Special Operations Today

The following is a suggested framework -- for understanding "special operations" in the first half of the 21st Century -- and, specifically, for understanding LTG Cleveland's thoughts, re: same, as related above:

A: The U.S./the West, now calling for the adoption -- by the other states, societies and civilizations of the world -- of our way of life, our way of governance, etc., in the first half of the 21st Century has:

1. Assumed the "expansionist" role that the Soviets/the communists had in the last half of the 20th Century. And, thus, has

2. Assumed the task of transforming the entire Rest of the World more along one's unusual and unique, and thus often alien and profane, political, economic, social and value lines. And, thus, has

3. Assumed -- and re: this "expansionist" task/role -- the "security problems" normally associated with this such requirement. For example, and from both the "locals" and from other foreign competitors: "resistance to transformation" and "competitive transformation." Herein, the U.S./the West now also,

4. Assuming (1) the "natural enemies" that the Soviets/the communists faced in the Old Cold War of yesterday (to wit: the conservative/"no change" elements of the various populations) and (2) the "natural barriers" that the Soviets/the communists faced back-in-the-day (to wit: the traditional political, economic, social and value norms -- that form the basis of/the foundations for the various ways of life, ways of governance, etc., of the other states, societies and civilizations of the world -- and thus, which stand in the way of, shall we say, "progress.")

B: In stark contrast -- to the U.S./the West's 21st Century such "expansionist" role -- today we find the Russians, the Chinese, the Iranians, etc., -- in the first half of this new century -- having:

1. Assumed the "containment" and "roll back" roles -- that U.S./the West had in the Old Cold War of yesterday. And, thus, these entities having

2. Assumed the task of throwing various and sundry "monkey wrenches" into our "expansionist"/ "transformational" plans, projects and designs for the other states, societies and civilizations of the world. (Much as we did to the Soviets/the communists and re: their such "expansionist"/"transformational" plans, projects and designs back in Old Cold War days.) Herein, the Russians, the Chinese, the Iranians, etc. -- in the New/Reverse Cold War of today -- likewise

3. Assuming the "security problems" that the U.S./the West faced back in our Old Cold War days. (For example, think along the lines of the "Red Scare:" http://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/red-scare)

4. What are, accordingly, the "natural enemies" of the Russian, Chinese, Iranian, etc, and re: their "containment" and "roll back" roles, plans, projects and designs today? These would, logically, be the liberal/"pro-change" elements of both their own, and indeed various other, populations. (Much as these were our "natural enemies" in the Old Cold War of yesterday?)

5. As to "natural barriers" that the the Russians, the Chinese, the Iranians, etc., face re: their "containment" and "roll back" roles, plans, projects and designs? These might be understood best in terms of humanities' -- normal and routine -- demand and requirement for a more-visible source of, shall we say, "progress?"

C. Conclusion: It is against this New/Reverse Cold War foundation and background, provided above, that I suggest that both "special operations" today, and indeed LTG Cleveland's thoughts related thereto above, can best be understood.

For example: I suggest that LTG Cleveland's thoughts re: "influence" and "manipulation" -- in the New/Reverse Cold War of today -- these can best be understood in terms of a Western version of the "Red Scare" [see my Item "B," Number "3" above]. And, thus, in terms of aggravating/accommodating the "security problems" normally associated with the entity who is attempting to do "containment" and "roll back." (In our case, this such "scare" -- put to the Russians, the Chinese, the Iranians, etc., today -- this would of course be, not a "Red Scare," but, indeed, a potent "Red, White and Blue Scare.")

In general, what LTG Cleveland and his Fletcher Security Review interviewer are discussing above -- and what I am discussing below -- is an acknowledgement that:

a. Our earlier post-Old Cold War national security strategies, foreign policies, and use of military force (in the service of same) concepts -- associated such things as "universal (Western) values," the "end of history" (the Western version), etc., (to wit: associated with our "soft power"); this/these such national security strategies, foreign policies, use of military force concepts, etc., have had to -- based on our recent experiences -- be shit-canned.

In the place of these,

b. We have had to adopt more "hard power" national security strategies, foreign policies and use of military force (in the service of same) concepts; concepts which acknowledge that resistance and competition -- re: our determination to transform the entire Rest of the World more along modern western political, economic, social and values lines -- will be the name of the game in the New/Reverse Cold War of today.

This such dynamic change, to our post-Old Cold War world-view, suggesting that our special operations (and, indeed, our other forces/capabilities) -- today and going forward -- (and as LTG Cleveland clearly suggests above?) -- have to be focused more on/employed more in a "convince and convert also," rather than an only "capture or kill only," manner.

Why is this?

Because:

a. The "capture or kill" (the few remaining "dead-enders") concept was based on the erroneous/invalid "universal (Western) values, etc., premise outlined above. To wit: on the erroneous/invalid premise that suggested that populations, liberated from their oppressive regimes would, quickly, easily and mostly on their own, adopt modern western ways. Whereas,

b. The "convince/convert" concept, on the other hand, is based on the more-correct, more-valid and more-time-honored "imperialist" great nation understanding of the "security problem." To wit: the understanding which suggests that transforming other states, societies and civilizations of the world -- so as to better provide for the wants, needs and desires of an "expansionist" great nation/great civilization -- this should be expected to be more of a long, slow, hard, uphill "generational" (as per GEN Petraeus) battle. This, rather than more of a short, quick, easy, downhill slide -- as suggested by such things as "universal (Western) values".

