Some Advice for Military Humanitarians

Great article and great real-world response to the disaster in Haiti. I would add one additional point, when entering a HA environment, always be part of the solution and don't become a part of the problem. On one of my missions, the Air Force refused to fly in with a full fuel tanker truck, because of their SOPs. An empty tanker of course only worsens the drain on scarce local resources. We stuck to our guns and the AF flew the fully loaded fuel truck, and dropped us in. We were able to do our mission and were self-sufficient. In the end, HA missions may be the most rewarding job for military personnel.

I've been working 14-16 hours a night on Haiti relief ops since day one and can speak with some authority regarding both the aerial delivery issue and the air flow into Port Au Prince.
Airdrops, both containerized and freefall, were discussed early and often at AFSOUTH (the air component to SOUTHCOM). Primary benefit would be to the recipients; HUGE secondary benefit would be the strategic communication message that we (all of us) are doing all we can. Drop zone security was a valid concern, more so with containerized elivery systems (CDS) than with the tri-wall aerial delivery system (TRAIDS). Hundreds of CDS bundles were built, then not delivered due to security concerns..and oddly enough reports that Haitians were "offended" by the aerial delivery method. TRIADS drops never materialized due the above factors and the logistical shortfall of there only being a couple hundred "Burlington Stock" boxes avialable; with a two-week production spin-up required for more. Having said that, I was personally involved in both Provide Comfort and Provide Promise as an aircrew member and started pushing the idea on day one. In my opinion, we may have missed an opportunity.
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With respect to MSF (and other) aircraft being turned away...the international response completely overwhelmed that the limited capacity (ramp space and cargo handling) at the Port Au Prince airport despite heroic efforts by both Air Force Special Operations Contingency Response Element personnel immediately following the earthquake to maximize throughput capacity. Safety of flight and ramp congestion considerations required the development of a "slot time system". As this system matured, it adjusted to meet requirements. When aircraft exceeded their alloted "ground times", it caused a ripple effect for follow-on aircraft. In order to prevent disruption of the entire flow, some aircraft had to be bumped from designated slot times. It was not (NOT) a political decision...simply a matter of logistics and safety.
The real issue was one of balancing the competing priorities of security, medical, food, water, and logistical support. While it's simple to say "five people died because MSF was turned away"; imagine how many people would have died if two aircraft had collided mid-air, or even worse on the runway, shutting down ALL operations for 12 hours. One might ask how was this prioritization conducted. The answer is that it was a joint effort between the Gov't of Haiti, the UN, and the lead US agency for relief operations -- the USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA).
Reports that relief flights were being turned away for political reasons is (in my opinion) irresponsible and uniformed at best; at worst, it denigrates the heroic efforts of those on the ground that were doing everything in their power to bring order to a chaotic situation.

Duck,

I am fairly certain that the DWB pilots trying to land in Haiti did speak English.

That's not my point, please view the author's description of the ethnic theory of planes crashes.

http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2008/12/02/midday2/

The cause of the miscommunication blamed for the crashes goes much deeper than language.

Some cultures have higher Power-Distance Indices (PDIs) and respect authority more than other ethnic groups. They are less likely to speak up to, or challenge superiors (for example, the ATCs).

In the case study crash, the pilots did speak English. The problem is more dependent upon cultural differences.

The press release below from Doctors Without Borders states a DWB plane, full of medical equipment, was turned away from landing at Port-au-Prince three times (as of 19 JAN 10). It also states that a total of five planes were turned away so far.

http://doctorswithoutborders.org/press/release.cfm?id=4176&cat=press-re…

I am currently a student at CGSC; these are my personal views and do not reflect the official policy of the US Army, DoD, or the US government.

Maj. Braud:

Your theory is possible if the pilots of the DWB airplanes were unable to communicate in English these facts:

1. They are flying an airplane.
2. They wish to land said airplane at Port au Prince.
3. Said airplane contains cargo valuable to the relief effort.

