... What is it about Afghanistan, possessing next to nothing that the United States requires, that justifies such lavish attention? In Washington, this question goes not only unanswered but unasked. Among Democrats and Republicans alike, with few exceptions, Afghanistan's importance is simply assumed—much the way fifty years ago otherwise intelligent people simply assumed that the United States had a vital interest in ensuring the survival of South Vietnam. As then, so today, the assumption does not stand up to even casual scrutiny.
Tune in to the Sunday talk shows or consult the op-ed pages and you might conclude otherwise. Those who profess to be in the know insist that the fight in Afghanistan is essential to keeping America safe. The events of September 11, 2001, ostensibly occurred because we ignored Afghanistan. Preventing the recurrence of those events, therefore, requires that we fix the place...
Fixing Afghanistan is not only unnecessary, it's also likely to prove impossible. Not for nothing has the place acquired the nickname Graveyard of Empires. Of course, Americans, insistent that the dominion over which they preside does not meet the definition of empire, evince little interest in how Brits, Russians, or other foreigners have fared in attempting to impose their will on the Afghans. As General David McKiernan, until just recently the U.S. commander in Afghanistan, put it, "There's always an inclination to relate what we're doing with previous nations," adding, "I think that's a very unhealthy comparison." McKiernan was expressing a view common among the ranks of the political and military elite: We're Americans. We're different. Therefore, the experience of others does not apply.
Of course, Americans like McKiernan who reject as irrelevant the experience of others might at least be —to contemplate the experience of the United States itself. Take the case of Iraq, now bizarrely trumpeted in some quarters as a "success" and even more bizarrely seen as offering a template for how to turn Afghanistan around...
For those who, despite all this, still hanker to have a go at nation building, why start with Afghanistan? Why not first fix, say, Mexico? In terms of its importance to the United States, our southern neighbor—a major supplier of oil and drugs among other commodities deemed vital to the American way of life—outranks Afghanistan by several orders of magnitude...
Much more at Commonweal.
Comments
Tim brings up an interesting point. What should we have done if Sudan had not expelled Bin Laden? What should we do if something similar happens elsewhere in the future?
Should the message be, we'll swack you then develop you (sort of like saying "just how many of you guys do we have to kill before you are ready to accept our help?")
Beyond Afghanistan or anywhere else we are currently conducting operations, what do we really want to communicate by our strategic actions? If the end is connected to some broader end as part of a grand strategy, then maybe broad development is exactly the right thing to do, but if its not - if we are creating strategic justifications that may be another matter altogether,and we may be creating strategic risk for ourselves by not really knowing what we are trying to accomplish.
Maybe sometimes its good to have some of you're enemies look around and say, " I don't want to be that guy, I saw what happened to him and it did not turn out well at all for him." I suspect that in most cases this will not only act as a good deterrent, but it will clearly communicate to friend, neutral and enemy alike the penalty and consequences for launching or allowing someone who has, is or planning to conduct an attack on the United States is bad news. If after you have destroyed, and/or disrupted their capability you know to keep a closer eye on them as they have proven to be a threat - and if they look threatening again, you go and communicate that message again possibly more severely then before.
Maybe you don't have to even do it the same way twice - you can be as creative as they are.
I don't know it just seems as though somehow our strategic thinking is drifting further away from purposeful actions designed to deter our enemies and where needed to compel them, and instead we are now leaning toward development for development's sake. When required we should be ready and know how to do it, but we should also know its hard, expensive and full of risk.
Its starting to feel like we believe we can fix all problems to the point where they require no more effort - sort of like the promise of the perpetual motion machine.
Best, Rob
Bacevich ignores the reasons why the 9/11 attacks were staged from Afghanistan. Why, for instance, weren't they done from Sudan? Because Sudan's government was amenable to pressure from the USA to expel Osama Bin Laden & Al Qaeda. The Taliban was not, largely thanks to the abandonment of Afghanistan by the USA after the Red Army's withdrawal.
