McChrystal report unwittingly slays counterinsurgency doctrine
This summer the U.S. government has faced a deteriorating crisis in Afghanistan. Such crises tend to force policymakers to face up to the facile assumptions they have previously made. Gen. Stanley McChrystal's report to his civilian masters on the faltering counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan has caused President Barack Obama and his advisers to face up to their basic assumptions about U.S. objectives and strategies for perhaps the first time. Obama and his team seem very likely to conclude from this long overdue examination of first principles that it will be impractical for the U.S. to successfully implement a counterinsurgency campaign plan in Afghanistan. McChrystal's assessment has unwittingly tossed the U.S. military's counterinsurgency field manual into the shredder.
McChrystal's report is brutally honest about the troubles in Afghanistan. He describes a long list of problems in his own organization, how the United States and allied forces are failing to implement essential counterinsurgency tasks, and why the Afghan government's corruption and ineffectiveness are so crippling. McChrystal declares the need for more resources and the need to quickly seize the initiative over the insurgents. By stating these problems, McChrystal has fulfilled his duty to his civilian masters. But he has also properly shifted responsibility for the most fundamental decisions about war policy to where they belong, namely the Oval Office.
So why will it be impractical for the U.S. to successfully implement a counterinsurgency campaign plan in Afghanistan? McChrystal's report describes what must change in Afghanistan to increase the odds of success. However, neither the U.S. military nor the rest of the government can hope to do much about these problems before the political clock runs out in the United States. The problems McChrystal discusses include:
1. The election of a president Afghans (and Americans) will accept as legitimate,
2. Corrupt and ineffective Afghan governance at the national and local levels,
3. U.S. soldiers' lack of facility with Afghanistan's languages,
4. The U.S. military's inability to gain trust and credibility with the population,
5. The difficulty expanding the size and quality of Afghanistan's security forces,
6. The requirement to significantly disrupt Taliban and al Qaeda sanctuaries in Pakistan,
7. The requirement for U.S. and NATO countries to accept higher casualty rates over the medium term as they attempt to protect Afghanistan's population.
McChrystal also calls for gaining military initiative over the Taliban over the next 12 months. Since the Taliban can easily go to ground without penalty during that time, the United States is unlikely to be able to visibly achieve this condition either. In theory, a sustained counterinsurgency campaign could gradually improve these problem areas. But it is very likely too late in the Washington political game to sustain the effort required. Obama and his team are thus likely to conclude that the counterinsurgency campaign McChrystal calls for in his report is impractical and should be abandoned as an option.
If his report brings matters to a head in Washington, McChrystal will have done his duty. The result will be a painful period of introspection and bickering in Washington. But history will remember McChrystal's honesty favorably.
Abandoning a counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan will mean that McChrystal's report will have unwittingly rendered a fatal blow to Western counterinsurgency doctrine. It will be hard for anyone to seriously recommend counterinsurgency elsewhere after it was abandoned in Afghanistan. McChrystal will be America's last counterinsurgency general for a long while. The United States will still have to endure a long era of irregular warfare. It just needs a new military doctrine for this era, and fast.
The Obama team doesn't understand irregular warfare
As McChrystal's report and U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine make clear, success against an insurgent movement requires convincing the indigenous population to support the legitimate government and to cut off support for the insurgency. The indigenous population will do this when it believes the legitimate government and its outside supporters (such as the U.S. military) are completely committed to the mission and will persist with the effort without hesitation until successful. If the indigenous population has any doubt about this commitment, it will not cooperate sufficiently with U.S. aims; if the locals miscalculate, they risk murder at the hands of the insurgents.
Regrettably, President Obama and his top officials have said exactly the wrong things on this score. Their remarks, designed to show a U.S. audience their pragmatism, flexibility, and open minds, are precisely what Afghans, calculating whether they should resist the Taliban, do not want to hear. And there is no way for the United States to succeed in Afghanistan without greater support from the Afghan population.
I have previously discussed the harmful effects of Defense Secretary Robert Gates's open doubts (see here and here). In an interview on The News Hour, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton seemed proud of her flexibility and oblivious to how Afghans would receive her remarks:
[W]hat I'm very grateful for is that we're not coming in with any ideological, you know, presuppositions. We're not coming in wedded to the past. What we try to do in this administration is to sort out all of the different factors and come to the resolution based on the best information we have, and then as soon as we do that we keep going at it. We don't say, "OK, fine, now we're set for the next five years." That's not the way the president works, that's not the way that any of us work.
