To Solve a Problem, You Need to Define It…Accurately

To Solve a Problem, You Need to Define It…Accurately

By 4Sight

“Fighting in the Revolutionary War, well, is terrifying.  But I’m terrifyingly terrified that the  terrified Regulars won’t be terrified no longer.”

                                                                                        ~ Francis Marion (The Swamp Fox)

This initiates a series addressing Unrestricted Warfare, or in the parlance of Harry Potter, that which cannot be named[1].  How far we will take this series is yet to be determined.  However, it will likely form the basis of a 4Sight seminar or roundtable. 

Whether you are a strategic analyst, planner or executive decision-maker, if you are seriously engaged with what is happening and what is right around the corner, it is advisable to read Unrestricted Warfare[2], by PLA LTG (RET) Qiao Liang and COL (at the time of its publication) Wang Xiangsui, as well as The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China, by Ralph Sawyer.   

Before we begin our exploration into Unrestricted Warfare, it is necessary to introduce two concepts which are critical to problem solving: Defining and Contextualizing.  This essay explores the challenges we face in conducting what may seem to be a rather simple exercise.  At times, we may not appear to be addressing Unrestricted Warfare directly.  But occasionally, an indirect approach helps remove preconceived notions. 

“It’s the Economy, Stupid”

There is a lot packed into that phrase James Carville coined in 1992.  In Carville’s case, it defined the messaging problem needed to help get his candidate elected.  For most problems, there are solutions.  Most solutions have price tags, be it time, money, logistics or even lives.  If we understand the problem, we can define it.  If we can define it, we have an opportunity to provide a cost-effective solution.  It is as simple as that.  Right?  “Everything in war is very simple.  But the simplest thing is difficult.” ~ Carl von Clausewitz.  Conversely, if we cannot accurately define a problem, the problem festers, accelerates or overwhelms.  Global events are escalating at such a pace, definitions require precise accuracy.  Otherwise, analysts, planners and their decision-makers will be overcome by events. 

To a certain extent, problems mimic each other.  Civil war is war, but not like war across one’s borders.  That distinction drives a different set of solutions.  This was relevant in Afghanistan.  Was it a civil war, an uprising or an insurgency?  In Yemen, there are civil war, secession and fragmentation scenarios, as well as an outside military intervention problem.  The solutions for each are different.   

Warning is the foundation of decision-based analysis.  One of the judgment types in strategic warning intelligence is definitional.  We consider definitional judgment to be the Knight on the chessboard of analysis because it can be the opening move to reaching an accurate definition of a problem, allowing decision-makers to seize the initiative.

When defining problems, most analysts rely on their education and experience, but they have trouble adjusting to a totally new experience which may appear to be like an old one but is not an update of the old one.  As long as there is a historic precedent, analysts are good at making a diagnosis.  When there is no precedent, most have extreme difficulty determining the alternative choices.  Ignorance about the alternatives leads to what we call “premature cognitive shutdown,” when an open mind is required.  Unfortunately, the list of warning failures from misdiagnoses is long and infamous.   

When instability problems are assessed through their phenomenology[3], we understand they are different phenomena because they require different solutions.  However, most information systems only provide real insight into four of them.  This is what we call “Fidelity on Four[4].”  Fidelity refers to the degree with which a phenomenon appears to be replicated; requiring further  analysis before making a judgment.  The four are Insurgency, Insurrection (aka Uprising), Coup d’état and Civil War.

Therefore, an uprising looks a lot like an insurgency.  All the government overthrows during the so-called “Arab Spring” looked like successful popular revolutions.  On close examination, they were praetorian coups by palace guards and the military units in the capitals.  The exception was Libya because the phenomenon changed to an outside military intervention problem.   As for uprisings and insurrections, these are important to distinguish because the policy responses appropriate to each are different.  However, we seldom get information that has the fidelity to know which is occurring.  The  difference lies in the amount of central control behind the popular uprising. 

We can tell when there is a popular movement but not distinguish whether it is a revolution, anarchy or the start of a civil war.  As one of our staff, who goes by the nom de plume Flavius  Belisarius, asked, “was the post-2001 Afghanistan problem an insurgency or a Pashtun insurrection that evolved into an insurgency?”  Is an assassination a coup d’état or a change of government?  A revolution is a change of the system, but revolutions become apparent after the fact.  Think about that.

Analysts and planners sometimes use these terms without discrimination, but the diagnosis and subsequent definition drives the response of the executive decision-maker.  Popular consent, as well as professional peer pressure, defined the Afghanistan problem as an insurgency for nearly two decades.  It was first and foremost a Pashtun insurrection from which parts of the Taliban confederacy took on the mantle of insurgency.  That is why few of our solutions worked.  Population movements, such as the  Cuban boat lift, Darfur, Rohingya and other mass migrations are no longer simply “events.”  They are very destabilizing processes, often violent and require careful analysis to determine who is behind and financing them.  Population movements are hardly spontaneous and can be instruments of state policy or influence operations orchestrated by state and non-state actors.  They can be quite violent and bloody (1-2 million people were killed during the partition of India in 1947).  By analyzing the phenomenology, analysts and planners can make better reasoned approaches and work, in-concert, to mutually facilitate judgment accuracy in defining problems.

“Location, Location, Location”

That often-used realtor’s advice to would-be home buyers puts context into perspective.  Context derives from a Latin root meaning “to knit together” or “to make a connection.”  Contextualizing involves linking observations to a set of relevant facts, events or points of view that make it possible to begin the problem-solving process.  Decision-makers are driven by the need to act.  They need problems broken down and simplified.  Therefore, there is a need to address them in human terms. 