As for Bacevich's claim that the USA can rely solely upon internal security measures against terrorism, a country like the USA with 16,000 miles of unfortified borders can do no such thing. If drug smugglers and illegal immigrants can enter the country from Mexico, Canada, or the coastlines, so can terrorists.
Andrew Exum at Abu Muqawama has a one word response for Andrew Bacevich's essay in Commonweal and that one word would be <a href="http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2009/08/nope.html">nope</a>.
BLUF: <i> I think one of the things that annoys Bacevich is that some of us have moved on to strategic and operational concerns after reaching different political conclusions than his own. It's not that we have not asked or have failed to consider the questions Bacevich asks. We've just asked them and then arrived at different answers. I have all the respect and admiration in the world for Bacevich's call for us to live within our means and to not get involved with costly misadventures like the one in Iraq. (I invited him to Washington, in fact, to speak on our Afghanistan panel at CNAS because I think his voice is one that needs to be heard.) But the two of us have simply reached different conclusions on Afghanistan, and I for one am sick of this argument that just because some of us are now working on operational concerns, we have somehow failed to ask the questions of policy Bacevich is asking. It's a little condescending, or at the very least reveals an ignorance of the debates and discussion actually taking place.</i>
Is "condescending" the right word here, or should it be replaced by "concerned"? Is "ignorance of the debates and discussion taking place" a valid counter, or a convenient cop out? When egos begin to play then rational debate goes out the window.
More on this debate at Democracy Arsenal in a post titled <a href="http://www.democracyarsenal.org/2009/08/our-public-debate-about-afghani… Public Debate About Afghanistan</a> by Michael Cohen.
BLUF: <i>I don't always agree with Andrew Bacevich, but he's right to be asking these core questions about US national interests in Afghanistan and he's right to offer military options other than population centric counter-insurgency. Not many other people in this town are.</i>
Which raises the issue - we are debating - but are we having the right debate?
To quote myself from Abu Maquwama:
Three quite simple reasons why Afghanistan shouldn't be compared to South Vietnam.
1 The 9/11 attacks. Even if we can assume that the majority of Al Qaeda responsible for planning such attacks is outside of Afghanistan at the moment that is still hardly a good reason for the United States to leave the nation and allow the eventual reconquest of the nation by the Taliban. Further I would like to ask Mr. Bacevich what he precisely would have done in 2001 if he had been president. The only difference I can find in Bush's actions and the hindsight of others is that they would have committed more troops and more heavily involved the U.N from the start.
2. Pakistan and its impact on the region. I don't know how things in Pakistan would have turned out if the United States hadn't launched its attack, but as they are now we cannot afford to ignore the fact that there is a serious crisis in the nation. I don't like it when people draw nicely made graphs of how losing a nation will cause the others around it to fall like dominoes, but only the most blind or gullible can state that the Taliban and affiliated groups and tribes are not a distinct threat to the long-term survival of the Pakistan one way or another.
The peace deals seem to have suggested weakness in the state to those groups, who stepped up their attacks prior to the large scale offensive made by the army. If Pakistan stops fighting them it effectively sacrifices all control over the border and could unnerve the United States enough to send soldiers across the border.
Finally if Afghanistan does fall to the Taliban we have a serious threat that their Pakistani counterparts could seize ever more areas of Pakistan than they already do. I admit that I don't have any idea where Pakistan's nuclear arsenal could be and I am fully aware that it is very unlikely that such groups would ever have the capability to actually use them. That said, I am not insane enough by any stretch to ignore the fact that those weapons could potentially fall into areas under the control of anti-American groups. With nuclear weapons you don't take that kind of chance.
3. To put it bluntly and harshly, a continued U.S presence in Central Asia. While the loss of South Vietnam didn't cost us Japan or South Korea, we don't have that large military presence or the threat of Communism to tie local leaders to the United States. Geographically speaking both China and Russia have much easier access to Central Asia, and while I find it unlikely that either would launch an invasion they might use economic pressure to convince those leaders to enter into stronger ties with them. Please understand, I don't consider myself to be especially Russo-phobic or Sino-phobic but I do put the interests of the United States before all others.
