Some press accounts have placed blame for M4 carbine malfunctions at the Battle of Wanat, Afghanistan, squarely on the weapon's manufacturer. In fact, other factors could have led to the disaster there...
Read the entire article at Proceedings.
Comments
Remember in all current insurgenices ie Iraq or Afghanistan all insurgent groups work off of "recon pull", once that "recon pull" is completed they tend to go into an attack planning/briefing mode and discuss the attack plans as much as a SF team does before a mission.
Once that briefing has been conducted the established security recon reports if the target security has changed or not changed --then the attack command is issued and there is no turning back.
Really feel that the on the ground unit did not fully realize the intensity of the "recon pull" being conducted, could not recognize it and when the initial insurgent attack elements moved in the swarm formations the attacked unit failed to understand the swarm attack concept and the fight degraded into indivdual battles not coordinated efforts to counter the actual swarm attack.
If one really looks at the current CTC training scenarios there is little to no emphasis placed on "recon pull" TTPs---ask any number of PL or Company Cmdrs and unless they were in an Airborne or Ranger unit most do not know what "recon pull" even means.
Ask any veteran of SF of VN and they will tell you today every VC/NVA attack manuever and just how many minutes they had to break them with a specific counter manuever or get run over---you simply do not see that in today's CTC training.
This is simply another lesson that should have been implemented in CTC scenarios but it has not.
The redacted CENTCOM investigation is at this link:
http://www2.centcom.mil/sites/foia/rr/CENTCOM%20Regulation%20CCR%202521….
As most are too busy to read it in its entirety and few have the ability to read it objectively, I provide some pointers and a challenge.
The challenge first - find the statement(s) that show there was not adequate planning or supervision and dereliction and negligence were in the place of contingencies and frictions of war. The pointers:
First, we all love Marines. They are our nation's finest planners, tacticians, resourcers, executors, warriors, and they each have impeccable integrity. A USMC Infantry LtCol was the embedded tactical trainer (ETT) OIC based at Blessing and responsible for the Marines at Wanat. Read his CSI statement (40C), his CENTCOM statement (40A) and if you have the time, note the questioning and re-questioning in his CENTCOM interview (40B). If we take his statements at face value we could conclude with "the end." If we don't believe this Marine's statements do we conclude that all Marines are unbelievable or just this Marine is unbelievable? The public domain has determined LtGen Natonski (USMC) (who based on his bio has not served in Afghanistan; based on his EXSUM did not walk the ground; and based on the CENTCOM enclosures did not interview scores of relevant people) is the objective investigator. A read of his work shows his conclusions are drawn from inferences in the absence of statements or facts. There is a larger Marine connection in the background but that can wait.
Second we all love NCOs. They call it like they see it, know ground truth and have the intestinal fortitude to speak the truth. I understand the battalion commander was an NCO before many of his NCOs were born and in the eyes of his former NCOs (scores if not hundreds that lined up to support the chain of command), he maintained the ability to see, know, and speak. Was everything perfect? No. Did they understand the mission? Yes. Did they understand the need to move from Bella where there was worry of the base being overrun, men killed, captured, and tortured while aircraft were shot down and men road marched up canalized mountain trails to reinforce? Yes. Did they understand timing and the selfless need to set up the next unit for success? Yes. Did they understand the location? Yes, as the best of all worst places (43B, page 1; 37A, pages 1-2). As an aside, all that want to be on the highest ground, every piece of high ground in Kunar and Nuristan has higher ground within 1000 meters, which is what happens when you are in the foothills of the Hindu Kush Mountains. Look at the available video from the area. Did they have the required resources? Yes. All they wanted or needed? No, like throughout the rest of their tour, throughout their AO. More than they expected? Yes. A bobcat for a platoon defense? When was the last time a platoon defense saw one of those at NTC, JRTC, or JMTC? Last time at any other COP in the AO? See the documentary Restrepo and see how another platoon established an initial base (43A, page 10; 43B, page 1). Were they out of water? No. Were they low? Yes (33A, page 4; 43A, pages 8-9). Did they have a well and two creeks within meters that the ANA were using? Yes. Did they have water purifying pumps/filters per squad? Yes. Did they have iodine tablets? Yes. Did squad or platoon chain of command opt to maximize these? No (33D). Why? Because to this experienced group the perceived threat was such that they could manage priorities such as to rest in the heat of the day (while not purifying available water) and work in the cooler periods of the day (43A, pages 8-9). Or as the platoon sergeant said, because these (pumps and iodine tablets) were meant for patrols (33D). Did the platoon call for an emergency resupply? No (40B, pages 13, 14). Why not? Because they did not perceive the low water as an issue at the time nor the enemy threat to warrant the immediate resupply. Did the platoon sergeant prioritize what supplies came in with the company XO? Yes (33A, second statement page 2-3). Was the platoon thrown out alone and unafraid? No, in fact they were withdrawn closer to indirect fires, vehicle, air, and (if necessary) foot mounted support. Was the platoon enabled? Yes, with more resources than any platoon at any time in the 14 months of the deployment and to the detriment of other bases (43B, page 1; 41A). Did they occupy, secure, and set their defense uninterrupted? Yes. With no indications or warnings (CENTCOM), the first rounds weren't fired for over 100 hours (or slightly longer than the entire Desert Storm/combat experienced by some). Did the Waygul Valley have hundreds of contacts? No. There were less than fifty contacts in the Waygul Valley in 14 months and nearly 400 in the Korengal (10 km south) ( ostlund). Three contacts occurred near Wanat. CPT Myer and his RTO were in all three to include the battle of Wanat (the only veterans of all three engagements).
