Taliban and Hells Angels: Same Difference

In stating that the Taliban and domestic gangs (or any criminal gang, domestic or foreign) operate in similar fashion therefore requiring a similiar response, you seem to imply that the "whole-of-government" approach is the way to go; i.e. the logical conclusion of your argument regarding Afghanistan and other nation-building/ COIN efforts would be something akin to the establishment of a "colonial" government, perhaps along the lines of the Marines in Haiti or maybe the Brits in India (after 1857) whereby an entire governance element, from military to law enforcement to infrastructure management, be emplaced in order to fix the problem.

Am I way off in my reading of this?

Now this is a censored commentary

Not sure how we got from the Hell's Angels to here, but to respond to this...

<i>An informed populace is hard to keep down no matter how "friendly" the dictator you have in power over them is to your interests.</i>

This is true enough, but I can't see it as terribly relevant to today's problems. There are some dictators around, but they aren't "ours" and they aren't terribly responsive to our interests: they're mostly concerned with their own. Many are overtly hostile to us or are barely on manageable terms with us.

The problems we face today don't come from popular rebellion against US-supported dictators. In Iraq and Afghanistan we intervened to remove dictatorial regimes and try to replace them with democratic ones. These regimes now face insurgencies, not because they are dictatorial but because they are perceived (reasonably) as weak, vulnerable, and potentially displaceable by those who seek power for their ownb purposes.

Look at our other trouble spots... Somalia has no government, it's not a rebellion against a US-supported dictator but a civil war among armed parties contending to fill a power vacuum. Pakistan and Yemen aren't facing popular rebellion against dictatorship, they are seeing civil unrest against superficially democratic but essentially dysfunctional governments styled on Western models that don't fit the societies they were imposed on. We're not seeing insurgencies against US-supported dictatorships in these countries, but armed players contending for pole position in the struggle to fill what is seen as an impending power vacuum.

I certainly agree that the US shouldn't impose dictatorships in countries where we've intervened, but I'd have to point out that attempts to install democracies haven't worked out so well either. The problem here is not that we install dictatorships, but the illusion that we have the capacity to install any sort of government in another country.

I agree that we shouldn't artificially sustain dying dictatorships that serve as our puppets, but I don't see us doing that (possibly in a few cases, Egypt springs to mind, but not as a prevailing pattern).

I do see us dealing with dictatorships that exist independently of us, do not require our support, and which circumstances dictate that we have to deal with. China, Uzbekistan, Saudi Arabia and a few others spring to mind. It's not always what we want to do, but I don't see what choice we have: these are not our client states, they don't dance to our tune, and we've little or no influence over them.

Giving away trade secrets?? :-)

But then, I'm not talking about some flatland, toothpick and paper producing Alabama forest here...

I had an Uncle who was assigned to a unit primarily from Oklahoma during WWII. He grew up in the 20s and 30s in the same forests I worked (after decades of logging) later. He was a big joke and known as "tall timber" for the "lies" he told about the trees in Oregon.

After the war, on a troop train from SF up the coast, their train passed several carrying logs heading south to California. Typical load was three logs per flat car, as that was all they could carry. A guy from his unit tracked him down on the train to apologize for the years of them all thinking he was FOS...

We're in some "tall timber" ourselves these days. Not impossible, but it does take a bit more thought and energy on how to deal with.

Slap:

UW is the art of inciting and manipulating insurgency in a country where one desires to pursue national interests that the current regime is not willing to entertain. One must understand insurgency to do this. Those who work in UW understand this, and study insurgency.

To execute COIN, one must also understand insurgency. COIN is not about preseving a particular government, though that may happen. COIN is not about defeating a particular insurgent organization, though that may happen as well. COIN is about understanding the nature of insurgency and pulling the fuel away from the fire.

As a teenager I spent three summers fighting forest fires in the mountains of SW Oregon. We didn't actually attack the fire, we just got as close to the fire as humanly possible and attacked the fuel, digging like men (boys, oblivious to the real dangers) possessed to drag the fuel away from the flames, creating narrow handtrails through the forest until we had contained a blaze, at which point it would simply fade away naturally. To attack the flames is crazy, and requires resources you probably don't have.