Looking at Dave D's catch on the SWJ Round'em up - there is an article by Sarah Carter (Washington Times) where the CJCS says:
"Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told editors and reporters at The Washington Times that nearly eight years after the war began, the US military is still digging its way "out of a hole" and has not reached "year zero" in the campaign to turn back Taliban advances and gain the trust of the Afghan people."
Does "Year Zero" mean 2001? or does it mean since the Taliban regrouped? I mean it as a serious question - it kind of gets to where you are in the movie. I guess the second question would be how far from back from zero are we? and the third might be how far past zero is enough?
Best, Rob
<b>Dave</b>
I routinely blame Congress for many things including venality and corruption and for placing their political party above national interest or their oaths. They did and do play a part in that but the reality is that:
- Carter reacted abysmally to the Tehran Embassy seizure. Congress had little play.
- Reagan deployed troops to Lebanon that he should not have, reacted poorly when stupid ROE helped create a disaster and withdrew rather than take strong action. Congress played only a very smallpart in that latter -- they did not play one in the decision to commit or in Reagan's reaction.
- Bush 41 foolishly responded to media pressure and sent people to Somalia. I'll forego commenting on not going into Iraq when it would have been far easier than it later was. Congress did attempt to impede entry on party lines but was unsuccessful -- and they knew that it would be unsuccessful and so were just making a political statement, they had little practical impact.
- Clinton's responses to numerous provocations did more harm than good (with a couple of minor exceptions); there were some Congressional restraints but the bulk of those were directed at the man personally and not necessarily at his policies. So that's the one case that Congress really interfered.
By that time, it was too late -- everything was in motion.
<b>Mark O'Neill</b><blockquote>"...Whether you agree with Andrew B or not, at least he is trying to get the discussion beyond the 'yes we can' recanting of learnt COIN tactical wisdom that has been passing for commentary and analysis in many circles lately."</blockquote>Wise words with which I totally agree; The Pundit / Tank-ocracy has contributed nothing to strategic thought. Far be it from me to say they aren't capable but I've seen little evidence...<blockquote>"Let's not forget that insurgency is not a tactical action but a holistic strategy. So what is the strategy to counter it, and why?"</blockquote>The strategy to counter it is to not to recognize you have a number of tall weeds and go to the top of each to start snipping but rather to put Glyphosate on the tendrils early on.
Submarines are best and most easily killed in port...
In my view the failure of four successive Presidents from both parties over the entire period from 1979 until 2000 to respond properly -- specifically, strongly enough -- to actions against US interests worldwide sent a terrible message. As most of the actions emanated from various nations in the Middle East, each failure was an inadvertent and cumulative encouragement to not only continue such probes but to escalate them with a totally predictable result -- A direct attack on the US on its own territory. That inaction or tepid action on our part was damaging to us on many levels and did us considerable harm; far more harm than effective responses would have brought.
Those failures led directly to where we are -- in Afghanistan and Iraq. We are there to show we can react strongly and we will not wander off if it gets annoying to some (in the world at large or in the US -- hopefully on that latter...) as we did in Viet Nam and Somalia. Thus our ability to do what we said we would do will have a significant impact on our future relationships with the World.
In defense of those former Administrations, the Armed Forces were not truly capable of a proper response to all the probes and provocations -- as Mogadishu and early days in Afghanistan and Iraq showed. That was the fault of the then senior leadership in DoD and a large number of people. It was also due to a very risk averse mentality, partly based on the misapprehension that excessive casualties would be unacceptable to the American people. Flawed logic. That is true but the definition of 'excessive casualties' to most Americans is too many for the payback received. Life is risk, most Americans know that and combat is a greater risk. They'll take that risk but they want good results.