I didn't reference the chain of command from company, battalion, brigade, or CJTF (their enclosures are 16,7,11,9) as well established fact fearing pundits established each as a self-serving dishonest dolt. Those few that look for additional truth absent the command, may want to read the DCG's statements (10A,B,C), brigade DCO's work (AH 64 15-6, original 15-6, or his statements 30A,B; 30B, pages 27-30 are insightful as he references Mr. or Colonel Brostrom's involvement early on), or the Marine ETT's (41A,B,C). If you don't "trust" officers? How about the platoon RTO (40A,B,C), mortar section sergeant (43A,B), alpha team leader (37A,C), or platoon sergeant (33A,B,C,D).
Few if any operations could withstand the national level scrutiny associated with Wanat. To include ongoing operations in Helmand where nearly 150 US and coalition forces have died since Operation Moshtarak was initiated in January. Nearly 70 of these were well trained, equipped, and resourced Marines. Many more were special forces of some type. May they rest in peace and their parents and all value their sacrifices and those of their units.
The intent of this post is not to bash the CENTCOM investigating team or their conclusions. It is to remind all that statements and interviews are on the net. Information is public. Based on each person's experience and interpretation, the lens they read through, the statements could be interpreted in many ways. The suggestion is not to read solely through Mr. Cubbison's lens or a grieving fathers as neither has a completely clear view. I'd also suggest you not asume the officers involved need leadership 101 lessons as each has benefited from consistent and significant subordinate support, which is a testament in of itself. Most officers I know across the board and across services have been making incredible sacrifices for the good of their men and units for many many years.\
/r-
GT
I hate shameless self promotion, BUT (it is SWJ promotion, so it is ok), last July I wrote a SWJ paper looking at Wanat (and Afghanistan in general) through the French experience in Indochina.
I've been following the recent investigations and am not happy with the recent overturn by the Army. Engaging the populace and protecting villages are key parts of COIN, but you have to be prepared for the enemy as well. Too few troops were sent to a poor location with limited resources and support. It is a manpower intensive operation and throwing a couple dozen troops at a problem is not the answer. You need to go full or none. Small positions only work when they are linked and connected with other positions, not out alone and unafraid. The opposite, a lone large position (aka Super FOBs in Iraq or Dien Bien Phu in Indochina) fails because it cedes the terrain and populace to the enemy.
If you're having trouble sleeping, consider reading my paper. I'd like to think I am a little less long winded now, but being a LT at Fort Bragg kept me too busy to write and I had fallen out of practice as a CPT in 2009. ATW!
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/07/avoiding-dien-bien-phu/
Cole,
Good points, and you and others may be right.
I guess, from my perspective, when I was a CO CDR in that position, when I was determining where I would establish patrol bases, I assumed that I would have no support and no resupply.
I was recon and a secondary supporting effort so my assumptions were not unfounded. I always tried to calculate if I could defend my position with what I had on hand with no additional support.
Obviously, none of us are right about this thing. Wanat, as well as warfare in general, are bigger than any of us.
I'm just hoping that others can learn from what happened. My boys are there now, and they will do it their way, and if they learned from those that came before them, then hopefully, we'll all find some success.
