Topics include:
1) Mullen finished off the Powell Doctrine,
2) What is Burma learning from the nuclear "rogues"?
Mullen finished off the Powell Doctrine
After a long illness and years of neglect, Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, finally euthanized the Powell Doctrine. Mullen administered the coup de grí¢ce in a speech he delivered on March 3 at Kansas State University.
During his tenure as chairman, Gen. Colin Powell stated the principles he thought the U.S. government should follow when contemplating the use of military force. According to Powell, the situation should involve a vital national security interest. There should be a clear and obtainable objective. A clear exit strategy should be planned from the beginning. The action should have broad political support. The military plan should employ decisive and overwhelming force in order to achieve a rapid result. And the country should use force only as a last resort. Powell's principles were no doubt the product of his negative experiences as an officer during the Vietnam War and the results of Operation Desert Storm, which seemed at the time to be a vindication of his ideas.
Needless to say, the deployments of U.S. military force this decade have obeyed precious few of these guidelines. Powell wrote his doctrine in an attempt to keep the United States from thoughtlessly involving itself in ill-defined and open-ended military quagmires. But critics have argued that modern irregular adversaries have exploited gaps the doctrine left uncovered. By this view, rigid adherence to the Powell Doctrine would prevent the United States from having any effective response to irregular warfare challenges. Neither the Bush nor Obama administrations have followed its precepts.
So what is the new Mullen Doctrine? For the chairman, the issue of whether the United States will employ military force has long been settled. The issue now is how the United States should apply its national power. Mullen summed up his views this way:
We must not look upon the use of military forces only as a last resort, but as potentially the best, first option when combined with other instruments of national and international power.
We must not try to use force only in an overwhelming capacity, but in the proper capacity, and in a precise and principled manner. And we must not shrink from the tug of war -- no pun intended -- that inevitably plays out between policymaking and strategy execution. Such interplay is healthy for the republic and essential for ultimate success.
The Mullen Doctrine accepts that every day for the foreseeable future, U.S. military forces will shoot at, or will be shot at, by somebody somewhere in the world. Given this seemingly permanent state of war, Mullen says that politicians, soldiers, and the public will need to engage in an open-ended discussion that will constantly adjust how the country employs its military forces.
Mullen assumes that the public now accepts that low-level warfare is an enduring fact of life. If he is wrong about this, the Powell Doctrine could rise from the grave.
What is Burma learning from the nuclear "rogues"?
Is North Korea helping Burma build a plutonium-producing reactor? On March 2, the Washington Post discussed this possibility, along with the broader military relationship between the two countries. The article noted that the budding military partnership between Burma and North Korea has the attention of the Obama administration. But as is the pattern with all such isolated and "rogue" regimes, the U.S. government is struggling to achieve diplomatic leverage over the situation.
Could Burma have a clandestine nuclear program? In September 2007, the Israeli Air Force bombed a nearly complete plutonium reactor it found in the Syrian desert. A subsequent investigation revealed that the site was a near duplicate of North Korea's Yongbyon reactor and built with North Korea's assistance. With the discovery of the joint North Korean-Syrian project, many wondered where else in the world North Korea may have secret nuclear partnerships.
David Albright, a nuclear proliferation expert at the Institute for Science and International Security, has concluded that information that Burma is constructing major nuclear facilities is inconclusive and that the regime is not close to establishing any significant nuclear capability. He also notes that trade in nuclear materials with North Korea is banned by the U.N. Security Council.
Albright is hopeful that the early detection of a possible Burmese nuclear effort will enable the international community to stop such a program, in contrast to its failure to do so with the Syrian reactor, with Iran's program, and with Pakistan in the 1970s.
U.S. Sen. James Webb's visit to Burma in 2009 reopened direct talks between the two governments. Such contact is helpful and could be part of a solution, but is not worth much unless the United States and its partners develop some significant leverage to counter the numerous incentives in favor of nuclear proliferation.