On September 20th Obama discussed his own commitment to flexibility, welcome news to a U.S. audience, but not so welcome to Afghan listeners:
"Until I'm satisfied that we've got the right strategy, I'm not going to be sending some young man or woman over there -- beyond what we already have," Obama said on NBC's "Meet the Press." If an expanded counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan contributes to the goal of defeating al-Qaeda, "then we'll move forward," he said. "But, if it doesn't, then I'm not interested in just being in Afghanistan for the sake of being in Afghanistan or saving face or . . . sending a message that America is here for the duration."
In this week's essay I have predicted that Obama will abandon a counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan. I may be wrong. As my FP colleague Christian Brose explains, Obama's long and public deliberation may actually be essential political preparation for a renewed commitment to the Afghan war.
A renewed commitment to counterinsurgency and nation-building in Afghanistan will have a (slim) chance of success only if Obama and his lieutenants can convince the Afghans themselves that they are completely committed to the mission no matter the time or costs. Of course that is not the message Obama's Democratic supporters or much of the American public wants to hear. The worst possible choice would be a half-hearted "temporary commitment" to a 12-18 month counterinsurgency campaign. Such an oxymoronic strategy would be unconvincing to Afghans and the Taliban and its failure would expose Obama and the U.S. military to a fruitless loss of prestige.
It is not possible for Obama to commit to the Afghan population and simultaneously remain "pragmatic" with his domestic constituents. He will have to choose one way or the other.
Comments
David:
I didn't think you misquoted me but you did repeat with slight differences what I had said. My repetition was to make the point that we agree the GPF has to be prepared to play. So to my mind there is no question of configuring the force on the premise that we can pick and choose. We must be full spectrum, no question. That does not mean that we cannot in future make better choices than we have in the past -- <u>before</u> we commit excessive force.
We differ mostly, I believe, in that you said that SOF should be a complement to the GPF when the reverse should be true.
You now say:<blockquote>"GPF will again be called upon as a last resort and must therefore be prepared, particularly given tomorrow's most likely urban operating environment, with all the challenges that it will bring."</blockquote>Yet as you said initially:<blockquote>"Every time it is in the U.S. national interest to stabilize a foreign government or country, to reverse state failure, or to provide temporary security pending the establishment of local authorities, COIN doctrine should and hopefully will be in high demand."</blockquote>So you appear to have switched from a COIN advocate in the more is better with GPF lead and SOF assist mode to a COIN when absolutely necessary mode. I can certainly agree with that.
I would suggest though that "tomorrow's most likely urban operating environment..." can be a self fulfilling prophecy -- as can commitment of GPF to COIN -- and that outlook leads to a desire to commit on the rationale that others just haven't done it correctly but we now know how so we can jump in. We've always known how at some level, we just do not do it at all well. I say again it makes little sense to play the opponents game on his turf, we should play to our strengths, not our weakness -- and conduct of COIN by the GPF is indicative of a weakness. Have to be able to do it but if you do, you're acknowledging that other more sensible and potentially productive and less costly methods failed. In short, Bush used the tool he had. Better to offer more and better tools; we can do that.
Did you happen to think of one in answer to this? "I'd appreciate it if you could name me one case where the US has intervened with the GPF in any numbers for an extended period and said intervention was successful and merited the total costs in all aspects."
Obviously the Armed Force of the US will do what their political masters tell them and they will do their best. They do need the doctrine of FM 3-24 et.al. to back up what they tell those political masters about impending operations. Lack of that did, as you say, contribute much to the flawed Afghanistan and Iraq operations. They also need the experience or training to make the case that GPF commitment in such cases is expensive in all terms and is to be avoided if possible. McChrystal has done that. Quite well, I thought...
I agree with Mr. Haddicks assessment of the probable consequences of abandoning Afghanistan for the future of counterinsurgency in American policy. However, I disagree with his depiction of cause-and-effect in a battle for the population. He argues that the "indigenous population will [support the legitimate government and its outside supporters] when it believes [they] are completely committed to the mission and will persist with the effort without hesitation until successful."
Mr. Haddicks assertion falls in line with a fallacy of population-first approaches to winning irregular wars. Everyone agrees that security is important, but the population-centric argument presupposes that a given unitary population evaluates its situation strictly in material cost-benefit terms. The complications of social identity are not addressed. Individuals and distinct social groups have histories and values of their own that set terms for how actions and events are received. Those are constraints that lie outside the ability of states to influence, no matter what flavor of military force they choose to apply. To overcome them would require generations of imperial rule if our ambitions continue to be as far-reaching as nation-building. We can succeed without greater support from the Afghan population as a whole if we circumscribe our aims. If we are seeking to establish a strong centralized government, displacing the indigenous tribal structure, the Afghanis may not be open to convincing by any means we should consider.
