by David Prugh
Download the full article: Uncut: Lessons Learned From Six and a Half Years in Afghanistan
Friends in the Coalition,
As I depart, I would like to thank the thousands of fellow members of the Coalition with whom I've had the pleasure to serve these past 6 ½ years. I'd also like to pass on a few things for you to consider... for what it's worth. If you like the observations, make them your own.
This is definitely a stream-of-consciousness effort. I expect, though, that each of you will be able to readily grasp what I'm talking about because each of you has at least partially "seen the elephant". (More on that elephant later).
You may agree with some points / observations and disagree with others. That's fine, of course. My main purpose for writing this is to give you something to chew on.
Download the full article: Uncut: Lessons Learned From Six and a Half Years in Afghanistan
Dave Prugh is a Texan, a former US Army Infantry Colonel, and a 1985 graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He has served as a soldier and a contractor in combat zone leadership positions for over 75 cumulative months, most of it at the senior or directorial level. In his over 6 years in Afghanistan, Dave has worked closely with every echelon of the Afghan National Army from the battalion through the ministry, including several echelons above corps. He is scheduled to leave Afghanistan in mid-April 2010 after 6 ½ years of combined Active Duty and contracting service in Afghanistan.
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Comments
Thanks to those who have read and commented.
A little background on this article - I actually intended this for a fairly narrowly-defined target audience. That is, I was aiming at the folks with whom I am currently serving and the many folks with whom I've served over the years. One of the recipients, though, suggested that I publish it. When he got my approval, he made a few minor edits (apparently some of my language in the original was a bit too colorful for public consumption) and sent it to the Journal. This should help explain why the article starts the way it does.
Another thing I need to clear up is that I didn't make up the story about the Blind Men and the Elephant. I'm not entirely sure that anybody knows the real origin of that story, but the Afghans insist that Rumi was the source. Rumi, of course, was a great Persian philosopher and poet from Balkh. The Afghans seem to take a great deal of pride in his contribution because, although it was part of Persia back then, Balkh is now part of Afghanistan. So the Afghans don't consider him a Persian poet/philosopher as much as they consider him an Afghan one.
The rest of the observations are a synthesis of my own observations combined with other folks too many to mention. There are a few original observations in there, but the majority of them are greatly influenced by exposure to 6+ years of soldier-philosophers.
You'll also note that the article is rather long. It could have been longer, but I needed to start focusing on packing my stuff to get out of here!
Dave Prugh
Mr Prugh,
Great stuff. Your stated purpose to 'give us something to chew on' is well achieved. I'll be sending a copy to some friends currently in theatre.
I whole-heartedly agree with your first point, that 'There is no such thing as an uneducated Afghan'. In an age where we resort to blatant, explicitly stated social networking to convey ourselves, all the various Afghan societies and cultures are completely people-people driven. Politics is played down at the lowest, most basic level of inter-personal relations and it matters - I'm not saying that 'our' manner of interacting is less political when it comes to relationships, but it is very easy to underestimate, miss or write off as 'basic' some of their simple customs that serve to convey a lot. Afghani society may be alien and very different to our own, yet despite first appearances it is far from simplistic!
With regards to Afghani's not wanting bridges; I disagree. My experience has been that they greatly desire bridges as they can to connect their village to the world - it is both a status and a utilitarian issue. Traditional bridges I came across in rural areas were (I'm guessing these would be the same you found) wood, mud and sometimes salvaged metal sheeting. Such bridges require seasonal maintenance and their siting is dependent upon the river/ obstacle - not for their communities convenience. Coming in as a westerner we bring outrageous amounts of money they would never be able to generate themselves for a single project, meaning we can provide cement and metal structures able to hold a vehicle. That's something they cannot build themselves, and it is something they desire on many levels.
Thanks for taking the time to put your thoughts and experiences into words.
Sir, a good article nontheless. And so far I took from my deployment was to "lay low" and not let many people know what you did. I think I did pretty good to an extent, with my CSM (or my impression) was that I needed some responsibility when I was the Co FSNCO at the time, and never told anybody. Matter of fact when my CO told a local governor that I was the "artilleryman" I nearly considered striking a commisioned officer of the US Army... but of course I didn't, I played the "I'm just a grunt" and kept it that way, even to now in my unit. I don't boast either. Makes me a target. Nontheless great article!
good stuff. Recently returned from a PLM deployment in the South your observations from the top mirror in many ways my observations at the lower level.
One thing that frustrated me was the lack of initiative on the part of "CE1" ANA units. They were FOB bound except for Kandak or higher level operations once every two months.
Is a Tajik dominated ANA the right vehicle for Southern Afghanistan COIN?