Who's responsible for mismanaging the long range strike program?

On September 16th, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates delivered a speech to the Air Force Association convention. During the speech he expressed his concern that the U.S. might suffer a shortfall in long range strike capability, a shortfall that could result in a strategic setback for the U.S. and its allies. What remains for others to examine is whether Gates himself should have done more over the past three years to straighten out his department's drifting long range strike program.

Here is what Gates said in his speech. First, he expresses pride in the F-35 tactical fighter program. The F-35 program will soak up hundreds of billions in procurement dollars over the next decade supplying short range strike aircraft to all of the services:

Without question, the F-35 program represents an ambitious effort. More than 3,000 aircraft, counting all military services and foreign partners. Twenty-two million lines of code. Over $46 billion for development plus an estimated $300 billion in total acquisition costs. A truly massive investment in the future of U.S. air power ... Next year's budget reflects a major commitment to accelerate the development and production of the F-35 -- with nearly half a billion dollars added to the FY 10 budget to support the flight-test program. Our objective continues to be to equip the first training squadron at Eglin Air Force Base in 2011, and achieve initial operating capability for the Marines and Air Force in 2012 and 2013 respectively. I consider the F-35 program a major leadership priority -- with all that entails with regard to funding, oversight, and accountability.

Then a few paragraphs later in the speech, Gates explains how a Chinese focus on high-end asymmetrical capabilities and theater ballistic missiles could thwart all of those new F-35s lined up at places like Kadena, Guam, and U.S. 7th Fleet aircraft carriers:

In fact, when considering the military-modernization programs of countries like China, we should be concerned less with their potential ability to challenge the U.S. symmetrically -- fighter to fighter or ship to ship -- and more with their ability to disrupt our freedom of movement and narrow our strategic options. Their investments in cyber and anti-satellite warfare, anti-air and anti-ship weaponry, and ballistic missiles could threaten America's primary way to project power and help allies in the Pacific -- in particular our forward air bases and carrier strike groups. This would degrade the effectiveness of short-range fighters and put more of a premium on being able to strike from over the horizon -- whatever form that capability might take.

As Gates explains, the solution is a long range strike capability for the future. What has the Pentagon been doing about obtaining this capability? Dithering, as Gates makes clear:

I am committed to seeing that the United States has an airborne long-range strike capability -- one of several areas being examined in the ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review ...Whatever system is chosen to meet this requirement -- be it manned, unmanned, or some combination of the two -- it should be one that can realistically be produced and deployed in the numbers originally envisioned. That is why it is so important that with aircraft -- as with all of our major weapons systems -- schedules are met, costs are controlled, and requirements are brought into line with reality.

Over the past three years, what priority has Gates himself assigned to this problem? Sure, it will be years before Chinese anti-access and area denial efforts threaten U.S. Navy and Air Force tactical operations in the western Pacific. But if Gates's remarks are any indication, it may be even longer before the U.S. builds an adequate long range strike capability. It is not clear the Pentagon has settled on a concept, let alone drawn up requirement for the platform.

Given the incredibly long lead times required for major U.S. weapons programs, the U.S. is at risk of lacking an adequate long range strike response to adversary anti access/ area denial efforts. Who will take responsibility for that?