The first article appeared in the New York Times. This excerpt summarizes the article's main theme:
Administration officials said the United States had eliminated more than half of its top targets over the last year, severely constricted Al Qaeda's capacity to operate and choked off a lot of its financing. The sense of progress against Al Qaeda and its allies has helped shape the internal debate over the best way to fight in Afghanistan as President Obama explores alternatives to a large escalation.The White House has begun promoting the missile strikes and raids that have killed Qaeda operatives in Pakistan, Somalia and elsewhere. Mr. Obama will visit the National Counterterrorism Center on Tuesday to call attention to the operations. While aides said the public focus was not related to the Afghanistan review, it could give Mr. Obama political room if he rejected or pared back the request for 40,000 more troops from Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top commander in Afghanistan.
The second article appeared in the Washington Post. It discussed how U.S. law enforcement authorities tracked and then arrested Najibullah Zazi on conspiracy to assemble improvised explosives. Here is an excerpt from the article:
In late August, shortly after federal agents began tracking the movements of the suspected terrorist in Colorado, senior officials added the case to Obama's daily intelligence briefing in the Oval Office.Agents had only fragmented information about Zazi at that point, administration officials said. But the case quickly piqued Obama's curiosity and led to what aides called an intensive three-week White House focus on the case.
The 24-year-old Afghan immigrant was arrested last month, accused of seeking to build bombs on U.S. soil after attending an al-Qaeda training camp in Pakistan. Investigators think Zazi was "entering the execution phase" of a bombing plot, a senior administration official said over the weekend, possibly timed to coincide with the president's trip to New York for a meeting of the U.N. General Assembly or the anniversary of the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.
[...]
"The Zazi case was the first test of this administration being able to successfully uncover and deal with this type of threat in the United States," a senior administration official said. "It demonstrated that we were able to successfully neutralize this threat, and to have insight into it, with existing statutory authorities, with the system as it currently operates."
Commentary
Part of the administration's exposition of the Zazi case is to promote an urgent legislative matter, the extension of some Patriot Act provisions that made the tracking of Zazi possible. These provisions, which include expanded wiretap authorities, are due to expire at the end of the year unless renewed by statute.
More broadly, the administration officials who are making this case in the New York Times and Washington Post must reassure skeptics that U.S. intelligence collection on al Qaeda, both overseas and inside the U.S., will be very good. One argument for why the U.S. needs to maintain a large presence in "Af-Pak" is that such a presence is needed for the intelligence that a counter-terror strategy relies on.
Proponents of the counter-terror/law enforcement approach are hoping to avoid the cost and risk of an expanded COIN campaign. But a counter-terror/law enforcement approach has its own costs and risks. Absent a large U.S. military presence, getting the intelligence to strike al Qaeda leadership targets will require the U.S. government to make deals with the most unsavory characters in Central Asia. Do the intelligence officers who will be called upon to aggressively develop this constant stream of intelligence wonder when they will be called upon to discuss their actions either in front of a congressional committee or perhaps a grand jury? As for the Zazi case and domestic security, safety against terrorism will likely require ever greater preventive electronic and database surveillance. Proponents of the counter-terror/law enforcement approach will have to be —to make the case for these measures, even more so if a terror attack succeeds.
The case being made in today's New York Times and Washington Post bypasses the issue of America's moral commitment to Afghanistan and the consequences to America's prestige from a drastic change in policy. I am not arguing for McChrystal's plan and against the counter-terror/law enforcement approach. Indeed, regardless of whether it is the right approach or not, I think the counter-terror/law enforcement approach is the inevitable end-state. But it will come with its own set of costs and risks which we should think through.
Comments
It is good to se that we are having success with dealing with terrorism on our own turf. However, I feel better dealing with them elsewhere where my family is not at as high of a risk.
I believe we need more troops in Afghanistan, and even though I did not vote for President Obama, I respect the fact that he is not willing to make a snap decision on the issue. I believe he has come to the realization that a rapid withdrawal from Iraq or Afghanistan is out of the question. He will soon understand that the COIN fight is resource (personnel) intensive. We can only hope that the Majority of the American public will soon come to this same understanding.