Iraq is not yet fully settled but it appears on a glide slope; Afghanistan can be improved upon though I do not believe that a strong central government with little or no corruption and / or 'backward' policies (in our view) can be had -- nor is that necessary. We just need to leave it better than we found it. Our doing most of what we said there will also impinge, one way or another, on our self respect as a nation. Many will say that is an irrelevancy. They are fools.
Our future direction is to be determined. Again in my view, that should be to continue the bulk of our long standing policies but with three modifications:
- We should (ala Professor Bacevich) pay far more attention to our neighbors north and south and far less to areas and things that are not a viable threat.
- We should interfere less in other nations, stop preaching to them and lead by example. We should not employ our Armed forces other than in humanitarian roles in foreign internal development and we should not employ military force in large quantities unless there is no alternative. We need to avoid attempts at Nation Building, Foreign Internal Defense, Stability Operations and the like -- we need to be prepared to do them, no question -- but we should avoid having to commit to them if at all possible. We emphatically should not seek them. We do not and will not ever do them well and the payback is almost never worth the cost.
- We were notified on 24 April 1980 that we <u>required</u> a strategic raid capability. Due to the very flawed Weinberger Doctrine and its Powell Doctrine clone, we diligently suppressed that requirement in most senses. We effectively lost our ability and our will to respond to many minor but quite deliberate attacks and provocations. That needs to stop. We should develop overt, covert and clandestine means for such operations and make no secret of the fact that we will employ them against actors, state and non-state who trifle with us.
Those would be the future goals to which I was referring. Like you, I'm not sure we're up to that. The venality and self interest of the political process mitigates against it; the worldwide trend toward a riskless society is diametrically opposed to such views on use of force. Many factors can preclude those things from happening. You could well be right, it may not be who we are. It certainly was who we were...
Ken,
In your last paragraph you said:
"In a sense, in both Iraq and Afghanistan we are undoing some of the damage we've done to ourselves in the past 30 years. We need to finish that as best we can, only then can we -- hopefully -- adjust for the future"
The first part of the last sentence, "We need to finish that as best we can", seems a bit loaded. I don't disagree with it, just that I think it may reqire us to understand what damage was actually done in the last thirty years, how it realtes to where we are, and also where we want to go in the future as there is no other explicit end mentioned. I'm not sure we are up to those three tasks - I'm not sure its who we are.
Best, Rob
There is some 'up and down' in Bacevich's argument, but for my mind this was the killer line:
'Yet technique is no substitute for strategy'.
He is right, and expresses one of the growing frustrations I have with many of the experts who grace us with their opinions.
Just because we think we can do something does not mean that we should.
I think that this is also a point that Steve Metz makes well in his book and last couple of SSI monographs.
Too much of what I would characterise as the 'ascendant' COIN narrative that exists in many places at the moment is trite as it focuses on tactical and low operational level issues. These might lead to 'security' (or improvements therein), but do not lead in and of themselves to success.
We need less earnest endorsement of tactical possibilities and far more informed discussion of strategic imperatives. Whether you agree with Andrew B or not, at least he is trying to get the discussion beyond the 'yes we can' recanting of learnt COIN tactical wisdom that has been passing for commentary and analysis in many circles lately.
Let's not forget that insurgency is not a tactical action but a holistic strategy. So what is the strategy to counter it, and why?
(cue silence and tactical platitudes...)
I think Professor Bacevich has missed a lot of the context while asking very important questions. Why are we in Afghanistan, what's the American interest there, and what to do we hope to achieve?
Well a lot has changed since 2001 and if our goal was to drain away the Taliban and AQ membership, we and the Afghans have done a lot of that. Furthermore, all the non-violent, non combat focused rebuilding efforts persist in draining the Afghan swamp of the radical islamic types and therefore is a part of the larger strategy. But a funny thing happened on the way to 2008-9. Pakistan began to shake with its own Taliban issues, and it has become quite clear that the Taliban, in and of itself, has the desire to overthrow the Pakistani government. The kind of Pakistan we had in 2001/2002 has changed due to its nuclear weapons being vulnerable to being stolen or controlled by Mullah Omar. To me that seems to be a darn good reason to see that we achieve the aim of a stable region. Prof Bacevich doesn't even bring up the nuclear weapon issue and the possibility of them falling into hands of the crazies. ISAF and the US bringing Afganistan along into a constructive and stable partner in the region helps Pakistan. Pakistan snuffing out the Taliban helps Afghanistan. The anger over the Durand line is alive and well within the Taliban's movement. The fewer people in that movement we hear talking about pushing the current border into the western half of Pakistan is all the better.