"Rogue" states contemplating whether to begin a clandestine nuclear program find numerous cases of positive reinforcement for doing so, and few if any cases of effective punishment. For example, China is a strong defender of state sovereignty and has stood up for this principle by defending nuclear rogues such as North Korea and Iran that most in the international community would like to rein in. Sharing strategic interests in the Indian Ocean, Burma could expect similar protection from China.
Burma has no doubt observed how North Korea has converted its nuclear and ballistic missile programs into lucrative cash businesses. In addition, North Korea has repeatedly extracted food and energy assistance in exchange for promises of good behavior. And Pakistan has exemplified how rewarding a nuclear arsenal can be. Concern over the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is a significant factor in the U.S. strategies for Afghanistan and South Asia and is a reason why Pakistan is one of the largest recipients of U.S. foreign aid.
On the other side of the ledger, there are few examples of the international community effectively punishing a nuclear proliferator. Iran's case remains open and is an opportunity for the U.N. Security Council to change that pattern. Until that happens, Burma and others considering their options will watch and learn.
Comments
oldpapajoe, et. al:
Agreed.
And for the new Mullen Doctrine to be understood, it, also, must be viewed within the proper (contemporary) context.
I have made an attempt (above) to outline what this new context looks like.
If one reflects upon the concept that transforming "the rest of the world" -- in order to preserve, build upon and profit from the current great power peace -- is what our new foreign policy is all about, then one can better understand Adm. Mullen statement at the end of his speech; wherein, he states:
"We must not look upon the use of military forces only as a last resort, but potentially as the best, first option when combined with other instruments of national and international power."
Thus, a most clear description of how "transformatation" -- via the "whole of government" approach -- will be achieved. And a most clear acknowledgement of how and why (societal transformation) the military will be employed in the 21st Century?
Hmmm? Weinberger was a civilian, and given his title of SECDEF, he was kind of like an American version of a Generalisimo--he was [the SECDEF is] the dude who actually runs the war for the POTUS. Powell as the CJCOS was a uniformed advisor to the SECDEF; a highly visible staff guy--not the Commander. So, there was the Weinberger Doctrine and the Powell "Doctrine" which was really a staff guy's opinion or "take" on Weinberger's view of strategy. In either case, as was said above, the Weinberger Doctrine and Powell's opinion was a reflection of America trying to come to grips with a post-Vietnam era, an era that left us defeated and on the defensive. No one should keep any policy --Weinber or Powell --unless that policy makes sense in the time one is using it. How about the MacArthur policy? Or the Truman Doctrine? No one would adopt or return to those as they are an anachronism. Is this not the same for Weinberger and POwell's "doctrine"?
Ken White:
Thanks. When I started out on my 22 years, I got $99.00 per month, as best as I can recall.
Interesting, though, that today we discuss (as does the author) -- a "permanent state of war" or an "era of persistent conflict" -- as if this were something very, very new and something very, very unique to our current time and our present circumstances.
Indeed, something very unique and very unusual has occurred.
Now, post-the Cold War, 3 billion-plus new people (those of Russia, China, India, etc) now trust their fate to capitalism and markets.
Thus, in order to preserve the present great power peace, the United States believes that these folks must be provided for. This, we believe is in our own best interests.
Accordingly, the United States sees transforming "the rest of the world" -- via something akin to a "International Community"/ "International Eminent Domain justification and concept -- as the only way to do this.
Thus, the current "era of persistent conflict," and the present "permanent state of war," is to be viewed -- and to be better understood -- within this rather unique context?
<b>Bill:</b><blockquote>Is this why U.S. military personnel -- and personnel within the other agencies of America's "whole of government" force -- should expect to have to shot, and be shoot at, in the 21st Century?"</blockquote>I dunno but I shot and was shot at for anywhere from 50 to 750 dollars a month for most of the last half of the 20th Century.
My Father did the same for much of the first half of that Century and a Grandfather did it for the last half of the 19th. And so on all the way back to the war of Jenkin's Ear when Benoni Hotchkiss went to Cartagena from Connecticut. I doubt they got paid as well as I did.
All for eminent domain. ;)
Nothing really new here...
