Topics include:
1) The U.S. military should keep a low profile in Haiti,
2) With China in mind, Gates deepens the U.S. defense relationship with India.
The U.S. military should keep a low profile in Haiti
The U.S. military is now carrying out a wide-ranging relief mission in Haiti in response to the dreadful Jan. 12 earthquake that virtually destroyed Port-au-Prince and other built-up areas in the country. Because it has the manpower, ships, airplanes, organization, and the budget to rapidly move equipment, supplies, and people to anywhere in the world, it is no surprise that the Pentagon's is the first phone that rings whenever such a natural disaster strikes. Recent large-scale relief missions after the 2004 tsunami in Indonesia and the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan brought acclaim to the U.S. military and the U.S. government. U.S. policy officials struggling for the moral high ground were happy to pocket the "soft power" benefits of these relief missions.
The disaster in Haiti provides another opportunity for the Pentagon to show the world the humanitarian advantages of its logistical power. All five of the military services are contributing to the effort and the Pentagon has created a webpage to collect all of its Haiti stories, photos, and links. But be careful, counsels Gary Anderson, a retired U.S. Marine Corps colonel and veteran of relief missions in Bangladesh and Somalia. In two essays written for Small Wars Journal, Anderson advises the U.S. military in Haiti to work only in support of the host government, to let the United Nations and non-governmental aid groups take the lead, and to generally take as low a profile as possible. Try to do too much, he warns, and the military relief effort will risk squandering any goodwill it might gain.
Based on its previous experiences with disaster relief, the U.S. military now has written doctrine on how to establish a headquarters staff for coordinating a relief effort. In his first essay, Anderson recommends tossing this plan into the bin. He argues that it is essential that the United States be seen supporting the existing Haitian government and ministries, no matter how feeble they may be. Anderson believes that standing up a large by-the-book civil-military operations center would appear to many outsiders as a de facto U.S. takeover of the country. Some foreign officials have already accused the United States of planning just that. Instead, the U.S. should adapt to Haiti's circumstances and improvise staffing solutions that support the Haitian government.
In his second essay, Anderson continues to recommend a supporting role for the U.S. military. The U.S. should use sea-basing in order to keep the number of U.S. military personnel ashore as low as possible. The U.S. should let the Haitian police and U.N. peacekeepers take responsibility for security. To the greatest extent possible, NGO personnel, and not U.S. soldiers, should handle aid distribution to the victims.
Is the U.S. government following Anderson's advice? For the most part, the answer seems yes. The U.S. is sea-basing its operations on an aircraft carrier, an amphibious assault ship, and a hospital ship and is using helicopters and landing craft for movement. The U.S. Agency for International Development's recent press briefings and fact sheets stress the lead roles of the Haitian government, the United Nations and NGOs in the relief effort.
After a fitful start, the U.S. military's relief operations in Haiti are still far short of what the disaster requires. But they are gaining momentum and will appear more successful every day. Just don't get carried away by that success, warns Anderson.
With China in mind, Gates deepens the U.S. defense relationship with India
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates completed a two-day visit to New Delhi with a mission of deepening the defense relationship between the United States and India. During a press conference after the meetings, Gates explained the latest accords under discussion: an agreement on communication interoperability and encryption; an agreement on geospatial data sharing (useful for navigation and targeting); and an agreement on logistics support. The highly technical nature of these deals is a good indication that the two countries are serious about developing an effective combined military capability.
Gates was not reluctant to mention the primary motivation for the increased military cooperation, as this exchange from the press conference shows:
Q: I wonder if you could talk a little bit about your discussions with India on China, whether there is a joint cyber threat that both India and the U.S. face from elements within China, and what you see as India's role in sort of a counterweight to China in Asia.
GATES: We didn't talk about China at length. We did talk in more generic terms about a common interest in security of the Indian Ocean and security of the global commons, and the global commons meaning the air, sea, space, and if you're talking about the internet, the ether, I suppose.
There was a discussion about China's military modernization program and what it meant and what the intentions of that military buildup were.
Gates went on to renew his plea to his Chinese counterparts for more bilateral discussions about strategic issues and China's military modernization plans. The U.S. and Indian governments are deepening their military cooperation in response to their perception of rapidly expanding Chinese air, naval, and strategic capabilities. With his statements during the press conference, Gates is indicating that the increased U.S.-India military cooperation is both prudent preparation and a signal to China's leadership to start talking more about security issues.
Gates must be hoping to indicate to the Chinese that they cannot win an air and naval arms race in the region; the U.S. will meet every increase in Chinese capabilities with increased sharing of U.S. military technology with India and with increased cooperation with other allies in the region such as Japan, Australian, and Singapore.
Gates must be hoping to show China that an arms race is pointless and wasteful. The way to avoid a race is through dialogue, which Gates has repeatedly called for. China has not been very forthcoming on military diplomacy. Gates must be wondering how many more military cooperation agreements with India it will take to change some minds in Beijing.
Comments
I agree with Maj Cogbill, et al.
I'm all for a due concern for the opinions of others; but for too much of the world, we're damned if we do and damned if we don't. Too many need a diablo-mannequin to blame for their (usually self-created) problems, and we're it whether we want/try to be or not. No matter what we do or don't do, we'll be blamed for the rainy days of others.