As to being the graveyard of Empires, again context is key and Professor Bacevich should understand the difference in the goals and abilities of those who played the Great Game in the 19th century and the goals of the interested parties and nature of the world today. An Afghan officer recently tole me that the goals of the US and of Afghanistan are the same. While I take that as his opinion, I think there are a significant number of his colleagues that concur. British General Robertson, and all the other players of the Great Game never had that particular dice come up for them.
As to the Mexico issue, yes Mexico is a vital interest of the US, but its a non starter to even talk about deploying any number of US troops to Mexico above the current USMC Embassy security detachment. The Mexican government wouldn't permit it. They even freaked out when NORTHCOM discussed placing Mexico in its AOR. I think Prof Bacevich knows this, he's just using an obtuse example. Point taken. But lets only deploy such troops and do these kinds of operations where we're invited, OK?
I rather like Zenpundit's last 3 paragraphs. Quite sensible.
Mexico crept into this thread somehow. I don't think the Mexican Army will let itself get beat. There was an interesting article in Mother Jones that, if is at all reflective of reality, would indicate that they are just as ruthless when they need to be as ever, ley de fuga and all that.
Secondly, there isn't a blessed thing we can do to affect what happens in Mexico, in Mexico. We can only sit and watch. I think they will handle it, and handle it without our help. They will probably be better of without it.
The deteriorating situation in Mexico is going to bite us in the ass, I fear. Set that aside though.
What is a realistic objective vis-a-vis American interests in Afghanistan? That the Afghan government and populace be hostile toward al Qaida's return. That's pretty much it. More aid is required for that than Bacevich argued, but it is still a reasonable goal and one that fits well with COIN. If the Afghan government is not ready to meet standards for EU admission or some DEA crop eradication certification, that should not be a great concern of ours.
Afghans have historically not expected much from their government and were most content with King Zahir Shah's regime that provided some benefits here and there, maintained a rough civil peace and basically left the tribes alone. That's good enough for a COIN bar.
Let's shoot for realistic objectives not maximalist ones.
I think his lack of Afghanistan experience is relevant because he bases a substantial portion of his argument on the "fact", as he sees it, that we will never prevail in Afghanistan. I strongly disagree with this assertion and as we start to get the right balance of forces in country and more of the interagency involved we will begin to see positive results.
The Classic COIN argument Anonymous uses isn't useful. The insurgency is taking place in the largely Pashtun areas which, when added together, do not add up to 30 million people as he argues. Additionally, some tribal groups and factions can handle themselves provided they get occasional visits from the government to replenish ammunition, etc.
All good and valid points. But if we were to withdraw, how would it work? Would we negotiate with the Taliban and turn over areas to them, district by district, evacuating those who worked with and supported us? How would we react when they begin to slaughter different groups including tribes that worked with us, different minority groups, etc.? And when al-Qaeda returns, are we confident enough that missile strikes are sufficient to stop their activities?
While we will likely increase our resources in Afghanistan, with Iraq drawing down the troops Bacevich needs will likely be available, at least some portion of them.
Bacevich means well and most of his ideas have a great deal of merit. I believe he is trying to push his nation -- and its thinking -- to a higher plane. Unfortunately, I don't believe that the nation is ready to do that. Perhaps someday...
The Stewart article also raise valid concerns -- concerns that should have been but were not considered prior to our invasion of Afghanistan. There have been tales the initial plan was to go in, disrupt or remove the Taliban and leave. That would have been a far better idea than was our telling the Afghans and the World we would stay and 'fix it.' In my view given the points that both Stewart and Bacevich make (among others; Afghanistan was not an unknown quantity in 2001), we should have realized all that up front and never said we would stay and fix it.