Honestly, I probably should have tempered some of my own judgement knowing that I wasn't there, but that's how emotion goes with our profession.
Mike
MikeF,
Read the full CENTCOM report today and it reminded me of a conversation my wife and I frequently have. She always accuses me of being a pessimist. I always respond that in my Army years we were taught about and experienced Mr. Murphy and his law on multiple occasions. Believe the Irishman's jinx was well at work in this tragic instance.
So why are the Bn and Co Cdr immediately the sole culprits when:
- The engineer Route Clearance Package vehicle breaks down leaving stranded jingle trucks (that were to follow) with all the Class IV sitting in Camp Blessing
- The fuel drum to fill up the Bobcat is transported to Wanat sans a key part for pumping fuel from said drum. Nobody bothers to tell the Infantry that Bobcats cannot fill 7' tall HESCO.
- Because of a postponement in the move from COP Bella, all the heavy construction equipment returns to Kabul
- Everyone blames infantry for not building fast enough yet the engineers predict it would take a month to build all the HESCO and two months for permanent stone walls. Lowest estimates are 14-23 days for HESCO. Wanat was attacked 4.5 days after its occupation.
- Everyone blames infantry for not patroling, yet they ran out of water and had to stop digging after 9 AM each day to conserve water...and could not very well patrol without water and while digging. Good luck trying to identify who was to blame for inadequate water as fingers were pointing everywhere.
- The Bn and Co Commander were doing a 15-6 due to the Apache airstrike of 4 July...a 15-6 no doubt requested by higher HQ. How high do you want to go in laying blame? Too many 15-6s at bad times" M4 failures? Lack of ISR UAS support? Lack of aviation lift aircraft? Lack of engineer support outside BCT chain of command?
- The ground QRF arrived fairly rapidly and was immediately effective...because the COP was in the valley next to the road. Could the QRF have been as effective if the COP had been on top of the ridgeline at 7-8,000 feet. Could helicopter have even landed there let alone carried as many supplies as they did each day in the lower valley site?
- Leaders actually thought the Taliban would never endanger villagers by firing from their houses and mosque. Perhaps leaders felt that Wanat's ANP and 24 ANA nearest the town would help? Instead numerous weapons were found in the police station after the attack and the ANP were in fresh clean uniforms. The ANA fired into the air, ran, and apparently ducked a lot given their low casualties.
I could go on but you get my point. Blame the poor company commander and other junior guys for everything. Near as I can tell the two Colonels each have a $85K retirement to look forward to regardless of this investigation's outcome.
Nungman,
What you neglect to mention is that COP Bella was under mortar attack just prior to the Apache attack, UAS reported association between the fleeing trucks and mortarmen, and frequent mortar attacks halted immediately following the Apache attack.
The FOIA CENTCOM report also cited that two senior Taliban leaders were most likely wounded in the Apache attack which most likely led to no further disruption of the COP Bella move. Of course sans that Apache attack we could have easily seen a CH-47 moving Bella troops downed by RPG fire which would have been significantly more than 9 KIA...
While not justifying the killing of other innocents in the July 4th attack, it is clear that not all parties were innocent and the Taliban bear partial blame for hiding behind noncombatants...as those cowards always do.
Tom Ricks and I have a love/hate relationship.
On a personal level, we get along great in many ways of mutual respect.
On a professional level, we often tend to agree to disagree; however, this is one of those times that I think Mr. Ricks offers the best insight into the mixture with his new series to be continued.
http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/07/07/wanat_the_families_resp…
Now, I'm gonna have to email Mr. Ricks and finally schedule that beer summit.
As much as the tactical side has to do with Wanat, the emotional side is far aside in terms of accountability and responsibility.
Bottom line, the pathetic commanders that allowed their units to be decimated by IEDs without changing their tactics are just as culpable as those that allowed their positions to be overrun by the enemy.
I would hate to have to walk around everyday carrying that burden knowing that I should have done something else.
In the existential sense, I think that's what Dante was writing about when he authored Purgatory.
As I stated previously, if I was placed in an indefensible position, then I would have resigned.
In hindsight we can beat to death what could have been done different tactically, but let's not miss the present axiom that perceptions are reality: a second investigation overturning an initial investigation, only to have its findings rescinded in the end, based on information submitted by those previously investigated and found wanting, does not give the impression that the Army leadership did due diligence at Wanant - like it or not.
