We already know that neither the Bush nor Obama administrations have gained any traction with this issue. According the NYT article, "the United States would ensure that Iran would not 'acquire a nuclear capability.'" None of the policy options aimed at preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear power have much chance of success. Protected by China and probably Russia, the UN Security Council will not pass economic sanctions that will change the decision calculus in Tehran. Iran's mullahs appear to have crushed the Green movement, so regime change appears off the table. But those hoping for relief through a new government forget that Iran's nuclear program is very popular inside Iran; a new government is very likely to continue the program. Finally, even if some deal were to lead to an expansion of IAEA inspections, events from the past few decades have soiled the reputation of inspectors to thwart the aims of determined proliferators. Gates was at the top levels of the CIA and National Security Council when both his agency and the IAEA missed Iraq's nuclear progress in the late 1980s. Gross intelligence errors the other way followed 10-15 years later. As a career intelligence officer, Gates knows all too well the fallibility of that profession.
Starting with his service on the Iraq Study Group and leading up to the present, Gates no doubt believes his job is to extract the U.S. military from Iraq and Afghanistan under conditions resembling success. For him, this is undoubtedly a satisfying way to end a long career in government. Seeing how all other courses of action regarding Iran are doomed to fail, his January memo to Jones may have emerged from a fear that he and his department would soon be called on to execute "the last resort" against Iran, even when everyone knows that an air campaign would not be decisive but would result in another open-ended entanglement.
Having worked so hard to clean up the other messes, Gates undoubtedly doesn't want to end his career having ordered the start of another. Did his memo help avoid that? Maybe Gates will instead arrange his retirement before "the last resort" arrives on his desk.
Comments
<b>Walrus:</b>
Well said, Pinniped. I agree. Iranian possession of a weapon is much over hyped IMO. The Mullahs are dicey but they aren't as dotty as many seem to think.
Fellow poster S-2 may have misunderestimated the cost of dismantling Iran's nuclear assets and those elements of its infrastructure supporting such. I don't think we're impotent, just occasionally sensible and not prepared to pay the costs you outline barring demonstrated -- not speculative -- need.
S-2:
"The cost to us in feigned (or real) global outrage is pre-determined. The cost by not assuring that Iran will be put back decades in its ambitions seems small in comparison."
I'm afraid I don't share this view. We all know that, to achieve the desired effect, a sustained air campaign is going to have to target Irans entire defence, industrial, and scientific infrastructure and the people who operate it, to do more than delay the production of a weapon, if that is indeed Irans intent.
The risks associated with such a strike do include the aforementioned outrage, however in my opinion, in the absence of a totally successful information (propaganda) operation on Americas part, the outrage is by no means "pre-determined" at all and is unlikely to be "feigned".
The outrage, in my opinion, is liable to be such as to make Israel's loss of credibility over operation "Cast Lead" pale into insignificance, especially as the people we have to kill are all those bright young University educated technocrats that were out demonstrating on Tehrans streets not long ago. Twitter is a double edged sword.
Gen. Petreaus has already warned of the danger to troops as a result of our Middle East policies and it is hard to see why these would not be magnified by an attack on Iran.
Then there are the risks associated with destabilising Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan, perhaps even Saudi Arabia.
Then there are the risks associated with the oil trade and the worlds economy. It is difficult to see how such effects could be positive.
Then there are the risks associated with alienating Muslim countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia and of course African countries, not to mention Muslim minorities in Europe and America.
Then of course there is the question of international law and establishing a precedent for pre-emptive warfare, and the likely effect on NATO and the willingness of other countries to join in American lead military operations in future. It is, for example, hard to see how Turkey's view of such an operation would be positive and why it might wish to remain in NATO.
It is extremely hard for me to see how these risks can be adequately managed, especially if Irans information operations are successful.
Of course Israel would appear to benefit from America joining it as pariah state from a Muslim point of view, but it is hard to see how America would benefit by becoming incapable of engaging with the Muslim world again this century.