The author states that "The Mullen Doctrine accepts that everyday of the foreseeable future, U.S. military forces will shoot at, or be shot at, by somebody somewhere in the world."
What would cause such an "Era of Persistent Conflict?"
Could it be that such an "Era of Persistent Conflict" is to come from an understanding that:
a. The "International Community,"
b. Led by the United States,
c. Will need to exercise "International Eminent Domain,"
c. In order to clean up and reconfigure the aberrant and less-productive peoples, nations and cultures of the world,
d. This, so as to adequately provide for the "Public Good" (that of the International Community).
Is this why U.S. military personnel -- and personnel within the other agencies of America's "whole of government" force -- should expect to have to shot, and be shoot at, in the 21st Century?
<i>"China is a strong defender of state sovereignty and has stood up for this principle by defending nuclear rogues such as North Korea and Iran that most in the international community would like to rein in."</i>
The 118 member non-aligned movement of nations endorses Iran's rights to peaceful nuclear energy as a member of the NPT, including the nuclear fuel cycle. How much would you like to bet Iran's nuclear rights would be upheld at a vote in the UN General Assembly (rather than the "elite" UNSC)?
The <a href=http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weinberger_Doctrine>Weinberger Doctrine </a> preceded the Powell doctrine and both were attempts by senior leaders in DoD to influence national policy. Both arguably were in positions where it was within their purview to provide such advisory 'doctrine' to assist in the formulation of national policy or strategy. Both unarguably failed because the 'doctrines' did not account for political variables.
George Schultz, then Secretary of State, objected to Weinberger's iteration and Madeleine Albright famously chided Powell about his doctrine by asking "Whats the point of you saving this superb military for, Colin, if we can't use it?".
Robert mentions that critics argued that modern irregular adversaries have exploited gaps in the doctrine. Unthinking critics, those 'doctrines' did not leave gaps, they laid out a road map for attacking the US -- one route of which has been exploited.
That was bad enough. The doctrines also drove doctrine and TTP development, training and equipment choices -- all to very ill effect.
He also says, correctly, that neither the Bush or Obama administrations have followed the precepts of the Powell Doctrine. Neither did the first Bush or Clinton administration follow either doctrine.
Robert notes:<blockquote>"Mullen assumes that the public now accepts that low-level warfare is an enduring fact of life. If he is wrong about this, the Powell Doctrine could rise from the grave."</blockquote>Highly unlikely. It never worked so why would anyone who thought for a few seconds want to resurrect it...
Not to mention that about a third of the public will support low level warfare, political leanings being the determinant and variable depending on which party wants to commit forces.
Another third or so will object due to opposing the first third and somewhat more than a third will lean one way or the other -- tending toward support so long as the operation(s)are generally successful. Been that way in this country since before we were a nation. Mullen is just flatly stating the obvious and practical. Good for him for doing so.
I think the Powell doctrine is a good thing. I can understand some debate with the "last resort" and "overwhelming force", but in general I think we should try to follow it. I hope that low level warfare with unclear objectives like the peace keeping and nation building efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq are not seen as the model going forward.
In regards to the quote from previous post:
"Whats the point of you saving this superb military for, Colin, if we can't use it?".
The Miyagi doctrine from the movie Karate Kid:
Daniel: Hey - you ever get into fights when you were a kid?
Miyagi: Huh - plenty.
Daniel: Yeah, but it wasn't like the problem I have, right?
Miyagi: Why? Fighting fighting. Same same.
Daniel: Yeah, but you knew karate.
Miyagi: Someone always know more.
Daniel: You mean there were times when you were scared to fight?
Miyagi: Always scare. Miyagi hate fighting.
Daniel: Yeah, but you like karate.
Miyagi: So?
Daniel: So, karate's fighting. You train to fight.
Miyagi: That what you think?
Daniel: [pondering] No.
Miyagi: Then why train?
Daniel: [thinks] So I won't have to fight.
Miyagi: [laughs] Miyagi have hope for you.