Some of us are wondering if the Army fully understands and appreciates it?
Charles,
The People in the area were thoroughly soured on the US military after a few misaimed bursts from an Apache helicopter killed the only doctor and paramedics for fifty miles around. And on that subject, we already beat the Republican Guard so what are tank busting helos doing deployed anywhere? Making us enemies, that's what.
We tried firepower and attrition in **our** Indochina war. We never came near the kill ratios required to defeat guerillas with an attrition strategy. We tried winning over the population at first. In the end, they were just in the way.
No doubt, Jim, the Mohmand clans that inhabit the badlands on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border don't feature having **their** villages saved by us destroying them.
Charles,
I reread your post again. I actually think that you and I would agree more often than we disagree. Here's one more question for you that better describes my mindset.
If you believe this to be true,
"The enemy has/had the capability to mass 200 personnel, albeit infrequently. If they can launch a surprise attack they could, in a day, cause the types of casualties we had in Wanat."
Then rather than sticking in a static position waiting for the TB to decide on a glorious battle, why don't you conduct psychological, deception, and shaping operations to convince the enemy to mass in an engagement area that you have defined so that you can kill him? I've done it. It works.
Soott,
"Wash, rinse, repeat."
Classic. I'm gonna steal that one for a small email distro on COIN for Dummies that I send out to my former subordinates as they find their way through A'stan and Iraq.
Mike
Charles,
Just to be clear, I have neither been to Afghanistan nor do I profess to be an A'stan expert. I post comments in this manner that help spark debate and answer my own questions.
But, I do understand manuever, and I prefer not to fight from the defense.
My real question is this:
If a patrol base limits your freedom of maneuver in your area, then why would you ever put one there?
Instead, figure out a way to get into the enemy's decision making cycle and win your local fight. There are hundreds of other creative ways to do it.
A couple of post above, Jim Gant offers one.
Mike F,
Have you actually been to Afghanistan?
The enemy has/had the capability to mass 200 personnel, albeit infrequently. If they can launch a surprise attack they could, in a day, cause the types of casualties we had in Wanat. That is still far less than a bad week in Iraq was due to IEDs. Losing far more than this to IEDs in a week never cost a BN or BDE CDR their job. How does direct fire make it any different?
The threat of an enemy ability to mass those types of numbers doesent mean that you shut down every platoon FOB. By the way, most FOBs are in the valleys as we cant resupply all of them, all the time, with helicopters, (if you want to do your vertical envelopments) and the roads are in the valleys, as Are The People. I dont think it would be physically possible to get humvees to the tops of those hills, let alone the jingle trucks we use to supply FOBS and VPBs. This VPB was within artillery range of supporting units, including IIRC 155mm fires, and had rotary wing/CAS within 30 minutes of reaction, which for Afghanistan is normal.
Technically, it appears the enemy chose to suppress Wanat and assault OP Topside, and I think much of the problems were associated with the choice to emplace a vulnerable squad OP that complicated the ability to employ fire support and had very limited sectors of fire. If the VPB was on top of a hill, and was suppressed, an enemy assault to overrun a squad OP would have resulted much the same, regardless of elevation differences. I am aware of a lot of FOBs that were attacked and rapidly responded with fire support, having only to worry about the location of civilians and qalats.
I find it odd that a "newsworthy" event like Wanat has so many people calling for relief for cause. Other commanders have lost far, far, more people to IEDs, and not killed a single enemy combatant in the process, yet we accept that as the cost of doing business, as if they are routine traffic accidents. And while I respect your service and valor, placing FOBs on the tops of hills in the OEF AOR is not a panacea or all-purpose solution.
This is nothing more than a side bar comment as I have not studied nor read the details of what occurred at Wanat.
However, at the same time we were conducting tribal engagement with the Mohmand tribe (2003), we were also conducting combat operations in the Pesch Valley and the Korangal Valley. The details of these missions are not important. However, we had two informal "meetings" with the tribal leaders in and around the area where Wanat is located. The first time we held a meeting they informed us they did not want us coming through their tribal area. I explained to them, in detail, that we had to move through that area in order to accomplish other missions. I emphasized that we did not want to fight their tribe. They told us that we were not welcome there and if we came through their again that we would have to fight. My answer was simple,"OK. Let's finish lunch together and then we will fight." That very day we were involved in a very large fight with them on our way out of the valley.
