Countering Others' Insurgencies: Understanding U.S. Small-Footprint Interventions in Local Context by Stephen Watts, Jason H. Campbell, Patrick B. Johnston, Sameer Lalwani, and Sarah H. Bana, RAND Corporation
Abstract: This study examines the counterinsurgency strategies and practices adopted by threatened regimes and the conditions under which U.S. "small-footprint" partnerships are likely to help these governments succeed. The report's findings are derived from a mixed-method research design incorporating both quantitative and qualitative analysis. Simple statistical analyses are applied to a dataset of counterinsurgencies that have terminated since the end of the Cold War (72 in all), and more in-depth analyses are provided of two recent cases of U.S. partnerships with counterinsurgent regimes, in the Philippines and Pakistan. The quantitative analysis finds that the cases of small-footprint U.S. operations that are commonly touted as "success stories" all occurred in countries approximating a best-case scenario. Such a verdict is not meant to deny the importance of U.S. assistance; rather, it is meant to highlight that similar U.S. policies with less promising partner nations should not be expected to produce anywhere near the same levels of success. The majority of insurgencies have taken place in worst-case conditions, and in these environments, counterinsurgent regimes are typically unsuccessful in their efforts to end rebellion, and they often employ violence indiscriminately. The case studies of the Philippines and Pakistan largely reinforce the findings of the quantitative analysis. They also highlight the challenges the United States faces in attempting to influence partner regimes to fight counterinsurgencies in the manner that the United States would prefer. The study concludes with policy recommendations for managing troubled partnerships.
Comments
It is often said that the…
It is often said that the best way to fight an insurgency is to prevent it from happening in the first place. While this may be true, it is not always possible. When faced with an insurgency, a government must take swift and decisive action to suppress it. Now I am willing to read more here about the eco-friendly projects for college students that they can start to get success in them.
This study validates an often resisted fact from history: most governments deserve the insurgencies against them: thus, it is almost a given in counterinsurgency that we will be dealing with less than ideal host governments. They are often their own worst enemy and getting them to change their ways, which they typically are loath to do, is as important as putting bullets into insurgents. Lack of success in counterinsurgency is too often the result of a host government being refractory to training in the art of government directed for the people, not the ruling elites.
D. Donovan