ElBaradei will leave the IAEA on November 30th. Between now and then, he will get a last chance to restore his legacy as the world's nuclear proliferation enforcer. ElBaradei's refusal to energetically confront Iran over its violations of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty has resulted in self-inflicted damage to his reputation. Should he leave it to his successor, Yukiya Amano, to open the Iran file to the public, we will be left wondering how ElBaradei viewed his mission at the IAEA. Was it to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation? Or was it to assist the developing world in containing Western power?
This week, advocates of the death penalty for murder received the greatest possible boost to their argument when Scotland's justice minister released Abdel Basset al-Megrahi from prison. Similarly, ElBaradei's tenure at the IAEA has provided no comfort for those who attempt to defend the usefulness of international institutions and international treaty law. Advocates of treaties such as the NPT, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and others have a responsibility to support the toughest possible enforcers of these agreements. ElBaradei's refusal to be a tough enforcer has damaged the case for international treaty law as a means of conflict prevention. Yukiya Amano will come to work in December finding much damage to repair.
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Another objective perspective on ElBaradei can be obtained online for six dollars at the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists:
http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/f15114mg646m1g81/?p=2dbc429384…
Excerpts:
The IAEA after ElBaradei. As ElBaradeis tenure reaches its close, a deep and troubling divide has opened up on the IAEA Board of Governors between advanced nuclear states, including most of the states with nuclear weapons, and developing and non-aligned IAEA member states that make up a majority of the membership. On highly publicized issues such as Iran and Syria, consensus--essential to the demonstration of firm political will by the board--has evaporated. Once, decision making had taken place in a climate of unanimity. But after the IAEAs confrontation with the United States over Iraq and the Iranian nuclear program, sources say, the willingness of board members to compromise on critical issues has disappeared. A few sources assert that ElBaradei contributed to the loss of board consensus by hammering away on the need for fairness and equity in international nuclear matters--such as the nuclear weapon states responsibility to disarm as called for in the NPT. But most sources--including some former U.S. diplomats--tell us that it was the Bush administrations unilateral approach to issues that poisoned many board deliberations, not actions taken by ElBaradei. Others blame the lack of boardroom agreement on the failure of member states to adjust to a multipolar world after the Cold Wars superpower standoff ended.
When the Board of Governors began looking for a successor to ElBaradei last fall, most advanced nuclear states deliberately sought a candidate who would scale back the IAEAs ambitions, diplomats from these countries tell us. They settled on Yukiya Amano, Japans ambassador to the IAEA, a career diplomat not known for taking risks or assuming a high profile. Most nonaligned and developing countries supported Abdul Samad Minty, a South African nuclear diplomat who was intensely opposed by most advanced nuclear members. Unlike previous board elections, the 2009 contest was acrimonious and Amano was elected in June by a mere one-vote majority.
In July, Amano tried to reassure member states that didnt endorse him that he would heed their interests and that he wouldnt emphasize the nonproliferation agenda of advanced nuclear countries to the detriment of other states development goals. The negative reception by developing states to ElBaradeis fuel-cycle initiative underscores just how many of these countries have a deepseated fear that additional nonproliferation initiatives are intended to prevent them from enjoying the benefits of nuclear technology. It will be difficult for Amano to restore consensus, but if the IAEA is to fulfill its current mission--to say nothing of additional responsibilities--rebuilding trust on the board must be his top priority.