- we did it because they actively campaigned to bring other countries involuntarily under their thumb.
We didn't attack the Taliban in Afghanistan because they were different -- we attacked them because they harbored terrorists who attacked us.
Seeing a pattern here?
Now...having broken a hostile country and government down to nothing, we can argue the wisdom, resources, and time necessary to restore a country to a functional state, and what form that takes, because we *have* engaged in all that, based on a belief (I hesitate to call it a strategy) that stability and such are enhanced by doing so. But there's no secret conspiracy to recast the world in our image by force.
Curmudgeon:
What is considered legitimate by a given population -- such as their rulers, their way of life, their values, etc. -- these are typically the things that stand in the way of where a foreign intervening power wants to go and how he wants to get there; thus, to understand why a foreign intervening power might decide it must intervene.
Herein, the "expansionist" foreign intervening power (for example, the Soviets/the communists in the recent past and the U.S./the West today) understanding that it cannot achieve its political objective (in this example, of transforming outlying states and societies more along, respectively, communist or western political, economic and social lines) (a) within a reasonable time-frame or (b) if at all -- this, by the use of "soft power" only and simply waiting to see is the desired transformation will ever occur own its own and via the attraction of the foreign intervening power's (often grossly alien and profane) way of life, way of governance etc. (A counter-intuitive thought if there ever was one?)
Frequently these such matters (the need to transform outlying states and societies sooner rather than later) are seen (or at least are portrayed) through the lens of "national interests" and "national security." In this regard, consider -- and re: the need for "transformation" of other states and societies more along modern western lines -- the "national interest"/"national security" emphasis of a current U.S. State Department document:
"Democratically governed nations are more likely to secure the peace, deter aggression, expand open markets, promote economic development, protect American citizens, combat international terrorism and crime, uphold human and worker rights, avoid humanitarian crises and refugee flows, improve the global environment, and protect human health."
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/democ/
It is as per this understanding (the "expansionist" foreign intervening power, for national interest/national security reasons, believes that it can not count on, nor can it wait on, the local population or the local government to come its way) that the foreign intervening power feels that it must move to embrace such things as political warfare, unconventional warfare and other forms of force, coercion, etc. These, to achieve its (the foreign intervening power's) national interest/national security ends and requirements.
Bottom Line:
A non-modern western-oriented but stable country, with a legitimate government and a somewhat happy population; these are often the most grave enemies that U.S./the West will ever face.
In this regard, think Nazi Germany, fascist Japan, a communist Soviet Union, the Taliban-led Afghanistan and possibly, in the near future and minus the use of coercion/force by the U.S./the West, an Islamist State. All of whom, one might suggest, met -- or might meet sometime in the future -- the criteria of stable country/legitimate government/somewhat happy population (but clearly "enemy") outlined in the paragraph immediately above.
Thus, to ask -- and as per our basic requirements for our CIVILIAN national leaders yesterday and today -- should the U.S./the West (in the past or presently) simply wait to see if the populations of these such "enemy" states and societies would/will, sometime if ever in the future, move to adopt our way of life, our way of governance, etc.?
Or do these matters, instead, and for national security/national interests reasons (for example, those outlined by the U.S. Sec. of State above) require our CIVILIAN national leaders to take a different and more immediate course of action? One best understood as attempting to achieve the necessary transformation of these "enemy"/"outlying" states and societies via such things as (a) expediency and (b) the application of force, coercion, etc., in the service of same?
Tick tock.
(The U.S. military re: these broad force or no force questions/equations -- and if a decision of force -- such broad questions of when, where and how, throughout the world, this such force will be implemented and applied? We of the military do not decide such things. We simply advise if called upon and, otherwise, just go and do what our CIVILIAN national leaders tell us to do. Such things as "success" or "failure," thus, to be understood accordingly?)
Yeah, my reading of that quote and yours are significantly different. I see nothing in there that suggest multiple definitions. I do see that Coercion stands in contrast to Legitimacy. Coercion destroys Legitimacy.
You see legitimacy as either something we are trying to create via Coercion or something we are trying to destroy via Coercion. I agree with the latter, disagree with the former.
I would argue that your reliance on Coercion is accepted by many in the military, and exactly why we lose. The old saying from the Vietnam era was "When you got then by the balls, their Hearts and Minds will follow." Coercion cannot create a stable State. It can maintain order. It can maintain power. But only as long as you continue to apply pressure.