Ken,

(I'll avoid the obvious shot that living the history personally gives one a front row seat...) But, like all kids, yeah, we've wanted to be like "Dad" all of our lives, it just took a while of copying his every act that we really grew into it. Won't dispute your dates and events, they all contributed to where we ended up. I actually pick the date I did as that is when the new information/knowledge age began to really kick in, and led first to the popular uprising that tore the Soviet Union apart, and then the Balkans; and ultimately into the Middle East and Africa. An informed populace is hard to keep down no matter how "friendly" the dictator you have in power over them is to your interests. Plus these things splash back on the home front far easier now then back when "Dad" was in the business. Oh for the good old days...

As to Mike, I won't argue that bad is good, it isn't. But as you well know, we've taught a lot of hate on our own shores; Hate for non Puritans in New England in the name of religion; Hate for Blacks in the South in the name of commerce; hate for native Americans on the frontiers in the name of manifest destiny; etc, etc. No one has a corner on this market, but it also tends to fade as situations change.

This is why I argue principles over values; as I see values to be a principle with a judgment assessed to it. For example, my copy of the Declaration declares that all men are created equal (principle), yet at the time one really had to be white and landed and protestant to be a player (value). This value has morphed considerably over time as our society matured. This is why I say we need to be more tolerant of those who do not share our values currently. Stand for the principle and take the long view on evolving the values they hold. To do otherwise is to judge and by a hypocrite. Neither is much appreciated in any setting. We need to be more Christ like, and live the example we wish others to follow, and not judge harshly those who fall short. Instead we come across like Christians, judging harshly any who can't meet standards we don't even meet ourselves.

Slap - "Bingo" (as I touch the tip of my nose with my index finger).

You have just had a breakthough momoment: If what we are doing if FID to sustain oppressive governments friendly to us in power, then it is AQ that is conducting UW among their populaces in order to "liberate the oppressed."

Or, as I like to say, "The US has grown up and become its father." (Picture Uncle Sam looking in the mirror shaving, and seeing good old King George looking back at him, and thinking to himself "when the hell did this happen?")

I would suggest that it began to happen around 1985, but really began in earnest in 1989, and became obvious to everyone else by 9/11/2001. For us, the realization is still yet to fully sink in.

Actually, the organization "fighting and winning UW" across the Middle East today most effectively is Al Qaeda.

UW is to foment and incite insurgency among the populaces of States where one hopes to modify the existing form of governance to one that is more supportive of the UW organizations goals, objectives and interests. UW only really works well where there already exists conditions of what I call "Poor Governance" between the existing governance and the segment of the populace one is targeting for their UW campaign.

I would argue that the US does not need to conduct UW with these states, as the fact is we already have relationships with these governments in large part that are willing to support our goals, objectives and interests. The problem is that those same governments have in many places come to act with impunity toward their own populaces based on the security this relationship with the US provides; thereby creating ripe ground for UW as being executed by AQ.

So, I would argue that we do not need to execute UW, but rather that we must understand UW and how it works, and then adjust our approaches with these countries so as to make those governments less vulnerable to UW and insurgency within their borders; and also to make the US less vulnerable to acts of "terrorism" by these nationalist insurgents globally as well.

I don't think the President needs to be Billy Jack, but he should damn sure know his phone number so that he can leverage his capabilities and perspectives when he needs to.

When senior leadership is misinformed and ill advised by those who do not understand the nature of a particular problem set, its causes or its cures; it is essential for those who do to speak up.

The US is like the Semi-truck wedged firmly beneath the overpass; as a dozen experts on road construction, emergency operations, public security, civil engineering, etc all stood about and discussed the problems and relative expense associated with raising the bridge, lowering the road, etc as a small boy sat watching the scene with curiosity from his bike nearby. Finally he said "why don't you let some air out of the tires?"

We can go around the world lowering proverbial road beds and raising proverbial overpasses; but such programs are terribly disruptive and expensive. It is time to look for ways to simply let some air out of the tires; and that can not be done by changing the tactics, tools, and design of DOD; it can only be done by changing the policies contributing to the rise of the products of friction we face, and that shape our approaches to dealing with the same.

I'm just sitting here on my bike.

One of the biggest problems the US (our people, our policy, etc) has is this incredible lack of Empathy. Sympathy? We have that in spades. But Empathy? The ability to truly see and apreciate things from the perspectives of others? No. We mirror image ourselves, our values, our perspectives on others and are shocked or angry when others reject or fail to conform to that perspective. They are deemed "failed states" or "immoral" or "evil empires" etc.

