Blog Posts

By Major Rob Thornton

Some time ago I began to consider how our various efforts in the Long War are linked. Many on the Small Wars Council (SWC) have slogged through this with me on threads such as "Stability Operations vs. Irregular Warfare", and many other threads in which we try to establish the linkages between strategy to operations to tactics, or in which we consider policy.

Part of what a "strategist" (and I use the term loosely!) tries to do is to understand and relate the writing, speeches and statements of our elected and appointed officials to our efforts -- or how our policy objectives get implemented into some type of action to realize them. Army strategists are taught the Ends, Way & Means formula, but they are also taught to consider other perspectives on strategy such as if a strategy is complete, feasible, acceptable, and suitable. This is important, because the strategist must consider if the actions or "ways" to achieve the "ends" are within the bounds of our strategic culture, if they do more harm then good, if they are suitable in terms of balancing our foreign policy goals with our ability to sustain domestic will, are the ways supported by the means, etc.? These are all important questions when it comes to devising strategy. A SWC member who has written a great deal about this is Dr. Steve Metz.

At the last SWC get together her at Leavenworth, SWC member "Hacksaw" brought up an interesting point. He posited we were on the "Strategic Defensive" (and you guys thought all we did at the non-virtual gatherings was drink beer!). I chewed on that yesterday, as I thought it provided me an angle I had not considered. He'd also referenced Clausewitz as having stated that the "defense is the stronger form of warfare" -- which also was worth chewing on. While after thinking and talking about it some more, I don't agree with Hacksaw in total, but I do think there is there is merit to the notion of the rationale for pursuing aspects of an indirect approach which coincide with the scale of our policy objectives, and the means available to pursue them...

On 9 February SWJ conducted a phone interview with Brigadier General Jim Huggins, Deputy Commanding General (Manuever), of Multi-National Division - Center (3rd Infantry Division / MND-C). MND-C arrived in-country last March as part of the "the surge" and the new population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy directed by General David Petraeus, Commanding General of Multi-National Force -- Iraq (MNF-I). MND-C's area of responsibility are the security zones located along the southern edge of Baghdad and scales from the border of Saudi Arabia to the border of Iran.

A summary of highlights from the interview follow.

1. We continue offensive operations in the Southern Security Belts. These operations started with the Surge and are methodical, not in any way "whack-a-mole" style. As General Petraeus stated, we cannot "kill our way" through and out of an area, what this meant for us was the Division moving into an area to establish security followed by what is now called Sons of Iraq (formerly Concerned Local Citizens) who assumed security duties for a given area. As background, we believe the formation of SOI / CLC was a direct result of the Surge.

2. An integral part of our offensive operations is a refined intelligence-driven targeting process that has denied AQI sanctuary forcing a dispersion of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) leadership and some of the Sunni extremists out of our area. The Division is now looking at exactly what this exodus means in terms of AQI capabilities as well as planning for capacity building and tying into overall Corps' operations to further pressure AQI and build on success. Capacity building includes increasing Iraqi security force (Army and Police) capabilities as well as supporting other lines of operations to include governance, rule of law and very targeted projects to build the perception of security in all the small towns and villages -- what we cannot do is 'blow by' areas and leave the Iraqis living in what can be called a 'war zone'...

Outstanding, H/T Abu Muqawama and Theo

Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV, Commanding General of the Combined Arms Center at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, on The Daily Show, 10 March 2008.

By Lieutenant Colonel (ret) Thomas P. Odom, of

Special Operations and Strategy: From World War II to the War on Terrorism

By James D. Kiras

Published by Routledge

To borrow a quote from Ronald Reagan, "Gian, there you go again."

Gentile's analysis is incorrect in a number of ways, and his narrative is heavily influenced by the fact that he was a battalion commander in Baghdad in 2006. His unit didn't fail, his thinking goes, therefore recent successes cannot be due to anything accomplished by units that came to Iraq during the Surge.