Unfortunatly this theory fails as ICAO regulations require all international flights to carry at least one pilot fluent in English. You see, English is the international air traffic control language. If DWB airplanes were ignoring this regulation, it is their own fault they were turned away, as it would be extremely unsafe to fly an airplane into a busy international airport without the ability to speak or understand english.

Is it possible that the Doctors' Without Borders (DWB/MSF) planes are being turned away due to the inability of the pilots to communicate effectively with the Air Traffic Controllers?

According to "The Ethnic Theory of Plane Crashes" (from the book OUTLIERS: THE STORY OF SUCCESS), cultural differences led to communication difficulties, and ultimately to plane crashes.

Other factors that led to the crashes included increased stress, fatigue, and poor weather.

Even though the planes aren't crashing, I can see a common thread.

The theory is explained further by the author: http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2008/12/02/midday2/

I am currently a student at CGSC; these are my personal views and do not reflect the official policy of the US Army, DoD, or the US government.

MA Lagrange:

No offense, but you simply understand the nature of terminal air traffic control. A fundamental rule about airport operations is you don't put more than one airplane on the runway at any one time (unless the airplanes are flying formation, which civilian commerical aircraft never do). Planes can't land and instaneously remove themselves from the runway to make room for the next airplane. It takes time. We haven't even discussed airplanes taking off, which greatly complicates operations at airports with only one runway (such as Port au Prince). There is a theoretical maximum number of airplanes a runway can handle in a given time. My stong belief is that Port au Prince is currently operating at or near that maximum. That belief arises out of years of experience flying in and out of U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marne airfields and dealing with the respective air traffic controllers. To a field they were all professional and knew their business. If you have evidence or proof that the Port au Prince airport is operating innefficiently (i.e. not using available ramp space and runway time), please post it here. (that is proof beyond your own ill-informed conceptions.)

Your blanket assertion that in times of natural disasters civilian airplanes should be given priority shows a similar lack of thought on the subject. For instance how do you know that the DWB planes weren't diverted in favor of U.S. Air Force C-17s filled with 10 times the amount of medical supplies than any DWB plane can carry?

Of course I don't know either. Which leads me back to my original point.....we need to know what airplanes were landed in favor over the DWB planes, and find out what cargo they had before we can determine whether there was a mistake made.

M-A Lagrange:

There is only one possible explanation for why the DWB planes were not allowed to land: congestion.

Therefore a proper inquiry into the reasons behind the denial to land would focus on what airplanes WERE allowed to land to exclusion of the DWB planes. The inquiry would then detail the cargo contents of those planes that were allowed to land and compare those contents to the cargo contents of the DWB planes. A determination could then be made about which cargo should have been higher priority.

Finally its important to realize that the personell responsible for making the realtime decisions about who to allow to land often have minutes at most to make those decisions.

I served as a Medical Platoon Leader with 2d ACR in Haiti during Operation Uphold Democracy in 1995. Although the Haitians speak Creole French, they do understand proper French. My platoon assisted with first aid and field sanitation classes. It was common practice to see women washing clothes and bathing children in the ditches and sewer water. There were also a few interesting incidents involving voodoo, so it's important for the deployed servicemen to understand this part of the culture. Additionally, it became necessary to escort the garbage trucks - the Haitians would harass the drivers and struggle with each other over the refuse. Pilfering was a problem, too. The Haitians would sneak into the camp at night - concertina wire was not a strong deterrent. Also, I served with the LAARNG at the Superdome for Hurricane Katrina. I agree with the earlier statements that it's important for the Haitians to do as much as possible for themselves. It would not only help lighten the load, but it would help them deal better with their shock. True rebuilding begins with the Haitian people. I am currently a student at CGSC; these are my personal views and do not reflect the official policy of the US Army, DoD, or the US government.

Hi Ryan, back in my day it would have been C-Rations......now that would have hurt.