Ken,
1) My post was more a response to GG and RH's posts than to yours, which may explain why you think I repeated or misquoted you.
2) The 'unnecessary' political element was introduced to underline the point that the military cannot always choose what they do and do not do, and that even when the commander-in-chief shares the aversion to 'nation-building', 'nation-building' can in fact be what they end up doing.
3) You seem to suggest that I think COIN is easy or that GPF are the perfect instrument for it, so long as they've read FM 3-24. That is not what I am saying. I agree with you that "Intervening in another Nation will always be an expensive and long-term operation, best avoided if large bodies of US Troops are envisioned". What I am saying is that sometimes these interventions cannot be avoided, and that configuring capabilities on the premise that we can pick and choose is a dangerous path to take.
Similarly, I agree that "alternatives to intervention should be explored", but I also believe that those alternatives won't always be viable. GPF will again be called upon as a last resort and must therefore be prepared, particularly given tomorrow's most likely urban operating environment, with all the challenges that it will bring.
David Ucko:
I think you've got it exactly backwards...<blockquote>"... it was also the approach favoured by the Bush administration as it invaded Afghanistan and Iraq: the U.S. military was not to be used for 'nation-building', right?"</blockquote>That introduces an unnecessary political element into a process debate but it deserves an answer. Yes, that's somewhat correct -- though I would say that was the position before, not as. The real question is how much better off would we be had they stuck to that very sensible mantra?
I agree that a retaliation -- and Afghanistan was that -- for 9/11 was indicated. I also agree that some kind of effort aimed at convincing the that attacks emanating from the Middle East would no longer be tolerated after 22 years under four administrations from both parties of not only tolerating but inadvertently encouraging such attacks. That inadvertent error was caused by a lack of cultural knowledge and awareness and / or ignoring that which was available, a likely prospect elsewhere in the future.
Iraq was a likely target for such a message for a variety of good reasons -- one of which was not WMD -- but in both cases, occupation and the subsequent 'insurgency' (both are or were much more than that) was neither required or desirable. It was however rendered necessary by a failure on the part of those aforenamed four Administrations -- particularly the last two -- and DoD to adapt to the end of the Cold War and provide enough tools other than sledge hammers. Said sledge hammers which you now seem to advocate using promiscuously about the globe...
In addition to less intrusive FID assistance, in the near term, some use of retaliatory or preemptive strategic raids by the GPF or SOF (not SF) likely will be required. Lack of that capability arguably was as responsible for the flawed and foolish Afghan and Iraq operations as was a lack of the doctrine -- and, again, far more importantly, the training connoted by FM 3-24; the book is somewhat immaterial, knowledge of what it contains including the excessive costs for likely results and ability to perform is not at all immaterial.
That 'Cold War' thingy BTW was a very artificial period in world history from which many derived incorrect lessons.<blockquote>"I think before we revert to status quo ante, it is worth remembering that you don't always know what you are going to get, and that we must be prepared for the possibility that using U.S. GPF to help stabilize a foreign territory will again be deemed to fall within the U.S. national interest. Failing to prepare for that eventuality will result in more discussions such as this one."</blockquote>I believe you're repeating what I said, at the risk of redun-dundancy it probably bears yet another repetition: "On engagement, I believe the issue is the timing, size and tone of our effort; quicker and smaller is better. The GPF must be capable but their employment should be avoided unless there are no other options. For the COIN that is indeed here to stay, use the experts and avoid sending in a host of marginally competent people, military and civilian that can do as much harm as they do good." As I've said elsewhere, we do small wars well (See Greece, El Salavador, the Philippines and a few others). The big ones, not so well because the GPF while usable and marginally adequate will NEVER be able to do the job well -- it is simply the wrong tool for the job. Remember that, it's important. While the theory is great, the reality is quite different and is ignored by theorists who have no responsibility for actual results.<blockquote>"Furthermore, using indirect approaches supposes that you have local auxiliaries who can do the work for you. Following regime change, or in weak states (where by force these interventions are going to take place), that precondition doesn't always hold."</blockquote>In order, not necessarily, I certainly did not say that. Why change a regime? We object to policies in China, in Zimbabwe -- are we advocating regime change in either? All states are weak, it's merely a matter of degree.