Personally, I would love to see the anonymous 'administration officials' credentials in military campaign design. Election campaign design does not really cut it...
Of course, anyone with access to a mil /strat blog site or a strategic studies Masters degree under their belt is now an expert, right?
@ Justin. Let us agree that it is not JUST about U.S. homeland security but also about the struggle for dominance in the Middle East.
Even so, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the highest priority for any U.S. President (and federal government in general) is the security of the homeland. One could imagine, for example, a scenario where wars amongst Middle East countries would be largely irrelevant to Americans. If, for instance, the U.S. ever found the political will to fully develop its vast oil, gas & coal reserves (shale oil in Colorado alone is estimated to be three times the oil reserves of Saudi Arabia)-- to say nothing of nuclear power-- then the price of a barrel of oil would absolutely plunge and Iran and the other one-commodity economies would crumble. That would go a long way to deciding dominance in the Middle East. On the other hand, we cannot continue to ignore the training camps for terrorists in Pakistan (or anywhere else) that educate legions of would-be terrorists to live among us. One 9-11 is too many.
But it's not about terrorist attacks on the US homeland - it is about the Middle-East and who controls it.
At present there is a struggle between the Iranians, Western-aligned Arab Governments and radical Islamists. There can be no peace until this struggle is resolved. If the radical Islamists win, there can be no peace.
If the US and its western allies walk away from Afghanistan it is strategic defeat. Not a change of posture and not 'peace with honour', just a plain old-fashioned beating. It will empower and energise America's enemies.
George, come back, all is forgiven.
A few, quick points.
1. The capture of Zazi et al should lead to greater concern over national security vis a vis Afghanistan and Pakistan, not less. The Zazi case shows, that far from eliminating Al Qaeda's reach, Al Qaeda and affiliated terror groups are able to train and equip a relatively obscure person in their Pakistan camps and set them loose in the U.S.
2. If Obama decides to abandon the effort in A-stan, to say nothing of P-stan, we will undoubtedly see the number and sophistication of these terror 'universities' multiply, sending an ever-growing stream of increasingly lethal drones into the U.S. ready to create carnage in unpredictable ways. Only one has to get through. And God forbid that Al Qaeda succeeds in its present campaign to recruit and train non-Arab, U.S. citizens -- something that will only accelerate as hard-core jihadists from Guantanamo are introduced into the U.S. prison system.
3. Herschel Smith over at The Captain's Journal blog makes very convincing arguments that it will be difficult and extremely dangerous for even our best Special Forces to carry out any missions in either A-stan or P-stan without the existing network of bases and logistics. Ditto for the UAV campaign. The UAV's have to take off from somewhere and once the U.S. makes it known that it is pulling back from A-stan, it is just a short time until the Taliban choke off the logistics to these isolated bases.
4. The failure of the Bush and, now, the Obama administration is the failure to insist on the dismantling of the terror camps in the FATA of Pakistan. These areas are critical for the Taliban and U.S. failure to make that a non-negotiable issue with Pakistan means that the Taliban always have the ability to retreat, re-fit and return to fight another day.
Rob,
Good point about operating on OPP, but one of the supposed benefits of electing Obama was that he is more favorably viewed by the rest of the world, which I guess is supposed to translate into some political capital on the international stage. Perhaps it's time to use some of that capital by making what will surely be an unpopular decision in stepping up ops in Pakistan - or at least lending more direct support in terms of advisors/trainers, other stuff - in conjunction with a drawdown in Afghanistan.
The debate may be useful to break the problem into parts such as "how do we best protect the homeland from International terrorism?" and "how do we best protect our interests in the Afghanistan and Pakistan area?" Where are the questions distinct and where do they overlap?
Since part of the CT thinking would seem to involve the ability to operate on other people's property (whether they control it or not) I suspect it will not be quite as attractive as it sounds. However, it may provide the basis for some middle ground between two extremes. At least it may help engender serious thought on policy that is broader than just AQ.
