Iraq Trip Report

Overview. What is shaping up in Iraq? There are four ongoing wars. 1) Shiite mafias in the south, 2) Anbar Sunni extremists 3) Shiite ethnic cleansing around Baghdad 4) Sunni extremist car bombings in Baghdad.

1. In the South the U.S. is doing little. The energy sector funnels billions to corrupt officials, criminals, militias and insurgents. The Brits weren't able to impose control. The hope is that the south remains a long-term mafia-type mess, and does not spill north to Baghdad.

2. In Anbar about 60% of the tribes are tilting toward the Marines and fighting the al-Qaeda types. Police ranks are swelling with tribal members. Anbar is improving, but how the Sunni tribes will work with the Iraqi Army, let alone the central government, is moot.

Prognosis for the next six months: Progress but no breakthroughs. The central government has to woo the sheiks and offer terms, figure out how police chiefs and Iraqi army commanders share power in the cities, and crack down on the insurgents captured in Anbar (put them away for life). Jails in Anbar are filling up, and the central government is not stepping up.

3. In Baghdad, as the Shiite ethnic cleansing advances, the front lines are easily marked by the blocks of abandoned houses. Checking the cleansing can be done by military means -- barriers, patrols and the like. The Americans are likely to stop this and turn around the trend.

4. Also in Baghdad, the Sunni extremists strike with suicidal murderers and car bombs. It is unlikely, given a million cars, that a technique will be developed to curtail this inside six months. In most countries, bombers are stopped by effective policing and spy networks, and Iraq is years away from that. This is the Achilles Heel. No matter the progress on other fronts, the persistence of gore and Shiite mass deaths is likely to continue to fuel hatred.

What, then, is the biggest problem? How the Americans can infuse into the Iraqi army and police in Baghdad a sense of mission and even-handedness such that the Americans can withdraw from neighborhoods in eight to twelve months without backsliding.

Existing American military tactics and techniques are adequate to staunch the ethnic cleansing; to transfer those conops or to design substitute techniques that the Iraqi army and police can use -- and to meld the army and police into a unity of effort -- is a far more problematic task. On the other hand, I've seen enough examples of tough Iraqi leadership at the battalion and police chief level to believe that some leadership is emerging. Right now, though, the glue is the presence of the American troops. They have to be out on the streets first, then the Iraqi forces fall in behind them.

The places in Baghdad where I saw clean streets, open shops, and guards on every corner were the Shiite areas. It's too early to tell whether we're dealing with a rope-a-dope feint by the Shiite politicians. It is in their short-term interests for them to help us purge bad elements, and restore order and services. But whether they believe a compromise with the Sunnis is possible or necessary -- who knows?

Specific Observations and Comments.

1. Open disclosure of Iraqi pay. At every joint US-Iraqi ops/intell update, one slide should address the advisors' update of payroll, equipment and food support for IP/IA. The higher up the US chain I moved, the more I heard how dramatically Iraqi ministries had improved. If so, terrific. If not so, then embarrassment is deserved at this late time.

2. Erratic standards of patrolling. The patrol is the basic tool in the US military inventory. Without patrols, there is no US presence or influence. The variation in the size and duration of patrols from location to location is astounding. One MiTT persuades an IA battalion to conduct twelve patrols a day; another in the same locale does six. One US company runs 15/day; another, 5. The variation is not caused by the actual threat; some of the toughest locales have the most patrolling. It is caused by an extreme variation in intuitively assessing the threat and setting the balance between force protection and mission accomplishment. A little ops analysis by experienced infantry of how often we are really on the streets and how one determines patrol size and mounted vs. dismounted would go a long ways.

3. Persistence of lack of population identification. It is impossible to reduce an insurgency if the insurgents cannot be identified. Most of our rifle companies, after several months in the same area, begin their own census and ID programs. I am a broken record on this, but I do urge that we systematically fingerprint and take census in critical locales, and provide the Iraqis with simple gear and templates to do likewise. OpSec firewalls can be built in to avoid subversion.

4. "Catch and release" swells the ranks of the opposition. Every battalion I spoke with was convinced the "rules of law" for arrest, imprisonment and release favor the insurgent. The Iraqi judiciary system cannot be straightened out for another five years. At higher levels, this is disputed. I remain on the side of the battalions. We must lock up tens of thousands until the violence subsides.

4. Under-utilized information tool. The loud speakers linked to news broadcasts several times a day in Ramadi is a terrific innovation that should be immediately installed at IA, IP and JSS locales.

5. A sound early warning system. In the Red Zones in Baghdad where ethnic cleansing is creeping forward, provide several cell phones per block and pay for the calling time. Each side will call in when threatened and provide the best early warning system.

6. Stop ethnic cleansing for profit. JAM systematically evicts Sunnis and moves Shiites into houses complete with furniture and electronics. The suddenly rich occupants then have great incentive to push Sunnis farther away so that the original owner can never come back to that neighborhood. We should take away this enormous economic incentive to cleanse neighborhoods. On a photomap in every JSS and COP, mark every abandoned house and refuse new occupancy JAM will lose adherents if the economic gain is removed. This step can be taken immediately, with substantial effect. It also insures that our patrols interact constantly with the people, who are sure to offer their opinions and tips.

7. Combat pay for the jundis in Anbar is essential. The tribes are encouraging local police enlistment. But the jundis have it much harder, and the strain will tell over the next year.

8. Anbar sheik movement merits US resources. In Anbar, the Awakening movement by the sheiks merits a crash program to pay, equip and advise what might be called a 'rural constabulary'. Analogies to the 2004 "Fallujah Brigade" -- a total disaster -- are misplaced. The Fallujah Brigade was controlled by the enemy and refused to cooperate. The Awakening is cooperating, although Anbar can only be resolved by political compromise on the part of the central government.

9. Negative habit of fixed positions. IA and IP devote >50% of resources to fixed positions. Given their aversion to unity of command and to patrolling, it is not clear what TTPs will allow them to control their own battle space, once Americans are not present. The counter that they "know the locals" is simply not true. The IA is as blind in many locales as we are, while the IP are years away from being trusted in many areas.

On the other hand, given that Iraq is a Rubik's cube, my discomfit may reflect only my own cultural bias. I measure by practical conops on the ground, and that may not be the right measure of effectiveness. As I was leaving a new Combat Outpost, an interpreter who had served with US units since 2003 told me, "The new strategy may work. It's a mental thing. We're out here. It's set them (Sunni insurgents and JAM) back."

10. Improving metrics for a police war. In essence, Iraq is now a police war. Yet our briefings, our metrics and our frame of reference -- how we organize, analyze and solve problems -- are military. Our basic tool to combat this insurgency and sectarian war is the patrol, too often mounted. In contrast, a police station -- the equivalent of our Combat Outpost -- is divided into patrolmen and detectives (of which we are woefully short because we have not thought in those terms.)

It would be interesting to invite a few senior cops from the States to visit, say, Ramadi and three districts in Baghdad. Then ask them to present how they would organize their daily brief -- what metrics they would demand from their police subordinates and what conops they would put in place.

11. Trust will decide this war. We know the essence of the problem: Whether the Iraqi central government and security forces are led by deceivers who tell us they believe in a stable federation with power-sharing, while they abet sectarian division. In my most recent visit, there was the pervasive, open acknowledgement by the police, IA and the residents that they trusted the Americans, but not each other.