However, we did so and we now have an obligation that we gave ourselves publicly to seriously attempt such fixing.
I can agree with Bacevich that effort would be better devoted to Mexico than to Afghanistan for many reasons. However, we turned away from that course years ago and we cannot undo the past 70 years. Things done before he was born have put us where we are today and adjustments will be incremental and possibly even painful. The probability is they will occur and his long term goals may be eventually realized. Eventually...
In a sense, in both Iraq and Afghanistan we are undoing some of the damage we've done to ourselves in the past 30 years. We need to finish that as best we can, only <i>then</i> can we -- hopefully -- adjust for the future.
Still he raises a good question that should be thought about. Why? There were three good articles in the 05 August SWJ OpEd roundup and one good one developing Afghanistan (and for that matter others) by Rory Stewart titled "The Irresistable Illusion".
In the 05 SWJ OpEd RU Bronwen Maddox of the London Times quotes the British Minister of Defense as saying:
"Our troops are in Afghanistan to keep our country safe from the threat of terrorism," he said. "To prevent al-Qaeda having a secure base from which to threaten us directly"
Really? Is he implying the only way to prevent having AQ from ever having a secure base of operations from which to launch attacks is to develop and socially engineer Afghanistan into something different? If that is the only reason he thinks we are in Afghanistan does it justify the risks and resources to an outcome that is probably decades (if not more in the making).
Then there are the couple of pieces which cite numbers. One by a couple of CNN reporters says in order to do "Classic Coin" it will require 600 K of security forces for Afghanistan's 30 Million. Another speaks to desired increases in Afghanistan's security forces.
These two articles should be read together because the math starts to work out to 600K (400K of desired ANA and ANP leaves a balance of 200K from somewhere). Both articles imply Afghanistan has 170K of ANA and ANP already - does this mean there are 170K trained and ready, or the ANA and ANP are authorized that number but the "on hand" numbers may be smaller? So how long would it really take to get to 400K - how about 600K? Why weren't they with the Marines in their recent operation? How about Wanat? What about quality and competency?
Can Afghanistan even generate and sustain 170K of security forces? Could it generate and sustain 400K how about 600K? A quick look at the ranking of the world's economies puts Afghanistan around the same peg as the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Compare that list with the size of various countries armed forces and you will get another perspective. In one of the articles John Nagl from CNAS is quoted as having said:
"predicts doubling the size of the Afghan Army would likely be a five-year, $25 billion commitment that would require 12,000 U.S. military trainers. Those troops would have to be reassigned from other duties."
Somehow I think that estimate may be a bit conservative.
Don't get me wrong, I'm all for development if it supports a defined and feasible end, but I'm not sure that logic holds true.
There was one other spot in the Rory Stewart article that is worth reading concerning the musing of Viceroy Rawlinson (1868)on why he was not terrible worried if the Russian attempted to invade Afghanistan:
"In that case let them undergo the long and tiresome marches which lie between the Oxus and the Indus; let them wend their way through poor and difficult countries, among a fanatic and courageous population, where, in many places, every mile can be converted into a defensible position; then they will come to the conflict on which the fate of India will depend, toil-worn, with an exhausted infantry, a broken-down cavalry, and a defective artillery."
In any event, the Stewart article raises the questions probably as good or better then Bacevich and is worth the read - http://www.lrb.co.uk/v31/n13/stew01_.html
I dont necessarily agree with Bacevich on this one - probably dont when the rubber meets the road. That said, I do not think that Afghanistan experience is a requirement when commenting on U.S. national security issues and strategy. Hes not talking just Afghanistan - hes tackling a much broader issue and looking out years in regards to what he thinks important / critical. Of course, if Afghanistan is the lynchpin to our grand strategy - whatever that may be - then his argument does not hold much water.