Legitimacy allows for a stable, self sustaining government. While legitimacy is always aligned with the values of the population, the values of the population change. But that's a dead horse.
Edited and added to a little bit:
Curmudgeon:
Re: "political legitimacy" and "unconventional warfare," consider the following from the United States Army Special Operations Command: "Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies: Irregular Warfare -- Annotated Bibliography," 2 June 2011:
BEGIN QUOTE
UW encompasses a broad range of military activities. As a careful reading of the definition notes, UW is more than the overthrowing of governments as it can also aim to “coerce and disrupt” legitimate powers without necessarily replacing them. Moreover, UWs’ practitioners develop not only the guerrilla force, or the traditional fighting force, but also the underground as well as supporting auxiliaries for both. These combined efforts serve to produce the end result of UW campaigns. UW operations have historically occurred in both general war scenarios, as in Kuwait in 1990-1991, or in limited war scenarios, such as in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Additionally, although UW is frequently associated with guerilla warfare, JP 3-05 Joint Special Operations also cites the subversion of the military, economic, psychological, or moral well-being of a given nation; the sabotage of preferred targets; intelligence gathering and assessment; and unconventional assisted recovery operations which “seek out, contact, authenticate, and support military and other selected personnel as they move from an adversary-held, hostile, or sensitive area to areas under friendly control” as falling under UW operations. Although the terms FID and UW are often used interchangeably, UW activities are differentiated from FID by the support of irregular forces in the latter and the support of the regular forces of the legitimate governing power in the former. Finally, the goals of UW are usually understood more broadly than purely military objectives within a strategic context which recognizes the geopolitical impact support of a given resistance movement will engender and the resulting effects on U.S. national interests.
END QUOTE
http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/13-01654%20ARIS%20IW%20Bibliography-small.pdf (see pages 69 and 70).
(Note first, in sharp contrast to your thought immediately above, the numerous and specific mentions, and methods, of "coercion" listed in the single paragraph above describing what unconventional warfare is all about.)
Thus, and as per the information outlined above, to understand "political legitimacy" (however achieved and/or constituted) -- within today's proper strategic context (our goal to transform other states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines) -- as:
a. Something we might use to achieve our "transformational" designs for other states and societies. (In this case, "legitimate authority" wants to transform his state and societies as we desire; or he can be coerced, via UW, etc., into doing so.) And/or to understand "political legitimacy" as
b. Something that we must overcome, overthrow and replace (for example via the assistance of UW) should such political legitimacy stand in our way; this, re: the transformation of his state and its societies as we desire. (In this instance, "legitimate authority" likes things as they are, desires "transformation" along other than modern western lines, or otherwise will not work with us to achieve our "transformational" goals for his state and society.)
Thus, not so much a general definition and understanding of the many and varied forms of political legitimacy, but more a specific understanding of political legitimacy (and unconventional warfare also) as these relate -- NOT to "the consent of the governed" and re: their interests -- but AS PER the wants, needs and desires of the U.S./the West and re: our "interests." (This, as the U.S. Army Special Operations Command document above seems to suggest/confirm?)
(In the Old Cold War of yesterday, Soviet/communist understanding of political legitimacy, and UW also, to be viewed through this exact same lens; that is, as per their, rather than the population's, "national interests" -- in the Soviets/the communists case, in transforming other states and societies more along Soviet/communist political, economic and social lines?)
Bottom Line: The "competition for the support of the population" in UW? This such activity to be seen as being undertaken by the foreign intervening power so as to gain the popular forces needed to bring pressure to bear/to scare the legitimate government into doing what we want it to do. (In our case today, to transform their states and societies more along modern western lines.) Or, should such coercive measures fail, "competition for the support of the population" may be/can be used to bring forward the popular forces needed to help overthrow and replace said legitimate government and to secure our interests in this alternative (overthrow and replace) fashion.
So, after reading the article I don’t disagree with the Good Colonel as much as I thought I would based on the Abstract, but I don’t think the article says what you think it says. It is not about coercion. It is about competition for the people’s support. It actaully sounds a lot like modern COIN.
Let me ask you this:
1) What is your definition of Political Legitimacy?
2) Do you believe Political Legitimacy matters in Unconventional Warfare?
A thought as you contemplate the other good Colonel's paper:
Consider the following from COL Maxwell's reply-to-comment below:
"Such normative transformations can only come from within, from the will of local actors to change long-embedded habits, overcome longstanding enmities or restore long-lost political traditions."
