in Afghanistan
. This document was authored by Sean McKenna and Russ Hampsey. Both Sean and Russ are retired officers of the Special Operations Community and are members of the RC East Counterinsurgency Advisory and Assistance Team (CAAT).The Afghan environment is like no other. Being able to address problems in multi-dimensional terms has never been more important. Do your homework. The Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) elements vary from location to location, unit to unit, and person to person. Levels of discipline, training, leadership, capacity and capability range the full spectrum. The following information is to provide you and your unit with recommendations that may or may not work in your area of responsibility (AOR). So, use what is appropriate at your location and develop the ANSF to support the success of the mission.
A Time for Sergeants: COIN Success at the Company and Platoon Level
in Afghanistan.
Comments
"Our senior leader's need to enable our junior leaders to win this war."
Hence my commentary about pushing greater amounts of authority to far lower levels.
Years ago, I believe that Cav platoon leaders used to have at their disposal an array of assets, to include BFV, tanks, artillery/ mortars, air support (were they allowed to control fixed wing CAS?), etc. If we could entrust a 2LT Cav PL with that amount of firepower and the ability to know when and how to use it, shouldn't we be able to enable our young leaders today of the same level of authority in executing COIN/ FID/ SFA/ UW/ whatever the term is today...?
Maybe I'm way off-base but I think "enabling" our PLs and PSGs means our senior leaders need to push some of their authority to lower levels (which would streamline communications and response times in the field), let these guys fight the fight, and deal with facing the network cameras....and don't throw these guys under the bus when something doesn't go our way.
Let's stop guessing what this article is about. The bottom line is this; we wrote this article to try and assist the forces that are tasked with executing the Afghan mission on a daily basis. Companies and platoons are deployed to a combat outposts and told to get after it. What does that mean to the Company or Platoon leadership? Our writings are meant to assist them in fighting this fight, no mater what it is called. (COIN, FID, stability operations, or unconventional warfare). The mission is clear but the execution is not. Our senior leader's need to enable our junior leaders to win this war.
Re: "And by the way in case you haven't noticed right now everything in Afghanistan is COIN; full spectrum COIN. Our senior planners and leaders should stop wasting time arguing about what COIN is and is not and figure out how to enable our Soldiers and Marines to win."
I think debating what COIN is and isn't is actually integral to enabling our Soldiers and Marines to win.
Conducting COIN "as it is" has cost countless amount of lives in Afghanistan. Also, journalists do not read the full FM 3-24 and their read of COIN is detrimental to the war as well: refer to Col. Gentile vs John Nagl recent JFQ debate (Wanat and Sean Naylor's article about 5/2 ID (SBCT))
Now in terms of this product and other products that Russ and Sean have produced in the few months - I think they are great even if only because they are proactive about producing change and effects on the ground level.
The CAAT has been a great back-channel asset and ally for me, but I think the RC(S) CAAT can be more vocal and public in their approach like their RC(E) counterparts.
Of course there is always time for Sergeants. How else are senior officers going to know what's realy going on unless they ask them. (I am an ex-Sergeant) :-)
The sort of devolution of responsibility has been in the Australian Army for decades, so is nothing new.
Ah the 20 year mark. It does wonders for one's morale and ability to write about unorthodox ideas and concepts.
Replacing Lieutenants with Majors and lietenant Colonels. There was a headqaurters that allegedly had SNCO positions filled by Majors and Lieutenant Colonels so they could get an active service medal, oops I mean active service experience.
As I sat there in the DFAC enjoying steak-n-lobster night using my plastic cutlery, I realized that I failed to adequately explain myself in the following: "Is this worth trying? Not sure, though I know of several young troopers, LTs and SSGs, that I'd trust with this sort of authority. Then again, I'm past my 20 years and am no longer overly concerned about my OER"
My apologies for letting my stomach dictate my hurried posting. What I mean by this statement is that my willingness to let LTs and SSGs take on this level of authority may be colored by my having reached the 20-year mark, lessening my concern about my OER and probably lowering my sense of risk-aversion. Of course, it might also be due to my serving with some decent LTs and SSGs & SFCs and knowing what they are capable of.
Ok...off to Green Bean.
A good read.
Perhaps what the authors are recommending is less reliance on "checklists" and other methods of "controlling our environment" in favor of a more unconstrained methodology (within a FEW well-defined parameters...secure the populace, enable ANSF, etc..), maybe even allowing greater autonomy at far lower levels of the chain than we are currently used to, let alone comfortable with.
