Are the FID missions in the Horn of Africa the model for the future?

Last Friday's New York Times had a story about the U.S. government's support for the Somali government's effort to drive the Al Shabab militia out of Mogadishu. According to the article, U.S. security assistance in Somalia is no secret. The issue is what role the U.S. Department of Defense currently has in Somalia, what role it will have in the future, and whether there will be any significant role for U.S. general purpose ground forces in the security assistance missions in Somalia, Yemen, and elsewhere in the region.

According to the article, U.S. surveillance drones are in the air over Mogadishu. The article describes a Somali government motor pool containing rows of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and gun trucks, presumably refurbished with U.S. assistance. The article also discusses a six-month military training program that has recruited thousands of young Somali men, transferred them to military training camps in neighboring countries, and returned them to participate in an upcoming government offensive against Al Shabab. Finally, the article mentioned training for Somali intelligence officers and logistical support for an African Union peacekeeping force that is supporting the Somali government.

But what is the U.S. military's current role in Somalia? "This is not an American offensive," said Johnnie Carson, the assistant secretary of state for Africa. "The U.S. military is not on the ground in Somalia. Full stop." However, the article did quote an anonymous U.S. official who forecast future American air support and direct action missions in Somalia.

Over the past two decades, the U.S. government has tried, with sketchy results, just about every approach to mitigating risk from Somalia. Previous strategies have included a large-scale humanitarian intervention, benign neglect, air strikes, small scale raids, support to warlords, and support for an invasion by Ethiopia. The latest iteration appears to be a methodical and comprehensive foreign internal defense campaign, presumably conducted mostly by other government agencies and contractors.

U.S. special operations forces may soon play a larger role for a time inside Somalia. Across the water in Yemen, they are likewise supporting the FID mission there. The results from the latest efforts in Somalia and Yemen may determine whether this OGA/SOF FID (and perhaps UW) approach will be the new strategy preference for U.S. policymakers. After Iraq and Afghanistan, will the U.S. enter a "post-COIN" era? Will the current operations in Somalia and Yemen be the model for the future? And what future roles should the general purpose ground forces prepare for?