I think it is a bit of a leap to describe Admiral Mullen's comments as a 'new' doctrine...all he has really done is drop the 'last resort' criteria. It is a safe call that "...low-level warfare is an enduring fact of life..." - it has been for the last couple of centuries, punctuated by occasional big wars and a rare outbreaks of peace. If he replaced 'the use of force' with 'use of the military', it would read better and offer more to the comprehensive or unified approach to employing instruments of national power.
If one wishes to understand American foreign policy and international affairs post-the Cold War -- (and understand the demise of the Weinberger and Powell Doctrines?) -- then one need only understand the relationship between:
(1) The concept of the "International Community,"
(2) The process of "International Eminent Domain" and
(3) The need for military forces designed and deployed such as to (a) enforce International Eminent Domain and (b) deal with the problems this policy brings with it.
a. The International Community represents the strong and rising nations of the world, which now, post-the Cold War, have 3 billion new mouths to feed (due to recent incorporation of the great powers of Russia, China and India into the global market regime).
b. For this ravenous, extremely needy and vastly expanded entity to be provided for, the governing agency of this International Community (the United States) has determined that it must exercise "International Eminent Domain" re: the problematic and less-productive peoples, nations and cultures of the world. This, so as to cause these significantly weaker and more-vulnerable elements to be brought more up-to-speed and more "on line" re: the needs of the International Community.
c. Thus, these more-troublesome, less-productive peoples, nations and cultures have been "condemned" via the concept of International Eminent Domain -- with "compensation" to be made in the form of "societal transformation" (via "democracy," "development," "aid," "freedom").
d. As in many/most instances of "Eminent Domain" generally, certain elements of these much weaker and much more vulnerable populations will, in spite of the odds against them, fight back against this loss (thus, today's "Global Insurgency").
e. Accordingly, the military forces of the International Community, and their corresponding doctrines, will need to be updated and adapted -- to (1) achieve the desired societal transformations and (2) defeat the Global Insurgency.
f. The Weinberger and Powell Doctrines were not designed with these tasks in mind.
Thus, "war is but an instrument of policy, beholden to it" is understood in today's context of (1) the "International Community" and (2) the exercise by this community of a foreign policy of "societal transformation" via the concept of "International Eminent Domain."
QED?
<b>kdog101:</b>
The Powell and Weinberger doctrines sound good but are unworkable. The bad thing about them was that both were an attempt by DoD to steer the Nation away from efforts like Afghanistan and Iraq.
I suggest that is NOT the job of the senior leadership in DoD, their job is to insure that the Armed Forces are prepared to respond to <i>any and all</i> threats against the security of the US that exceed the capability of the civil sector. They failed to do that and instead tried to adapt the rules to their liking, an effort that was always doomed to fail as many both outside and inside DoD tried to point out at the time.
By focusing on the Powell and Weinberger doctrines, virtually a generation of Armed Forces effort was directed at a mirage while ignoring the reality that was the world. We developed an admittedly highly competent force for major combat operations which was not able to effectively perform lesser missions. That created an obvious imbalance which our various opponents -- not all are overtly hostile -- have taken advantage of to a considerable extent.
What we in essence did was create a big sledgehammer which the Politicians, who actually direct what the nation and its armed forces will do, could use for wrecking the houses of others. We deprived the nation of the ability to to build a decent piece of carpentry or remove and replace a medicine cabinet.
We deliberately did <b>not</b> develop the ability to perform strikes with surgical precision in another nation or to apply less than a major effort. The limiting clause, from Weinberger: "<i>U.S. troops should only be committed wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning. Otherwise, troops should not be committed</i>" was wrongly believed by those in DoD to be the way things would work. The Politicians never signed on to that and never will, If a Politician believes a force majeure situation requires commitment of forces, they are going to be committed and another Weinberger item "<i>The commitment of U.S. troops should be considered only as a last resort</i>" is <u>never</u> going to be heeded.
As <b>SJPOneill</b> correctly states, low level warfare has been a fact of life for the last couple of Centuries (I'd say Eons...).
