General Robert Scales On The Steep Price Paid By America’s Infantry by James Clark, Task and Purpose
Since World War II the majority of American combat deaths have come from the infantry. This band of brothers, and now sisters, makes up a small minority of the military, but does the bulk of our fighting and dying.
These are our nation’s warriors. Their job is one that requires them to leave the wire every day with the intention of finding, closing with, and killing the enemy. They do battle with their foes close in and at the small unit level. These engagements should be one-sided fights, with the odds weighted in favor of American infantrymen and special operators. Tragically, this is not the case.
In his upcoming book “Scales On War: The Future Of America’s Military At Risk,” retired Army Maj. Gen. Robert H. Scales Jr. posits that had ground combat troops serving in Iraq and Afghanistan been better armed, equipped, and supported, the extraordinary feats they accomplished in battle would not have been required, and the losses suffered might have been substantially less…
Comments
Given that the world-wide conflict that we are witnessing today resembles, to such a significant degree, the Old Cold War of yesterday -- albeit with the U.S./the West, today, taking on the Soviets/the communists old "expansionist" role,
Given this amazing similarity, then should we say that, in such conflicts as these, an Army of the "expansionist" state (that of the Soviets/the communists back then and that of the U.S./the West today) -- if its infantry were better armed, equipped and supported as MG Scales suggests -- this such Army would have been/would be better able to help these "expansionist" states accomplish their, common it would seem, mission?
(This such common mission -- of the Soviets/the communists back then and the U.S./the West today -- being to transform outlying states and societies more along one's own political, economic and social lines, and to incorporate these such "transformed" states and societies more into the "expansionist" nation's own political, economic and social sphere.)
The answer here -- specifically to the question posed in my second paragraph above -- is possibly "Yes."
Why?
Because, much as with the primary use of air and special forces by the much more powerful "expansionist" entities today (the U.S./the West), likewise the use by these such "expansionist" entities of (a) their much larger ground forces but (b) in a manner which prevents these such forces from being easily injured or killed; both these methods, obviously, work to defeat the -- common it would seem - "political attrition" strategy of one's much weaker "resisting unwanted transformation and incorporation" opponents. (A strategy which is based on, and indeed depends upon, the "expansionist" nation's public, and its government, not being able to tolerate, over the long haul, the exceptional costs -- in blood, political capital and other treasure -- that are exacted in a "long war.")
Bottom Line:
As Andrew Mack notes in his "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Warfare," since World War II, the ability of the much more powerful imperial nations, to transform and incorporate outlying states and societies against their will; this has been largely hindered/stymied by these much less powerful "resisting transformation and incorporation" entities' successful, and uniform, employment of a "political attrition" strategy.
Thus, logically it would seem, if the imperial nations of today (those of the U.S./the West?) wish to, against their opponent's will, transform and incorporate outlying states and societies currently, then these such imperial nations must, obviously, find ways/means/methods to overcome and defeat their much weaker "resisting transformation and incorporation" opponents' such -- potent -- "political attrition" strategy.
It is to this exact end (to wit: to defeat our much weaker "resisting transformation and incorporation" opponents' "political attrition" strategy) -- shall we agree -- that we see:
a. The U.S./the West primarily using air and special forces today? And we see:
b. MG Scales making his "better arm, equip and support the infantry -- so that they cannot be so-easily injured or killed" recommendations?
(Via efforts such as those noted at "a" and "b" immediately above, it is our much weaker "resisting transformation and incorporation" opponents' and, specifically, their "political attrition" strategy that is placed in great jeopardy/in harm's way. This, thus, [a] very adversely effecting his ability to resist while, in sharp contrast, [b] very much allowing that we might stay on, and fight on, indefinitely re: our "expansionist" cause?)
Bill,
I differ on what you identify as General Scales wisdom in this quote:
"You have one side declaring war and executing it and the other side trying to avoid the problem, but this is a war. People are dying. There’s another old saying that America fights short wars brilliantly and long wars poorly, and so the mere act of stretching out the enterprise in an attempt to simply outlast a political situation makes it more painful, and in the end, more destructive to our side, because we do long wars very poorly."
I believe that America is good at war (brilliant may be a stretch); but that we are very bad at political conflict other than war. We think it is war simply because looks like war, feels like war, and we opted to call it war. Call a bull a cow, but don't complain when you don't like the flavor of the milk. When we intrude upon (or create) the internal political conflicts of another our doctrine and narrative of warfare run head-on into reality. We never learn the strategic lesson, that these types of conflicts are much more illegal democracy, demanding very different approaches than if they were "war." So we muddle away at them with little positive effect as we apply our war solution half-heartedly to yet another non-war problem.
Bob
GEN Scales makes an argument that our infantry is our center of gravity and we're under investing in them. If enough soldiers are killed, then our political will to continue the fight will falter. It does seem in many cases in recent years that our adversaries (at least the irregular ones and even the NVA) were/are more focused on killing and maiming us, than achieving a traditional strategic/operational goal like capturing a city. GEN Scales believes we can achieve a decisive over match and reduce these casualties if Congress diverts funding to extremely expensive items such as aircraft carriers into the following four areas to help the man on the ground:
1. Drones
2. Robots (or ground drones)
3. A soldier network
4. A new suite of man-portable arms that could kill tanks, shoot down planes, and engage the enemy outside the range of their weapons. (I agree this one would be a game changer, one that could be applied against us also when this technology proliferates)
He lost a little credibility when he projected the wars we're going to fight are all infantry wars, while the Navy "wants" to fight China? I don't think the Navy wants to fight China, but they sure as heck are obligated to prepare for a potential conflict, and we need a Navy as capable as our ground forces. It would just be nice if our senior leaders who are supposed to be joint officers would set aside their service biases and focus on identifying the right balance of forces to defend our nation's interest. O.K., it was just a happy thought that has passed, now back to reality.
GEN Scale's wisdom came out when he wrote,
"You have one side declaring war and executing it and the other side trying to avoid the problem, but this is a war. People are dying. There’s another old saying that America fights short wars brilliantly and long wars poorly, and so the mere act of stretching out the enterprise in an attempt to simply outlast a political situation makes it more painful, and in the end, more destructive to our side, because we do long wars very poorly."
Doing long wars poorly is a problem our so-called COINdistas and unconventional warfare advocates like to side step during feasibility discussions. We can say it is going to take decades to win, but that doesn't resonate well with the American people and our politicians who know this ongoing conflict will become political ammunition for their opponents when the next election comes around.
We can wage these long wars or contests effectively when they're mostly a bore to the media and the American people. Examples include our decades long support to Columbia, the resistance in Afghanistan, and helping Thailand counter communist insurgents and then deter the Vietnamese from invading from Cambodia.
The situation in Syria is quite different, by taking the slow path (through, by, and with) we created large windows of opportunity for not only ISIL to adapt, but we created opportunities for Russia, Iran, and now possibly the Chinese to intervene in a way that will give them long term influence in the region that will undermine our long term strategic interests. Not to mention the ever unfolding humanitarian crisis that has also resulted in mass migration that is will have a yet unknown strategic impact on the stability of Europe. I believe it is likely this would not have happened if we went in big and hard with conventional forces and broke the enemy's back (both Assad and ISIL), which paradoxically could have set the conditions for a successful long fight in the shadows to consolidate gains instead of UW enabling conventional forces as we traditionally view it.
GEN Scales ended the article with," If we’re not going to fight a war, then don’t fight it."
This is the frustration that the American military has dealt with since the end of WWII, with few exceptions. We should invest in the technology that gives our military an unfair advantageous, but that won't solve all the problems GEN Scales addresses.