An influential Pentagon advisory board will recommend that Defense Department Secretary Robert Gates slash the civilian work force by more than 111,000 people and drastically pare the military's combatant command structure as ways to save billions of dollars.
The Defense Business Board task force also will urge Gates to initiate a hiring freeze for the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD), all Joint Staff directorates and all combatant commands. It also is calling for DoD to shut down OSD's Networks and Information Integration (NII) directorate and the contractor-heavy U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM).
According to the Defense News article, the Defense Business Board task force has focused its efforts on finding contractor positions within OSD and at the combatant commands which it believes are redundant or wasteful. The goal of the task force is to cut at least $100 billion over the next five years in overhead expenses, savings that the Congress would redirect to weapons acquisitions. To reach this savings target, the task force aims to eliminate over 111,000 of the Defense Department's 743,388 civilian billets.
What are the odds of such savings occurring? One can find precedents in history to argue either way. Regarding the alleged bloat in the intelligence community, I recently argued that such bloat (if it really is bloat) is understandable because of the American tendency to spend whatever it takes to save lives. Thus, when it comes time to consider such ideas as shutting down Joint Forces Command or winding up program offices or staff positions during wartime, such efforts could run into resistance if the condemned billet-holders can convincingly show how they save American lives on current or future battlefields.
We have recently witnessed the consequences when stock market and real estate bubbles burst. Is there a defense contractor bubble worthy of bursting? Many of us know some of these contractors, who are real people doing serious and sometimes dangerous work. A lot of their work we would not consider to be a bubble. Perhaps some is. If the Defense Business Board and Secretary Gates get their way, some of us will watch friends and their families suffer personal and financial pain, in the name of a stronger defense and national solvency.
Comments
This is the first comments section I have ever seen with intelligent, no BS interaction. Thank you all for making my day.
As for the subject matter, as a fed employee at a Navy command in CA, I have worked with JFCOM extensively for the past five years. The command provides necessary support in multiple arenas in spite of themselves.
Even the folks that work for JFCOM get frustrated at the policies and procedures that they have put upon themselves and others to do business with them.
I don't see the command being shut down. I don't see Gates getting pressured to do that. Pressure to keep it open, yes. Hopefully, the observations of the DBB will be recognized, and an overhaul will take place. Redundancy eliminated, BAH contractor positions reviewed for necessity. Bust out the knife and start trimming the fat.
But that won't happen anytime soon. We're still dealing with BRAC 2005 !!
<i>And what about the US Army BCTs? We reduced the number of functional skill battalion HQs and pushed all the companies down to the BCT where we had to create bloated staffs (do we really need 3-4 LTCs and 5-8 MAJs in a BCT HQs?) to integrate their support and "Special" Troops Battalion HQs to cat herd the low density-high demand Soldiers. </i>
RobV:
I'd submit that the BCTs are probably a better example of gaining equities through consolidation. Do we really need division level functional skill "battalions" that are merely force providers anyway? What's wrong with putting the onus of training for "full spectrum ops" on the guy/gal who's going to actually use these capabilities?
One can argue numbers of O4/O5 within a BCT if it makes one feel like they are doing something to fight "bloat".
I'd further argue that the "Special Troops Bn" replicates what you want to recreate - a force provider not an execution arm.
Example: The Bde Sig Company supports the Bde S6's overall comms plan, and by extension, the Bn/Company requirements. What's the Special Troops Bn's responsibility for that? Virtually nil. But since it is horrific to many that a mere staff officer actually exercise OPCON of a unit - even if that effort is in direct support of their particular function - we need a genuine, Green-tab wearing "commander" to apportion forces.
If I recall correctly, the Stryker BCTs and/or the ACRs got it right: Specific companies that are under direct Bde Control (the Bde DCdr). Cuts a level of bureaucracy and makes the support agile to Bde needs.
And what about the US Army BCTs? We reduced the number of functional skill battalion HQs and pushed all the companies down to the BCT where we had to create bloated staffs (do we really need 3-4 LTCs and 5-8 MAJs in a BCT HQs?) to integrate their support and "Special" Troops Battalion HQs to cat herd the low density-high demand Soldiers.
BCTs aren't more effective today than the old Bde Task Force was--and nearly all seem baffled by the management requirements for COIN. How adaptive would a BCT be in a major combat operation? Compare how long it takes to get an IBCT/HBCT/SBCT from home station to Iraq today with DESERT STORM.
The entire defense establishment from OSD to BCT needs an enema to clean out all the excess we've built into the force structure.