Back to dsicussion. Back to Manuever Welfare and a question....Who is the Main Effort in Haiti? The UN, The Haiti Government...the US ???

Slapout: "One person getting hit by an individual MRE is not a life threatening experience..."

Unless it is the cavatelli!

Alright, sorry. Back to being serious.

Hi Gary,

Thanks for the practical, sensible advise offered.

I'd like to ask a question about your comments on NGOs. In the article, where you talk about NGOs, all those mentioned are international NGOs. In your experience, for the military is any co-ordination with an NGO likely to mean with an international NGO, or will there be occasions where you partner with locally-directed NGOs? And on what basis do you 'pick' between them?

You list some specific capabilites that certain (I)NGOs have, but local NGOs might have the vital information on access/accurate reporting on the ground that INGOs lack. How can this be accessed?

I know your article has been prompted by the awful situation in Haiti, but I would be interested in any responses in general terms (i.e. general practices in disaster response).

Best, Ruairi

M-A Lagrange,

So now what you are talking about, is unity of effort and command, correct? Well, the best way to achieve unity of effort is a centralized command, and a command language that everyone can agree upon as the standard for the incident. You basically need something that everyone understands and uses, and is very simple for anyone to understand. Especially for non-english speakers--it must be simple to understand and use.

In my opinion, the Incident Command System is exactly the answer to creating an effective unity of command and effort. ICS was also mandated as the preferred command system by the Department of Homeland Security in the US back in 2004 (NIMS). It should be the universal command language world wide that unites the military with civilian elements and everything in between.

I know many organizations that have ever participated in any large scale disasters, have also enjoyed the simplicity and organizational qualities of ICS, and they probably didn't even know it. The tent cities, the daily briefings, the operations guy, the logistics guy, the camp manager, all of it comes from ICS. I used it all levels throughout my career as a forest fire fighter, and I am a firm believer on how cool it really is. I have also experienced ICS from a logistics point of view, when I worked as a initial attack dispatcher, and I was continually amazed with how well it worked for disasters.

During 9/11, or the shuttle disasters, or fires every summer, and even the Katrina disaster-- most participants were all brought under ICS. It was also the fire services providing the lead on this stuff, because they actually use the system over and over again. FEMA and USAID suck at ICS. Thats why they always turn to the Type 1 and Type 2 management teams that the federal fire services use, in order to organize incidents.

The other important aspect of ICS, is that it is simple to understand. It is way more simple than than what the military has to offer for a command structure, and way more organized than what NGO's specifically have to offer. It is fluid and scalable and tested by hundreds of very complex and chaotic disasters year after year worldwide. It is the one system that can provide the glue for all involved.

If anyone here is interested, I discuss the benefits of ICS all the time on my blog. I have written quite a bit about it and I would be glad to go into further discussions about how the military or aid organizations could better integrate into ICS for large scale disasters.
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History (from wikipedia)

ICS was originally developed in the 1970s during massive wildfire suppression efforts in California and following a series of catastrophic wildfires in California's urban interface. Property damage ran into the millions, and many people died or were injured. Studies determined that response problems often related to communication and management deficiencies rather than lack of resources or failure of tactics. ICS fell under California's Standardized Emergency Management System or SEMS[2][3] . In 2003, SEMS went national with the passage of Homeland Security Directive number 5 "mandating" all federal, state, and local agencies use NIMS or the National Incident Management System to manage emergency in order to receive federal funding.

Weaknesses in incident management were often due to:

* Lack of accountability, including unclear chains of command and supervision.
* Poor communication due to both inefficient uses of available communications systems and conflicting codes and terminology.
* Lack of an orderly, systematic planning process.
* No predefined methods to integrate inter-agency requirements into the management structure and planning process effectively.
* Freelancing by individuals with specialized skills during an incident without coordination with other first responders
* Lack of knowledge with common terminology during an incident.