Maybe that's one of the problems people have with COIN as we are currently discussing it...it hints (to me, anyway) at the need to decentralize operations far more than we are doing now, as well as giving 2LTs and SSGs (maybe even E4s) the authority that, at the moment, rests at the O6 or higher level.
Is this worth trying? Not sure, though I know of several young troopers, LTs and SSGs, that I'd trust with this sort of authority. Then again, I'm past my 20 years and am no longer overly concerned about my OER.
Perhaps we need to look at restructuring our small-unit elements, repacing LTs with MAJs & LTCs. Is that too weird? I suppose it is....but who would've thought that non-SF officers and NCOs, even some lower enlisted, would end up doing FID in a fifth-world country over an 8-year period? Maybe now is a good time for some creative weirdness.
Gian,
Sir - it is about changing the military culture to recognize that JUST killing enemy soldiers is not enough. Today, we have to win a war that has an ultimate cap on how much violence we can utilize. Nukes, strategic bombing, mass deportation/resettlement and/or large-scale cross-border neutralization of enemy support structures are all out. Therefore, we have to fight the fight we have, here, in Afghanistan, valley to valley and village to village. As Army combat arms guys, we are inculcated with an aggressive, tenacious desire to find/fix/destroy our enemies. Folks who take the Warrior Ethos to heart, lead from the front, and effectively synchronize effects at a given time/location to vaporize the hostiles are the guys who tend to move up in our organization. Unfortunately, as you well know, in COIN it takes a bit broader skill set than that. Our COIN doctrine and manual could quite rightly have a whole segment on target development (p. 5-29 in FM 3-24 is pretty sparse), but we dont really need a new doctrinal reference for that - it is deeply ingrained into us already. But to have an understanding of why it is important to meet on a routine basis with a particular Imam (or Mullah, over here) and what benefits can accrue - that is not a natural thought process for your typical Army leader. It surprises me that you are so vehemently against our COIN doctrine, after we executed most of the elements of it in Ameriyah - with reasonable, if not total, success. Surely we havent figured it all out, and are still struggling to find the right balance of violence, restraint, protection and risk. We are also struggling with how to bring it all together in support of a government which is only marginally effective and widely castigated as corrupt. But as your "Uncle Carl" once said, "The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and the means can never be considered in isolation from their purposes." How else would you have us justly and morally prosecute this conflict given the current values of our own people, the global strategic situation and our tools at hand? We are stuck with COIN until something else arises, and Ive seen nothing here to make me believe that, properly executed, COIN wont work. Russ and Sean are trying to put out some broad-spectrum advice for our NCOs who are coming here to fight COIN, like it or not. Their extensive experience makes them believe that the pieces they have put into their article will help NCOs lead soldiers in COIN, keep more of them alive, and gain greater advantage over the insurgent enemies. While protecting the populace (what, you mean like building a big jersey-barrier ring around a district?) may not always mean that they will tell you things and support you, NOT protecting them pretty much guarantees that they will oppose you and tell you nothing.
The problem isn't that COIN "straitjackets" our military. The problem is that the battlefield is much more ambigious and requires unique solutions to every challenge. The fact is, unfortunately, that the military very much is a "checklist" army and has been for a very long time. It is this fact which works against our current efforts in Afghanistan. Creating a checklist is how many of our leaders attempt to cope with all problems, not simply COIN issues. FM 3-24 has its faults, but to state that it straitjackets our forces by creating checklists is wrong on its face for the reason just mentioned. Our leaders demand checklists, always have in some manner. FM 3-24 insists that while certain objectives must be met, the procedures for accomplishing these are dependent on the specific circumstances. Perhaps the biggest problem with FM 3-24 is that it cannot provide a simple step-by-step guide to waging COIN, but this isn't a problem with the doctrine, it is a problem with all non-conventional operations in general.
And no, just because you "protect" people doesn't automatically mean those people will offer you intel on a silver platter. This isn't a video game; you can't just unlock achievements. But it may be that people who feel that you have their best interests at heart may be "more" willing to work with you on other matters. Or perhaps not. Trust is not something that is an either/or. It is layered and conditional. It has limits and it doesn't necessarily automatically confer immediate benefits.