All human behavior are the actions of living systems.  All living systems exist in dynamic tension with their environment and with themselves in processing information, matter and energy.  As systems grow more complex, new features emerge.  Emergence is a key concept[5].  As systems evolve and learn, threats emerge in new ways.  Human behavior is not data centric.  It is systematic, based on subjective probabilities.  It is no easy task to contextualize a defined problem when it is prone to evolve.

For example, of the various phenomena of violent internal instability, insurgency stands out as a chronic  problem.  It is a balance between the amount of resources applied by both sides and it adds a military dimension similar to civil war.  When the balance changes in favor of the opposition, an insurgency can emerge as an insurrection.  If the insurrection is widely supported, it can re-emerge as a popular uprising.   If the balance changes in favor of the government, it can transition from a military to a police problem. 

Therefore, the analysis must be an iterative process, with contextualization applied throughout.  Analysts, planners and decision-makers must be dexterous enough to anticipate and adjust with the changes and not get shackled to a static definition.  Flexibility at the policy level is essential, which is easier said than done (harkening back to the Clausewitz quote).  The critical challenge then becomes identifying and effectively communicating the interrelated conditions in which the phenomenology exists and the problem occurs.          

Once the problem has been explained, the executive decision-maker will likely ask a question.  “So what?”  This is where we need to break things down within two distinct, yet interconnecting spheres: its meaning and its significance.  Decompositional judgment has a role here.  The meaning is directly related to its definition and its significance is related to those interrelated conditions which puts it into context.  In this arena, data performs an important function. 

The Afghanistan problem underscores the topics we have already covered.  Let us view it through a more strategic lens, by placing the Taliban within the regional context of Pakistan and India.  If we ask most Americans about the Pressler Amendment, we will hear crickets.  If we ask a taxi driver in Islamabad or Karachi, we may get a dissertation.  The Pressler Amendment dramatically slashed US military support for Pakistan.  After which, Pakistan faced a serious problem.  They needed to augment their strategic depth and protect their western flank without compromising their force structure along their contiguous border with India.  The Taliban became relevant to Pakistan’s regional defense strategy against India by denying access to Pakistan’s western flank.  After December 2001, a decentralized and fragmented Taliban was dependent on Pakistan for survival in multiple ways.  Therefore, within the context of Pakistan’s regional concerns, one solution to NATO’s Taliban problem in Afghanistan would have involved making the Taliban irrelevant to Pakistan.  Unfortunately, bringing Indian companies into Afghanistan, especially those working on Afghanistan’s infrastructure, was unhelpful.  Beyond the regional security context, there was, of course, the Taliban’s context within Afghanistan, vis-à-vis the various internal instability phenomena referenced in the previous section.  Given the events of 2021, consider the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.  We will save that for another time. 

Reflect on what we have outlined regarding the need for accurately defining and contextualizing problems at the country and regional levels.  When you expand your perspective and entry  points of analysis to a global level, you will see different phenomena and processes emerge.  It takes effort.  But for those analysts and planners who really enjoy their work, they should pounce on the opportunity to exercise their tradecraft.                     

Good COP/Bad COP

There is another challenge directly linked to defining and contextualizing problems.  That is getting everyone on the same page with a Common Operating Picture (COP).  It is common knowledge that the goal of a good COP is to develop a collective view of a situation within and across organizations.  A good COP will help tear down organizational silos, unify plans and operations and bring synergy to problem solving.  A bad COP handicaps those efforts, costs lives and money and could eventually compromise national interests. 

The art of developing a good COP requires much more than a common view.  It requires understanding.  Unfortunately, understanding seems to be the missing link in many COP development activities.  Given many of the intangible aspects of Unrestricted Warfare and the unrelenting pace of global security events, it is important to remain disciplined and take the essential steps required for understanding.  This is why defining and contextualizing are critical analytical and planning skills. 

“Mirror, Mirror on the Wall….”  

We have all done it.  It is human nature.  When assessing a threat or developing a COP, we sometimes hear someone say, “If I were _____, I would _______,” or words to that effect.  It is called mirroring.  It will get us into trouble every time we enslave ourselves to the magic mirror.  When we mirror, we place the threat in our own shoes, as we try to rationalize situations from our own perspective.  It takes discipline and training to overcome mirroring because it can easily become a chronic problem.  We must appreciate threats from their perspective, for the insight needed to gain and maintain the initiative. 

The challenge with Unrestricted Warfare, as well as Irregular Warfare is they require a greater depth of understanding of human behavior and decision processes.  If we slip-up and engage with opponents through the prism of our own perspective, we will find ourselves in a maze with no exit.  Engaging in Unrestricted and Irregular Warfare is not mental gymnastics, it is psychological judo. 

The Cognitive Domain

The paradox of Irregular Warfare is when it is all said and done, no one should realize what was actually done.  Therefore, when we define and contextualize the problems associated with or exploited by Unrestricted Warfare, we had best be precise and be prepared to challenge conventional wisdom with reasoned analyses with probative value.

Imagine what it was like for Galileo Galilei and Christopher Columbus to challenge the common knowledge and professional opinions of their times.  Of course, it is easy to criticize their peers and seniors centuries later.  Now, think about the challenges we face in defining and contextualizing problems related to Unrestricted Warfare in our time, when professional opinions and conventional wisdom are influenced by malign activities masquerading as reasonable arguments.    

This is where we begin our examination of Unrestricted Warfare. 

This is a thinking game. 

Welcome to the cognitive domain.