Several weeks later, the tribal elders came to our firebase and we had another "meeting." The same topics were talked about. We enjoyed a very nice lunch together and the outcome was - we will continue to fight. We could not come to any type of agreement on how we could work this issue out.
So we continued to conduct combat operations to include raids in their tribal area.
But at least we understood each other.
One last note. The terrain there was by far the most difficult terrain I have ever fought in.
Sometimes, you just have to fight...
Once again, this isn't a statement about Wanat per se, but the tribes who live in and around the area. They are a tough, fighting group of people.
I, too, would have had attempted to get out among them and tried to establish relationship with them had I lived in that valley. Would it have worked? I just don't know.
Just putting a little historical information out there...
STRENGTH AND HONOR
Jim Gant
There are other unfortunate paralells between Wanat and Dien Bien Phu.
The Vietminh were so inconsiderate as to attack before most of the construction materials slated for the base could be brought in. Like the French and their indigenous allies, the defenders of Wanat could only dig in the earth as a means of defense. They had nothing with which to build a bunker system. There does not even seem to have been camouflage netting deployed at Wanat, allowing the enemy to follow--even to video--every move by the defenders below. This (minus the videoing) was just what Gen. Giap's forces were able to do to the French in 1954.
The first barrage by the enemy seems to have taken the US forces by surprise, knocking out all their heavy weapons just as the artillery at Dien Bien Phu was taken out early on by the Vietminh bombardment, leaving the French officer commanding the artillery to declare "I am completely disgraced" and shoot himself.
How about yet another story of a fort misplaced on low ground next to the trail, instead of on the more inconvenient surrounding high ground?
My wife and I spent the morning of July 4th at Mt. Vernon catching up with my Main Man. There, we were reminded of a green and untrained Major George Washington picking the wrong spot for Ft. Necessity during the French and Indian War. When later attacked, he had to surrender the position, the garrison, and himself.
Armies in general don't learn from other armies. Perhaps it's understandable that our brilliant generals have never heard of Dien Bien Phu and what can happen when you cede all the high ground to an enemy on whose territory you are fighting.
But what about Fort Phil Kearny? That was in Montana not Indochina. It had to be abandoned 140 years ago to the Lakota braves of Chief Red Cloud because of its location in a bowl with mountains all around. Why was it put there? Because that made it easier for the supply wagons.
Looks like not much has been learned.
"I'm easily confused as my wife can confirm."
Ha Morgan, aren't we all?
COL G,
And I come off a bit too harsh on the subject. In other news, I got to meet the new company commanders in my squadron. I was very impressed.
The dude that took my troop was a PL with COL Macfarland in Ramadi. He confirmed that Niel Smith was a badass in Tal Afar. Plus, his main focus right now is on training basic combat skills. After his ten minute rant about how we were losing our skills, I knew that I was in good company.
COL Poppas will be fine. If I'm reading him right, he spent the first 30 days finding the enemy, conducted shaping maneuvers to push them into an engagement area, and then conducted his attack away from the civilian populace. He knows maneuver. When we last talked, I was skeptical if he could pull it off on the brigade level, but apparently, he is.
Mike:
I only used "poor" as a figure of speech to show a certain level of sympathy for the kind of pressures and constraints the company commander might have been under.
Good on your old boss and his success at killing the enemy. Such is the basic element of war. Makes sense to be sure. A combat outfit takes casualties and must respond. Moreover even within a population centric coin framework, if the god cursed enemy is so active and in your face every day with small arms and IEDs then logic demands the tactical offensive to kill the enemy, the hearts and minds stuff can wait. I know folks retch, roll their eyes and say damn it gentile, you still dont get it. They say the way you get at the enemy is through the population, but I say, that is the theory of it all which has not been proven in history and in practice.
I wonder if your old boss is being chided by MG Flynn for being too "emotional" in wanting to kill the enemy instead of focusing on developing trusting relationships with the locals and cultural knowledge?
Happy 4th to you Mike, and thank you for your service.
v/r
gian
After reading the report and reviewing the visual of the COP, it seems so obvious the tactical decision in placement was subordinate to the overall strategy metrics in the Korengal.
As many of you know, the strategy under COIN doctrine is to "get close to the people". The COP was indeed very close to the village and as such, much of the of the village infrastructure was in overwatch.
That said..the strategy may of and perhaps did originate from General McC camp as a result of the perceived successes of the surge into Baghdad (living with the bad guys)...that is.."getting close to the people" as part of the hearts and minds initiative.