Blaming COIN for the mistaken efforts of some commanders is ridiculous. A theory or strategy isn't wrong because someone makes a mistake in executing it. Moreover, I don't think anyone believes that a slavish following of any doctrine is the best course of action. The battlefield, conventional or unconventional, has tended to reward those who think creatively and act decisively according to the reality on the ground. The important thing is to see the situation clearly and understand what is important and what is not--- documents like FM 3-24 attempt to make these critical items visible to commanders who may not have otherwise recognized them.
RE: Arghh
You should read the article for what it actually says and not what you want it to say e.g. another example of how everything is COIN. Your concluding sentence "We have become an Army of checklists" is wrong. I can tell you that we have been an Army of checklists way before COIN (ARTEP's, IG Inspections, the Military Decision Making Process, Battle Drills...wait battle drills actually are helpful aren't they?)
This document's purpose is to assist our non-commissioned officers and junior officers who are living at combat outposts and are given the mission to conduct COIN with little practical guidance from senior leadership who, for the most part, has never actually had to execute a mission quite like the Afghan Mission. This article is not meant to be a checklist as the last paragraph highlights: "The key to your continued success is your ability to adapt, manage expectations, be a problem solver, and continue to move forward - however long it takes." A checklist does not allow for much adaptation or problem solving.
Your comment suggests that the flexibility to conduct various tactical level operations are not part of COIN is ill-informed. In fact you cannot protect the populace without defeating the enemy or the enemy intimidation; therefore COIN is not all about the hold and build stages which COIN detractors focus on. To secure and clear requires using the tactics, techniques and procedures outlined by you in your comment "clearing the hedgerows." Of course clearing a hedgerow along a forward line of troops in World War II was much more familiar to the Army conceptually than the mission we are asking our junior leaders to execute in Afghanistan.
A total war allows for a focus on enemy formations; how do you gain an intelligence advantage over an enemy whose formation is within the populace? Just like we sent scouts out to get eyes on enemy formations defending hedgerows in World War II; we must send "scouts" out to get eyes on the Afghan insurgent where he operates. Not a hedgerow but a village or qalat. The populace is where the information we need to defeat the insurgent is, to get that information we must be able to protect the populace.
FM 3-24 is a overarching manual designed to assist executioners of a specific style of warfare to develop plans to assist them in achieving the commander's end state. It does not malign any other field manual, military engagement strategy, or political solution. Its simply a starting point for leaders on methodologies to defeat an insurgency. Much like the 1981 version of FM 100-5 outlined a doctrine for the conduct of operations when fighting the armored columns we expected to face during the cold war.
And by the way in case you haven't noticed right now everything in Afghanistan is COIN; full spectrum COIN. Our senior planners and leaders should stop wasting time arguing about what COIN is and is not and figure out how to enable our Soldiers and Marines to win. Strategic and Operational decisions are not made by the audience for this piece; but the daily execution of those decisions falls into their laps. You did not make any recommendation on how to assist these forces in execution of the mission they are given; which in and of itself is part of the problem.
russ
The article said this:
"Protecting the populace will open up a wealth of information to your team."
Arghh!!! When will we move beyond this mind-numbing Coin straightjacket? Look how breezily that was stated with the underlying belief that if the population is protected therefore they will tell us everything we want to know. How can we be sure this theory actually works in practice? So now we are telling our combat NCOs in this piece that IF you protect the people, then they will tell you things. Moreover what are the tactical tasks that bring about population protection? "Protect the people patrols"? What happens if a SSG assesses his area and the high level of enemy activity and says to himself before I can do any of this Coin stuff I have to hit the enemy hard? I cant give up the resources to establish this little village Cop and for combat efficiency I need to concentrate on a larger FOB to generate combat patrols to kill the enemy. But if he thinks this he is then hit in the face with this guidance that is not an option and the only COA is to establish a cop right in the middle of the village with the belief that in so doing we will establish trusting relationships with the locals. Want to understand Wanat, look no further than the Coin straightjacket.
And strategy? Here it is ironically in a short piece that is intended to give tactical guidance to NCOs in Afghanistan. How is this piece really any different from General McChrystal's leaked assessment of last November or even General Petraeus's speech at his recent assumption of command? Now everything from policy down to micro tactics is FM 3-24. How would it have appeared for General Eisenhower in late summer 1944 in a speech on Allied strategy to talk mostly of how infantry squads will go about clearing enemy positions from the hedgerows? What we have now is essentially that.
Schmedlap's quote of the week is quite telling here. We have become an army of checklists.
gian