Should one not explore alternatives to intervention rather than as in Viet Nam, Afghanistan doing it principally and probably wrongly in a great many senses of the word for domestic political reasons -- and for a valid strategic reason but with terribly flawed execution for Iraq?
I'd appreciate it if you could name me one case where the US has intervened with the GPF in any numbers for an extended period and said intervention was successful and merited the total costs in all aspects.<blockquote>"This is why the SOF-dominated approach must COMPLEMENT rather than supplant a preparedness and capability to intervene directly as and when needed. FM 3-24 and the associated learning of the past few years therefore remains critically important and must not be abandoned."</blockquote>That's where you have it backwards.
In reverse order, FM 3-24 (or an easily and much improved, more concise successor that is not a sales brochure for a flawed concept) should not be abandoned and the lessons of the last few years must not be discarded. We can agree on those points.
However, on the first clause you've got it exactly backwards. First, not SOF dominated; Diplomatically and Intelligence dominated with a strengthened USAid and a renewed USIA and some SF help only if warranted. That also might and probably would entail some non SF military support short of GPF units in a combatant mode.
Secondly, not SOF but SF, <i>Special Forces</i> in their primary role and not their pseudo SOF HVT role -- very different animals. Use of a better trained GPF in FID or SFA should only be contemplated if the first approach does not work.
The soft approach first, <u>only</u> if that proves inadequate should the GPF be committed to complement the Intelligence, diplomatic and low key SFA effort.
Do not send the SWAT Team when only a Process Server is required.
The idea that IW can be delegated to the SOF community and be done indirectly ONLY was in vogue in the early 1960s and in the 1980s (click name for lengthier elaboration). If I remember correctly, it was also the approach favoured by the Bush administration as it invaded Afghanistan and Iraq: the U.S. military was not to be used for 'nation-building', right?
I think before we revert to status quo ante, it is worth remembering that you don't always know what you are going to get, and that we must be prepared for the possibility that using U.S. GPF to help stabilize a foreign territory will again be deemed to fall within the U.S. national interest. Failing to prepare for that eventuality will result in more discussions such as this one.
Furthermore, using indirect approaches supposes that you have local auxiliaries who can do the work for you. Following regime change, or in weak states (where by force these interventions are going to take place), that precondition doesn't always hold.
This is why the SOF-dominated approach must COMPLEMENT rather than supplant a preparedness and capability to intervene directly as and when needed. FM 3-24 and the associated learning of the past few years therefore remains critically important and must not be abandoned.
Oh David, there are all kinds of things that perhaps dont "invalidate" FM3-24 and its underlying theory of population centric counterinsurgency (aka, Maoist counterrevolutionary warfare) but it has become highly, highly problematic. A suggestion for you, read side by side FM 3-24 and Stathis Kalyvas's "The Logic of Violence in Civil Wars" and ask yourself honestly the feasibility of population centric coin theory and practice actually working in complex environments like Afghanistan.
Next consider history and have a look at Carl Hack's new scholarship on Malaya and Douglas Porch's work on the French in North Africa; the work of both of these historians raises serious doubts that population centric coin has worked in practice the way historical myth has portrayed it.
Why the fascination with principles and the almost theological view that if Coin principles are applied correctly then voila victory can be achieved? I shudder when I hear our general officers lecturing us that well the "principles" of coin that we learned in Iraq are definitely applicable to what we are trying to do in Afghanistan. Wow, there is a recipe for dogma to be sure and in fact such thinking is determing action presently in Afghanistan. Clausewitz said that genious in war certainly knows and understands the rules (more losely stated principles) and usually follows them. But he also said that it is genious that is able to discard them when necessary.
Lastly, I agree with Ken White that of course we need FM 3-24 and good Coin doctrine. Yet the present version must be not polished around the edges with a few more annexes on social networking but deconstructed and put back together so that the American Army, as a matter of important operational doctrine, has a broader approach to countering insurgencies and instability throughout the world other than a simple rehash of David Galula.