Emergency managers determined that the existing management structures -- frequently unique to each agency -- did not scale to dealing with massive mutual aid responses involving dozens of distinct agencies and when these various agencies worked together their specific training and procedures clashed. As a result, a new command and control paradigm was collaboratively developed to provide a consistent, integrated framework for the management of all incidents from small incidents to large, multi-agency emergencies.
[edit] Jurisdiction and Legitimacy

In the United States, ICS has been tested by more than 30 years of emergency and non-emergency applications. All levels of government are required to maintain differing levels of ICS training and private sector organizations regularly use ICS for management of events. ICS is widespread in use from law enforcement to every-day business, as the basic goals of clear communication, accountability, and the efficient use of resources are common to incident and emergency management as well as daily operations. ICS is mandated by law for all Hazardous Materials responses nationally and for many other emergency operations in most states. In practice, virtually all EMS and disaster response agencies utilize ICS, in part after the United States Department of Homeland Security mandated the use of ICS for emergency services throughout the United States as a condition for federal preparedness funding. As part of FEMA's National Response Plan (NRP), the system was expanded and integrated into the National Incident Management System (NIMS).

ICS is widely used in the United Kingdom and the United Nations recommended the use of ICS as an international standard. ICS is also used by agencies in Canada.[4]

New Zealand has implemented a similar system, known as the Coordinated Incident Management System, Australia has the Australasian Inter-Service Incident Management System and British Columbia, Canada, has BCERMS developed by the Provincial Emergency Program.

In Brazil, ICS is also used by The Fire Department of the State of Rio de Janeiro(CBMERJ) in every emergency or large scale events.

M-A Lagrange Said:
I care about how many people are saved, protected and helped.
_________

And that is what myself and slapout are concerned with as well.

My heart goes out to the people of Haiti, and to all those that are doing what they can to help them.

New be Loggie,
it's all good man, not about right and wrong it's about discussion,learning and improvement. However I rechecked all my posts and I don't see anything about Sling Loads??
But, being Airborne is Parachutes,Helicopters,sling-no sling doesn't matter to me.
It is combined arms for food, you don't do it all by air as I and Matt, but you start there until the Marines can land with the heavy stuff. We used to do an annual exercise like that every year when I was in.
Both MSNBC and FOX news are reporting that the Air Force is preparing C-17's for Air Drop operations.

Matt,
I have had that website for a long time, gives a great history of Airborne logistics capabilities. the Marines got out of Cho Sin Reservoir because we drooped a bridge after the Chines blew up the one they were using to with drawl on.

M-A Lagrange,
Like I say it is all good. Discussion is about improvement and learning not who is right or wrong.

USA...USA...USA...USA...USA...USA...USA

And now the Air Force is finally doing airdrops. This is after how many days? Six days, and they have finally decided to drop this stuff? We should have been dropping since the beginning.

Now for some of you military buffs, who would like to read some excellent history on paracargo operations over the years, check this site out. I put up Iraq and Bosnia, as examples of recent paracargo operations. Christian Amanpour brought up these two operations in her interview with the UN Secretary.

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Iraq - "Provide Comfort" Humanitarian Airdrop

At the end of Operation Desert Storm thousands of Kurdish refugees were on the brink of starvation in northern Iraq and refugee camps in Turkey. The 5th Quartermaster Detachment was deployed from Germany to Incirlik Air Base, Adana, Turkey to conduct emergency airdrop of relief supplies into northern Iraq. Rigging and airdrop to the Kurds lasted from 7 April to 1 May 1991. At the end of this operation the Detachment had rigged over 7,600 CDS bundles and packed over 6,700 parachutes.

The 5th used three methods of aerial delivery. The high velocity delivery method was the most frequently used, about 76% of total airdrops. It was used for items that could better survive impact such as packaged food. The low velocity method was used for 22% of the drops. It was ideal for dropping fragile items such as medial supplies, baby food jars and bottled water. The last, free drop, was used as a last resort when parachutes and other aerial delivery equipment was unavailable.