Let's consider a different explanation, this being that:
Such normative transformations (for obvious reasons) generally CANNOT come from within; that is, they often CANNOT come from "the will of the population" -- who have no desire to change "long-embedded habits, overcome longstanding enmities or restore long-lost political traditions."
Thus, these such massive changes, throughout history, have routinely required (a) an outside power or (b) a local ruler; both of whom, understanding that such radical change -- in the political, economic and social orientation of various states and societies -- this will typically require (a) the establishment a strong central government and (b) powerful military, police and intelligence forces needed to see such extreme "transformational" efforts (such as "modernization") through.
This such understanding helping us to see that such normative transformations(?) generally DO NOT, in fact, "come from within" and, thus, generally DO NOT come about via "the will of the local populations."
In this explanation above note that I, also, do not see the population as "passive players in politics." If such were the case, then the strong central government -- and the military, police and intelligence forces which are normally introduced, built up and brought forward in support same -- these would not, one would think, be needed. This, to handle the (typical I would suggest) internal objections of the population. (Think, for example, of America's Civil War.)
Bottom Line:
The "will of the people" routinely stands in the way of "progress" and thus, is most often the matter that must be overcome; either by the local leadership and as per its own initiative and agenda, or by a foreign power, and re: its "interest" in bringing about significant and radical political, economic and social change in said country.
Bottom Bottom Line: "Use of force" is routine, SOP, re: such radical political, economic and social changes. "Will of the people" re: such radical change? A rare occurrence/a rare commodity indeed -- one that, most often, (a) cannot be waited on and (b) cannot be counted on.
Curmudgeon:
So you would, for example, disagree with COL Bjelajac's assertion that the amazing transformational success that the Soviets/the communists achieved post WWII can best be explained by hard power/coercion, to wit: by:
a. Their (the Soviets/the communists) "relentless political, economic, subversive and propaganda offensive against non-communist countries and people?" And likewise disagree with his (COL Bjelajac's) contention that:
b. Using such things as "unconventional warfare," the Soviets/the communists first "subjugated hundreds of millions of human beings in the more advanced areas of the world," and thereafter moved on to likewise subjugate millions of people "in the underdeveloped and newly emerging nations?"
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1034145?seq=6#page_scan_tab_contents (go to the section entitled "Weapon of Peaceful Coexistence.")
Note that this explanation by COL Bjelajac -- via the clarification of the huge numbers and diverse (both modern and traditional) peoples thus transformed -- this seems to call into question your alternative "no change in values required" and "all these folks were used to being serfs" explanations.
Likewise I would suggest the Soviet Union collapsed not because the Russian population's values changed [indeed, many would argue that they still have not changed even now 25 years post-the Cold War!). But, rather, the Soviet Union collapsed because Soviet leaders attempted to mimic certain attributes of the West; these such efforts being undertaken to make the Soviet Union, in fact, a stronger competitor against the United States. But these such efforts, obviously, backfired/had unintended consequences.
Finally, to suggest that your contention that "tribal people don't like/will not accept liberal values," while true I believe, this does not give us the full and complete picture that we need.
Herein to note that tribal folk also did not seem to like/often would not accept (willingly at least) the radically different and, in their eyes, equally profane values associated with communism. (The fact that liberalism and, indeed, communism BOTH fall under the category of modernity, modernism, etc.; this explains why I cannot use these terms [modernity, modernism, etc.], in place of "westernism," in my attempted explanations of U.S./western transformational efforts -- yesterday and today.)
The explanation immediately above (the "modern" Soviets/communists, and the "modern" U.S./the West, both being seen -- by more-traditional states and societies -- as alien and profane) also helping us to understand why the enemies of the Soviets/the communists, and re: their expansionist designs/transformational undertakings of yesterday, have become our enemies now, and re: the U.S./the West's contemporary expansionist/transformational activities of today?
Bottom Line:
a. Soft power (the appeal of our way of life, our way of governance, etc.) did not work and, indeed, often achieved adverse, rather than positive, results. Accordingly,
b. We have now embraced "hard power" (coercion, in the form of such things as political warfare and unconventional warfare in the service of same) as our way forward.
c. "Nation-building?" Still the mission. And, as my evidence above suggests, certainly not impossible. Rather, we have determined that we are simply going to have to go at it in a different, more traditional way (see "hard power"/"coercion above).
d. "What the targeted population's wants and needs?" If not consistent with the wants, needs and desires (i.e., the "interests") of the "expansionist" great nation, great power and/or great civilization (such as is the case today re: the U.S/the West and differently organized, ordered and oriented states and societies and as, indeed, was often the case throughout history), then these (the targeted population's wants and needs) are simply matters that the "expansionist" entity must change (in its, the "expansionist" entity's, favor) and/or, in some other manner, overcome.