I'm thinking it (as any COA) also comes with its own set of undescribed/ill defined risks that will not be fully evident until after the fact.
Best, Rob
"But the case quickly piqued Obama's curiosity and led to what aides called an intensive three-week White House focus on the case."
"The Zazi case was the first test of this administration being able to successfully uncover and deal with this type of threat in the United States,"
This is great news. We have the white house involved in the minute details of individual terrorist investigations. I'm sure this adds greatly to the effiency of the law enforcement organizations involved. I'm also glad that the "administration" is taking credit for the bust.
Seriously though, this leads to a point that must be considered in the overall debate. There is a consequence of focusing more on capturing or inderdicting these people internally: erosion of civil rights. (such as the above mentioned extension of wiretap laws). Although this doesn't necessarily mean that we will loose further freedoms (although I personally believe it will), this policy would virtually guarantee that we will never return to pre-patriot act times.
I'm not saying that our civil liberties in and of themselves are reasons alone to follow the Mcchrystal proposal, but this point must be added to the overall cost/benefit analysis.
These two articles discuss the continuing debate over our nation's Afghan strategy. I see this debate as positive for many reasons. First, we as a nation need to define what our goals are in Afghanistan. What do we want to have as the End-State upon completion of operations there. I would argue that to a degree, we haven't come to a collective agreement on this point. Once we have identified what our goals are, we can then best determine how we want to achieve them and what resources we will need to achieve them. This involves several related issues. How committed will the American people remain to the Afghan mission and how much longer will that committment translate into actual resources in order to accomplish that mission.
This debate is very spirited, and probably overdue. We can approach this debate in multiple ways, but whatever we decide, it must have the continued support of our citizens, gain support of the international community, and provide a justifiable and acceptable end-state that we are looking to achieve. The last thing our nation can afford, both economically and ideologically, is to go forward with a strategy without the resolve to finish the mission. The United States alone controls our ability to withdraw from Afghanistan. The ongoing debate and eventual decision should outline what success looks like so that we can withdraw on the right terms that don't give way to misperceptions from our enemies that this was a defeat.
<i>One argument for why the U.S. needs to maintain a large presence in "Af-Pak" is that such a presence is needed for the intelligence that a counter-terror strategy relies on.
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This seems a bit dubious to me. How does a large COIN force in Afghanistan assist us in intelligence collection on al-Qaeda elements in Pakistan?
<em>But the counter-terror/law enforcement approach comes with its own costs and risks, which promoters have an obligation to explain.</em>
Do COIN proponents similarly have an obligation to explain that their approach could cost considerably more than the $70B a year currently being spent in Afghanistan, and that this expenditure could continue for ten or fifteen years, or longer? Do they have an obligation to explain that a reconstituted, legitimate, responsive Afghan government that is able to provide services and security to its people will do absolutely nothing to interdict the planning or training capability that AQ and other international terrorists retain in portions of Pakistan? Or that a new, post-war Afghanistan may still be too weak to prevent the return of unsavory elements when the U.S. leaves, even if that's in 15 years, because of the simple facts of geography and state weakness?
Do they have an obligation to explain for what period of time 100,000 U.S. troops will be required in Afghanistan before we can re-embrace a smaller footprint involvement, or how long the counterinsurgency can be expected to be "hot"? Do they have an obligation to explain that even those countries that receive the most U.S. aid money, weapons, and training are often still incapable of or unwilling to use those resources in such a way as to translate them into <em>capabilities</em>?
Because thus far, I haven't seen a whole lot of that. And what really burns proponents of the "counter-terror/law enforcement approach" (and pretty much everyone else outside of COIN advocates) is the idea that COIN is the default, and that any other potential course of action requires more justification, more explanation, more equivocation.
Maybe COIN proponents, regardless of obligation, should start to explain -- in ways that go beyond prosaic platitudes -- how it is, precisely, that a long-term, resource-intensive counterinsurgency effort in south Asia is going to 1) make Americans safer or 2) serve American interests that can't be promoted in other ways more cheaply, easily, or quickly.