Decisive effectiveness will do more than indecisive but PC fumbling about.
In the article above, it states that Col (R) Anderson said that the U.S. risked "squandering and good will it might gain." My point is that, at this time, our mission should be about our impact - not our image - and not even necessarily good will. It is about saving as many lives as possible.
In the long term, sure, put the host nation in charge, transition over to the UN and local authorities. But at this point dont expect the host nation security forces and the UN mission, both of which were nearly obliterated in the earthquake to take the lead role. Do not sit back and wait to be told by the UN or by Haiti where they need help. It is blatantly apparent where there is need just by watching CNN or other footage from the crisis.
Readers of Small Wars Journal should know that if the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have taught our military anything, it is how Soldiers and leaders at the small unit level can seize the initiative and achieve an amazing impact on the ground. Instead of isolating them in ships off the coast, the U.S. military should allow these Soldiers to go out into the streets and start having an immediate impact.
Dont confuse our response in Haiti to COIN or an operation in which we initially went in to break things and kill people, and now are trying to prove we are really nice and not there to stay. On January 12th, the day of the earthquake, the leadership and people of Haiti cried out for assistance and we responded. People are not going to assume were there to conquer.
Even if you do apply the COIN or Small Wars construct to this, then you will have to concede that security of the population is the most important factor. When people are dying from simple cuts and fractures, have no food to eat, or water to drink, then the population is not secure. A time like this is not a time to be focused on training host-nation security forces or standing behind the UN. This is a time for decisive action to help the people.
Once the population is secure, then build the host-nation, reinforce the legitimacy of the government and international organizations there to stabilize the country, and transition our efforts to them. Now is not that time.
Col. Anderson offers sage advice, least we be viewed with suspicion by many Haitians, as well as the NGOs working among them, that our footprint is taking on the appearance of an occupation.
I hope our government also understands the importance of making sure we don't repeat the failed programs that have left the population impoverished, the terrain denuded, and Haiti continually on the edge of a crisis.
I really don't think Colonel Anderson was arguing for making the U.S. "look good" at all. Rather, and he is spot on regarding this, his point was supporting the Haitian government in their efforts. This makes a lot of sense for many reasons and Anderson is looking at the long-term effects of our HA/DR mission.
Col (R) Gary Anderson needs to understand that our presence in Haiti right now should not be about making the U.S. look good. It is about saving lives and helping to repair a broken country.
An article in the Baltimore Sun this morning stated that senior U.S. military officials closed down the landing zone at the palace grounds in Port-au-Prince because they were concerned about the appearance that the U.S. was "taking over." As a result a team trying to evacuate 120 Haitian civilians to the USNS Comfort was forced to sit on their hands all day.
I think in the final analysis, most rational minds will conclude that it is much more important to help save lives of children who are dying from simple fractures and cuts than overly concern ourselves with how a few international pundits might view our intervention.
A couple of things. What the military is doing right now, is not low profile. If anything, we are a bull in a china shop there in Haiti. Plus we look pretty damned intimidating with our guns and equipment, and combat sunglasses wearing soldiers. So I guess we could all hide on boats off shore or something, but then world opinion along with US opinion would be complaining that we weren't on land doing all we could to save lives.
If anything, if we are going to say 'we will be using the US military to support this operation', we have just committed ourselves and we should not apologize for that effort and presence. And to me, the profile of the military is not as important as how many lives they save, how efficient they are, and how well they integrate within the civilian/military operation. I also think the world opinion will sour much worse about our presence in Haiti, if we didn't do everything in our power to save Haitians, once we said we are going to be there. So to me, the issue is more about how do we integrate well within the operation and not be the bull in the china shop.
Which brings me to my next point. How is it that the federal government mandates that all of it's State and Federal EMS folks be integrated into the ICS system through NIMS, but the military isn't? I mean if the military wants to get into the disaster response business, and work side by side with civilians, then it is going to have to look hard at a way to play well with others. Unity of command and effort, consolidated communications and that type of thing?
And folks, there is no need to reinvent the wheel, or create some new acronym for the concept and put a military stamp on the whole thing. Just say 'we will do this', and commit to it.
I have also witnessed the military organize itself and at least try to integrate into ICS. During the Tyee Complex back in 1994, I was a firefighter on that fire and I worked with Marines as part of the disaster response. The Marines were great, and they organized into twenty person crews, and I was a civilian tasked with leading them on digging some fire line on the fire. They had the yellow shirts, they lived in the fire camps, they marched around the fires, and their leaders participated in the camp briefings every morning. So the military can integrate into this stuff if they want too. It just takes a leader to make it happen. On that fire, we actually gave the Marines a nickel plated pulaski fire tool as a gift for a job well done. We also did a big field games event after the fires were put out, complete with tug of war and log toss. It was fun and a great experience for all. Did I mention that I am a former Marine, so the experience was very cool for me.
And actually, if the US wants to be really cool, they can start promoting one command system for disasters throughout the world. There is nothing political about ICS, or militant or offensive or anything. It is also simple to understand and it works. ICS is the closest thing to a universally accepted command system that I can think of. The UN has recognized it, and so have a few countries. The military can still use their internal command systems and lingo, but if you want to play on a disaster, they could be leading by example and getting on board with ICs. It is just one way to help join military operations with civilian operations during very complex and chaotic environments like the one in Haiti.