by Matthew Collins
Download the full article: Fixing Intelligence... Again
Winter was a cruel season for the US Intelligence Community. The Christmas bomb plot and suicide bombing of a CIA base in Afghanistan were high profile failures for our security services. What followed in the press was much accusation, counteraccusation, and ill informed conjecture. Cold war analysts used to say of old Soviet Union propaganda, those who speak do not know and those who know do not speak. The sentiment also applies to intelligence, whose dealings are understandably cloaked in a veil of secrecy. But when that veil is torn by failure, it is time for more public scrutiny of these activities.
The Christmas bombing was an analytic failure of the highest order. Familiar arguments about inter-agency cooperation and information sharing have been rehashed. Of course, analysts already have to sift through a voluminous mass of reporting already, so removing whatever stovepipes we have left will do little to solve this problem. The reality is that this was, first and foremost, a cognitive failure as were most strategic surprises, be they Pearl Harbor or Sept 11th. The president was correct in admitting as much, publicly. He should expect better and, indeed, deserves better.
Download the full article: Fixing Intelligence... Again
Matthew Collins spent eleven years as a Marine Intelligence Officer. He served with the British Army in Sierra Leone, Marine Corps Central Command during Operation Iraqi Freedom and served in the Defense Intelligence Agency's Iraq office from 2005-2007. He is a graduate of the US Naval Academy and recently completed a Master's of Strategic Intelligence from American Military University (with Honors). Opinions expressed are his own.
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The issue of mediocrity is real and current. My experience in military intelligence for a number of years gives me some perspective on the issue. I have come across maybe one or two enlisted personnel who had the requisite analytical and cognitive abilities to analyze a set of facts or pieces of information and then make a logical assessment based on said analysis. This process is not taught in public schools and even most colleges do not teach people how to think critically. Herein is why I also have found few junior officers with the ability to do much more critical analysis than their enlisted counterparts.
So the issue is the generally poor education that certainly high school graduates get and the vast majority of college graduates obtain. Some intelligence is innate, to be sure. But the balance of one's intelligence is learned and mastered through the comprehension of formal and informal logic, for example. Most folks have never set foot in a logic course in college and so the process of working through a set of facts or assumptions as syllogisms is a lost art. I have taken to reading my own books on deductive and inductive logic to try and make up for what I was not taught in either high school, undergrad and graduate school. If we could all go to a Jesuit high school where the trivium (logic, grammar, rhetoric) is taught, we'd not have the problem we have in today's intelligence community.
To those who are ruffled by the comment regarding a Rhodes Scholar getting passed over for a community college grad, relax. A Rhodes Scholar is generally better equipped to handle the complexities of COIN and asymettrical warfare than the vast, vast majority of community college grads. That is not elitist--that is a fact.
Occam,
"Really? Then they clearly need thicker skin."
They are told they are not good enough all the time. Their skin is tough enough.
"I consider myself to be a pretty bright guy, but I readily cede the fact that MOST Rhode scholars outclass me in more ways than one. Such is life. I've gotten over it. It's clear that not everyone else on this board has."
There is a difference between opportunity and capability. If you do not believe you were ever capable of becoming a Rhodes scholar if you were given the opportunity, that is your personal belief. You should not project your own self-assessed inadequacies onto a larger audience.
Talent needs to be discovered and fostered. I think we all agree on this. Where talent is discovered SHOULD be irrelevant. Not every Mensa member is a Rhodes scholar or even a college graduate.
When a Rhodes scholar is told to wait in the back of the line, there is elitist outrage and calls for action. When a young adult takes advantage of one of the very few opportunities open to them, it is considered indicative of a broken system if this encroaches on the territory of the elites. This is why so many on the board had a negative view of Collins' article.
Such arrogance defies belief! An enlisted man with a degree, obvious field experience, probable language skills being offered a job in preference to Rhodes scolar and an officer. What is the world comiong to?
Probably its senses. I remember an Australian Air Force Base where the Training Officer was a Corporal and the Base Information officer a Sergeant. It is the qualifications and not the rank which count.
Except both examples you cite are organizational/structural as much as they are related to personnel.
The Israeli firm and/or Department of State are not part of the U.S. intelligence community. So, how again does the hiring standards of the intelligence community equate to failure there?
You say yourself that in Afghanistan an analyst was assigned "to be in charge of what should have been the responsibility of a seasoned field operative." Again - an organizational/structural issue, not personnel.
You have yet to present one compelling argument that ties the hiring and clearance processes in the intelligence community to these failures.
Ms. Mackenzie McVie - The Christmas Day bomber was an abject failure in screening at the airport - the Israeli firm responsible there, failed at the basics, as did our Dept of State in monitoring.
Our CIA base penetration in Afghanistan was a failure to follow time tested procedures in handling an agent, and was a result of assigning an analyst to be in charge of what should have been the responsibility of a seasoned field operative.
I posit the problem is with personnel - the personnel in charge that are never held accountable which perpetuates mediocre performance.
Collins is spot on. I've been there, done it - MI and CI/HUMINT. In reference to the quality of intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination you get what you paid for.
Collins' op-ed might ruffle a few feathers but he calls a spade a spade. We do not invest in attracting the best and brightest to the intelligence profession. Sorry to the real pros in our profession. But you know it - take a look to your right and then to your left - how many of those on either side would you really say I'd go to war with - how many would you trust...