I account for it because:
a: the amazing success of empires of old did not require a change in values. Everyone was tribal and accepted that might made right. You aligned yourself with the most powerful entity or you died. There was no change in values, because there was no value hierarchy that placed liberty before tradition and security. (Except for Athenian/Spartan Greece until that system collapsed from within.)
b: The Soviet expansion worked over areas where the population was used to being serfs, as in the old Russian Empire. These were societies who embraced Traditional values. It did not require a realignment of the values hierarchy. It failed in places like Czechoslovakia, who were more used to liberal values, where there was active rebellions. I agree that you can suppress a population with coercion, but that is an expensive and unending proposition. Once you let off, the population will resist.
Further, I would argue that we did not win the Cold War as much as the value hierarchy within Russia began to change along more western lines. The Soviets collapsed from within because the population’s values changed. The Russians defeated the Soviets to win the Cold War.
c: the amazing failure of the present is exactly for the same value incongruence. Tribal people don’t like/will not accept liberal values. This is not really a new problem. Athen's liked to install radical democracies onto city/states that rebelled against it. Those states did not like democracy and often went to Sparta or the Persians, prefering being a vasal state of a system they liked than a "free" state under the Athenians.
The Curmudgeon above said:
"What matters is what the target population wants and believes. If they do not want to change, they will not."
If such were the case in the further back past (think the "expansionist" efforts of the empires of old), if such were true in the recent past (think the "expansionist" efforts of the Soviets/the communists following World War II), and if such were the case also today (think the U.S./the West's "expansionist" efforts following the Old Cold War) then how does one account for:
a. The amazing success (re: political, economic and social transformation of other states and societies) of the "expansionist" empires of old? And for
b. The amazing success (re: political, economic and social transformation of other states and societies) of the "expansionist" Soviets/the communists following WWII? This, as compared to
c. The amazing failure (same criteria as "a" and "b" above) of the "expansionist" U.S./the West following the Old Cold War?
The way that one accounts for these distinct differences (success on the part of the empires of old and on the part the Soviets/the communists following WWII; and failure on the part of the U.S./the West following the Old Cold War) is not, I suggest (except in the U.S./the West's case) as per the free choice of the native populations thus accosted by an "expansionist" entity.
(Did the populations "love" the way of life and way of governance of the empires of old and the Soviets/the communists? I think that this kind of "individual choice" thinking cannot account, for example, for the number of dead bodies produced by the empires of old, and by the Soviets/the communists, re: their, respective, "expansionist" undertakings.)
Rather these distinct differences are best accounted for via an understanding that (a) the empires of old, and the Soviets/the communists following World War II, understood the operational environment and acted accordingly (see my CONTESTED and COERCION explanations below) and that (b) the U.S./the West, following the Old Cold War, did not (see my WELCOMING and NON-COERCIVE suggestions).
The fact that the U.S./the West has now (a) moved to adopt a proper "CONTESTED" worldview re: its "transformational" objectives for other states and societies, and has now, accordingly, (b) moved to adopt the means and measures appropriate for such a hostile operational environment (think COERCION, for example, in the form of unconventional and political warfare); these such recent moves appear to confirm my thesis.
Throwing my two cents in, I largely agree with Mr. Dave Maxwell and largely disagree with Bill C. What matters is what the target population wants and believes. If they do not want to change, they will not. Using the old adage, we can show them how to fish but we can’t lite the stick of dynamite and throw it in the lake for them.
However, it is more complicated than that. As Bill C. has pointed out in the past, our failures are due to a fallacious concept of human nature. We believe that everyone has the same values hierarchy that we have. We (Westerners, and in particular, Americans) believe that everyone around the world values Self-Direction (freedom) more than Conformity or Tradition. That is not true. While all humans share the same set of values, they rank them differently. As long as we assume a universal value hierarchy – as long as that is an unquestioned “Fact” in every plan -- we will fail.