If this was in part the case, then leaders not only failed to provide the basics, leaders also failed to really understand the culture and issues in the Korengal Valley. In short, the entire chain of logical assumptions which could result in tragedy..did!
Therefore, aside from the location, poor construction support, weapons issues and notice of intent to occupy..in effect, the entire valley and those in adjacent Pakistan knew the unit would be in Wanat.
Note that COL P had commanded 1/87 10th MTN as an LTC at Operation Anaconda and would of had first hand experience with "working" with the Afghan people. One wonders if there was an objection to the COIN strategy in the Korengal..
There is no doubt a deeper more tiered issues to the questions of what happened at Wanat.
But, I suspect the overall strategy which drove tactics had an strong influence on what happened that fateful day.
Paktia/Khost-2003
Morgan, believe you may be recalling COP Keating's planned closing when attacked in October 2009. It was an attack similar to Wanat but in a much more protected/established facility...showing that force protection facilities are of limited value if the enemy can shoot down into them. In both cases the enemy engaged marginally-protected mortars and key vehicles early.
However, General Campbell offered this about the valley site on page 7 of his rebuttal:
"e. The TF Bayonet.CJTF-101 AR 15-6 ROI and the JAGMAN investigation concluded that the closure of COP Bella and the establishment of a COP at Wanat were correct, given the exposure of COP Bella and the importance of Wanat. Likewise, they concur that the selection of the actual COP site at Wanat was appropriate in light of the terrain and the desirability of interacting with the Afghans. Finally, they conclude that the timing-prior to the TOA between the 2nd Bn, 503rd Infantry, and the 1st Bn, 26th Infantry-was reasonable in light of the difficult challenges that the 1st Bn, 26th Infantry, would encounter if it had "inherited" COP Bella (for example, lack of in-theater experience, a new force with fewer Soldiers). With these conclusions, I concur."
The company commander was not able to arrive on scene until a day prior to the attack which was a mitigating factor in General Campbell's decision. He and others were involved in a 15-6 investigation concerning the July 4th attack that killed 17. He also cited that there were no attacks at Wanat between 8 and 13 July while other attacks in Korengal and Chowkay valleys were absorbing the attention of the battalion and BCT commanders.
Could not get the CENTCOM link to work.
MikeF, also was glad to see the air assault into Kunar valley was so successful.
I'd encourage a close read of CENTCOM's report on Wanat at http://www.centcom.mil/press-releases/centcom-releases-wanat-investigat… followed by GEN Campbell's reveiw at http://www.army.mil/wanat.
As fine a historian as COL Gentile is, he could offer some trenchant observations on GEN Campbell's use of oral history to find no fault other than the friction of war for this action.
COL Gentile,
Sir, I hope y'all have that reunion. Working through the ambigious hell of 2005 the way that y'all did deserves honor.
You know that I rarely disagree with you.
With that said, I refuse to acknowledge ANY commander that ever whines about how hard his job is. There is no such thing as a poor company commander. That person needs to find another profession.
My old boss has taken over RC-East. After a month in and 20 KIA's, he's gone on the offensive. Last week, his maneuvers through vertical envelopment killed 150 Taliban.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/06/afghan_us_forces_lau.php
The company commanders were my platoon leaders. The S3's were my fellow commanders. I'm just impatient that I had to sit this one out.
Cole,
Thanks for that info, and my apologies for what might be considered "piss-poor info" on my part. I was going off of what we ETTs told regarding air support. As for the closing of the COP, can't recall where I read that...Drudge maybe..Army Times?
In any case, the info you provide seems to reinforce some of the things I brought up and that the Cdr's, both company and BN, perhaps even BDE, had little say in the positioning of the COP.
Until I can read the 15-6 and get a clearer picture of what happened and why, I'm willing to give these guys the benefit of the doubt. They fought hard, fought well, and kicked some serious butt, though at quite a price.
Morgan, we used Wanat as part of a training practical exercise. To gain info for the P.E., I read Cubbison's 245 page report and the earlier 15-6, so have purely "academic" rather than real combat experience leading to these "corrections" of your points:
1) Wanat was not closing. Nearby COP Bella had just closed and Vehicle Patrol Base Kahler at Wanat was replacing it July 8th, 2008 (attack occurred near dawn of July 13th) because it had access to a road allowing ground resupply from FOB Blessing 5 miles to the south.