In my opinion the cost to us of not assuring that Iran can never be nuclear capable is quite small in comparison to the cost to Iran were it ever to threaten the use of a nuclear weapon. That risk is easily manageable at the push of a button, as it has been since about 1955.
I was at a loss to understand Mike Mullins' assessment of "limited results" to be achieved by any military campaign against Iran.
Such a campaign is, of course, inevitable as the kabuki dance unfolds. Haddick is correct to assess that Iran's ambitions will be protected by the PRC, Russia or both-at least diplomatically.
Why, though, we entertain anything less than a comprehensive air campaign of unlimited duration to dismantle any present or likely target and all the accoutrements associated with protecting such is beyond me? In for a penny, in for a pound. Such, of course, would be far greater than "limited" in result.
The cost to us in feigned (or real) global outrage is pre-determined. The cost by not assuring that Iran will be put back decades in its ambitions seems small in comparison.
Does our military leadership really believe we're incapable of dismantling Iran's nuclear assets and those elements of its infrastructure supporting such? I'm dismayed at our evident impotence if so.
Read the article and followed the links. Read the comment above and followed its links.
I'm old, I <i>must</i> be missing <i>something</i>. It all reads like ill informed semi political or ideological speculation of dubious value to me. Which is okay if one is into that stuff, I suppose...
I gather that no one writing about this has a clue what the Agency in the classified arena actually said about Iran's nuclear progress in the late 1980s, what the current Memo actually says or is inside Gates' mind...
Which brings me to this point. Quoth Mark Pyruz:<blockquote>"It's public knowledge that key elements of the IC were effectively bullied into its conclusions by the Vice-President."</blockquote>I believe one might better say "It's public knowledge that key elements of the IC were effectively bullied into their <i>publicly released conclusions</i> nominally by the Vice-President."
Speculation is fine, we all indulge. However, it seems to me there is little benefit other than political -- and that is dubious -- to any of this particular phony kerfuffle.
<i>"Gates was at the top levels of the CIA and National Security Council when both his agency and the IAEA missed Iraqs nuclear progress in the late 1980s."</i>
Keep in mind, this was at a time when the US and Iraq were wartime allies against the Islamic Republic of Iran. This aspect of the relationship and lack of action is crucial.
<i>"Gross intelligence errors the other way followed 10-15 years later."</i>
It's public knowledge that key elements of the IC were effectively bullied into its conclusions by the Vice-President.
Regarding the Gates memo, per Arnold Evans:
<i>The content of the memo is really not notable. We've known for a long time that the US does not have options to prevent Iran from attaining a nuclear capability. We've even known that the Obama administration knows, or should know this because we've seen the results of multiple elaborate war-gaming exercises none of which presented an option that meaningfully affects Iran's acquisition of nuclear capability.
What is notable about the memo is that it was released, that we hear in the administration's own voice 1) that Iran's program cannot be stopped and 2) that Iran's program is not expected to aim for a weapon but for weapons capability. 1) and 2) together mean that the US commitment to ensure that Israel has a monopoly among its neighbors of nuclear capability is over. To hear that in a report both authored by the administration and released to the public is very notable. In fact it is a huge change in the strategic environment.
The way the memo was leaked, on Saturday night, too late for the Sunday news presentations to schedule an administration representative to speak on them - along with the fact that this Sunday it so happened that no members of the administration were scheduled to appear on any of the Sunday television news interview shows indicates that it was a deliberate leak by the administration, and that the New York Times published the account with the blessing of the White House.
The New York Times does have a history of withholding news stories at the request of the President's office. Surely Obama could have had this story withheld.
Gates claims that the memo was not a wake up call - was not a spur to request that the White House create some new military option that didn't exist before. That claim by Gates is correct but also not surprising. Gates does not claim that the memo's conclusion, that the US does not have a policy option that will prevent Iran from achieving nuclear capability is false. If there is news in the later report, that is it.</i>