Deciphering the Taliban by Diego Solis - Stratfor
Afghanistan embodies geopolitics in a way that few nations can. Its breathtaking mountains, vast steppes and harsh deserts have obstructed the influence of would-be rulers since ancient times. Yet these topographical impediments have protected and sheltered so much of what defines Afghanistan today, forming zones of refuge that harbor ethnic patchworks living in defiance of easy categorization or governance. Interpreting the complexities of the human and physical terrain from the lines and colors on a map is almost impossible. It is only when gazing over the deserts and mountains from 35,000 feet that the intricacies of the country become clearer. And only by walking in the shoes of everyday Afghans can you begin to comprehend their mindset. Very quickly you learn that Afghanistan is a country that rejects easy solutions…
Afghans tell you in no uncertain terms that the jarring environment, complicated history and conservative religious beliefs — regardless of ethnicity — will make you a warrior. And as a warrior, you are compelled to resist any perceived foreign encroachment against your land and beliefs. It is this Afghan warrior culture that will ultimately delimit any proposed long-term resolution. Many people I sat with felt that a negotiated solution to the country's problems is the only plausible outcome. Time and again it was emphasized to me that the existing tribal order will continue to trump any foreigner-backed government that operates under perceived Western values. Any system of governance associated with outsiders is immediately suspect in the eyes of Afghans, regardless of intent or investment. This is in part why the Taliban's message continues to resonate and why the militant organization is so hard to eradicate. The group represents a distinct tribal order that emerged from the rural countryside and the ungoverned expanses that typify the region. The Taliban will not give up, not until they have achieved at least a stalemate in their favor. They have already endured better than anyone expected, thanks to their fluidity and comparative military resilience, their deft use of mountain hideaways and the support they receive from local communities — willingly or unwillingly given…
Comments
Vicrasta: Immediately above you said:
"However you define "peace" is drastically different than what we have seen after him."
But let us ask ourselves -- in Afghanistan and/or indeed elsewhere throughout the world today -- whether "peace" is what either "we," and/or indeed "they," actually seek to achieve/is what everyone (or anyone for that matter) is actually fighting for?
(Herein, to think of both "we," and "they," in "writ large" terms; thus, as including not only the U.S./the West, the Taliban, the Pashtuns, etc., but also Russia, China, Iran, Turkey, the Islamists, etc., etc., etc.?)
Or, in truth, would we be better served to see, understand -- and indeed acknowledge -- that ALL OF THESE such diverse "we"/"they" entities (and more) are concerned more with gaining greater power, influence and control -- in Afghanistan and/or elsewhere throughout the world -- this, rather than in achieving "peace?"
(Note that if this latter objective is, indeed, more accurate, to wit: that gaining greater power, influence and control is the goal, then "peace," "stability," etc.; these must be seen as being knowingly sacrificed so as to achieve this goal/to be seen as being achieved only via the successful attainment of this goal. Yes?)
Thus, in circumstances such as these (greater power, influence and control is the goal), do discussions which indicate that "peace" is most important/peace is the goal; do these such discussions not seem to be somewhat out of place/seem to indicate that we do not really understand:
a. What "our" -- and indeed "their" -- priorities actually are? (To gain greater power, influence and control.)
b. What both "we" and "they" are actually willing to sacrifice to achieve such goals? ("Peace" and "stability.") And, thus, do not understand:
c. What both "we" -- and indeed "they" -- are actually fighting for? (See "a" immediately above.)
(Again, best to think of "our"/"we" and "their"/"they" more in the "writ large" terms that I note in my first "set off by parenthesis" paragraph above?)
1. misquote as a verb: quote (a person or a piece of written or spoken text) inaccurately.
2. misquote as a noun: a passage or remark quoted inaccurately.
3. Synonyms: misreport, misrepresent, misstate, quote incorrectly, take/quote out of context, distort, twist, slant, bias, put a spin on, pervert, falsify, garble, muddle, mistranslate;
Without sounding like a lawyer or theoretical physicist,by omitting key terms you distort the meaning of the statement.
Additionally, Kabul/urban area modernization + adhering to Islam and Pashtun traditions= peace in the Zahir Shah era.
By intentionally or unintentionally leaving the tribes to their own ways and lands, it decreased the catalysts required for a Pashtun insurgency.
However you define "peace" is drastically different than what we have seen after him.
Vicrasta:
Are you confusing the term "misquote" with not quoting a portion of an item that you would prefer to see quoted -- this, because you think that it is important/critical to a fuller understanding of the matters being discussed?
For example:
a. While I end my quoted portion of the subject paragraph at this particular point: "has violently and savagely pitted the urban, secular, educated and modern of Afghanistan against the rural, religious, illiterate and tradition."
b. You end your quoted portion of the subject paragraph at a somewhat different point, to wit: "It is this later group that composes and supports the Pashtun insurgency."
Given that, in both cases noted above, the paragraph that we are referring to continues on much further, then either (a) we have both "misquoted" or (b) neither of us has done so. Yes?
I do, however, appreciate the point that you appear to be trying to make here; this, by quoting this additional sentence.
In this regard, might we, in fact, consider an additional "commonality" re: the Afghan and the U.S./the Western anti-modernization "insurgencies" (if, indeed, I might call them that)?
This being the apparent commonality of "ethnic majorities" playing a/the leading role in the "anti-modernization" efforts in both Afghanistan and in the U.S./the West also?
(As to the U.S./the Western such "ethnic majority" characteristic, this seems to have been noted -- and indeed pointed to specifically -- in the Harvard "Trump, Brexit," etc., report I refer to in my initial comment above.)