Gian
Ps; as always I appreciate the excellent writing and thinking of Robert Haddick to spur debate and discussion
COIN may have come "too late in the Washington political game" to be properly implemented in Afghanistan. Still, why does that mean FM 3-24 should be thrown 'into the shredder'. To the contrary:
1) FM 3-24 emphasises the significant requirements in manpower, resources and time necessary in any comprehensive and direct engagement in counterinsurgency. In that sense, it should be compulsory reading, not resigned to the dustbin. Arguably it was the lack of a FM 3-24 (and the absorption of its principles) that got us where we are in Afghanistan today (and before I get attacked by trolls, that does not mean that it would have been a cakewalk had FM 3-24 been around). Still, Afghanistan doesn't so much prove the bankruptcy of COIN as the dangers of failing to apply some of its core principles, and of then trying to do it on the cheap.
In other words, should we scrap everything we've learned about COIN just because it won't magically reverse 8 years of entropy?
2) "It will be hard for anyone to seriously recommend counterinsurgency elsewhere after it was abandoned in Afghanistan"
COIN cannot and should not be done everywhere. Nor is it a silver bullet. But none of that invalidates the theory of COIN or its relevance. Every time it is in the U.S. national interest to stabilize a foreign government or country, to reverse state failure, or to provide temporary security pending the establishment of local authorities, COIN doctrine should and hopefully will be in high demand.
Finally, COIN is much more than just population security. It is about understanding the political environment and about bringing moderates to your side. It is about understanding the 'human terrain' (not the best term, but you see what I mean). It is about building capacity and preparing for complexity: different cultures, languages, the media, NGOs, irregular adversaries, etc. In that sense, though FM 3-24 may not work for Afghanistan (time will tell), it will be required for many a future campaigns, whether COIN or not. Whatever happens in Afghanistan, let's not throw the baby out with the bathwater...
I strongly agree with David that the lack of an equivalent to FM 3-24 contributed to problems in both Afghanistan and Iraq. More correctly, a lack of professional education and of training for almost 30 years in the basics of post attack operations, occupation, foreign internal defense and security force assistance significantly and quite adversely affected operations in both nations. I thus agree that FM 3-24, flawed as it is, should not be discarded.
However, what FM 3-24 does not provide that decent training might have is the knowledge that, in COIN, <i>"...failing to apply some of its core principles, and of then trying to do it on the cheap "</i> is both a correct statement and a very strong cautionary. Particularly the latter. Intervening in another Nation will always be an expensive and long term operation, best avoided if large bodies of US Troops are envisioned.
The first problem is that we do not have large bodies of troops; we have a relatively small professional Army. It is fairly competent but competence does not provide presence; COIN requires presence and lots of it. The second problem is that Americans do not meld well with other cultures; a few do, many recent immigrants will but the majority of US Troops are not going to provide the culturally attuned efforts required -- fortunately, Special Forces folks are an exception -- and the language skills desired cannot be mass produced and maintained for all potential trouble spots.
The third problem is that the American people will tolerate casualties and great expenditures provided reasonable progress is seen; lacking fairly constant and visible situational improvement, they will get restless and be ready for the effort to end -- particularly if they see no pressing strategic need.
Better Intelligence, heavy Diplomatic involvement and a small SF footprint up front can negate a requirement for such commitments.
So, no, do not discard FM 3-24 -- rather use it, next time, to allow the now far more knowledgeable Generals to educate the starry eyed Politicians and avoid such foolishness unless there is absolutely no alternative -- and there usually are several.
A point on alternatives. Much of the problematical aspects of Afghanistan and Iraq were and are induced by a lack of viable alternatives. At least a part of that shortfall is due to excessive caution in DoD in avoiding the funding of true strategic raid capability (another part is due to turf battles but that can be handled).
I also suggest that Robert's statement:<blockquote>"McChrystals assessment has unwittingly tossed the U.S. militarys counterinsurgency field manual into the shredder."</blockquote>is probably incorrect in that it is not at all unwitting nor does it toss the manual in the shredder -- though it may very well result in considerable soul searching before the US again commits the GPF to an intervention in another Nation.
That is a good thing...
Robert Haddick is right on the mark by noting that the fence sitters among the Afghan population are likely to tilt to the other side if the Administration does not accept GEN McChrystal's recommendations. I would also add the probability that the NATO countries would begin to run for the exits and that the Pakistanis would double down on their bet that the Taliban is a viable long-term option for Afghanistan.
I also think Dr. Ucko is right that COIN is not going to go away. We are an empire - hyperpower if one prefers the term - and have no alternative to engaging in the semi-governed and ungoverned spaces in the world. Irregular warfare is here to stay and will continue to be the preference of our adversaries, especially when they see the damage to our power and prestige that will occur should we withdraw from Afghanistan.
Pol-Mil FSO:
I agree that COIN is not going away, I also agree that we must engage in many places and that a premature withdrawal from Afghanistan would have very unpleasant consequences..
