by Colonel Gary Anderson
Download the full article: In Marja: Lead, Follow, or Get Out of the Way
It never ceases to amaze me how quick we are to lecture our Iraqi and Afghan allies on the importance of good governance and interagency operations while blatantly violating many of those principles ourselves. The latest incident of interagency fratricide played out in the Washington Post in an April 13th article by Rajiv Chandrasekaren regarding attempts by U.S. Marines to use innovative methods to reduce the poppy crop in Marja, Afghanistan. In their attempt to reduce a major source of funding for the Taliban in that region, the Marines fell afoul of "anonymous sources" at the Headquarters of the Helmand Province Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT).
It seems that the Marines have been paying local farmers to plow under their land rather than harvest the lucrative poppy crop. The Marines have also been blocking roads to keep out migrant laborers who are brought in to harvest the crop. The farmers seem relatively happy with this arrangement because many of the migrants are reluctant to enter the Marja area anyway because it is still an active combat zone.
Some PRT members chose to become part of the problem rather than part of the solution by taking their gripes to Chandrasekaran rather than by offering constructive alternatives to the poppy problem which they have been unable to come to grips with on their own for years. Unfortunately, this is not an isolated incident. Members of the traditional civilian development community have failed consistently to grasp the basic principles of counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan for years by adhering to ideas more suited to development work in Togo or Chile than in war zones such as Afghanistan and Iraq.
Download the full article: In Marja: Lead, Follow, or Get Out of the Way
Gary Anderson is a retired Marine Corps officer. He recently left the State Department after a year-long tour in Iraq as a Senior Governance Advisor with a Provincial Reconstruction Team.
About the Author(s)
Gary Anderson is a retired Marine Corps Colonel who has been a civilian advisor in Iraq and Afghanistan. He is an adjunct professor at the George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs.
Comments
I suspect that the back story of this issue is more complex than implied here.
It is my understanding that the Helmand PRT is a UK operation. There are very likely policy differences here between the US and the UK at the bottom of the dispute.
You have to wonder how much coordination was conducted between the UK PRT and the USMC before these actions took place. The UK has been running the show in Helmand for about four years. Given that experience and the sensitivities involved when working with allies, I hope that the Marines and the PRT talked over these COAs before they were executed. If that didn't happen, this disagreement should not be a surprise.
Final thought: I think it is very inaccurate to describe PRT and part of the traditional development community. They are government run organizations staffed by military and civilians working for ISAF nations. In general, non-Afghan NGOs in Afghanistan have at best been cool to the PRTs and at worst openly hostile. Additionally, the US PRTs are staffed mostly by military folks and essentially OPCON to US Brigades. (The PRT in Panjshir is a slightly different animal)
You all make good points. If you have not read Seeds of Terror, then you should. The Taliban primary source of income is the opium. You can not target every one in the food chain, just is not likely. To do this would would be targeting high ranking politicians, intelligence agency's, military, and police, in Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and UAE. Basically we have ignored the drug problem for so long, that know it is the elephant in the middle of the room. Tough decision have to made and the Marines are stepping forward and making those decisions. We will make more enemy, well they already our. If the farmers were not strong enough to stand up to the Taliban, then they sure are not going to take a stand get the Marines. Also the Military has been paired up with DOS for a while. They have been the security element for the DOS. I know someone personally, that did this for 9 months. We are dealing with a drug cartel that will do anything to keep their livelihood. Mullah Omar is the Drug king pin and all they want to do is harvest, sell, and ship this poison to infidels. You say don't mess with the poor farmers livelihood, well they paid very little to cultivate poppy and most are forced to grow poppy by the Taliban. Most farmers do not want to grow poppy, but are forced to do so. I believe you have to start some where and if is the farmers so be it. For this to be effective we need to keep a constant present in those areas, if not the Taliban will come back and force them to grow poppy. We can not trust the ANP or local officials, to do this because they are more than likely involved. God bless of troops. From an OEF veteran.
I have to second Pol-Mil FSO's comment. I have been in and around many country teams over the last 30 years and have never seen FSOs wear "anti-Americanism as a badge of honor." Sure there are differences of opinion on how to use all the instruments of national power but the FSOs I have worked with are American patriots doing our nation's work often at great personal and family sacrifice.
Herschel Smith:
I agree with your revulsion about the USMC and the DEA working together.
If there is one thing we should have learned in the last 9 or so years its that we should avoid having various government agencies working together or if it is unavoidable for two different agencies to come into contact with each other; they should minimize the contact to the maximum extent possible.
So-called anonymous sources are cowardly. If you believe something, say it out loud or write it down, attach you name to it and engage people in debate over it. Further, I agree that many in the State Department wear their anti-Americanism as a badge of honor. It sickens me.
That said, it deeply saddens me to see the U.S. Marines involved with the DEA. They have no business entangled with this mess, and more to the point, it won't work. I'll say it again. It won't work.
They knew better than to go after poppy when the 24th MEU went into the Garmsir AO in 2008, but have lost their way if they are trying to convince farmers as to the "legitimacy" of their crops (to use your word).
Again, this won't work. The reason is that it accomplishes nothing at best and potentially worsens the situation. If it reduces their income because it isn't as valuable as poppy, then we have harmed their livelihood and they won't forget that. If we merely replace it with something else that becomes lucrative, yet we leave the Taliban alive, the Taliban will tax that crop.
There are other examples I have discussed in:
http://www.captainsjournal.com/category/financing-the-taliban/
For instance, meetings have been held with farmers over pomegranates, with the Taliban literally at the meetings (as an interested party). The Taliban raise their largesse in various ways. They tax businesses, are in possession of emerald mines, other precious gem mines, marble quarries, timber logging companies, and other assets.
What we going to do when the Taliban begin making income off of pomegranates by taxing the farmers? Place pomegranates off limits for them as an legitimate crop? Do we ban emeralds and precious gems because they raise money for the enemy? Marble? Trees?
The problem isn't poppy. The problem isn't gems or timber or marble or anyting else like that, and the U.S. Marines have no business entangled with enforcing drug laws in a global war on drugs.
The problem is the Taliban, and no amount of poppy eradication wiil change that. Go after mid- and high-level drug traffickers, criminals, and especially the Taliban. Leaving any of them alive will be a deadly mistake for the campaign. Leave the farmers out of it, or we will be more hated when we leave than when we came.
I think the coaches on both sides might consider taking the "anonymous sources" and the author out of the game for a while to cool off before they foul out. I agree with the Colonel that public griping about a decision taken above one's paygrade is unprofessional; I also think that public disparaging other members of the team fits that bill. The PRT guys might take their time-out in a VA hospital with some guys who are going to live the remainder of their lives with pain, handicaps and the standard of living that a disability pension provides; the Colonel can spend his in rural India and see what might be the best possible future for Afghanistan.
I'm glad Colonel Anderson is here to tell us that the people on the ground in Helmand don't know what they're seeing and experiencing on the ground. I'm also glad he helped me realize that the aid community, and not the military with ten times the manpower and twenty-five times the budget, is solely responsible for everything going wrong, ever.
Seriously, I'm sympathetic to being frustrated at State for its bureaucratic failures... but to pin things solely on the civilians, when they are a whispering presence compared to ISAF and the U.S. military, is deeply misleading (to put it charitably).