The facts speak otherwise. Gentile's battalion occupied Ameriyah, which in 2006 was an Al Qaeda safe-haven infested by Sunni insurgents and their Al Qaeda-Iraq allies. I'm certain that he and his soldiers did their best to combat these enemies and to protect the people in their area. But since his battalion lived at Forward Operating Base Falcon and commuted to the neighborhood, they could not accomplish their mission. The soldiers did not fail. The strategy did...

March 2008 document (guidebook) from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

About the document:

Civil-Military Guidelines & Reference for Complex Emergencies is the first collection of core humanitarian instruments developed by the United Nations (UN) and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) on civil-military relationship in complex emergencies. Its goal is to help promote respect for international law, standards and principles in these situations.

Engaging military support for humanitarian operations is not a new endeavour. In today's security environment, however, the military are ever more involved in the 'direct' provision of aid, while humanitarian actors are often faced with situations where there are no alternatives but to rely on the military, as a last resort, for safety and to access populations in need - at the serious risk of compromising their neutrality, impartiality, and/or independence, and thus their ability and/or credibility to operate.

Combined with the tides toward 'integration' and 'whole-of-government' approaches, as well as the increased propensity of some Governments to deploy mixed civilian-military teams to provide aid as a 'tool' to address security threats, the situation calls for enhanced understandings between the military and humanitarian professionals at all levels.

International law, standards and principles can assist both actors to properly and legitimately discharge their respective missions in far-away lands. Adhering to these and de-conflicting each others' activities can maximise the effectiveness and efficiency of the respective operations. These tasks are crucial when working in the same area.

Written in a practical, user-friendly style that brings together the essential guidance materials on the subject into a single form, the Booklet aims to assist professionals to handle civilmilitary issues in line with such law, standards and principles, in a manner that respects and appropriately reflects humanitarian concerns at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

A Seminar with the Formulators of Counterinsurgency Doctrine

Sponsored by the Institute for the Study of War

March 13, 2008, 1:00pm to 6:00pm.

Georgetown University Convention Center

3800 Reservoir Road, NW Washington DC

Registration Required

The Institute for the Study of War will host "Moving Forward in Iraq" at the Georgetown University Convention Center at 3800 Reservoir Road, NW Washington DC, on Thursday March 13, 2008, from 1:00pm to 6:00pm. Space is limited to permit the opportunity for questions and discussion, and advanced registration is required for attendance. Email Adriel Domenech at [email protected] or call at 202-293-5550 to reserve your place.

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One of my pet peeves is commonality of language -- calling a spade a spade and sticking with doctrinally acceptable terms to describe doctrine that is, well, accepted. Before you go changing the language, please do us all a favor and change the doctrine first, ensure the new terminology is better suited than the old, and above all - make sure the new and improved terminology finds its way into the DoD Dictionary of Military Terms.

Continue on for the Army's attempt to reduce the noise level...

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From the ASP web page:

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Lots going on (expect no less) over at Abu Muqawama; the COIN doctrine debate, a French COIN reading list, the Lebanon narrative and US Army doctrine, a bit about Robert Fisk (The Independent) and his disdain for our new COIN doctrine, and finally (something we linked to earlier) a little about the history of that COIN doctrine.

U.S. Tongue-Ties Self In Talking To World by MountainRunner blogger Matt Armstrong over at Democracy Project.

Much more follows...

Charlie at Abu Muqawama has more commentary on The Colonels and 'The Matrix'.

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But at some point when that separation anxiety is past, we will probably look back fondly at the old days of cheesy shared hosting, reminiscing about how quaint it was for our hosting provider to periodically block our legitimate users from accessing our site, and then take plenty of time to load so they could savor the experience in between false IP blocks.

Only in the waning days of our time there, did we come to realize the company we kept on our old box. We were rubbing digital elbows with a virtual Who's Who.

By Lieutenant Colonel Gian P Gentile

The notion as presented in the article by Cullen Nutt "Petraeus's Big Tent" that the construction and writing of the American Army's new counterinsurgency doctrine FM 3-24 was based on wide-ranging debate within the American Army is fallacious.