Over 3,000 members of the four armed services supported these drops. The Marine Corps brought in a detachment of parachute riggers from the Aerial Delivery Platoon, 1st Landing Support Battalion, 1st FSSG at Camp Pendleton, California to work side by side with Army riggers.

Doctor Marcel Bonnot from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs observed the first airdrop while visiting a refugee camp near Uludere, Turkey on 8 April 1991. The arrival of the first aircraft was a dramatic and emotional scene. The noisy camp hushed when the sound of arriving airplanes was heard. At first most of the refugees rushed for cover, thinking the humming engines heralded a reappearance of Saddam's air force. However, when no bombs began falling, eyes focused upward and followed a lumbering C-130 as it slowly circled the camp. A roll of toilet paper thrown from the plane tested wind direction. Suddenly, a series of large object dropped from the plane's tail section. The fearful Kurds were astounded when gigantic white parachutes blossomed and bundles of food floated to the earth. The hungry people they mobbed the drop zone and each scrambled to capture one of the small brown plastic MRE packets. Despite the confusion on the ground, the lack of a distribution system, and poor understanding about the proper use of MRE rations, the Kurds in the camp realized that someone was helping them.

Bosnia - "Provide Promise" Humanitarian Airdrop

Quartermaster Riggers were key players in the humanitarian airdrop of relief supplies former Republic of Yugoslavia (Bosnia-Herzegovina) from February 1993 to the end of 1995. In this, the largest humanitarian airdrop in U.S. history, more than 30,000 bundles of humanitarian supplies were dropped. See Emerging Technology in Airdrop Operations.

The largest number of drops were high velocity drops from C-130s flying above 10,000 feet. The CDS bundles in these high velocity drops used A-22 cargo bags and five layers of honeycomb mounted on 3/4 inch plywood. A 26 foot ring slot parachute attached to this load reduced impact to 55 mile per hour. With proper padding even the most fragile medical supplies could be dropped without damage.

This operation saw a great deal of improvisation and modification to standard rigging practices. Over 200 different methods of rigging were developed to drop nonstandard loads of the hundreds of food and medical items donated by numerous countries.

http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:_7LSOSrJbicJ:www.qmfound.com/rigger…

Slap out.

We have different points of view. I think we are both right. I agree that Airdrop is an option, just not in the time frame that you suggested (Just heard this C-130s will be Airdropping in the area-soon. 1+ week after the earthquake).

BLUF: The emotion of the event can not stop the planning process. If we just go in with an all hands on deck mentality, the possibility of losing the momentum is high.

Slapout You just changed the subject and proved my point.

First you said Airdrops...not Sling loading; big Difference doctrinal and logistical.

Second, you still have not addressed the amount of mouths you would need to feed (I underestimate at 7+ million mouths). Tell me how many airdrops would have been needed? You'll need to prove the reliability and dependability of dropping that much. No planner would say it is.

Third they are doing exactly what I said eariler, open the sea ports and aiports and move the supplies needed.

Lastly, with experience comes patience; history proves that you just cant throw it on a plan and drop it out of the back end to be a hero.

The 82nd ABN was alerted hours after the earthquake...if what you suggest were feasible, suitable, and acceptable AT THE TIME..why didn't they start airdropping supplies into the area after 24 hours.

Finally: I agree that this is an event that the US will have to take the lead which we have. But its not a military solution we need, but a detailed, phased response by USAID to distribute the supplies needed. True the military will be needed to do most of the lifting which means detailed planning and execution will occur not just reliving 'D-Day with food and water not bombs and bullets.'

Hi All,
New Loggie, they just interviewed a US Navy Admiral on TV that said where they have made large helicopter drops that they were amazed that the population SELF ORGANIZED and DISTRIBUTED the food fairly NO RIOTING. That is the main point that you are not delivering food in the middle of a Civil War but a disaster, meaning you basically have a docile population that just needs help, that is a very different situation as far as security. Also I have no illusions that we are going to change the immediate situation but there are certainly lessons to be learned.