Well, we won't fail everywhere. In places where it is a happy coincidence that the majority of the population has a value hierarchy that matches ours, we will likely succeed. That was the case in the Post WWII Western European Theater, and partially true in Japan. Korea took some cajoling, but they came around after a few decades. But in places like Iraq and Afghanistan (and even Vietnam), where Traditional tribal values run deep, it is not an easy sell.
The next question is, what causes people to change their value hierarchy? But that is another conversation.
Edited and added to a bit:
Nation-building an impossible mission? Because such is not within a great nation's, a great power's or a great civilization's "control?"
Pure BS.
From our article above:
BEGIN QUOTE
It was the political missions that followed, the efforts to transform the politics of the places where American arms prevailed, that failed.”
Why? Because political success was never within our control. Such normative transformations can only come from within, from the will of local actors to change long-embedded habits, overcome longstanding enmities or restore long-lost political traditions.
In each of these cases, argues Mandelbaum, political transformation “was up to them — and they were not up to it.”
END QUOTE
Let's take a run at this assertion using, as I often do, a comparison of the Soviets/the communists' similar "expansionist" efforts -- and their similar promotion (of their version ) of "world revolution" -- this, following World War II and after Stalin's death.
Herein to note, and re: the communist's such "expansionist" efforts back then, that while only one communist nation might have existed cir. 1944, by about 1980 approximately one-third of the world had "gone communist."
This being the case, and as per the logic of our author above (political success is not within the control of the outside power -- such normative transformations can only "come from within"), then:
a. Did the Soviets/the communists succeed, re: their "political transformation" efforts in other countries following WWII, because they, and their way of life, etc., were so very much loved and embraced by the locals?
b. And did the U.S./the West, in stark contrast and re: our similar "political transformation" efforts following the Old Cold War, fail because we, and our way of life, etc., were so very much hated and rejected by the natives?
Such, I suggest, is simply not the case. Rather, I suggest that the Soviets/the communists, following WWII, succeeded because they understood the operational environment. While the U.S./the West, following the Old Cold War, failed because we did not. Explanation:
a. The U.S./the West erroneously thought, following the Old Cold War, that it would encounter a "WELCOMING" operational environment; one that was defined by such ideas as "universal values," "the overwhelming appeal of our way of life" and "the end of history" (the western version of such ideas). This suggesting that the U.S./the West need only liberate the "pining for westernization" populations from their oppressive regimes (think those denying "westernization") to achieve our "political, economic and social transformation" goals for other countries.
b. The Soviets/the communists on the other hand, and following World War II, were under no such significant illusions. Thus, the Soviets/the communists understood that they would encounter a "CONTESTED" operational environment re: their "transformational" designs for other countries (much as we have experienced post-the Cold War). And would, accordingly, have to adopt more-coercive means/methods to accomplish their objectives.
(Principle among these being the use of, for example, "unconventional warfare." In this regard, see the following 1962 paper and, specifically, the portion entitled "Weapon of Peaceful Coexistence." http://www.jstor.org/stable/1034145?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.)
Herein to suggest that the U.S./the West also, and following the many failures it has recently encountered via its faulty "WELCOMING" operational environment construct, has now:
a. Likewise embraced a proper "CONTESTED" understanding of the world (specifically, vis-a-vis our "transformational" designs for same). And, thus, the U.S./the West now has, likewise:
b. Embraced such coercive means, measures as "unconventional warfare," "political warfare," etc. -- this, so as to achieve its "transformational" objectives in the clearly "CONTESTED" operational environment that we now readily acknowledge.
BOTTOM LINE:
Political success -- re: transforming other states and societies more along one's own political, economic and social lines -- "not within the control" of an "expansionist" great nation, great power and/or great civilization?
Pure BS. (As the specific Soviet/communist example above illustrates, and as history in general informs us.)
Rather, the "expansionist" great nation, great power and/or great civilization, to gain greater chance of "transformational" success re: other states and societies, simply must:
a. Adopt as fact (as those before us have done and re: their such "transformational" designs for other states and societies) that such operations will be undertaken in a "CONTESTED" (rather than in a "WELCOMING") operational environment. And that the "expansionist" great nation, great power and/or great civilizations must, accordingly,
b. Adopt more-coercive strategies, means, measures, etc. (for example: unconventional warfare, political warfare, etc.); which are appropriate for such a -- now properly understood -- hostile operational environment.
And this, I believe, is exactly what we have been doing recently and are now doing today.
(Herein to understand that it is more the idea of "universal [western] values," etc., that is being rejected today -- not so much the idea of "nation-building?")
