The Army #Operating Concept’s Global Landpower Network

If -- as per COL Maxwell's comment below -- the common theme among the Services and USSOCOM's emerging strategy is reliance on Global Partnership Networks,

How then do we square this with LTG McMaster's warning -- re: his "Mutual of Omaha Wild Kingdom Fallacy," -- that US reliance on proxy forces is an extremely questionable idea/complete folly?

QUOTE FROM LTG MCMASTER:

"While it is hard to imagine future operations that will not require US forces to operate with multiple partners, primary reliance on proxies is often problematic due to issues involving capability as well as willingness to act consistent with U.S. interests. The political and human dimensions of war often create what economists and political scientists call principal-actor problems."

END QUOTE.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/discussing-the-continuities-of-war…

And here, as to "capabilities," "willingness to act" and "U.S. interests," we must understand -- as addressed by me below and re: our political objective -- that our partners may no longer be "on board."

From the AOC itself:

<blockquote>The diversity of threats to U.S. security and vital interests will increase the need for Army forces to prevent conflict and shape security environments. Army forces have long been essential to preventing conflict through the forward positioning or rotation of forces overseas. Regionally engaged Army forces are needed to build partner capability, assure allies, and deter adversaries. While long-range strike and offshore capabilities will remain important to joint force operations, deterring threats from extended distance through retaliation often proves insufficient because determined adversaries attempt to achieve objectives rapidly at low cost prior to a U.S. or allied response. Army forces communicate U.S. commitment. Army forces and their partners bolster forward defense to dissuade adversaries who are unwilling to risk direct confrontation. Moreover, Army forces are critical to deterring conflict because they are capable of compelling outcomes without the cooperation of the enemy. </blockquote>

This would appear to be both a main dilemma of Joint force and future Army forward positioning and a primary advantage thereof. While exact places and times where the Joint force and Army may be required is unknown, treaties and vital interests dictate a forward presence in several key theaters with rotational active duty forces and prepositioning to make the global land network a reality. This presence does not need to involve large formal bases with excessive bells and whistles. Such bases might prove difficult to implement diplomatically and expensive to operate and man. In addition, they easily could be targeted by precision missiles, more extensive prepositioning equipment could be seized, or the ability of that extensive equipment to be used <strong>elsewhere</strong> could denied by the host nation.

Similarly sea-based presence has hundreds and in some cases thousands of Sailors and Marines on centralized platforms that are vulnerable to surprise strikes both in the open seas, in port, and as they attempt to close with and conduct forcible entry into dangerous areas. Airpower similarly requires many hundreds of Airmen to support squadron operations and formal agreements allowing use of large foreign bases. The soft skin of aircraft, supporting maintenance and logistics infrastructure, barracks, and easily targeted aircraft shelters (if even available) become easy target for precision missiles to include related runways and taxiways. The requirement for runways able to accommodate fighters, bombers, C-5s and C-17s and the associated maximum on the ground (MOG) that results to offload/upload/service them severely limits U.S. options to limited area in each supported host nation.

In contrast, forward prepositioning of armored company teams with mixes of IFVs and tanks provides protection and forward presence disproportional to their size. At Bashur, Iraq in 2003, the air insertion of a small heavy element in the Kurd-controlled areas required enormous C-17 resources yet once emplaced was instrumental in protecting 173rd Airborne elements that otherwise could have become speed bumps. If a heavy company team had already been on the ground prepositioned in an adjacent allied nation, entry of supporting Soldiers to operate those armored systems would have been far simpler. With rotational forces in some cases already on the ground or in adjacent nations an assisted entry could be expedited when facing regional tensions. This could be a phased entry with initially just the Soldiers of an armored BCT joining their equipment with subsequent options to add other lighter BCT elements as events warranted.

Thus, perhaps we should consider prepositioning an armored BCT company team of tanks and IFVs in as many NATO and Pacific states as possible. This would demonstrate resolve to support partner nations with associated agreements for contingency use of airfields protected by forward Patriot and THAAD assets that create an umbrella not only for us, but also host nation forces, aircraft, and naval vessels nearby. This minor forward presence with rotational forces only periodically on the ground would limit overhead and risk of losing assets to a coup or terrorists, while also presenting hardened targets that are difficult to kill with long range precision missiles. Use of inherent armor protection and firepower would assist protection of aircraft shelters and associated infrastructure and softer wheeled and tracked vehicles such as fuel trucks, MLRS launchers, helicopters, and air defenses with equal importance but greater vulnerability.

Agreements to preposition such limited armored assets would require diplomatic agreements between coalition nation partners allowing potential air transport to other adjacent nation’s experiencing conflict. The dispersed nature of say nine prepositioned company teams of an armored BCT at nine different locations with associated limited support might be one solution. This would require aggressors to target multiple hardened prepositioning locations to eliminate the armored Army combat power within intratheater range of any “unknown” contingency location.

If prepositioning was executed, aggressors with A2/AD missiles would face a dilemma of either preemptively engaging multiple coalition nations in a surprise attack with many hundreds of long range missiles creating an immediate coalition of the willing, or allowing U.S. Soldiers to close on their gear along with the fewer rotational forward Soldiers to disperse it and create an even more difficult to hit target. After all, armored BCT tanks and IFVs would require nearly pinpoint plinking to have any effect which would not be easy given air defense and nearby fighter aircraft proximity. Multiple countries with U.S. gear near smaller airfields would eliminate the MOG problem and simplify intratheater deployment to affected areas over far shorter distances than from the U.S. to Asia, Europe, or the Middle East, particularly if we made the IFV portion of an armored BCT C-130 Hercules-transportable.

Of course the Stryker BCT portion of our Army already fits that C-130 bill as do our SF/SOF, infantry, airborne, and air assault elements. Thus in some cases, a prepositioned armored company team with limited MLRS and manned-unmanned aircraft team support could become an anchor supporting assisted entry into areas for protecting nations being attacked by near peers. A notional two-component IFV and armored gun systems with each major component fitting in a C-130 and capable of low level airdrop would allow rapid early entry into someplace like Taiwan or the Baltics before those nations are fully invaded and have closer air defenses putting our C-130s at risk. This would allow us to secure ports, airheads, and amphibious entry points for the Joint force as well.

The common theme among the Army Operation Concept; Navy, Marine and Coast Guard emerging strategy (http://www.stripes.com/news/navy/navy-marines-coast-guard-to-release-re…), and USSOCOM Operating concept (http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/SOCOM2020Strategy…) is global partnerships/networks.

The prime factor that would seem to inhibit our ability to work with partners, to achieve our political objective, is -- shall we say -- our political objective.

Our political objective has been, and still is, to transform outlying states and societies (great and small) more along modern western political, economic and social lines.

When we (and many others) thought that this could be achieved quickly, easily and cheaply -- relying primarily on the "universal appeal" of our way of life, our way of governance and our values, attitudes and beliefs -- then we had no trouble finding partners.

Today, however, viable partners are increasingly hard to find.

Why is this?

Because everyone today knows that to achieve our political objective, of transforming outlying states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines, this is either (1) impossible, (2) a fool's errand or (3) something that cannot be achieved quickly, easily and/or cheaply.

Thus, our "partners" have -- more or less -- abandoned us and our mission; this by, generally speaking, investing and providing more in (1) "lip service" and less in (2) the funds, forces and capabilities needed to get the state and societal transformation jobs done.

Given this disconnect, just how much can we, or should we, count on a "Global Landpower Network" -- and/or "partners" -- to accomplish the Army's missions (a) today or (b) cir. 2025 and beyond?