Matt, again I agree 100% the people are fighting for survival not a civil war, As General Honore said there is no need to be scared of the people they just want help. They don't want to fight they want to live. Very different situation. All your Airborne options are viable and should have been done. We could have covered the whole city with food bombs and water and anything else if we had decided to do it.

Also is not true that about 80% of the people that survive cave in situations are self rescues? Meaning they were dug out with simple hand tools?I briefly saw a commentator on TV say something like that?

Bad weather will come sooner or later and some type of emergency shelter is going to be critical. Again all could be mass air dropped but I don't think it will happen.

During the Vietnam War the Air Force had a project called "Jungle Jim". On on one of there operations they dropped the needed equipment (mostly hand tools) to the local population(who had never done anything like that before) to build an emergency air strip and it was all done from the air, including delivering the instructions on how to do it.

You got a point about Airborne methods....do we really mean to do it or are we just going to talk about it and add another badge to the uniform. It is like Counter Terrorism a failure of our imagination.

Slapout 9, amen. At least you get what I am talking about. Disaster response needs to be aggressive and it needs to be realistic. This is initial attack, and it is a war against time. We don't have time to fix airports or docks within the first 72 hours. What we do have time for, is canvassing the city with small bundles of equipment that will give the Haitians a fighting chance. Help them, to help themselves.

We can also parachute soldiers in there, to do all sorts of stuff. (thats if helicopters are not practical and the airport is down) Rescues, security, medical, drop zone management, etc. Why do we train people to parachute in the first place? Is that just for show or some kind of flashy pin on a uniform? Load them up on a plane, and dump them out onto the soccer fields and pastures of Haiti. Then ruck them up, and march them into the city with some authority. Then use the Navy and Marines for amphibious landings on the beach to get supplies in. Or do we only practice that stuff for show?

The other thing with these bundles, is the people can use these tools for the rebuild of their city. They can use them for cleaning debris, or digging latrines, or burying bodies. The chutes will really come in handy, for when it rains--which will come. Or better yet, use those canopies to keep rain out of rescue operations. Imagine folks drowning on this fifth or sixth day, all because rain was leaking into their tomb?

The food of the bundles would be vital too. People are panicking now, because they have had five days without that stuff. Food and water drops, in the form of small bundles, could have helped alleviate this build up of hunger. I really liked the idea that Slapout mentioned, that we did in Afghanistan. We dropped individual packets of food, as opposed to big parachuted pallets, and we could have done that in Haiti. Especially in the beginning, to stop the build up of hunger that is driving folks to do irrational things now. They have been working hard in their individual rescues, and suffering, their blood sugars are down because of a lack of food and water, and I don't blame them for freaking out.

Another thing that could have been put into bundles, is water filtration devices and pots to cook water. In the fire services, we actually dropped five gallon water cubies in bundles. Even salt tablets or chlorine could be dropped, so they can quick sanitize water or use it for field surgeries. Even the paper boxes that the bundles come in, could be used for splints or for fires or for hauling around tools and food. There is all sorts of options, with small bundles, and we can throw them all over the city.

It is also peculiar that paracargo was appropriate during the Berlin Airlift, World War Two, Vietnam, and in the fire services now, yet inappropriate for this? We used to do paracargo all the time, and for all sorts of reasons. Now we see helicopters hovering dangerously over frantic people, and somehow this is a better option than small bundle paracargo operations or dropping food packets?

One final point, is parachutes. All of our old parachutes, that the military throws out, should be instead saved and converted to paracargo chutes. You can even cut those chutes up, and make splat chutes out of them. Those are just square canopies with four tubular nylon lines. They are cheap, and the smokejumpers use them all the time. We also use cardboard boxes, and basic riggings that are either hand tied out of rope, or pre-made webbing, all to attach a chute to a box filled with essentials. In our fire cache in Redding CA, we even had a box of old French Cross chutes that we used on a fire in the late nineties. They worked, even though they were super old.