While the Miyagi doctrine has merit as a philosophy, it will run aground on the shoal of reality -- others do not believe in it and will take advantage of you if you do believe in it and state it publicly. The world is not a nice place and it is filled with many who do not wish us well.
Failure to respond properly and effectively will lead to increased provocations in an effort to get an inappropriate response from us -- that kind of probing action emanated from the Middle East for over 22 years and four Presidential Administrations did not properly respond to it so the attacks escalated over the years resulting in Afghanistan and Iraq where you and I agree we don't need to be but where the Politicians saw no alternative -- or had none available. That very arguably due to the fact that no tailored international response capability was available to our politicians.
The problem is that you and DoD believed in the Miyagi Doctrine, a fictional myth from a movie, the real world Politicians and our opponents did and do not.
In trying to adhere to the phrase:
"War is but an instrument of policy, beholden to it"
I have tried to look at what the relevant policy might be.
Herein, in view of Bush Sr.'s "New World Order," Clinton's "Engagement and Enlargement," Bush Jr.'s "Democracy and Freedom" and Obama's (probable) "Diplomacy and Development," I seem to see a general policy direction.
As noted in my comment above, this new policy direction seems to reflect the idea:
a. Of an "International Community," which
b. Believes that it has the right to exercise its powers via a concept that I call "International Eminent Domain" to
c. Clean up, fix, "transform" and, thereby, better utilize various trouble spots around the world and, thus (coming full circle)
d. Better provide for needs of this much larger "International Community" (Russia, China, India, et. al., all now on board re: market capitalism).
Is this the context (a new policy direction -- based on a new worldview)that we should use (as has the post-Cold War presidents) to reflect on and understand "the long death of the Weinberger and Powell doctrines."
I always thought the Powell variant to be a reason NOT to do something my imposing McClellan-esque requirements on national leadership before acting. So the death of the Powell Doctrine shan't be lamented long (if at all).
The Weinberger Doctrine made sense when promulgated and makes sense now. It just needs a modern tweak.
Taking the first four tenets of the Weinberger Doctrine from the wikipedia link above, consider changing "forces", troops" or "combat troops" to "elements of national power" and the doctrine remains valid and on-point.
Doing this does more to assure point five ("...commitment (with) a "reasonable assurance" of the support of U.S. public opinion and Congress.")
Point Six is moot in the "Phase Zero" environment when now operate (e.g. USAFRICOM).
@ SJP ONeill:
You wrote: "If he replaced 'the use of force' with 'use of the military', it would read better and offer more to the comprehensive or unified approach to employing instruments of national power."
From what I've here and other places, the recurring mistake is that it always seems that this must be an expression of force. That is, until it's not about force...then the other aspects of national policy are not ready, willing, able, postured, manned, or organized to be immediately useful.
I thought that this "whole of government" idea was the thought process into how USAFRICOM was organized. It starts from a going-in position that it's about DIME/DIMEFIL/MIDLIFE(R) (however one views it) and deemphasizing the force option so that it is a true "last resort".
With the radical transformation of the communist great powers (abandoning economic communism and embracing market capitalism) the focus of international affairs radically shifted at the end of the Cold War -- from that of Great Power War -- to that of Great Power Peace.
Now the emphasis (and foreign policy) would be centered on maintaining and building on this Great Power Peace.
"Progress" along these lines was to be seen in transforming "the rest of the world" such that it might better meet the needs of these largely interdependent Great Powers.
Because "the rest of the world" was now completely vulnerable (post-the Cold War, they had no Great Power Champion they could turn to for protection -- all the Great Powers were now aligned against them), the initial thought was that the required transformation could be achieved voluntarily, rather quickly and with not too much difficulty.
But this did not always work as, confronted with the realities of what transformation actually would mean re: their cultures and their beliefs, certain individuals and groups in "the rest of the world" (1) found common cause and (2) organized to fight back.
It is within this context that the Powell Doctrine had to be abandoned. And a doctrine -- that could better accommodated the needs of the new Great Power Peace and better deal with the now-better understood difficulties presented by the the required "transformational" foreign policy and process -- had to be devised and be adopted.