Currently Ms Flournoy and others call for "pragmatism." Ok, but lets start with some empathy first, and THEN get pragmatic about how to best address our interests in a manner that does not inadvertantly create greater problems by trodding all over the interests of others in the process. Maybe we need to seen the Humnan Terrain Teams to DC instead of Afghanistatn.

We have a President with great instincts for this, but he is not getting great advice from his "experts." Hard is indeed not impossible, but we need to focus on the right hard tasks if we want to produce the best effects.

We can't start with "dirct tone" or "secure first" as one never gets past "Clear-clear-clear." We need to start with a fresh understanding of the problem and the cures; then a comprehensive messaging campaign to beat that in a steady drumbeat; then a family of actions across that spectrum that are clearly consistent with and linked to that drumbeat message.

Carl,

A few thoughts, first, anyone who doesn't think we are beating up the Taliban out on the ground is misinformed. Sure, we walk away from many engagements where civcas and civdamage is likely, but when we get them away from their civilian shields it goes very bad for them very fast.

As to Pakistan (and several other nearby states that are using the US involvement in Afghanistan as an opportunity to make life hard for us - but nearly so much as we did when the Soviets were in the same boat) I would suggest that first we need to as a matter of policy fully recognize that US interests and US values are NOT UNIVERSAL INTERESTS AND VALUES.

We have to evolve from "you are with us or against us" mindset that every nation, friend or foe, would share and prioritize their interests the same way the US does, because they don't. We abuse allies by strong-arming them with NATO to participate in our little adventures; and we add unnecessary friction with "foes" as well simply because they disagree with us. Same with values. It is a galactic level of arrogance to assume that US values circa 2010 are somehow now "universal values" for all people in all times.

Point being that countries such as Pakistan, Iran, the other Stans and China (which all have borders with Afghanistan) have very unique and distinct national interests in regards to their relationships with Afghanistan that we in large part ignore in our demand that that everyone help us with ours. This puts friends and foe alike in difficult positions. Oh, and significant segments of the Afghan populace have unique and distinct relationships back with these neighboring countries as well.

Poor Pakistan is supporting the TB with one hand, and now attacking them at our demand with the other. Don't think that that has not contributed significantly to the instability in that country. They play a balancing game, and we have them in a precarious position. Any US position in Afghanistan must include a serious sit-down with Pakistan to insure that their interests are recognized as well. As to the insurgents who take advantage of the sanctuary the border provides, they have their own interests as well. All must be taken into account, and to skew them to line up with US interests as the measure of "right" or "wrong" is not helpful. Dangerous in fact.

To tell our senior leaders that we can "Develop" our way out of this is as wrong and dangerous as it is to tell them we can "Secure" our way out of this. Similarly, to take a condition that we must preserve the Karzai government and help them to "Govern" their way out of this is even more flawed unless they can fix their legitimacy issues. Reconciliation is the last, best chance Karzai has at fixing his Legitimacy. We can't fix it for him, and we need to stop being an obstacle to his efforts to fix it himself merely because we can't square that with how we see our national interests.

Why the Taliban would be willing to reconcile even though they are already currently winning:

This is just my assessment, so take it for what it's worth (true of everything posted on here by anyone, but important to note all the same):

1. The Taliban are being employed by the government of Pakistan as their agent to destabilize Afghanistan at a minimum, but ideally to take control and ensure that Afghanistan is available as rearward maneuver room that is critical for ensuring the survival of Pakistan in any major confrontation with India. I know many say "no, there is no direct intel on this, and it is just the ISI doing this." Ok, so if it is just the CIA doing something it is not the USA doing it? This is a silly nuance to play. We don't see what we don't want to see.

2. If the Taliban senior leadership make a break from their Pakistani masters and take the Karzai deal they have a true chance at the one thing they have no chance at under the current situation - they have a chance at a major leadership role at some point down the road in Afghanistan free and clear from Pakistani control. THAT is huge!

3. Some evidence of this is the recent roll up of about half the Qetta Shura by Pakistan. I think that was a non too subtle message to TB leadership that, much like being a hitman for the Mafia, there is no quitting.

So, why is reconciliation so important? Because it take the TB leadership out of the fight and into the governance of Afghanistan. There they operate in the light of day and we can work with the entire new, more comprehensive GIROA as a whole. This addresses the top of the insurgency, the revolutionary movement that MUST be resolved prior to being able to have success with the rank and file resistance insurgency.