I agree with MAJ K.... the tip of the proverbial "spear" must be as wide as ten Grand Canyons for all the warriors standing abreast at one time. The DoD needs a major shakeup within our senior ranks. What I thought was inefficiency and unneeded redundancy (in the form of MND-B, MNC-I, MNF-I) during my 2005-2006 tour, has been replaced with complacency in 2009-2010 by many of the same persons. Did (do) we really need three levels of burdensome command to push the LOO "Support Governance" down to the BCT or BN? Cutting that "fat" from the carcass would have greatly reduced soft targets (ie... logistics convoys) and streamlined reporting and decision-making. But, alas, we may have lost considerable growth in soldier numbers, but our GO ranks continue to swell.
Those GOs do not appear on the battlefield without their requisite trappings of commensurate staffing. The train-up for my return trip to Iraq focused heavily on understanding the nuances of negotiating with our Iraqi partners, and I am convinced this time was ill-spent. Getting to "yes" with Iraqis has proven quite easy, but getting the support of your fellow American Forces is the challenging piece of todays battlefield equation.
Many Americans chide our politicians for "hamstringing" or "tying the hands" of our soldiers. I contend there is no need for politicians to do that, we do it quite efficiently ourselves.
Thats just my .02, but over the course of five deployments between 2001 (Invasion of Afghanistan) and today (Advisor to Iraqis), these are the troubling trends I have noted.
Why focus on pairing down the tail when the pointy end is as disgustingly bloated as it is? The amount of people; contractor, civ, and mil alike, hanging out at Green Beans in the middle of the day on any downrange HQ or FOB should be the first clue. If a magic wand was waved and immediately cut 25-50% of the personnel in Kabul, the war would continue without skipping a beat. The second clue is that we contract out almost all of the priority functions of a downrange command. THE training, mentoring, and advising command in theater performs a daily parade of navy sportscoats walking or convoying to the various GIRoA ministries to do this 'critical' job. How critical is it if we outsource it? I'd say if it was a vital national interest to necessitate our being here, we wouldn't have to pay extra to have contractors do it for us.
So disregard the money and vote-seeking congressmen and senators who purport to have 'national security' at heart, leave the CONUS commands alone for a moment, and focus on where the real waste of personnel and contracting dollars is happening....downrange.
MikeR hits a home run with his post. I might have agreed with the NBB finding in 1999-2001 but not of late, and especially with Mattis and soon Odierno in charge. Beyond those tasks mentioned by Mike, no other command that I know of is taking a serious look beyond the current fight like JFCOM is. Yes, other commands and the Services have concept branches, etc. but none are really doing the "futuristic" look that JFCOM does for the Joint Force.
The NBB study seems to have been a number crunching drill (especially targeting contractors) sans the serious look at the functions and services JFCOM and others provide. Are there some cuts that could be made here? Well yes, as there are in every single staff throughout the DOD. Let's do this smartly, that is not too much to ask. Is it?
Not sure that shutting down the command that trains forces (often MRXs prior to deployment) and tries to integrate 4 Services, DOD agencies, and into other Govt. agencies into a cohesive fighting force ("jointness"), is the best option. I mean, the audacity of JFCOM, those bastards, they try to cut through four stovepipes of pork barrel acquisiton platforms and duct tape together a unified team to go fight. What's wrong with them?
It seems that the joint community gets the blame, but what are the bloated Service staffs doing for the warfighter? Trying to lobby Congress for more F-22's and ships? We need more integration, because Joint Force Commanders need it downrange.
Why not look across the board and cut back on 5-10% of the "tail" through attrition, etc. We all know there are a ton of front office types who don't even manage anyone but park themselves in the bureaucracy, both contractor, military, and civilian. It seems like we could all live with less overhead, but I don't see the wisdom in picking one COCOM and chopping it. Especially the one that tries to deliver integrated forces to a JFC.
I just wonder if the solidarity of said-legislators is more in regard to the potential departure of defence $ from the Norfolk area than any actual grasp of what JFCOM does and how it supports "military effectiveness and readiness"? Would the concerns be the same if JFCOM was merely to be relocated to, say, Kansas?
Probably the biggest way to save money quickly would be to stick to the 2011 AFG drawdown plan, which would then ripple into the supporting organisations.
<a href="http://www.suffolknewsherald.com/news/2010/jul/24/shoot-down-bad-plan/"… down this bad plan</a> @ the Suffolk News-Herald.
"State and federal officials were quick to denounce the Defense Business Boards reported plans Friday to recommend the closure as part of billions of dollars in cost-saving measures that Defense Secretary Robert Gates had charged it with finding. Even city officials -- once they became aware of the stories on the issue that were pending or already in play in various Hampton Roads media outlets -- sent out a press release saying they would be "closely monitoring" the process as it winds toward an official recommendation in October."
"In a highly unusual show of solidarity, Virginia Congressmen J. Randy Forbes, Glenn Nye, Rob Wittman and Bobby Scott joined Senators Jim Webb and Mark Warner in releasing a statement Friday afternoon stating the key strategic importance of JFCOM to American military effectiveness and readiness."