Seems like this article is the same kind of "ill-informed conjecture" that the author laments.
The author dismisses the argument that intelligence failures are due to "technology or organizational structure," arguing instead that they are due to the "more banal problem of personnel policy" without offering so much as a semblance of explanation for this conclusion. This logical leap is never explored further. Certainly, there are personnel problems in the intelligence community, but how does the author support his supposition that they are the root causes of intelligence failures?
I also echo the previous poster who questions Mr. Collins' current status. His last mentioned assignment was in 2007 - has he remained in the intelligence community since that time?
I agree with the previous comment!
Matthew Collins' bias and arrogance really shine in this tirade. The insinuation that, because one was previously enlisted means they are necessarily of lower mental caliber, is bunk and insulting.
Where, professionally, has Matthew Collins' so-called superior Naval Academy education and training landed him? Does he still work in the intelligence community, if not, why not? Matthew Collins' comments sound like a classic case of the fox and the grapes.
Read this article below as a contrast to Collins' rant. It's written by John McCary, who used to be an enlisted soldier in the US Army. John is out trying actively to solve the world's problems instead of complaining from an ivory tower about injustices in the security clearance process.
"Lesson from Iraq: Engage the tribes"
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2010-03-18/news/bal-op.afghanistan18ma…
Shame on you Matthew Collins.
Your words are a back-handed insult to thousands of enlisted intelligence professionals.
wow, pretty ignorant insinuation, Mr. Collins: enlisted = buffoon with some community college credits. surely as an officer there must be some intelligence in your brain that maybe this enlisted person had a bachelor's degree or even a master's degree( I know some who have one or are working on it) and had other qualifications that this officer didn't have. Maybe, just maybe this enlisted person had the same intelligence level and reading and writings skills as this officer but enlisted right out of high school because he didn't have the money to go to college. We can chalk this one up to elitism, I think.
The problem cited by the author re: the hiring process and is well addressed by Abu Nasr. There's yet another factor:
The Intelligence community has surrounded itself with an excessive number of arcane and questionable rules to preserve security. The extent and dangers of over classification have been thoroughly discussed. Less obvious is the pernicious clearance process which has gotten so time consuming and expensive that a person with an existing Secret or above security clearance has a major edge over a more qualified individual lacking that clearance.
The articles ends thusly:<blockquote>"An organizations culture is built around the behaviors it rewards or punishes, and we have seen little of either from our intelligence community. Unless something can be done to shake up this culture of mediocrity, it is only a matter of time before our next season of spectacular failure."</blockquote>I submit the problem is more pervasive than mediocrity; abject risk aversion comes to mind...
Is this comment serious?
"Without demeaning eithers service, it is reasonable to question a hiring process that favors a community college graduate over a Rhodes Scholar for a job that primarily involves reading and writing."
You should have mentioned over-educated elitists that champion a high priced education over field experience.
And did you just honestly credit Derek Harvey with the Surge?
The author's last paragraph is hard: 'Operating as they do, under the necessary veil of secrecy and with their security clearances ensconcing them from meaningful accountability, we should not be surprised that the community produces mostly mediocrity with flashes of brilliance and ineptitude. An organizations culture is built around the behaviors it rewards or punishes, and we have seen little of either from our intelligence community. Unless something can be done to shake up this culture of mediocrity, it is only a matter of time before our next season of spectacular failure'.
I wonder if the author has read other, non-US reviews of intelligence failure? In the UK context maybe the Franks Report (Falklands) and the Butler Report (Gulf War & WMD).
A good "Health Warning" for consumers of intelligence is on this link: http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/security_and_intelligence/community/cen… which I always recommend.
I think part of the problem is the mismatch between consumer understanding of intelligence in its broadest sense, the setting of requirements and what the intelligence community can actually deliver. This debate is often found in the journal 'Intelligence and national Security' (my only interest is to be a subscriber).
That "heads did not roll" after the Farouk incident - the Detroit bomber; I found when in the USA at the time eluded understanding amongst those I met and did little to retain American public confidence in the state providing public security. Now times has passed will there be any sackings?
"Shame on you Matthew Collins.
Your words are a back-handed insult to thousands of enlisted intelligence professionals."
Really? Then they clearly need thicker skin.
Could Mr. Collins have been slightly more tactful? Certainly. But is there a systemic issue with mediocrity? Undoubtedly.
Practical experience is key. But it doesn't mean that you have the brains to tease out the convoluted truth out of an obfuscated fact pattern. Neither does going to college, or being an officer. I think that the missed argument is that the hiring process should reflect intelligence, and the ability to learn (gain experience). NOT simply a clearance and experience (CE). If you don't have the brains to really make a difference, you shouldn't be pandered to because of your CE. Similarly, if you have the brains, then we should be targeting you, not picking low hanging fruit (exemplified by those lacking brains, but possessing CE). Demographic (officer/enlisted, masters/CC, etc) determinations, while not entirely irrelevant, shouldn't make much of a difference.
However, anyone who doesn't think there's a tangible difference between a community college graduate and a Rhodes scholar in terms of mental acuity is simply naive; I consider myself to be a pretty bright guy, but I readily cede the fact that MOST Rhode scholars outclass me in more ways than one. Such is life. I've gotten over it. It's clear that not everyone else on this board has.