We also recycle our paracargo chutes, and use them over and over again. But for Haiti, those chutes would have to stay with them for survival reasons. Splat chutes and small bundles would have sufficed. Lots of options, and small bundle airdrops could have helped big time

Slapout and Matt you just proved my point. Both of your suggestions are about a week late.

This operation went to the sustainment phase in 2 days. Riots are already occurring! History shows that the support needed for this Humanitarian relief effort will be by land, not air! BLUF: The numbers of mouths you need to feed, its impossible to do it by air.

As for ICS you need a government to have a functional ICS. With a government in shambles like it is in Haiti, ICS is pointless and way ahead of the Haiti goverment conception just due to technology.

To move the amount of food and water needed for this in combination with the amount of fuel and wheeled vehicles needed (both critical shortfalls now). The ports have to be opened and that takes time.

Hi All, I understand the opposing viewpoints but I think Matt is right. And I admit I am biased as I am former 82nd and over 20 years LE experience and have been on FEMA planning teams. The Incident response system Matt refers to is a pretty good SOP.
He is also correct in that the Airborne effort is just the initial assault which should be followed up by the Marines landing the heavy equipment to complete rescue operations and then move to long term sustainment.

Small widely distributed air drops will not kill anybody and if you communicate your intent to the population by loudspeakers and leaflet drops I don't think you will have food riots......you may have small food fights.....but that is already happening, so you have little to loose IMO.

When people have gone so many hours without water or food trying to register them will create a riot for sure. Do the paperwork later. Water,Food,First Aid and Tools to as many people as possible as fast as possible during the first 72 hours is the way to start your attack. It is D-Day with food and water not bombs and bullets.

Hey folks, this about the initial attack. This is not about the sustained attack for an incident. The whole point within the first couple of days, is to be able to rescue folks.

Small bundles being dropped all over the city, or at controlled drop zones, would work. Hell, I did it all the time on fire disasters summer after summer. The military and companies perform small bundle drops all over Afghanistan as well.

What ticks me off, is that Secretary Gates got some really terrible advice on his decision not to use air drops. Sure, if you throw a two ton pallet of food right in the middle of a city of starving people, they will riot to get at that food. But this is not the Sudan, and this is not a WFP famine relief mission. This is initial attack in the beginning of a disaster. Big difference. I posted a story about this on my blog, and I wonder how many more people we could have saved, if folks would have been on the ball with the initial attack of this disaster.

And for those that have no clue what I am talking about, as far as the initial attack for disasters, that's too bad. It matters totally what you do within the first minutes, hours, and days of an incident. Time is the enemy, and getting the ball rolling immediately is so important. It makes all the difference on how quickly we respond, and what that response entails.

In the case of Haiti, empowering the survivors to rescue those that are trapped, along with trying to get rescuers in there as fast as you can, would be the appropriate response. Of course all the massive amounts of aid and persons will come in after the initial attack is over, and we transition to the sustained attack. We are usually pretty good about that about that aspect of disaster response.

We should also be working to establish our initial attack capability for incidents like this. The tsunami, Katrina, and now this earthquake should all be learning lessons, and we need to do better for the initial attack of future large scale incidents. Paracargo and airborne forces can definitely even the odds, but you have to think smaller, and more nimble if you want to make it work. Having plans for initial attack operations would be a big help too. Fail to prepare, prepare to fail. Just my two cents.

Food riots will happen. NOT a good idea in an urban environment.

New Be Loggie and M A Lagrange,
click on the video to see what I am talking about.....all cardboard.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AlOanfQvrOE&feature=PlayList&p=12F59DAEA…

GO AIRBORNE ALL THE WAY!!