2) Afghanistan was not short of air support. FOB Fenty at Jalabad had an Apache aerial QRF and MEDEVAC aircraft on standby that arrived within an hour of first rounds fired...only because they were notified slightly late to respond. It was a 29 minute flight. A B-1 bomber and artillery support arrived much sooner but could not help close-in where many fighters had already infiltrated. It is true that Predator support had been withdrawn from providing area security and a villager specifically inquired whether Wanat had UAS coverage just prior to the attack.
3) Previously, Bella could only be resupplied by helicopter, and in many ways was an even worse location. So you are correct that Wanat's easier-to-resupply location was a prime rationale for the move there from Bella. Wanat also was the district center that included a police station, a small hotel, and a valley bazaar.
Last Sunday, Dateline did a follow-up report that included more video and pictures of Wanat. I had seen Taliban video before and graphics depicting the area in various newspaper but the Dateline video was excellent.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37853775/ns/dateline_nbc-international/
It would have been very difficult to place the COP anywhere else near Wanat. Part of the problem was the unit telegraphed its intent to locate there well in advance by negotiating for the site rather than just occupying it as villagers actually wanted. In hindsight, the base could have been much smaller with more protective HESCO for vehicles/troops, further from the hotel and bazaar. OP Topside was also in a problem location and CPT Myers identified that but lacked time to move it prior to the attack.
IMHO based on what I read in Cubbison's report, CPT Myers was deprived of adequate Class IV and engineer support, and logistics such as water. The unit had planned to patrol that day but the attack beat them to the punch. It was hot, the final 2 weeks of a 15 month tour, and the unit had experienced more firefights than nearly any unit in the Army, alongside sister units in nearby Korengal Valley.
Cubbison's report makes a case that the preceding unit had a better COIN plan and thus avoided some of the hostile contact. But 173rd lost the CSM's son nearly immediately, along with multiple other troops who were participating in Shuras...and then got ambushed returning to their COPs. Do believe, they may have erred in indiscriminate airstrikes and use of artillery...even the aviation retired Colonel whose son died recognized that. But an Apache incident on July 4th that killed 17 villagers, many of whom were medical personnel, also may have led to the attack.
It's difficult to lay blame on any of the units or their leaders for enduring in one horrendous combat tour what Marines would endure in two timewise...and hope that General Casey's 9 month tour drive can work out to preclude this sort of burn out.
But also believe Wanat illustrates that restraint in use of force and more interaction/support for villagers ala COIN doctrine may have helped alleviate some of the bad will between both our forces and the Afghans.
Mike:
But then what does the poor company commander do after he has made such an argument about a place like Wanat and is then told to put it there anyway because the theory of Coin says that outposts must be embedded in, or very close, to the population? How does a captain argue with a theory that has been turned into a religion based on faith? Call bullshit to it, put the thing in a tactically better spot but then be harangued and harassed by the experts for not getting coin? I dont think it was as easy to do otherwise as you suggest. So then the cop must go where ordered and at that point the LT and his men have to make the best out of a tactically insufficient situation. But what did they do to improve their advantage? Carl gets at least some techniques to consider.
Also I don't buy the small wars is a captain's war argument. In fact all wars in one way or another are a captain's war, or for that matter a colonel's or general's too. I bet you could find riflemen in your own company who thought that the CO and First Sergeant were out of touch and the only ones that really knew what the hell was going on were us bastards down at platoon and squad. I guarantee my SSG section leaders in 2006 harbored those thoughts about me at times; but then so did I at times about my brigade and division commander. Only natural.
Enjoy your well deserved reunion with your men. I have often thought of trying to put something together soon for the Squadron I commanded in Iraq.
gian
Two things,
1. I just saw actual pictures of the patrol base site. The terrain made success impossible. I was shocked b/c I would have refused to stay there. Not an ignorant, self-righteous refusal, but I would have offered a better COA. At first glance, I would probably have been doing a mixture of JCustis's mobile patrols with Jim Gant's One Tribe at a Time. Anything to stay frosty and not get hampered by the human and physical terrain.
2. One of my LT's is getting married this weekend so we're having a big reunion. I'm seeing some of my former leaders for the first time since Iraq, and a bunch of memories came back. We had a similar situation that got ten guys killed, and I haven't fully told that story yet.
Okay, so, I'll put my last emotional post in better context. IMO, for the Regular Army, small wars are a Captain's war. On the platoon level, you're not quite in charge, and on the battalion level, you're just a bit too far removed. That's how I see the world.