Reintegration only deals with the bottom of the insurgency. This will largely cure itself once the top is addressed. We need to get over our revulsion to dealing with the top. Reintegration programs will be fairly simple and low cost. The current program to dump buckets of cash into a reintegration program that is not tied to following a successful reconciliation program is a mindless attempt to buy the support of the popualce, and will merely contribute to the conditions feeding the insurgency and further line the pockets of governmnet officials and their cronies. It has no basis in sound insurgency or COIN theory to go with this plan.

My opinion. Reasonable minds can and do differ, but look hard at the insurgency understanding of those who shun reconciliation and promote reintegration instead. Make them make their case.

Bob's World point gets to the crux of the matter (and the likely difference between the two).

If the Afghan National Army was roving amongst our neighbourhoods, would:
a) The Hells Angels fight them;
b) Would we turn over Hell's Angels members living in the neighbourhood when the ANA came through?

The majority of the Taliban are resistance fighters. They fight us because they are pashtun, because they feel no loyalty to the current government (must be shown to them first, and it is not), because they can earn an honest wage for a days work doing it, and because the Coalition is there.

The resistance will be there as long as the revolutionary leadership for the taliban (the target of Karzai's reconciliation program) want to keep it going and as long as the Coalition is present.

This is why Reconciliation is far more important of a COIN program than the Reintegration program that the Coalition is so fixated on. The Reistance will reintigrate all by itself once the Revolution is effectively reconciled.

The problem is that we are waging our own little resistance to the Reconciliation program, because WE don't like the likely results. So long as we make it all about us we will not make much headway.

Im a bit confused by the assumption that the Taleban, or more accurately, the mujahedin isnt a lifestyle choice too. Why work home on the farm breaking your back all day when you can be part of gods army, ride a cool motorbike and fight Shaitan?

Great thread!! And the contemporary environment stuff is pretty good as well!

I think that COL Gentile's first post pretty well hit the nail on the head, in that how can we..."solve its problems and transform (or build) its institutions in a matter of months or even years?"

I'm not sure where it came from but for the last 18 months or so, we've been using as a model that it takes at least a full generation, more likely two, for change to really take effect in a society. At the very minimum, a year of stability to overcome every year of chaos/irregularity, which for Afghanistan would give us 31 years if we got back to 1979...and that period of stability has not yet started in Afghanistan...in some ink spots, yes, in other areas, not even close...Conversely, the descent into chaos can take effect in a disproportionately short period of time e.g. the former Yugoslavia, East Timor, Iraq, etc

Noting a general lack of success in quelling organised crime since the end of WW2, the analogy between the Taliban and organisations like Hells Angels might be more apt that it first appears...?

Gentlemen

I thoroughly admire the depth of thought put into responding to this article. Will pursue the critical thinking further with your combined comments.

There are nuances that I may have missed however Im a great believer in the psychology of incentives that drive people to make decisions and believe they dont change too much no matter where you live.

Within two weeks of a project finishing in an RC E Province in AFG two former labourers blew themselves up laying an IED. They were young guys faced with incentives from opposing sides - there had been zero incidents in this area during the period of the project. (there are of course many other issues here such as the often short term approach to many projects in clear to hold areas or the poor retention of labourers to be re-employed in another project to keep them out of the grip of the instigators)

In other words it is hard to break that bond with the only way you know in life - cloaked in the mist of religious fanaticism and it is even more dangerous and difficult to break.

I take street kids up the Kokoda track in PNG. It is as much of a mental and emotional challange as physical. A few come back with a completely different view of the world. Yet others slip back into what they know given the incentives of their surrounding environment - violence, crime, drugs, associations gangs etc

Im not ignoring obvious differences between AFG and our societies - but I found the many similarities and tried to keep the analysis to simple constructs in this respect and therefore any practicable implementation of actions.

It also played out in both environments that information was gathered on leadership structures and tensions and where the real bad-guys lived so that "other people" could do their job - call it neighbourhood watch. So it wasnt all just about being nice. There needs to be equal amounts of carrot and stick.

Thanks

Jason

PS: Virgins writing sex manuals; that is superb!

You may use it but I cannot take credit for it. Saw it on a sign somewhere but cannot recall where so I cannot give you a citation for it. But it does come in handy to provide some levity as well as provide an (in)appropriate analogy sometimes!

Dave, Could I please steal your comment:"Don't bother us. We are like virgins writing sex manuals." It sounds like the Army War College paper I am writing. I'll bludge anything anytime if it helps. Even my nickname I purloined off David Finkelstein.