And, logically in such circumstances, one cannot expect to "capture and kill" all of the massive numbers of folks -- who presently disagree with you for one reason or another -- re: "transformation."

Rather one must, logically in such circumstances, work to "convince and convert" these such huge resisting/ competing populations (and/or their governments); this, if one is to ever realize one's "transforming the entire Rest of the World" goals.

(Thus, for example, to see our special operations and other commands -- in "selection" and elsewhere -- now begin to advertise, look for and recruit individuals who show [a] a unique understanding of and a unique knowledge re: the foundations of our way of life, our way of governance and our values, attitudes and beliefs, and who show [b] a unique ability to, shall we say, "convince and convert the heathen" accordingly? In addition to this suggestion, or as an alternative thereto, to see various military and civilian "schools" be developed -- to provide for these such New/Reverse Cold War requirements -- which are [a] so reminiscent of the similar requirements of the Soviets/the communists in the Old Cold War of yesterday and, thus, [b] so comparable to -- and so understandable re: -- their similar "world transformation" goals back then?)

Let me cherry-pick through some of LTG (ret.) Cleveland's -- and the Fletcher Security Review interviewer's thoughts and comments above -- to try to make a few points:

First, LTG (ret.) Cleveland:

BEGIN QUOTE

LTG Cleveland: To get to understanding about what we are currently confronting, we have to take off our blinders as military professionals and look at the security problem. Our premise is that the economic, social, political, and ideological trends in international competition are converging among State, Non-State actors and others in a new type of security paradigm. ... The fact of the matter is, that we are in competition with various state and non-state actors for physical, cognitive, and moral security of populations and increasingly, in this hyperconnected world, the notions of sovereignty and identity.

END QUOTE

As I read these thoughts and ideas of LTG Cleveland, they seem to confirm my thesis that today we are engaged in a New/Reverse Cold War; one in which:

a. The U.S./the West now seeks to "transform" the entire Rest of the World more along our (often seen as alien and profane by the natives and by other foreigners) political, economic, social and value lines. And

b. The entire Rest of the World seeks to prevent these such (properly seen as "competitive" -- by both the locals and by competing foreigners) political, economic, social and value changes from occurring.

This, in sum, causes the U.S./the West -- in the New/Reverse Cold War of today -- to have the exact same "security problem" (local and other-foreign resistance to transformation/competitive transformation) that the Soviets/the communists had in, the Old Cold War of yesterday, when they sought to "transform" the entire Rest of the World.

(To wit: a time when the Soviets/the communists then, much like the U.S./the West today, saw/see their "security problem" as "competition with various state and non-state actors for the physical, cognitive, and moral security of populations and increasingly, the notions of sovereignty and identity" contained therein?)

Next, to the Fletcher Security Review interviewer:

BEGIN QUOTE

FSR: I’m going to follow this up by asking an extremely Fletcher question, because what we have here [at the Fletcher School] is not just a mix of security folks, but also development and people who walk the line [between the two disciplines]. So in an era where the military and especially SOF is being relied on more and more for a wide variety of missions: fighting transnational crime, containing disease outbreaks, responding to humanitarian disasters and helping to rebuild failed or failing states, how do you personally define the line between what are and are not appropriate military tasks?

END QUOTE

So:

If, in the New/Reverse Cold War of today, the goal of the U.S./the West is to transform the entire Rest of the World more along modern western political, economic, social and value lines.

(Much as it was the goal of the Soviets/the communists, in the Old Cold War of yesterday, to transform the entire Rest of the World more along communist political, economic, social and value lines.)

Then, to understand the nexus (then as now) between:

a. "Development" (the provision of the specific political, economic, social and value "infrastructure" needed to facilitate the fundamental and complete "transformation" of a subject state, society and/or civilization). And

b. "Security" (the forces/the capabilities needed to hold the populations and governments of these targeted states, societies and civilizations down -- and/or to otherwise "influence" these populations and governments, in such a manner, as to allow that these such radical "transformations," of these such outlying states, societies and civilizations of the world might, in the face of such significant local resistance, and in the face of such significant other-foreign power "competition," be achieved; in as peaceful a manner as possible).

(In this "influence" light, to understand the following quote from the FSR interviewer -- which he attributes to LTG Cleveland: "FSR: You were also recently quoted as observing that the US has exquisite capabilities to kill people, while what it needs are exquisite ways to manipulate them.")

Bottom Line:

If one (a) seeks to transform the entire Rest of the World more along one's own, often alien and profane, political, economic, social and value lines and, thus, if one (b) expects to encounter both local and other-foreign "security problems" (resistance to transformation; competitive transformation);" to wit: those problems normally associated with these such "transformational" goals and activities of an "expansionist" greant power, then (c) it makes perfect sense -- re: this exact objective, and re: these exact and associated "security problems" -- to (d) employ one's special operations forces, and indeed all of one's instruments of power and persuasion in (e) the development/security nexus manner addressed by LTG Cleveland, and his FSR interviewer, above?