One of the primary responsibilities for a company commander (amoung a million others) is site selection. If he messes that up, then everything else can crumble.
Here's one quick anecdote.
In my first ever patrol base, I was asked to occupy a house in Mukisa. I was stoked b/c we were getting out of the FOB and into the fight. I drove up for my initial recon, and my jaw dropped. The house was not defendable. I sent my lead PL to find a better site. He found it.
I went back to the BN CDR that I was attached to, explained the situation, and offered my recommendation to take the other house. It was defendable, and it better met his actual intent. He concured.
It was never about that first house. He wanted me up there to stop the Sunnis/Shias from killing each other. If I had taken the first house, then the probability of having to fight a big fight with lots of casualties would have risen.
So that's my take. My first post was probably a bit harsh b/c of my own memories. I have never been to Wanat, and I understand that I don't know the whole situation.
That's something I've always wondered about, too, Mike.
Why didn't they push out combat patrols? I suspect it's because BCT told them that their sole duty was to build the (pointless but COINerific) patrol redoubt for the incoming unit's potential use and they took those orders literally.
I would've pushed out patrols.
Also, if I recall, they had identified MAMs who appeared to be walking toward the patrol base, most likely armed, but ROE/EOF prevented the defenders from shredding them.
That might have encouraged me to send a dismounted patrol to find, frisk and probably fight them.
Mike:
Why strip the company commander of his silver star? That seems harsh and unfair to me. Regardless of the decision to occupy the base, should not his valor in action once the engagement began be enough to justify the award for valor? Why hold anything else against him? Shoot Mike, you are offering up a very slippery slope here.
Also, Mike, why do you stop with your recriminations at the company level, and then praise from platoon leader and below for heroism? Is it not possible that mistakes were also made at the lowest of levels too? For example, what kind of tactical, combat patrolling was done in the days and hours prior to the engagement?
gian
To Mike and others with far more combat experience than I...
I, too, feel, based on what I've read, that Wanat (and far too many other FOB/ COPs in A'stan) are poorly situated & positioned for easy attack.
Like Mike, I would love to ask the command team why they established the Wanat COP there. Was it the BDE CDRs call? BN Cdr? Co Cdr? I suspect that the Co cdr or BN Cdr didn't have the authority to make the final call, that the BDE CDR had that authority, but had to get final approval from someone in Kabul (that's how I recall things working in A'stan....kinda odd). If this is the case, is anyone with stars going to be looked at regarding this? If not, why not?
If the final call was made at the BDE level or lower, then like Mike, I agree that those Cdr's ought to be relieved, GOMOR'd, and made to clear minefields with their feet.
Despite the crappy location of the COP, I'm still inclined to give the CDR's the benefit of the doubt (I've not read the 15-6) because of the following:
- The COP was due to close the week of the attack, meaning resources like CL IV for defensive reinforcement would have been diverted elsewhere. If I recall correctly, the BDE command team had requested repeatedly to close the COP.
- A'stan in 08 was short air support, both Apache and Blackhawk. Air resupply would have been a lengthy affair and prioritized towards COPs that were being established/ reinforced VS one that was closing.
- Locating the COP in the valley makes ground resupply easier. Perhaps that was the determining reason for putting it there....not that I agree with it.
Just throwing that out there.
"Bad leadership, bad commanders, bad weapons, bad position. Nothing will change until the Army holds someone somewhere accountable for something."
Concur. In my world, the Company, Battalion, and Brigade Commander should be relieved for ever occupying that patrol base. Moreover, they should be stripped of any awards.
As many in SWJ know, I've done a bunch of tours, I have a bunch of valor awards from Iraq, and LTG Caldwell recently invoked my unit as a prime example of leadership in COIN. Futhermore, I spent my time after combat studying small wars.
That's my pedigree, and the memories that I remember force me to make this statement. Rarely do I offer any absolute truths in small wars.
This is one.
The patrol base is Wanat was undefendable. Period.
That is the only lesson learned. The leaders failed to recognize. If they were real leaders, then they would have quit rather than occupying that patrol base.
That's why I was suprised with LTG Caldwell's message. I threatened to quit four times during the Surge. We broke every standing ROE and rules drawn up by lawyers with no real experience. There is still one time that I didn't stand my ground that haunts me.
The only heroes in Wanat were the soldiers fighting in the defense.