Again -- re: our goal of "Deciphering and Understanding the Taliban" -- are we not well-served, thus, to note, acknowledge, etc., all of these such commonalities? (If, indeed, we do agree that these such commonalities exist.)
I'm not sure why you keep misquoting Matt Hoh's letter. Probably to support your "modernizer" narrative which is not completely accurate.
Once again, the actual quote from the letter is:
"....from at least the end of King Zahir Shah's reign, has violently and savagely pitted the urban, secular, educated and modern of Afghanistan against the rural, religious, illiterate and traditional. It is this later group that composes and supports the Pashtun insurgency".
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/hp/ssi/wpc/ResignationLetter.pdf
King Zahir Shah era 1933-1973.
"These reforms were not always popular in a deeply traditional Islamic society. But the Zahir Shah years were characterized by a lengthy span of rare peace. This tranquillity is recalled now by many in the country with immense nostalgia. On the other hand, peace was not accompanied by prosperity, and the king is faulted for failing to develop the economy."
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/23/world/asia/23cnd-shah.html
Is it less difficult to "decipher the Taliban" if we look, and indeed find, very similar "conflict" problems in the U.S./the West today; these, emanating from what appears to be a common "problem causing" source?"
In this regard, let us consider that the common source of these very similar "conflict" problems -- which appear to be found in both Afghanistan and, indeed, in the U.S./the West today also -- this is the wrenching political, economic, social -- and especially the "value" -- "change" demands of "modernization;" demands which tend to pit:
a. The urban, the secular, the more-educated, etc., -- and, thus, the more-"modern" of various states and societies -- this, against:
b. The rural, the religious, the less-educated, etc., -- and, thus, the more-"traditional" of these self-same states and societies.
First, and with respect to Afghanistan in this case, a 2009 observation of this such "common source"/ "common problem" phenomenon:
BEGIN QUOTE
If the history of Afghanistan is one great stage play, the United States is no more than a supporting actor, among several previously, in a tragedy that not only pits tribes, valleys, clans, villages and families against one another, but, from at least King Zahir Shah's reign (Afghanistan's first "modernizer?"), has violently and savagely pitted the urban, secular, educated and modern of Afghanistan against the rural, religious, illiterate and traditional.
END QUOTE
Item in parenthesis above is mine.
(Source document for this quote: "Resignation Letter of Matthew Hoh [pdf] - Washington Post.")
Next, and in this case with respect to the U.S./the West this time, a very similar, it would appear, "common source"/"common problem" observation:
BEGIN QUOTE
"The conclusion highlights several main findings. First, the results of analyzing the demographic and social controls confirm that populist support in Europe is generally stronger among the older generation, men, the less educated, the religious, and ethnic majorities, patterns confirming previous research."
END QUOTE
(Source document for this quote: "Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash" [pdf] Harvard University -- see Page 4 and the Conclusion at Page 29.)
Finally, and in this case re: Afghanistan again, the present-day/contemporary observation of our author above; this, re: this such apparent "modernization = conflict between modernists versus traditionalists" source/problem scenario:
BEGIN QUOTE
Having spoken with members of rural communities and the weary survivors of Afghanistan's numerous conflicts, I sought the opinion of a different demographic: young city-dwellers that have a different perspective from their forebears. In the opinion of one young Uzbek I spoke to in Kabul, it is the duty of all Afghans to be united under a single country and state. For a Hazara in her mid-20s, the goal was to get a college degree and eventually run her own business. Such a dream could only become a reality under the current government in Kabul. And for a young male Pashtun who ran a local enterprise in the city, the Pashtunwali and the strict interpretation of Islam belonged to the countryside, not in places like Kabul.
END QUOTE
Thus -- re: "deciphering the Taliban" -- this would seem to become much easier if one simply sees the Taliban in the "we are much like them -- and for much the same reason" lens that I provide above?
A lens which finds similar problems (rebellion against unwanted political, economic, social and/or "value" "change"), a similar source of such problems (the demands of "modernization" and its proponents) and, accordingly, similar "combatants" (see the common characteristics of the "pro-modernization change" versus "anti-modernization change" population groups; those found both in Afghanistan and in U.S./the West today also -- as noted at my subparagraphs "a" and "b" above -- and as addressed in my quoted items)?
This is precisely why even the solutions outlined in this RAND assessment will fall short of the actual long-term objectives of de-centralized tribal governance through the Afghan federal government. It only took the author two weeks to realize this!?!?
What Afghanistan Needs to Move Forward: A Political Solution
https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/08/what-afghanistan-needs-to-move-forwar…
"Afghanistan's key weakness has been the absence of a government that is trusted, legitimate and capable of managing the affairs of state. In 2014, following a disputed election, the two leading contenders for president, Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, signed a power-sharing agreement to form a government of national unity as president and chief executive, respectively. This agreement, brokered by then-Secretary of State John Kerry and witnessed by the U.S. ambassador and the U.N. special representative, stipulated a "loya jirga," or constitutional convention, be held within two years to formalize the role of the chief executive as a prime minister, the holding of local elections and electoral reform.
But the U.S. and the international community never followed through on their promise to help the Afghan government achieve real reform. The 2015 parliamentary elections have been delayed pending electoral reform that was never legislated. The lack of district elections, a virtual logistical impossibility, has impeded progress toward a constitutional convention because district representatives are required for a quorum."
From the current article:
"Where I'm from, there are only two things that matter: Pashtunwali and Islam, which are very intertwined and which are the only rules of law that we need. We do not view ourselves as Afghans or Pakistanis. That is a creation of the states. We are tribal and Pashtun. The so-called state and those that support it want to take away our customary laws and give us in exchange their Western laws, while encroach on our lands and levy taxes on us. That is why we will always resist."
There are no states.