New Be Loggie,you might want to check a little closer into how it was done. In Afghanistan they didn't drop pallets but big cardboard boxes that broke apart and scattered the MRE's individually over a defined area. One person getting hit by an individual MRE is not a life threatening experience and that was done at high altitude because of an Anti-Aircraft threat.The main problem is they dropped the wrong kind of food for them to eat. In Haiti they could be dropped at very low altitude similar to line bombing. And if you did want to use pallets you don't have to use regular Air Drop Rigging Pallets but wooden ones that could be used by the population to make shelters or whatever.
Also you don't have to make a surprise military drop, you can use speakers to announce to the people what is going to happen before you actually execute the drop.
Also as Matt pointed out you can drop small bundles again doing away with need to retrieve regular pallets.

Matt,
agree 100% we can and should be airdropping basic water,food,tools,first aid kits and let the population help themselves until more substantial relief gets there. And no you don't have to use a pallet but you can still use them and not hurt anyone. They dropped thousands of MRE's from the air for civilians when we first went into Afghanistan, it was the wrong kind of food for them but the drops were successful. Air dropping the supplies all over the target area will keep the population dispersed but satisfied,a big plus for security. If they concentrate into a crowd is when you are most likely to have a riot.

Excellent paper. One thing I disagree with though, is the air drop thing. Small bundles of tools/food/water/medical supplies etc., would have been a big help within these first three days of the disaster. It is a fallacy to think we can get in there on time to save everyone within the first couple of days. We should instead be empowering the people to save themselves in those initial days, by strategically dropping small bundles of paracargo all over the city. Not pallets, like the author mentioned, but small bundles the size of a small refrigerator or crate.
What kills me, is that we have thousands of paracargo chutes just sitting around in Fire Caches all over the west in the US. The Air Force and Air Force National Guards have paracargo chutes too. But chutes for small bundles are in abundance with the federal fire services in the US. There are also tons of capable loadmasters and pilots who do these types of operations in the federal fire services every summer. And seeing how the fire season is over right now, we could have tapped into that resource easily.
As for the life saving capabilities of small bundles? The tools are obvious (hack saws, crowbars, shovels, jacks, gloves, etc.) To see people digging with their hands, because they do not have tools, is heart breaking. The food and water should be just enough to sustain people as they are working feverishly to rescue people those first couple of days. The chutes from the bundles could be used as shelters or blankets. The chord from the chutes could be used for all sorts of stuff. The point is, small bundles should have been dropped all over Haiti in the early half of the disaster, in order to increase the amount of lives saved.
Small bundle drops could have been done easily with all sorts of aircraft as well. Small Cessnas, Twin Otters, DC 3's, Sherpas, Seaplanes, etc. can all serve as make shift airdrop platforms that can get close to drop zones, and put bundles in key places. You can even parachute folks down, to secure drop zones, so people don't get hit by the things. Airborne types, Rangers, SF, Pararescue, and smokejumpers could all be used for parachute based operations for the initial attack. Of course helicopters would be nice, but fixed wing is more cost effective, and parachuting doesn't require a runway or dock.
Of course everything else after the initial attack and first couple of days or so, is pretty standard. Open up the pipe line wide, so aid can get to all the essential places of the disaster. Protect and serve the victims. Do the best you can do.
As to my background, I am a former Marine, former Smokejumper, former Initial Attack Dispatcher with the federal fire services, and current security contractor. I have deployed to numerous disasters as a fire fighter/smokejumper, and as a security contractor.
I am also knowledgeable about the Incident Command System, which is considered the preferred command system for disasters in the US and parts of the world. The military should know how that works as well, if they want to integrate with the various EMS and civilian components of a disaster. Establishing ICS on the ground, and doing the triage/recon of the area, is super important.
Most importantly though, is communications. Having a means to communicate with everyone is so vital. If I was USAID, bringing in programmable radios with dedicated repeaters so everyone can talk with one another would be a big one. Yet again, the federal fire services can provide much in this area. So could the military.

Maneuver Welfare Operations what a great name! Good article to!