The outcome of the manual was predetermined by a few key individuals like General Petraeus, General Mattis, retired Lieutenant Colonel Conrad Crane, active Army Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl, and neo-conservative analyst Fred Kagan, to name a few. The fact that a conference was held at Fort Leavenworth in February 2006 to "discuss" this pre-determined doctrine and even acknowledging that at this conference there was wide inclusiveness with civilian academics and analysts does not change the fact that the doctrinal outcome of the manual with its narrow use of historical lessons learned, theories, and principles of counterinsurgency warfare was predetermined...

Dissent and Strategic Leadership of the Military Professions by Dr. Don M. Snider.

Developing Strategic Leaders for the 21st Century by Dr. Jeffrey D. McCausland.

After Fidel, The Deluge? by Colonel Alex Crowther.

Falling Behind: International Scrutiny of the Peaceful Atom by Mr. Henry Sokolski.

The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program by Dr. Daniel A. Pinkston.

Petraeus' Big Tent - Cullen Nutt, New Jersey Star-Ledger

The Center for a New American Security (CNAS) and Foreign Policy magazine set out to address some of the most challenging questions facing the U.S. military in the 21st century: What is the state of America's military? How healthy are the armed forces? How prepared are they for future conflicts? How confident are they in civilian leaders and government institutions? And what impact have the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had on them? To find out, CNAS and Foreign Policy teamed up to conduct a survey to find out what senior retired and active duty officers — the very people who have run the military over the last half century — collectively think about the state of the force, the health of the military, the course of the war in Iraq, and the challenges that lie ahead.

SWJ Blog entry here.

Learn more: CNAS Fact Sheet | Questions and Data

Methodology

The U.S. Military Index is based on a survey of 3,437 retired and active duty officers holding the rank of major or lieutenant commander and above from across the services. About 35 percent of the participants hailed from the Army, 33 percent from the Air Force, 23 percent from the Navy, and 8 percent from the Marine Corps. The Index focuses on a very select portion of the retired and active duty military, including 232 retired general and flag officers, elite generals and admirals who have served at the highest levels of command. Approximately one-third were colonels or captains, while 37 percent held the rank of lieutenant colonel or commander. Twelve percent graduated from one of America's exclusive military academies. Approximately two-thirds had combat experience, with roughly 10 percent having served in Iraq, Afghanistan, or both. Over 95 percent of participants had served in the military for fifteen years or more, 81 percent more than twenty years, and some 17 percent had served more than thirty years. Nearly 30 percent were either active duty or retired within the last ten years, with current active duty personnel accounting for over 8 percent of respondents. Participants in the survey were selected by the Center for a New American Security and Foreign Policy magazine. The nonscientific survey was administered online from December 7, 2007, to January 15, 2008.

Release Event Information:

CNAS and Foreign Policy Magazine launched the results of this survey on February 19, 2008.

The release event also involved a panel discussion with:

Maj. Gen. Robert H. Scales, Jr., USA (Ret)

Maj. Gen. Scales served more than 30 years in the U.S. Army, including as commandant of the United States Army War College. He is a Fox News Channel military analyst and the president of Colgen, Inc.

Lt. Gen. Greg S. Newbold, USMC (Ret.)

Lt. Gen. Newbold served more than 30 years in the Marine Corps, including as director of operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He currently serves as the managing director of Torch Hill Capital.

Lt. Col. John A. Nagl, USA

Lt. Col. Nagl is commander, 1st Battalion, 34th Armor at Fort Riley, Kansas. He was deployed to Iraq in 2003, helped write the Army's counterinsurgency field manual, and is the author of Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya to Vietnam.

CNAS Clarification:

February 22, 2008--Since the February 19 release of a Center for New American Security (CNAS) and Foreign Policy (FP) magazine survey of retired and active duty officers on the state of the U.S. military, we have heard concerns from several people we respect about the manner in which its findings have been presented. CNAS takes these concerns very seriously. We regret that some of our findings were presented without the proper context and caveats for which we take full responsibility. We wish to clarify here what this index is and what it is not. We have updated our website to address these concerns. CNAS is committed to addressing this issue openly and directly.

The FP article summarizing the survey's results noted that it was "nonscientific," and that it included both "active and retired" personnel. While we continue to believe that the CNAS/FP survey provides many useful insights, it has become evident that its limitations require more explanation and clarification.

