More than a year has passed since an Afghan police commander turned on coalition forces and helped insurgents carry out a surprise attack that killed nine Americans, wounded more than 30 United States and Afghan troops and nearly resulted in the loss of an allied outpost in one of the deadliest engagements of the war. Within days of the attack, Army historians and tactical analysts arrived in eastern Afghanistan to review the debacle near Wanat, interviewing soldiers who survived the intense battle, in which outnumbered Americans exchanged gunfire for more than four hours with insurgents, often at distances closer than 50 feet.
Now, that effort to harvest lessons from the firefight of July 13, 2008, has contributed to a new battlefield manual that will be delivered over coming days to Army units joining the fight in Afghanistan with the troop increase ordered by President Obama. The handbook, "Small-Unit Operations in Afghanistan," strikes a tone of respect for the Taliban and other insurgent groups, which are acknowledged to be extremely experienced fighters; even more, American soldiers are warned that the insurgents rapidly adapt to shifts in tactics...
More at The New York Times.
Comments
dustin cole - I suspect one of many issues of Wanat and the latest fight in the Nuristan is not being able to adequately patrol in force, and thus, pulling back and become too static without knowing what's going-on around you.
I recall occasionally seeing small concrete "pill boxes" laying askew above ground in Vietnam in the middle of indian country. I pitied the poor citizen of France who sat in those while the Viet Minh tunneld under and blew it up!
I always felt more comfortable on patrol as opposed to digging-in. I would slyly have my men drop their helmets, flack jackets and lighten-up. We also constantly practiced IA drills, and became comfortable at patrolling at night.
My experience was a long time ago. Every generation has a new learning curve. I hope this handbook helps, and if I bored anyone, please don't hesistate to tell me - with tact, I'm fragile!
ever since the news came over the net/tv/media after the battle of wanat a little more than a year ago it's been one of the more emotional things that i've read, and has stayed close to the surface of my mind, per se. over the weekend, thom shanker wrote another great article in the times that added to the one mentioned in this post. eerily, the next day, the taliban seemingly pulled an imitation like attack in kamdesh, north of wanat only 30 miles. the subsequent handbook mentioned in the article, 'small unit operations in afghanistan' aims to sharpen the analysis of reality on the ground for our men and women, and hopefully our troops won't be called on to fight off ambushes while outnumbered 3 or 4 to 1 in poorly placed and equipped outposts to an enemy that knows every inch of the land.
*is the 'small unit ops in afghanistan', by cubbison available to the public? i can't locate...?
Does the employment of mortars belong in this manual? Where pre-registering observed mortar fires is impractical, "basics" would seem to dictate a map inspection which would show the unit commander areas where an enemy can assemble with overhead cover using terrain.
It concerns me these and other basics aren't being taught and reinforced in regular training?
One issue isn't in question though: these men at Wanat kept the faith and fought - and did what had to be done in the end.