BOTTOM, BOTTOM LINE: Abandon "nation-building" missions? Ain't going to happen. Adopt, instead, (a) a proper "CONTESTED" operational environment understanding and, accordingly, (b) the more-coercive strategy, means, measures, etc., appropriate for same? Yep. That, I suggest, is exactly what we "expansionist" folks are doing today.
I shouldn't get so focused on Silicon Valley that I forget old school DC contracting:
<blockquote>In addition, a key part of the project was subcontracted to a company owned by David Kilcullen, who was the senior counterinsurgency adviser to Army General David Petraeus in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Kilcullen’s research methodology, according to a contract proposal I obtained, was “built around a streamlined set of metrics” that provide a “manageable method for assessing counterinsurgency campaigns that can be replicated and customized in other insecure environments.” The contract was submitted to Reabold on October 16, 2012.
.
The USAID official confirmed that Kilcullen’s company, Caerus Associates, “received two grants totaling approximately $77,000 to assist USAID/OTI to assess licit and illicit networks in San Pedro Sula,” Honduras’s largest and most violent city. But, he added, “the Honduras Convive program is not a counterinsurgency program.”</blockquote>
http://www.thenation.com/article/how-hillary-clinton-militarized-us-pol…
Good old big data.
The article -- and I presume the book -- presumes a particular path of action...or rather, inaction. Our failure was that we attempted to make large-scale modifications to political, economic, and social systems without committing the time and resources necessary, expecting people to magically fall in line simply because we're good guys. Under other conditions, we succeeded reasonably well with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. There's nothing inevitable about the "hands off" approach we attempted to take in Afghanistan or Iraq.
The article also hews to Friedman's believe that the social media-linked masses have powers far greater than recent history proves out. Egypt and Bahrain seem to be having no trouble controlling their populations. Disorganized mobs don't produce permanent change, and rapidly changing a mob into an organized group is a highly visible, and therefore risky, job.
The civilizations that built functional democracies with or without American assistance had one thing in common:
Absence of powerful and regressive religion-based ideologies that discouraged modern education and therefore, wealth creation and people empowerment.
Details: http://www.amazon.com/Defeating-Political-Islam-The-Cold/dp/1591027047
Let me give the most succinct and simplistic explanation I can for the phenomena we are seeing.
In the post WWII/Cold War era we helped Germany, Japan and South Korea to rebuild themselves. (We love to tout the Marshall Plan but one of the keys to the Marshall plan was that we did not DO things for the Europeans - we provided assistance so that they could do things themselves).
In the Post Cold War World (PCWW) we took on the role of not only the world's policeman but also the world's problem solver and instead of helping people to helping themselves as our old cliche goes, we started really doing things for people and countries in earnest and took on the role of building nations for people rather than helping people build (or rebuild) their own nations.
A simplistic overly broad generalization I know but I think we need to examine our mindset change from helping others help themselves to the idea that we have to do things for them and by definition impose our ways on others even though our ways may not be compatible with the culture, customs, tradition, and history and even security needs and desires of others.
Excerpts:
QUOTE Don’t get him wrong, Mandelbaum says. The U.S. beat back some very bad actors in Bosnia, Somalia, Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, and later in Libya. “The military missions that the United States undertook succeeded. It was the political missions that followed, the efforts to transform the politics of the places where American arms prevailed, that failed.”
Why? Because political success was never within our control. Such normative transformations can only come from within, from the will of local actors to change long-embedded habits, overcome longstanding enmities or restore long-lost political traditions.
In each of these cases, argues Mandelbaum, political transformation “was up to them — and they were not up to it.” END QUOTE
And this is key:
QUOTE The only option is more consensual government and social contracts among equal citizens. But that gets us back to Mandelbaum’s argument: What if it’s up to them and they’re not up to it — and the result is growing disorder and more and more of their people fleeing to the world of order in Europe or North America?
Then we may have to find a way to help them at a cost we can afford — even if we don’t know how. This will be one of the biggest foreign policy challenges facing the next president, which is why this book is a must-read for him or her. END QUOTE
Thomas Friedman and the internationalists at the New York Times and their like are just worried about their position as global lecturers and meddlers. Since the end of the Cold War, an entire profession of managing people overseas has arisen (expanded, really) from NGOs, think tanks, GONGOs,contractors, academics, an entire class of professionals that need client states for something to do. Or else, who needs their expertise or opinion? Maybe some local can do the job better and without any help from the States.