On engagement, I believe the issue is the timing, size and tone of our effort; quicker and smaller is better. The GPF must be capable but their employment should be avoided unless there are no other options. For the COIN that is indeed here to stay, use the experts and avoid sending in a host of marginally competent people, military and civilian that can do as much harm as they do good.
I'm not at all sure irregular warfare is here to stay. I agree it is prevalent now because we are willing to play at it and the opponents have an advantage over us if they can draw us in. I do not believe continuing that willingness is in our best interest and I believe that we can and should pursue alternatives to preclude getting sucked into efforts where we are playing to our weaknesses and the other guy's strengths...
I did that in two wars, you did it in two others -- we can do better.
<a href="http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/politics/In-Afghanistan_-let-U_S_-tro… Afghanistan, let U.S. troops be warriors </a>
There was an international uproar when, on Sept. 4, in Afghanistan's Kunduz province, an American fighter jet under NATO command bombed a group of Taliban fighters who had hijacked two fuel tanker trucks. The trucks exploded, the fighters were killed, and so were a still-undetermined number of Afghan civilians.
The civilian deaths sent shudders through the American military command, already fearful that civilian casualties would further alienate the Afghan public. Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top American commander in Afghanistan, was said to be angry and determined to tighten the U.S. force's already-strict rules of engagement even more to avoid future civilian deaths.
Then something odd happened. When McChrystal met with local leaders in Kunduz, a few days after the bombing, he got an earful -- but not what he expected.
According to a <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/05/AR20090… account</a> in The Washington Post -- a story that has received too little attention in the ongoing debate over U.S. policy in Afghanistan -- <strong>the local Afghan leaders told McChrystal to stop being so fussy and to go ahead and kill the enemy, which they said would help bring stability to the region.</strong>
Post reporter Rajiv Chandrasekaran was given extraordinary access to the bombing investigation. According to his account, McChrystal began the meeting with a show of sympathy for those who had been killed or wounded. The general didn't get very far before he was interrupted by the provincial council chairman, Ahmadullah Wardak.
The security situation has been getting worse in Kunduz, Wardak told McChrystal. American and NATO troops haven't been aggressive enough in pursuing and killing the Taliban. In Wardak's view, the bombing of the fuel tankers, rather than a mistake, was the right thing to do.
"If we do three more operations like was done the other night, stability will come to Kunduz," Wardak said, according to the Post account. "If people do not want to live in peace and harmony, that's not our fault."
Chandrasekaran reported that McChrystal "seemed caught off guard." Wardak clarified a bit more: "We've been too nice to the thugs," he said.
So instead of receiving an angry lecture on America's disregard for Afghan life, the general received an angry lecture on America's hesitance to go after the enemy.
---
Now cut again, this time to Sept. 8, when four U.S. Marines were killed when the Taliban ambushed their patrol in Kunar province. The Marines were taken completely by surprise and pinned down under heavy Taliban fire. McClatchy reporter Jonathan Landay was with them and wrote a <a href="http://www.mcclatchydc.com/227/story/75036.html">harrowing account</a> of their desperate battle to survive.
The rules of engagement again played a role. "U.S. commanders, citing new rules to avoid civilian casualties, rejected repeated calls to unleash artillery rounds at attackers dug into the slopes and treelines," Landay wrote, "despite being told repeatedly that they weren't near the village."
This is all just painting a narrative. We cannot withdraw from Afghanistan until the American people are convinced that it is unwinnable. They will soon hear enough of these reports about the resources demanded, the odds stacked against us, the solemn decisions that weigh our objectives versus the costs, and the loss of will amongst our allies. Eventually the American people will conclude that it cannot be won and we will adopt less ambitious objectives that allow us to significantly reduce our footprint without calling it a withdrawal.
Just to sum up my views:
Events have revealed (for the second time in fifty years) that American society is unsuited for large, expensive, and visible counterinsurgency and stabilization campaigns. Ken White has discussed some of the reasons (and there are more). Thus I conclude that COIN -- that requires long deployments of large GP forces -- will be out as a future policy option.
However, techniques such as FID, UW, and SFA/SA have a great future. The U.S. military should -- and is -- preparing specialists to better implement these techniques.
Regarding these aspects of irregular warfare, there remains much to learn, much doctrine to write, much training to do, and many opportunities for field experience. Irregular warfare will keep the U.S. military busy for a long time. But not doing GPF-centered COIN.