1. Nonscientific survey. Like many surveys conducted by the media and other organizations, including past FP indexes on terrorism, the CNAS/FP effort was not a randomized poll. Instead, emails were sent to thousands of individuals, mostly members of the Military Officers Association of America (MOAA), but also to additional active duty personnel currently serving in fellowships or at senior service schools, as well as to several hundred retired general and flag officers who were selected for their long service and extensive experience. Those who participated spent about twenty minutes online to complete the survey, sometime during the period between December 7, 2007 and January 15, 2008.

2. Predominantly retired officers. When we sent out the survey, we were unsure what mix of retired and active officers would respond, particularly through MOAA. As it turned out, although 285 active duty personnel responded, the response from the retired community was much larger, so that 92 percent of the 3,437 total respondents were retired. Some 700 participants had retired within the past 10 years, so that 29 percent of survey respondents were active duty or retired within the last ten years, while 71 percent had retired more than 10 years ago. Finally, and as noted in the FP article, more than two-thirds of respondents had combat experience and 10 percent had operational experience in Iraq and/or Afghanistan.

3. Did not consider junior officers or enlisted personnel. The survey's purpose was to ascertain how a very select group -- retired and active duty officers who had served at the highest level of command, Major/Lieutenant Commander and up, assessed the current state of the military and a number of related issues. The survey was not designed to "take the pulse" of the entire military. In particular it did not attempt to assess the views of company-grade or noncommissioned officers, who play a pivotal role in leading today's military and who will become senior leaders in the future. More broadly, it did not attempt to assess the views of enlisted personnel, who make up 84 percent of the active duty military. We hope that future surveys focus on these groups, but also believe that retired and active duty officers represent a very knowledgeable and influential group whose perspectives were of particular interest.

Both CNAS and Foreign Policy magazine posted the results of the survey online, including demographic data about the participants, the day that the article was released. However, while we provided the relevant information to the public, CNAS regrets not doing so more directly and effectively.

In presenting survey results at a public event on February 19, we noted several areas where retired and active duty officers surveyed seemed to have significant differences. For example, 44 percent of active duty officers and those retired for a year or less believed the military was weaker than it was five years ago, compared to 60 percent of respondents overall. On the other hand, for many questions, the results for officers who were either active duty or retired within the last year were similar to those of the overall group surveyed. We regret that we did not communicate both areas of difference and concordance more effectively. For those interested in further comparisons, we have posted results for this sub-group (active duty and retired for a year or less) on the CNAS website along with overall results for all 3,437 respondents.

We have updated the description of the survey methodology and results on the website, and hope that these changes and this clarification help to address any concerns regarding the survey. Our goal is to incorporate lessons learned into our future work, and we would appreciate your feedback ([email protected]).

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JCISFA's current mission statement: Institutionalize lessons and best practices from security force assistance (SFA) operations to better prepare U.S. and partner nation forces to rebuild security infrastructure during stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations. Serve as the DOD Center of Excellence and U.S. Armed Forces focal point to provide advice and assistance for international security force assistance mission...

White House Ties Troop Levels to Iraqi Elections - Doyle McManus and Julian E. Barnes, Los Angeles Times

US Casualties Down 30% in February - Michael Goldfarb, Weekly Standard

U.S. COIN Doctrine Meets the Korengal Valley - Westhawk

GEN Casey, Meet LTG Caldwell - Charlie, Abu Muqawama

Bush Elbows NATO for Troop Relief - Jon Ward, Washington TImes

U.S. Plan Widens Role in Training Pakistani Forces - Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, New York Times

Turkish Troops Leaving N. Iraq - Sudarsan Raghavan and Ellen Knickmeyer, Washington Post

The Patton of Counterinsurgency - Frederick W. Kagan and Kimberly Kagan, Weekly Standard

Israel Takes Gaza Fight to Next Level - Steven Erlanger and Taghredd El- Khodary, New York Times

The full report can be found here.

Colonel Richard Stevens, Commander, Combined Task Force Rugged and the 36th Engineer Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, on 27 February 2008.